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Foreword 
Internationalization processes have long been a core topic of International Business research. 
Scholars thereby usually assumed that the headquarters in the home country create a direct 
and immediate link to the activities in a specific foreign market. However, a quite different 
phenomenon can also be observed in practice: Subsidiaries in foreign markets in some cases 
take a charter – initiated by the headquarters or on its own initiative – beyond their original 
host market and internationalize themselves into third markets. This process which has been 
labeled “internationalization of the second degree” may help a multinational company to lev-
erage its existing resources and capabilities in remote locations more effectively than the tra-
ditional approach. 
Nicolas Lohr focused his doctoral thesis on the internationalization of the second degree. The 
topic has high practical relevance but has rarely been investigated in business research. In fact, 
there exists almost no other study that focusses explicitly on this phenomenon. Nicolas Lohr 
provides the first comprehensive study on this issue and it is the first study to investigate the 
reasons for the internationalization of the second degree as well as the dynamics of this man-
date. 
From his work as a business consultant, Nicolas Lohr already had a thorough understanding 
of business practices in internationally operating companies when he started his doctoral stud-
ies. He quickly understood how to take an academic perspective on precisely defined research 
questions and how to apply the adequate scientific research instruments in a rigorous manner. 
He investigated his research questions with a qualitative method, based on eleven case studies. 
Each case in itself is worthwhile reading and brings the reader interesting insights. But it is 
the identification of commonalities and differences between the cases by means of a systemat-
ic cross-case analysis that is the true accomplishment of Nicolas Lohr. With this procedure, he 
creates new knowledge and manages to propose extensions to existing theory. 
Overall, Nicolas Lohr’s doctoral thesis provides a valuable and important contribution to the 
research in International Business. He contributes to our understanding of a very relevant 
phenomenon. First discussions on his results in the academic community already demonstrat-
ed that his findings are well received but also provoke debate.  
  
IV 
I recommend every researcher who intends to investigate internationalization processes to 
read this book. Furthermore, it is also of great value for company executives whom it can help 
to reflect on their own business practices. I am convinced that the study will be widely read 
and will stimulate further studies into the issue by other scholars who will find the results of 
Nicolas Lohr a profound basis for their own research. 
 
Fribourg, April 2013 





Carrying out a doctoral thesis can be both a lonely and seemingly infinite undertaking, espe-
cially if one is used to working in collaboration with teams and under defined deadlines. A 
thesis requires the self-discipline to set up one’s own goals and timelines, even when it seems 
no one else would notice the difference. At the same time, this project has given me the op-
portunity to investigate a scientific research topic with a level of depth and engagement that is 
simply not possible in everyday working life. Although I’ve noted the solitary nature of my 
scientific journey, this thesis would not have been possible without the endless contributions 
of many individuals. 
Firstly, I would like to thank my thesis supervisor Prof. Dr. Dirk Morschett for his support 
throughout this process. When I look back at our initial exchange about my study exposé and 
all our subsequent discussions about its progress, I recognize how he equipped me with the 
tools and framework I needed to master the challenge of qualitative research in subsidiary 
internationalization processes. Prof. Dr. Dirk Morschett was always willing to respond with 
prompt and constructive feedback, whether it was about my initial findings, the preparation 
for scientific papers and presentations, or even with the submission of my final draft. In addi-
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structive criticism and encouragement. 
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1. Introduction to the study 
1.1. Subsidiary internationalization: a topic for research 
Over the last fifty years the unit of analysis in the research field of international business 
(henceforth ‘IB’) has seen a shift from a country to a firm and recently to a subsidiary level. 
Looking ahead, scholars are encouraged “to study the linkages among the key units of analy-
sis adopted in the previous fifty years, with a focus on the subsidiary as the key building block, 
taking into account the reality of regional strategy and structure for most MNEs” (Rugman, 
Verbeke & Nguyen, 2011: 779). Understanding the emergence, evolution and potential col-
lapse of subsidiary mandates beyond original host markets not only links the aforementioned 
units of analysis, but it also allows an initial look at the dynamic nature of subsidiary interna-
tionalization as suggested by Blankenburg Holm, Drogendijk, Hohenthal, Holm, Johanson 
and Zander (2009). 
Since the development of the Uppsala or internationalization process (henceforth ‘IP’) model 
by Johanson and Vahlne (1977), the process of firm internationalization has been studied by 
numerous IB scholars around the globe (Johanson & Vahlne, 1990). The IP model investi-
gates the expansion of business operations of a parent company from the home market to a 
single or to several foreign markets, a process called internationalization of the first degree. 
While IB literature on subsidiary roles has long emphasized that local resources of foreign 
subsidiaries can also be leveraged by the multinational corporation (henceforth ‘MNC’) to 
enter new markets (e.g. Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1986; Birkinshaw & Fry, 1998), internationaliza-
tion processes at subsidiary level were not taken into consideration. Understanding why and 
how foreign MNC units themselves internationalize following the initial market expansion of 
their parent companies, a process also labeled as internationalization of the second degree 
(Forsgren, Holm & Johanson, 1992), therefore remains largely unexplored (Blankenburg 
Holm et al., 2009).  
The few IB scholars who touched upon the topic in the past (e.g. Forsgren et al., 1992; Tag-
gart & Berry, 1997; Forsgren, 2002) clearly demonstrated that subsidiary influence can stretch 
beyond host market borders but they failed to identify the drivers and restrictions of subsidi-
ary internationalization. Given the continuous internationalization of markets and the need for 
firms to leverage resources on a global scale (Dunning, 2000) in combination with the grow-
ing relevance of regional integration strategies (e.g. Oh & Rugman, 2012; Rugman & Oh, 
2010), the lack of research on subsidiary internationalization seems ever more surprising. 
Other than traditional internationalization processes that are by definition associated with in-
creasing commitment to foreign markets (Welch & Luostarinen, 1988), cross-border reaching 
of foreign subsidiaries is not necessarily associated with an increased global presence of a 
firm’s operation. In fact, it can initially relate to a capability and charter upgrade (Birkinshaw 
2 
& Hood, 1998) of a foreign sub-unit that causes declining or dissolving responsibility scopes 
at the other ends of the MNC. As shifting foreign market charters or mandates generally im-
ply enhanced future market development through an alternative and decentralized approach, 
however, a firm’s overall attitude towards foreign activities is modified, which alone charac-
terizes it as an internationalization process (Johanson & Wiedersheim-Paul, 1975). 
Internationalization trajectories of MNC units are based on relationships with external actors, 
with the MNC headquarters and with other MNC units located inside or outside of the host 
country (Araujo & Rezende, 2003). Understanding processes of subsidiary internationaliza-
tion therefore requires a holistic study perspective, spanning the entire MNC (internal) and 
numerous business markets (external). Referring to the research topic, Blankenburg Holm et 
al. (2009: 15) note that “the MNC is likely to contain a portion of business opportunities for 
internationalization at the subsidiary level, which remains unrealized (or delayed) due to the 
inability of subsidiaries to act upon them, because of limited resources, the inability to com-
municate their potential, or due to limited influence on political processes within the MNC”. 
Internal competition for corporate marketplace (Galunic & Eisenhardt, 1996) further suggests 
that subsidiary internationalization is likely to follow other process patterns than internation-
alization of the first degree. 
Adding to the complexity of subsidiary internationalization, modern MNCs are characterized 
by a multiple embeddedness of their entities where knowledge acquisition may happen at one 
level while its application may take place at a geographically distant MNC unit (Tallman & 
Chacar, 2011). Subsidiary embeddedness can benefit the MNC by assimilating new 
knowledge (Andersson, Forsgren & Holm, 2001), by developing firm-specific advantages 
(henceforth ‘FSA’) (Birkinshaw, Hood & Jonsson, 1998), or by exploiting country-specific 
advantages (henceforth ‘CSA’) (Rugman & Verbeke, 1992). At the same time it creates an 
agency problem (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) due to information asymmetry or goal incongru-
ence between an HQ and its subsidiary (O’Donnell, 2000). In combination with psychic (Jo-
hanson & Vahlne, 1977) and cultural distance (Kogut & Singh, 1988), subsidiary internation-
alization is likely to be accompanied by a high level of uncertainty that may influence corpo-
rate decisions. The challenge for corporate management therefore seems to be the exploitation 
of locational advantages of foreign subsidiaries in the international context (Rugman, Verbeke 
& Yuan, 2011) while maintaining the resulting risk at acceptable levels. By doing so, the 
MNC is faced with liability of outsidership, arising externally from uncertainty about foreign 
markets but also internally from a lack of HQ knowledge about subsidiary networks and ac-
tions (Vahlne, Schweizer & Johanson, 2012). 
While business networks of foreign subsidiaries generally reach beyond host market borders 
at some stage of their evolution (Forsgren, Holm & Johanson, 2005), local subsidiary man-
agement is generally forced to seek HQ approval for the systematic allocation of local re-
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sources to foreign markets (Ambos & Birkinshaw, 2010). Obtaining cross-border mandates 
thereby appears to be facilitated by a mix of tactical maneuvering, endurance, and luck of 
subsidiary personnel (Birkinshaw & Fry, 1998) capable of more than offsetting countervailing 
forces of corporate immune systems (Birkinshaw & Ridderstråle, 1999). Foreign subsidiaries 
are generally best positioned in the perpetual bargaining process for intra-organizational pow-
er if they, in addition to strong local business networks, can contribute to MNC knowledge 
development (Andersson, Forsgren & Holm, 2007). 
Even though the aforementioned determinants of subsidiary bargaining power across the 
MNC are largely supported by other studies of leading IB scholars (e.g. Mudambi & Navarra, 
2004; Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008), the particularities of cross-border mandates as opposed 
to host-market or intra-firm-orientated mandates seem to be important for the study at hand. 
Internationalization generally requires the successful combination of existing FSAs with 
CSAs of the target market or region and this adaptation process is likely to involve varying 
degrees of time and cost (Rugman & Verbeke, 2005). Is the individual value-proposition of a 
foreign subsidiary to overcome liability of outsidership (Johanson & Vahlne, 2009) and inter-
regional foreignness (Rugman & Verbeke, 2007) therefore decisive for obtaining significant 
cross-border reach or remaining largely host-market-restrained?  
Following the initial mandate gain that sets the geographical and functional scope of a subsid-
iary’s foreign market operations, responsibilities may be preserved, extended, reduced, or 
dismantled. The depletion or enhancement of subsidiary capabilities, driven by parent compa-
ny, subsidiary and host country factors, thereby specify the direction of mandate evolution 
(Birkinshaw & Hood, 1998) and it is up to local subsidiary management to build on their dis-
tinct capabilities (Birkinshaw, 1996). Frequent regional HQ relocation as one form of cross-
border subsidiary responsibility driven by aspects outside the local management’s area of in-
fluence (Kähäri, Piekkari, Barner-Rasmussen & Hilvo, 2010), however, rather indicates the 
opposite picture. Are foreign subsidiaries therefore likely to have a pronounced stake in the 
evolutionary path of cross-border subsidiary mandates? And to what extent does the level of 
influence differ from relatively limited functional scopes, e.g. cross-border sales and service 
responsibilities, to important HQ-like functions (Lehrer & Asakawa, 1999) for an entire re-
gion? 
Internationalization trajectories of firms are to this day often associated with gradualism as 
“experiential learning and building trust and commitment, the basic prerequisites for develop-
ing business, and hence for internationalization, certainly have not changed” (Johanson & 
Vahlne, 2009: 1421). This postulation raises an interesting aspect of subsidiary internationali-
zation and the evolution of cross-border subsidiary mandates. While the degree of experiential 
learning and network development for the area covered by the subsidiary mandate is due to 
geographical proximity likely to be most pronounced among subsidiary management 
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(Forsgren et al., 2005), major commitment decisions are still taken by HQ personnel. HQ–
subsidiary relationships that accompany any form of cross-border subsidiary mandates there-
fore appear to interrupt natural flows between learning, trust-building, and commitment in-
crease observed for internationalization processes of the first degree (Johanson & Vahlne, 
1977, 2009). Is it therefore reasonable to assume that internationalization trajectories of for-
eign subsidiaries equally embody elements of gradualism and discontinuity as suggested by 
Araujo and Rezende (2003)? 
The study aims to contribute to the academic understanding of the internationalization of for-
eign subsidiaries by identifying process drivers and restrictions in modern MNCs. More spe-
cifically, it seeks to understand the initial opportunity-identification and the subsequent rent-
seeking process involving all relevant stakeholders within and outside of the MNC. Following 
the initial mandate gain, the study further seeks to shed light on internationalization trajecto-
ries of foreign subsidiaries. The sustainability of cross-border subsidiary mandates as well as 
the factors that cause extending, stagnating, declining, or potentially dissolving foreign mar-
ket responsibilities are thereby subject to thorough examination. Again, the focus will be set 
on identifying drivers that stimulate mandate change as well as underlying HQ rationales for 
the modification of decentralized market development approaches.  
The study uses a multiple case study approach in order to contribute to the topic of subsidiary 
internationalization. Semi-structured interviews with process stakeholders from the corporate 
headquarters and the foreign subsidiaries thereby serve as the main sources of data. Overall, 
study findings are based on eleven cases of subsidiary internationalization at seven European 
MNCs from the manufacturing industry sector. While corporate headquarters of all MNCs are 
based in Western Europe, the case sample is characterized by significant heterogeneity with 
regard to subsidiary location and local value-add, geographical and functional mandate scopes, 
as well as internationalization trajectories. In addition to HQ- or subsidiary-driven initiatives 
with positive outcomes that resulted in initial mandate gains or subsequent extensions of 
cross-border subsidiary responsibilities, the case sample also exhibits failed subsidiary re-
quests for extended geographical reach as well as truncated and reversed evolutionary paths of 
subsidiary internationalization. 
1.2. Points of departure 
The topic of internationalization processes of foreign subsidiaries already implies that the two 
IB research streams of firm internationalization and subsidiaries as part of the MNC need to 
be taken into thorough consideration when carrying out a scientific study in this field. The 
process nature of the topic further suggests equally making use of literature with a static as 
well as dynamic viewpoint. While studies with a static viewpoint can provide a better under-
standing of why firms internationalize or why firms internalize foreign market operations 
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through the setting up of foreign subsidiaries, related research with a dynamic study perspec-
tive allow a clearer picture to be obtained about how the international operations of an MNC 
and the roles of foreign subsidiaries unfold over time. 
As noted by Blankenburg Holm et al. (2009), IB research is still lacking the explicit study of 
internationalization processes of foreign subsidiaries, meaning that an obligatory starting 
point for the study does not exist. While the work of Forsgren et al. (1992) or Taggart and 
Berry (1997) may have identified certain characteristics that accompany cross-border respon-
sibilities of local subsidiary management, none of them explicitly sought to understand pro-
cess drivers and restrictions of decentralized foreign market development or evolutionary 
paths of cross-border subsidiary mandates. Other studies, however, were capable of providing 
some breeding ground to the study at hand. Birkinshaw (1996), for example, looked at how 
multinational subsidiary mandates are gained and lost. While failing to deal with process 
stimuli, the Birkinshaw (1996) study provided meaningful insights into why mandates change 
and where in the MNC evolutionary processes originate. Birkinshaw and Hood (1998), again, 
linked multinational subsidiary evolution to altering subsidiary capabilities and thereby clear-
ly touched upon important elements of the study. Finally, Araujo and Rezende (2003), though 
not explicitly looking into subsidiary internationalization, sketched internationalization trajec-
tories of foreign sub-units and thereby provided the investigator with some guidance at the 
offset of the study. 
Overall, a lack of explicit IB studies on subsidiary internationalization processes forced the 
investigator throughout the entire study to rely on multiple research streams and to combine 
findings from different fields. A detailed description of relevant research streams is provided 
in Chapter 2 of this study. It should be noted that literature was only to a limited degree lever-
aged at the offset of the study in order to avoid an overly narrow approach for theory-building 
from a comparative case study (Eisenhardt, 1989b). When later comparing case observations 
with confirming as well as contrasting IB literature, however, numerous additional studies 
significantly helped to strengthen the robustness of the study findings.  
1.3. Research questions, aim and approach 
The main objective of the study is to obtain a better understanding of the internationalization 
processes of foreign subsidiaries. The focus is thereby limited to the process drivers and re-
strictions of subsidiary internationalization and the evolution of cross-border subsidiary man-
dates over time. Based on these goals the following four research questions guide the scien-
tific approach: 
1) How and where in the MNC are business opportunities for subsidiary internationaliza-
tion identified? 
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2) Why are foreign subsidiaries assigned to develop foreign markets as opposed to ex-
ploiting identified opportunities centrally from corporate headquarters? 
3) How and where in the MNC is the evolution of cross-border subsidiary mandates 
stimulated? 
4) Do cross-border subsidiary mandates develop in a particular form (responsibility ex-
tension, preservation, decline, or dissolution) and if yes, why? 
Based on the type of research questions (how, why), a comparative case study analysis was 
selected as the overall research design (Yin, 2009). The study thereby explicitly follows the 
advice of Blankenburg et al. (2009) to empirically investigate the topic of subsidiary interna-
tionalization on the basis of case studies.  
1.4. Structure of the study 
The overall PhD study is structured in six main chapters. This initial Chapter 1 is relatively 
short and aims to provide the reader with a broad overview of the study background, a classi-
fication of the research topic in IB literature, the overall research objective and approach, as 
well as the structure of the scientific approach. In Chapter 2 the most relevant terms associat-
ed with internationalization processes in general and with cross-border responsibilities of for-
eign sub-units in particular are defined. The main objective of this task is to avoid potential 
misinterpretations by the reader. The chapter further outlines IB literature that is directly or 
indirectly related to the topic of subsidiary internationalization processes. The aim here is not 
to offer an exhaustive excursus into relevant IB research but to provide a synopsis of interest-
ing studies of the past that are capable of contributing to the observations made in the course 
of this case study analysis. Findings related to internationalization processes of the first de-
gree, subsidiary roles including HQ–subsidiary relationships, and cross-border subsidiary 
charters or mandates constitute the core of the literature review.  
The focus in Chapter 3 is set on thoroughly explaining the chosen study approach and illus-
trating the execution of the comparative case study analysis on a step-by-step basis. Initially, 
advantages and disadvantages of qualitative research in general and case study analysis in 
particular are outlined. Afterwards, detailed information is provided about how cases were 
added to the overall case sample, what type of data sources were used, how and with which 
techniques or instruments data was analyzed, and how the overall research quality was moni-
tored and ensured. The aim of the chapter is to offer a maximum level of transparency in or-
der to enable any reader to easily reconstruct the approach taken for this study and, based on 
this, to evaluate to what extent it is capable of contributing to contemporary IB research.  
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Chapter 4 provides the reader with an extensive description of all eleven cases of subsidiary 
internationalization, encompassing an overview of the MNC and the focal subsidiary as well 
as a thorough outline of each critical incident related to the foreign market participation of 
foreign subsidiaries. In addition, the outcome of the three most relevant within-case analysis 
techniques is highlighted. While critical incident charts extract relevant information from a 
vast amount of raw data, event-state networks further illustrate what event or state led to an-
other and what conditions stimulated or facilitated the change. Finally, case dynamics matrix-
es, in which process stimuli and impacts are shown from a subsidiary as well as a parent com-
pany perspective, mark the end of each case description. The main goal of the chapter is to 
offer a comprehensive overview of the different cases, to show the main results of within-case 
analyses and thus to enable the reader to assess the subsequent cross-case analyses as well as 
the concluding discussions of the study. 
While Chapter 4 already contains interpretative results on a case-by-case basis, Chapter 5 
clearly constitutes the heart of the PhD study from an analytical standpoint. First, it thorough-
ly documents the outcome of the cross-case analyses and thereby provides the reader with 
observed cross-case patterns of subsidiary internationalization processes and associated evolu-
tionary paths of cross-border mandates. In the subsequent discussion part, it contrasts cross-
case patterns of subsidiary internationalization with confirming and conflicting IB literature in 
order to enhance the overall robustness of case study findings. 
The PhD study concludes in Chapter 6 with a summary of the overall findings and their level 
of contribution to IB research. It further establishes a reference to business practices by outlin-
ing the managerial implications of the study results. Finally it states the main research limita-
tions based on the selected research design, the identified case sample, as well as the observa-
tions made in the course of the study. It also makes suggestions for future research in the field 
of subsidiary internationalization. Additional material that was leveraged in the course of 




2. Definitions and literature review  
2.1. Introduction  
The relatively unexplored research topic of internationalization processes at the subsidiary 
level initially suggested a rather inductive study approach, which would not or only to a lim-
ited degree require a thorough examination of literature in relevant research streams. Eisen-
hardt (1989b: 536) supported this point by postulating that “theory-building research is begun 
as close as possible to the ideal of no theory under consideration and no hypothesis to test”. 
Gummensson (2000), however, confronted this statement by questioning the need for contin-
uously reinventing the wheel in the course of new studies and actually urged scholars to make 
use of existing theory also for qualitative research undertakings. A pragmatic middle ground 
had already been set by Perry (1998: 789), who established ties between the two perspectives 
by noting that “pure induction might prevent researchers from benefiting from existing theory, 
just as pure deduction might prevent the development of new and useful theory”.  
Understanding both sides of the highlighted scholars’ debate and acknowledging the vast 
amount of research that has been carried out in the field of internationalization processes and 
subsidiary roles and evolutionary paths up to now, a selective use of literature was eventually 
chosen. The focus was thereby set on bridging mentioned literature streams in order to explic-
itly understand process drivers for subsidiary responsibility into foreign markets. Throughout 
the study particular attention was paid to the right balance of induction and deduction, thereby 
following Sminia’s summarizing note (2009: 105) that “some amount of deduction is believed 
to help in guiding the researcher through the research without posing too much of a precon-
ceived understanding on the particular course of events”. In summary, the selected approach 
significantly helped to structure the overall data collection process while at the same time not 
limiting the subsequent data analyses and interpretations to already existing findings. The core 
benefit of qualitative research studies to develop new theories was therefore not constrained at 
any point of the study.  
The following section will commence with a short definition of subsidiary internationalization 
processes encompassing the key process stakeholders as well as subsidiary mandates that 
stretch beyond host market borders. Afterwards, a selection of relevant IB research streams 
using the MNC and foreign MNC units as the core unit of analysis will be presented to the 
reader. Throughout the literature review a differentiation between static and dynamic research 
perspectives will be used in order equally understand rationales for and drivers of peripheral 
internationalization processes. At the same time, a distinction between the MNC and foreign 
subsidiaries as the core unit of analysis will be applied in order to obtain a differentiated pic-
ture of the two involved firm levels.   
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2.2. Definitions 
Before examining in more depth past research findings directly or indirectly related to the 
internationalization process of foreign subsidiaries, a brief definition of the term ‘subsidiary 
internationalization’ and the involved process stakeholders and process items seems appropri-
ate in order to avoid potential misunderstandings by the reader. The primary aim is to clearly 
specify the unit of analysis, internationalization processes of foreign subsidiaries. In addition, 
the two major process stakeholders, the MNC and the foreign subsidiary, will be defined and 
confined from similar organizational forms. Finally, various means of cross-border interplay 
between corporate and subsidiary management or forms of responsibility delegation and ful-
fillment that are often referred to as subsidiary mandates or charters will be briefly stressed.  
2.2.1. Subsidiary internationalization 
In the course of this study the term subsidiary internationalization or internationalization of 
the second degree (Forsgren et al., 1992) is defined as: 
The process of increasing subsidiary involvement in international operations manifested in 
an official foreign market mandate 
According to the initial part of the definition, ‘the process of increasing subsidiary involve-
ment in international operations’, the internationalization of subsidiaries can equally refer to 
cross-border trade or foreign direct investment, whereby involved process stakeholders at any 
MNC level can select from a wide range of market entry modes in order to benefit from cross-
border participation (Kutschker & Schmid, 2011). It can further relate to gradually increasing 
foreign market exposure (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977), e.g. from relatively low commitment 
stages like indirect exports up to the setting up of fully-owned foreign subsidiaries, as well as 
to internationalization moves that leapfrog certain stages of the establishment chain (Hedlund 
& Kverneland, 1985). Moreover, it acknowledges so-called ‘born-globals’ (Weerawardena, 
Mort, Liesch & Knight, 2007), where foreign subsidiaries may be involved in cross-border 
business operations from their very establishment. Finally, the definition encompasses out-
ward internationalization, i.e. the marketing of goods and services abroad, and inward interna-
tionalization, i.e. the supply of input goods or know-how from outside the subsidiary’s host 
market (Welch & Luostarinen, 1993). 
The second part of the definition, ‘manifested in an official foreign market mandate’, high-
lights three important aspects. First, subsidiary internationalization refers to “the process of 
adapting firms’ operations (strategy, structure, resource etc.) to international environments” 
(Calof & Beamish, 1995: 116). Even though “a non-exporter may first become involved in 
exporting in a reactive manner, responding to unsolicited orders” (Cavusgil & Czinkota, 
1990: 179), the definition explicitly excludes uncoordinated internationalization efforts. 
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Throughout the study internationalization therefore only occurs if “management recognizes 
the important contributions international business can make toward accomplishing corporate 
goals” (Cavusgil, 1984: 197) and commits itself on a medium to long-term basis to a certain 
foreign market or foreign region. This restriction is important in order to reflect on corporate 
management’s resource sovereignty across the MNC (Ambos & Birkinshaw, 2010) and the 
subsidiary’s need to constantly claim its stake in the corporate marketplace (Galunic & Eisen-
hardt, 1996). Second, the term mandate points to a potentially temporary nature of cross-
border subsidiary responsibility as it is generally seen “as a license to apply the subsidiary’s 
distinctive capabilities to a specific market opportunity” (Birkinshaw, 1996:  489). 
Finally, the term ‘mandate’ outlines another particularity of subsidiary internationalization 
that needs to be addressed when carrying out the defined study. When scholars refer to inter-
nationalization stages they generally refer to the development of new markets from a compa-
ny’s home territory (e.g. Johanson & Vahlne, 1977; Santangelo & Meyer, 2011). Nonetheless, 
from a subsidiary perspective obtaining foreign market responsibility, expressed by an official 
mandate, may represent the initial cross-border reaching even though the MNC has already 
obtained company presence in this territory in the past. Subsidiary internationalization can 
therefore equally refer to the development of markets without prior MNC presence and to a 
transfer of existing foreign market responsibilities or charters from one MNC unit to another 
(Birkinshaw & Hood, 1998). As the internationalization process of foreign subsidiaries repre-
sents the core unit of analysis, the study focus is primarily set on why and how subsidiaries 
internationalize while the question of whether this process leads to increased foreign market 
exposure of the MNC only comes second.   
2.2.2. MNC 
The internationalization process of foreign subsidiaries is likely to be impacted by a set of 
stakeholders (Tallman & Chacar, 2011). In addition to external parties like customers or com-
petitors it may be shaped by corporate headquarters, affiliated subsidiaries and the focal sub-
sidiary itself. As the latter three units constitute the MNC, a closer look at its definition seems 
appropriate. According to Forsgren et al. (2005: 1) the MNC, which is also referred to as the 
multinational enterprise (MNE), is “one of the most significant institutions of modern socie-
ties”. Forsgren et al. (2005) further defined it as an entity that controls resources across bor-
ders and that operates in and between various countries. While the degree of resource control 
and the level of cross-border participation may significantly differ from one country to anoth-
er, from one industry to another or one institution to another, the two aspects of cross-border 
resource control and business operations are most characteristic for an MNC. As with most 
technical terms in IB research, however, there is no single MNC definition that has been 
agreed upon by leading scholars around the world.  
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Taking different dimensions of the term ‘multinationality’ into consideration, Root (1990) 
offered a relatively solid overview of existing MNC definitions. He thereby differentiated by 
the criteria of ownership, nationality mix and organizational structure or business strategy, of 
which he only viewed the latter as an adequate means to distinguish MNCs. Perlmutter (1969: 
11) already highlighted the difficulty in defining and measuring MNCs as “no single criterion 
of multinationality such as ownership or the number of nationals overseas is sufficient” and as 
“external and quantifiable measures such as the percentage of investment overseas or the dis-
tribution of equity by nationality are useful but not enough”. Advocates of ownership as key 
criterion for multi- or transnationality often postulated that an MNC exists if corporate head-
quarters are simultaneously owned by stakeholders of at least two nationalities. While this 
may hold true for exceptional cases like Shell or Unilever, most globally operating companies 
are owned by a parent company of a single nationality. Similarly, the criterion nationality mix 
comes up short and lacks generalizability for defining the MNC. According to it, a company 
is multinational only if its management at headquarter level is composed of individuals with 
varying nationalities. As many of today’s firms are strongly involved in international business 
activities with a management team all from the same country, the definition criterion does not 
seem to suit the need for the study at hand. 
The remaining criterion, organizational structure or business strategy, finally sets a robust 
definition of the term MNC. Developing on earlier work of Vernon (1971) or Behrman (1969) 
and based on organizational as well as strategic considerations about the firm, Root (1994) 
developed a three-fold MNC definition that will be used in the course of this study. According 
to it, an MNC represents a business enterprise that (1) engages in foreign production through 
its affiliates located in several countries; (2) exercises direct control over the policies of its 
affiliates; (3) implements business strategies in production, marketing, finance and staffing 
that transcend national boundaries. The definition fits particularly well for the topic of subsid-
iary internationalization as it encompasses cross-border endeavor, resource sovereignty at a 
HQ or parent company level as well as strategy definition across various elements of the value 
chain. All three aspects are crucial to the study at hand. 
2.2.3. Foreign subsidiary 
Foreign subsidiaries represent one of several market entry forms (Kutschker & Schmid, 2011) 
and are viewed by some IB scholars as “the actual manifestations of the MNC’s international 
expansion” (Blankenburg Holm et al., 2009: 14). Despite the significant relevance that re-
searchers attribute to foreign subsidiaries and their wide existence across countries and busi-
ness segments, a clear and consistent definition is not as easy to obtain as an outsider may 
initially think. Having chosen the internationalization process of foreign subsidiaries as the 
core unit of analysis, however, a differentiation of subsidiary types as well as a stringent de-
lineation from other MNC units represents an important task at the study’s offset. 
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Birkinshaw and Pedersen (2009: 367) defined the subsidiary as “a value-adding activity out-
side the home market” and thereby referred to wholly-owned subsidiary companies. By indi-
cating the location of the subsidiary as outside the parent company’s market, Birkinshaw and 
Pedersen (2009) set a clear separation from home market subsidiaries that may exist for or-
ganizational or strategic purposes. Nonetheless, wholly-owned subsidiaries represent only one 
of various MNC unit types and a clear definition therefore seems necessary. Gatignon and 
Anderson (1988: 314) used the level of control in order to classify MNC governance struc-
tures in foreign markets and came up with the following four-stage subsidiary typology: 
 Wholly-owned subsidiaries (the MNC holds 100% of equity) 
 Dominant partnerships (the MNC holds the dominant share of equity; that is, owns 
more equity than any other partner) 
 Balanced roughly equally partnerships (the MNC’s share is the same as that of the 
largest partner) 
 Minority partnerships (the MNC holds less equity than the largest partner) 
While all forms require equity-based investment, only wholly-owned subsidiaries (1) and 
dominant partnerships (2) also fulfill the subsidiary criterion of controlling interest by a single 
parent company of the MNC (Kutschker & Schmid, 2011: 906). Nonetheless, also equal (3) 
and minority partnerships (4) may qualify as subsidiaries if the controlling interest is achieved 
by other means (e.g. special voting rights).  
By looking at the overall degree of control of a firm over a foreign entity, many IB scholars 
extend the definition of the foreign subsidiary beyond the aspect of equity investments. Mor-
schett (2007), for example, called attention to the increasing relevance of non-equity-based 
cooperative forms in foreign market operations (e.g. licensing, management contracts or fran-
chising). Morschett (2007) cited the statement of Buckley (1983: 43) that “it is not necessary 
to own a production process to control it” in order to underline the relevance of control. Joint 
ventures may therefore also constitute foreign subunits even though they may be influenced 
by stakeholders outside the MNC, e.g. joint venture partners. This view further corresponds 
with the definition of Birkinshaw and Petersen (2009) that a subsidiary needs to add value to 
the MNC as outlined at the offset of this section. 
Despite the existence of various types and definitions of foreign subsidiaries, the study at 
hand is clearly limited to wholly-owned subsidiaries. The deliberate exclusion of any coopera-
tive foreign market development form is aimed at avoiding additional complexity levels that 
may complicate the study’s contribution to the unexplored research topic of subsidiary inter-
nationalization. It is acknowledged, however, that subsidiary internationalization may equally 
take place among other subsidiary types with potentially deviant process mechanisms. 
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2.2.4. Foreign market subsidiary mandates or charters 
The decision to set up a foreign subsidiary by the means of a greenfield approach or acquisi-
tion is likely to have several, potentially overlapping, reasons. As laid out by Dunning (1993) 
the rationale for any MNC activity can be the seeking of markets, resources, efficiencies and 
strategic assets. A foreign subsidiary can thus serve its parent company by gaining foreign 
market access (market-seeking), by exploiting locational advantages (resource-seeking), by 
achieving higher productivity levels (efficiency-seeking) or by strengthening the MNC’s 
competitive positioning (strategic-asset-seeking). The subsidiary’s level of value-add to its 
respective MNC may therefore range from specialized R&D or sales functions to covering the 
entire value chain (Kutschker & Schmid, 2011: 906). In the latter case the local value-add can 
equal or surpass its parent company counterpart, in which case foreign subsidiaries are also 
referred to as miniature replica (White & Poynter, 1984). In addition to varying functional 
scopes, the geographical scope may also differ from one subsidiary to another. In fact, while 
the subsidiary’s responsibility for a certain product may be nationally or regionally limited it 
may possess a world mandate for a specific product (e.g. Rugman & Douglas, 1986). The 
initial functional and geographical scope of a foreign subsidiary is in most cases the result of 
an HQ assignment. Nonetheless, both scopes of responsibility may alter over time driven by 
initiatives from either corporate or local subsidiary management (Birkinshaw & Hood, 1998). 
When referring to global responsibilities for a single product, the term foreign market subsidi-
ary mandates was first used. Based on empirical examination of mandate development of sev-
eral foreign subsidiaries, Birkinshaw (1996) stressed local capabilities as a key driver for 
mandate growth and highlighted the transient nature of subsidiary mandates. A subsidiary 
mandate can to a large extent be equated with its individual corporate charter. While the ini-
tial definition by Galunic and Eisenhardt (1996: 256) as a “businesses (i.e., product and mar-
ket arenas) in which a division actively participates and for which it is responsible within the 
corporation” referred to corporate divisions rather than foreign subsidiaries, Birkinshaw and 
Hood (1998) later claimed its similar suitability for subsidiary responsibilities. Birkinshaw 
and Hood (1998: 782) viewed charter as “a shared understanding between the subsidiary and 
the headquarters regarding the subsidiary’s scope of responsibilities”. 
The existence of various types of FDI strategies for foreign subsidiaries (Dunning, 2003) that 
may or may not be manifested in a subsidiary’s mandate or charter is well acknowledged by 
the author. Similar to multiple subsidiary types as outlined in the previous section, however, 
the study is limited to foreign subsidiaries with predominately market-seeking objectives. The 
study limitation is equally targeted to circumvent further complexity levels that may arise 
when seeking to embrace all FDI strategies for the unexplored topic of subsidiary internation-
alization. The author admits, however, that subsidiary internationalization may also happen in 
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foreign subsidiaries that pursue FDI strategies other than market-seeking with possibly diver-
gent process mechanisms. 
2.3. Findings of relevant IB research streams  
2.3.1. Classification of available literature 
When examining fifty years of IB theory Rugman, Verbeke and Nguyen (2011) grouped most 
relevant research findings by their unit of analysis. While early, neoclassical studies predomi-
nately dealt with the country as the core unit of analysis, a shift of focus towards the firm in 
the international context marked a new era of IB research. Hymer (1960
1
, 1976) is thereby 
seen as the “intellectual father of the second stage in modern IB studies” (Rugman, Verbeke 
& Nguyen, 2011: 756) as he first explicitly looked at the firm’s benefit from cross-border 
participation. More recently, scientists have increasingly paid attention to subsidiaries as they, 
in sum, constitute the MNC. Even though all three units of analysis (country, MNC and sub-
sidiary) are at least partly interrelated, the literature review will be limited to cross-border 
aspects of the firm and the subsidiary as they make up the heart of the study. Limited transfer-
ability of macro-level observations with microeconomic aspects further supported this ap-
proach. As noted by Markusen (2001: 70), general-equilibrium analysis of foreign trade or 
direct investment theory “leaves it ill-equipped to deal with individual firms and the important 
role that the latter play in the real economy”.  
The study examines internationalization processes of foreign subsidiaries and thereby seeks to 
understand why and how foreign subsidiaries obtain foreign market responsibility and how 
such a mandate evolves in the course of time. In order to support both types of research ques-
tions around the causality and modality of subsidiary internationalization, a further categori-
zation of literature streams by static and dynamic viewpoints seemed appropriate. While re-
search findings using a static viewpoint were expected to contribute to a better understanding 
of why foreign subsidiaries obtain foreign market responsibility, literature about dynamics of 
firm internationalization was browsed to shed light on how expansion processes are initiated 
and how they evolve over time. It should be noted that findings on the dynamic nature of firm 
internationalization are still relatively limited (Kutschker & Schmid, 2011) despite a request 
from leading scholars for a more process-orientated IB research focus for more than two dec-
ades (e.g. Doz & Prahalad, 1991).   
                                                     
1
 Not published until 1976. 
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Figure 2-1: Classification of relevant IB literature streams and guiding review questions 
 
The aforementioned classification of relevant IB literature by the unit of analysis and the 
viewpoint is summarized in Figure 2-1 above. The two-by-two matrix was further enriched by 
four questions that guided the overall literature review process. As a result, the following pag-
es are strictly limited to findings directly or indirectly linked to the rationale for and the pro-
cesses of subsidiary internationalization. The matrix also shows that neither the units of anal-
ysis nor the study perspectives are mutually exclusive and that there exists a certain degree of 
overlap in the reviewed literature streams. Overall, this literature review does not claim to 
exhaustively cover all relevant literature streams related to subsidiary internationalization. In 
fact, they are deliberately limited to the study topic on why (causality) and how (modality) 
firms or subsidiaries internationalize, rather than covering other interesting and neighboring 
aspects like where (locality) or how fast (temporality) firms or subsidiaries expand their activ-
ities into foreign territories. In addition, a focus was set on foreign subsidiaries as the core 
unit of analysis and on dynamic study perspectives. In summary, the screening of past studies 
in the field of IB was aimed at facilitating the data collection process as well as the subse-
quent data analysis process without limiting the theory-development process desired from the 

















For what reasons are firms 
engaged in cross-border 
business operations?
What factors drive or 
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Table 2-1: Classification of relevant IB literature with the firm as core unit of analysis 
Static viewpoint Dynamic viewpoint 
 Monopolistic advantage theory (Hymer, 1960, 
1976) 
 Transaction cost / Internalization theory (e.g. 
Williamson, 1975; Buckley & Casson, 1976) 
 Eclectic paradigm (Dunning, 1977) 
 Knowledge-based view (e.g. Kogut & Zander, 
1993) 
 Asset-seeking view (e.g. Doz, Asakawa, Santos 
& Williamson, 1997) 
 Product lifecycle theory (Vernon, 1966) 
 Uppsala model (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977) 
 Helsinki school (e.g. Luostarinen, 1979) 
 Network approach (e.g. Johanson & Mattsson, 1988) 
 Innovation-related approach (e.g. Bilkey & Tesar, 
1977) 
 GAINS paradigm (Macharzina & Engelhard, 1991) 
 Resource-based view (e.g. Teece & Pisano, 1994; 
Teece, Pisano & Shuen, 1997) 
Source: Own illustration, based on Rugman, Verbeke & Nguyen (2011) 
The classification of relevant IB literature with the MNC or the subsidiary as core unit of 
analysis can be viewed in Table 2-1 above and Table 2-2 below. The selection of relevant 
literature streams was strongly inspired and supported by two IB publications. While the work 
of Rugman, Verbeke and Nguyen (2011) facilitated the identification of the most relevant 
studies using the MNC as the core unit of analysis, the article of Birkinshaw and Pedersen 
(2009) strongly helped to obtain a better picture of studies with an explicit focus on foreign 
subsidiaries. Adding to this, significant efforts were made in order to come up with additional 
studies that were able to contribute to a better understanding of internationalization processes 
at the periphery of modern MNCs.  
Table 2-2: Classification of relevant IB literature with the subsidiary as core unit of analysis 
Static viewpoint Dynamic viewpoint 
 Generic subsidiary roles (e.g. Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1986) 
 Specialized subsidiary roles (e.g. Rugman, Verbeke & 
Yuan, 2011) 
 World product mandate (e.g. Rugman, 1982) 
 Centers of excellence (e.g. Frost, Birkinshaw & Ensign, 
2002) 
 Regional headquarters (e.g. Lehrer & Asakawa, 1999) 
 Divisional headquarters (e.g. Forsgren, Holm & Johanson, 
1995) 
 Subsidiary evolution  (e.g. Malnight, 1995) 
 Evolution determinants (e.g. Birkinshaw, 
1997) 
 Subsidiary internationalization (e.g. Forsgren 
et al., 1992) 
 Internationalization trajectories of MNC units 
(e.g. Araujo & Rezende, 2003) 
 Dynamics of regional headquarters (e.g. 
Kähäri et al., 2010) 
Source: Own illustration, based on Birkinshaw & Pedersen (2009) 
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2.3.2. Studies with static views and the firm as core unit of analysis 
As outlined above, research streams in the field of IB have seen shifting units of analysis over 
the last years, decades and even centuries. While early trade theories predominately used the 
country as the unit of analysis, for example by looking at country-specific advantages and its 
impact on national competitiveness (Smith, 1776; Ricardo, 1817), later studies applied a more 
microeconomic approach. Many scholars (e.g. Buckley, 2009; Kapler, 2007) view Stephen 
Hymer’s work (1960, 1976) on the international firm as the starting point for modern IB re-
search as it explicitly sought to provide answers to why and how firms internationalize. In 
addition, Hymer (1960, 1976) truly focused on the firm as the unit of analysis, which differen-
tiated his work from previous macroeconomic perspectives. Rugman, Verbeke and Nguyen 
(2011: 756) emphasized this contribution of Hymer as he “pioneered a fundamental change in 
the unit of analysis adopted in IB studies: he positions the MNE and its FSAs at the core of 
his analytical approach”. Moreover, his work significantly influenced subsequent IB research 
across the globe and set the breeding ground for two major research streams of firm interna-
tionalization: transaction-cost-based and internalization theories of the MNC (Kapler, 2007). 
Despite its existence for more than fifty years, his work will therefore be explained in detail in 
the following pages. 
2.3.2.1. Monopolistic advantage theory of the MNC 
In his PhD thesis on the international operations of national firms, Hymer (1960, 1976) pro-
vided a new explanation for how firms benefit from foreign production and why firms choose 
foreign production over relatively simpler selling or licensing of technology. With regard to 
the first question, Hymer (1960, 1976) argued that firms can develop certain proprietary or 
monopolistic advantages that eventually allow the firm to more than offset locational ad-
vantages enjoyed by market participants in a particular host market. These proprietary ad-
vantages therefore serve as a means to overcome barriers to international business operations. 
Extending Bain’s (1956) work on national barriers of competition across different sectors, 
Hymer (1960, 1976: 45) stated that “there are as many kinds of advantages as there are func-
tions in making and selling a product. The firm’s advantages may be that it can acquire factors 
or production at a lower cost than other firms. Or it may have knowledge or control of a more 
efficient production function. Or the firm may have better distribution facilities or a differen-
tiated product.” 
Regarding his second research question, Hymer postulated that firms opt for foreign direct 
investment rather than selling or licensing technology in order to lower or even eliminate 
competition. Competitive strength can be achieved by acquiring foreign firms and by maxim-
izing the exploitation of aforementioned proprietary advantages. His argumentation is based 
on the existence of market imperfections like uncertainty. Through foreign asset ownership 
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the firm “internalizes or supercedes the market” (Hymer, 1960, 1976: 48), which may yield a 
higher return to the company. By highlighting the aspect of market failure in the context of 
firm internationalization, Hymer (1960, 1976) not only gave rise to the following transaction-
cost-based research streams on the MNC but also to numerous studies of internalization of 
cross-border business operations. As noted by Kapler (2007: 290), Hymer “predicted ‘inter-
nalization’ of international exchanges of intermediate knowledge-based products for the pur-
pose of reducing contracting costs, as well as for maintaining monopolistic or oligopolistic 
advantages and maximizing rents on the basis of barriers to entry”. The IB research stream of 
internalization theories is of particular interest to the study as it explicitly looks at the subsidi-
ary as the core unit of analysis and the delegation of tasks across various MNC units. 
2.3.2.2. Transaction cost and internalization theories of the MNC 
The transaction cost and internalization theory of the international firm are closely related to 
each other and have shaped IB research up until today. The importance is underpinned by 
Buckley’s statement (2009: 310) that “transaction cost theory provided a different perspective 
on the reasons for the growth of MNEs”. Oliver Williamson (1975) is often seen as the pio-
neering scholar in the field of transaction cost and internalization theories of the MNC, but 
similar studies
2
 were carried out independent of and parallel to his work. Ignoring their vari-
ances for simplicity purposes for one moment, both literature streams applied macroeconomic 
Coasian (1937) transaction cost theory to the MNC and shared the belief that “the cost of or-
ganizing a given transaction varies with the method of organization chosen to organize it” 
(Hennart, 2001: 133). Methods referred to either carrying out a transaction through the market 
or through the organization, i.e. by internalizing the market into the firm. Other than Hymer 
(1960, 1976), Williamson (1975) argued that the cost of organizing a given transaction is not 
only linked to structural market imperfections but also to natural market imperfections. Such 
imperfections, also labeled ‘non-pecuniary externalities’, may arise from bounded rationality 
as a result of information inefficiencies, from opportunism due to individual benefit maximi-
zation stretching from misinterpretation to fraudulent intent, and from asset-specificity that 
requires tangible and/or intangible asset investments. The mix of these imperfections there-
fore “produces the strongest incentive to internalise a transaction rather than to use contracts 
in the market” (Buckley, 2009: 311). 
While Williamson’s (1975) and similar transaction-cost-based approaches to the firm only 
briefly touched upon cross-border activities of an enterprise (Kutschker & Schmid, 2011: 456), 
internalization theory scholars made a stronger attempt to understand why firms are actually 
engaged in foreign production. The research focus was thereby shifted “from the conventional 
act of FDI at the country level, to the level of the institution making the investment, i.e. the 
                                                     
2
 e.g. Buckley & Casson (1976); Hennart (1977, 1982). 
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MNE” (Rugman, Verbeke & Nguyen, 2011: 759). The basic argument, however, that market 
imperfections may result in higher efficiency levels of organizing foreign business operations 
within the firm as opposed to organizing it through the market remained unaltered. With re-
gard to the type of business activities that should best be internalized, IB scholars have taken 
numerous directions. Teece (1981), for example, proposed internalizing the procurement of 
raw materials and intermediary products to secure the company production supply. Buckley 
and Casson (1976) stressed the internalization need for business knowledge and experience as 
market failure (government intervention, information asymmetry between buyers and sellers 
etc.) for such intangible assets is particularly high. While this internalization list could be fur-
ther extended to principally all activities where markets reveal any form of imperfections, 
Rugman (1981) added an interesting point to internalization theories by pointing out the ex-
istence of CSAs and FSAs as well as its relationship. According to Rugman (1981), each 
MNC is equipped with a unique set of capabilities or FSAs (production expertise, brand repu-
tation etc.) that is built on the CSAs of a nation and that constitutes its competitiveness on a 
national and international level. He also stated that internalization serves as a valid means to 
avoid third party FSA dissipation. As noted by Rugman, Verbeke and Nguyen (2011: 760), 
three decades later the MNC “transfers, deploys and exploits its FSAs through the use of for-
eign subsidiaries that monitor, meter and regulate the use of FSAs abroad”. 
2.3.2.3. Eclectic paradigm 
While the contribution of transaction cost and internalization theory of the MNC to modern 
IB research is undoubted, both literature streams fail to offer an integrated explanation of firm 
internationalization, i.e. by providing a holistic answer to why, where and how it occurs. 
Dunning (1977) was the first IB scholar who explicitly faced up to this challenge. According 
to Buckley and Hashai (2009: 58), his “approach to the complex phenomenon of the multina-
tional enterprise (MNE) has proved robust and, over time, has become one of the most influ-
ential streams of thought in the international business literature”. In his theory, which was 
renamed to eclectic or OLI paradigm at a later stage, Dunning (1977, 1988 and 1998) ex-
plained firm internationalization through three inter-related determinants: (1) ownership, (2) 
location and (3) internalization advantages. Ownership advantages are thus linked to an exist-
ing or potential MNC and can be split into tangible (e.g. production facilities) and intangible 
(e.g. knowledge) assets as well as coordination capabilities. Location advantages are associat-
ed with foreign markets and their individual characteristics like market size, labor costs or 
political environment. Internalization advantages in turn refer to efficiency gains resulting 
from an internal organization of activities through the organization rather than through the 
market.  
In Dunning’s eclectic paradigm, ownership advantages represent the prerequisite for any form 
of firm internationalization and their combination with location and internalization advantages 
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determine the form of foreign market entry and market development (Kutschker & Schmid, 
2011: 464). The impact of access to different advantage types on the likely entry mode for a 
particular market is highlighted in Table 2-3 below. While Dunning’s work may have come 
short in fully establishing a clear separation between his three forms of advantages (Itaki, 
1991), his framework has strongly contributed to IB research by synthesizing various isolated 
research streams and by allowing for a differentiation of market entry type modes. 
Table 2-3: Market entry modes in Dunning’s eclectic paradigm 
  Categories of advantages 






√ √ √ 
Exports 
 
√ √ - 
Contractual re-
source transfer  
√ - - 
Source: Kutschker & Schmid (2011: 464) 
2.3.2.4. Knowledge-based and asset-seeking views of the MNC 
While the screening of literature regarding the rationale of firm internationalization could 
long be continued, the remaining pages will focus on knowledge-based views of the MNC. 
What makes this literature stream particularly relevant to the study is its focus on cross-border 
knowledge and capabilities embedded in stakeholders within and outside the MNC. When 
seeking to understand subsidiary internationalization and the involved responsibility delega-
tion by a parent company, the impact of knowledge accumulation, transfer and exploitation on 
firm internationalization may also provide scientific guidance for the study at hand. 
Knowledge-based views on the MNC, which challenge and aim to extend traditional transac-
tion cost and internalization theories, constitute a relatively modern IB research stream. In fact, 
most of their advocates view knowledge as a core instrument for obtaining comparative ad-
vantages in the global marketplace. Other than transaction cost theory, knowledge-based 
views therefore no longer disregard the origin or the evolution of ownership advantages 
(Kapler, 2008: 295). 
Kogut and Zander (1993) are generally seen as the scientific pioneers of knowledge-based 
MNC views. Tallman (2003: 495), for example, praised their article as “an important marker 
in the transition of the dominant conceptual model of the multinational firm from the market 
failure approach of internalization theory and transaction cost economics theory to the market 
imperfections approach of capabilities or knowledge-based theories of the firm”. Challenging 
the earlier internalization theory view of knowledge as a public good and market failure as 
primary driver for the MNC, Kogut and Zander (1993) argued that firm determination lies in 
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its ability to transfer and transform knowledge relative to other market participants. Their em-
pirical study revealed that the more complex and the less codifiable and teachable the 
knowledge of a firm becomes, the more likely it selects the setting up of foreign subsidiaries 
as foreign market entry mode as opposed to other forms of transfer instruments like licensing. 
Moreover, in addition to viewing knowledge as a major source of firm competitiveness, 
Kogut and Zander (1993: 640) also highlighted the relevance of knowledge management ca-
pabilities by stating that the “limiting factor on their growth is not only the competitiveness of 
other firms and the demand of the market, but also the extent to which their advantage can be 
replicated more quickly by themselves than through imitation by competitors”. 
The importance of knowledge for a firm’s competitiveness and its often tacit nature that 
makes it difficult to diffuse across the MNC (Haldin-Herrgard, 2000) also led to the strongly 
related research stream of asset-seeking internationalization rationales. The core idea is well 
summarized by Buckley and Hashai (2009: 58-59) as it “essentially implies that ownership 
advantage does not necessarily originate in a firm’s home country, but rather may be acquired 
and augmented abroad, and thus serves as a motivation for firm internationalization”. Doz et 
al. (1997), who elaborated a widely recognized working paper in this research field, actually 
coined the term ‘metanational corporation’ for an institution that deliberately seeks 
knowledge from outside its home market. As noted by Doz et al. (1997: 2), “the metanational 
creates value by accessing, melding, and leveraging distant capabilities and market knowledge” 
in order to respond to increasing dispersion and contextual embeddedness of relevant 
knowledge in its industry.  
2.3.3. Studies with dynamic views and the firm as core unit of analysis 
Given the study’s aim to understand internationalization processes at the periphery of modern 
MNCs it seemed more than appropriate to dedicate sufficient time and effort to scan past IB 
research findings around the mechanisms of the phenomenon under investigation, in particu-
lar those that shed light on what drives or possibly restricts internationalization processes. 
Even though the product lifecycle theory of Vernon (1966) dealt to a large extent with macro-
economic aspects in the form of country-specific technology advantages, it can be viewed as 
an initial step towards a more dynamic view of firm internationalization. Since then, the 
school of thought has been strongly developed by Scandinavian researchers, in particular by 
Johanson and Vahlne (1977, 1990 and 2009) from the Uppsala University in Sweden who 
offered a new perspective on process patterns and internationalization models of enterprises. 
While their findings predominantly suggested an incremental and gradual internationalization 
process, later studies (e.g. Macharzina & Engelhard, 1991) also disclosed radical and revolu-
tionary process elements. Despite limited empirical examination of the dynamics of firm in-
ternationalization (Oesterle & Richta, 2009), a number of valuable contributions have been 
made in the research field that will be summarized in the following pages. 
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2.3.3.1. Product lifecycle theory 
As noted above, IB research on the dynamic nature of firm internationalization was initiated 
by the product lifecycle theory of Vernon (1966). The core assumption of his work was thus 
that the production of an enterprise is moved abroad once a product has reached a certain ma-
turity stage in the home market. Emphasizing “upon the timing of innovation, the effects of 
scale economies, and the roles of ignorance and uncertainty in influencing trade patterns”, 
Vernon (1966: 190) stated that firms from advanced countries, in particular the US, have 
technology-related and country-specific advantages linked to their home market operations. 
While such advantages can be best exploited in the home market at the early stage of a prod-
uct lifecycle, they may still benefit the firm abroad once the product matures and becomes 
increasingly standardized. Product maturity stages are classified into new, maturing and 
standardized products. According to Vernon (1966), the initial stage is characterized by local 
value-add, i.e. US production and partial exports to other advanced countries, the second stage 
by increasing production in other advanced countries and first exports to less developed coun-
tries and the final stage by diminishing US production and increasing production in less de-
veloped countries.  
The work of Vernon contributed to modern IB research in three dimensions (Kutschker & 
Schmid, 2011: 441). Most importantly, it provided a first dynamic view on the topic of firm 
internationalization by looking at different stages in the product lifecycle and linking it to 
international business endeavors of the firm. In addition, Vernon managed to integrate several 
other research streams like the technology gap theory of trade by Posner (1961) so that he 
offered a solid ground for further process research. Finally, he already acknowledged the 
complexity of decision-making processes and thereby refrained from a purely cost-driven 
decision-making rationale. Most criticism regarding Vernon’s work resulted from actual field 
observation on international manufacturing and marketing patterns other than those described 
in the model. Vernon’s work is further criticized for its inability to provide a solid explanation 
of how internationalizing firms overcome locational disadvantages vis-à-vis local competitors 
(Giddy, 1978).  Nonetheless, the significant contributions of Vernon’s model to IB research 
are still valued today. As stated by Buckley (2009: 315), “its simple, yet powerful, dynamic, 
resting on the interaction of demand and supply over time, has never been improved”. 
2.3.3.2. Internationalization models with an evolutionary process perspective 
With the Uppsala or IP model of Johanson and Vahlne (1977), the internationalization of a 
firm was for the first time explicitly treated as a process. Based on the behavioral theory of 
firms (Aharoni, 1966; Cyert & March, 1963), the underlying model explains internationaliza-
tion as a result of knowledge development and increasing foreign market commitment. Draw-
ing on empirical data from Swedish firms in the manufacturing industry, Johanson and 
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Vahlne (1977) argued that internationalization of a firm occurs over time along an establish-
ment chain and a psychic distance chain. While the establishment chain stresses that a firm 
follows a defined pattern of increasing market commitment, the psychic distance chain postu-
lates that a firm selects those markets for internationalization first where opportunities can be 
identified and perceived uncertainty is low. The internationalization process of a firm is driv-
en by a constant interplay between state aspects, ‘market knowledge’ and ‘market commit-
ment’, and change aspects, ‘commitment decisions’ and ‘current activities’, as illustrated in 
Figure 2-2 below. The process can therefore be seen as causal cycles. Within this cycle the 
aspect of learning takes a predominant role. The more a company knows about a foreign mar-
ket or the less uncertainty about a certain region exists the more it is willing to commit re-
sources to it. The primary process driver is therefore experiential knowledge about foreign 
markets resulting in an incremental nature of internationalization processes. As noted by Jo-
hanson and Vahlne (1990: 12), more than a decade later experiential market knowledge “gen-
erates business opportunities” and constitutes the “primary way of reducing market uncertain-
ty”.  
Figure 2-2: Principles of the Uppsala or IP model 
 
Source: Johanson & Vahlne (1977: 26) 
With regard to the change variable ‘commitment decisions’, Johanson and Vahlne (1977) al-
ready pinpointed the relevance of risk levels perceived by corporate management. According 
to their risk formula a firm gradually increases its commitment for a specific foreign market 
only until “its tolerable risk frontier is met” (1977: 30). If a firm eventually commits itself to a 
particular foreign market or decides to extend its existing international operations, intensified 
market participation, e.g. in the form of customer exchange, is then likely to gradually reduce 
perceived uncertainty levels. Reduced risk levels would then again allow enhanced interna-
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tionalization commitment. Figueira-de-Lemos, Johanson and Vahlne (2011) only recently 
built on the original risk formula of the IP model when analytically and graphically examining 
its variables ‘market commitment’ and ‘market uncertainty’. Regarding the initial IP model, 
Figueira-de-Lemos et al. (2011: 144) stated that the “model’s nuclear assumption – the inter-
nationalization mechanism – is analytically supported by a formula that relates risk, commit-
ment, and uncertainty”. The visualization of risk-related aspects in the internationalization 
process is shown in Figure 2-3 below.  
While R* refers to the maximum tolerable market risk for a particular firm, R stands for its 
actual risk level at a certain time, which is the product of market commitment (C) and market 
uncertainty (U). If a firm amplifies its foreign market commitment (∆C) as shown on the left-
hand side of Figure 2-3, the overall risk level increases (∆R). Subsequent market participation 
would then lead to reduced market uncertainty (∆U), which would bring risk levels back to a 
previous level (R0) as highlighted on the right-hand side of Figure 2-3. Figueira-de-Lemos et 
al. (2011) pointed out in their work that increases or decreases of market uncertainty may also 
be impacted by variables other than market commitment and by factors outside the MNC, e.g. 
from altering government legislations or competitive landscapes. 
Figure 2-3: Risk alterations as a result of internationalization moves 
 
Source: Figueira-de-Lemos et al. (2011: 147-148) 
Despite its apparent limitations, especially the narrow field of application (Andersen, 1993), 
the Uppsala model is still viewed as one of the leading theories in the field of internationaliza-
tion processes. A number of scientists have therefore tried to support and expand the original 
model. In this context the network approach by Johanson and Mattsson (1988) deserves a par-
ticular mention as it linked the internationalization process of a firm to its changing position 
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and Mattsson (1988) equated internationalization with altering network positions in foreign 
territories that can be achieved by either developing new networks abroad, by penetrating 
existing networks or by connecting networks in different marketplaces. Overall, the network 
theory strongly contributed to process research on firm internationalization as it explicitly 
examines the business context of multinational enterprises. By highlighting the importance of 
business relationships across borders it improved the “understanding of the decisive factors 
behind internationalization as such” (Björkman & Forsgren, 2000: 13). 
Johanson and Vahlne (2009) themselves revised their original model as a result of changing 
business practices and research findings of the past. While they maintained their dynamic 
character of the model with state and change variables they added and replaced certain varia-
bles in order to better reflect today’s business world. With regards to the state variables, ‘op-
portunities’ were integrated as a subset to knowledge, viewing it as the most important body 
of knowledge for the internationalization process. In addition, ‘market commitment’ was re-
placed by ‘network position’, assuming that internationalization processes are pursued within 
a given network. Regarding the model’s change variables, ‘current activities’ were replaced 
by ‘learning, creating and trust building’, whereby Johanson and Vahlne (2009) emphasized 
the outcome of business operations.  
Finally, the term ‘commitment decisions’ was expanded to ‘relationship commitment deci-
sions’ in order to underline the direction of commitment towards business networks. In order 
to highlight the relevance of business networks, Johanson and Vahlne (2009) viewed liability 
of outsidership rather than liability of foreignness as a key challenge for internationalization 
processes. Nonetheless, liability of foreignness, a term coined by Zaheer (1995: 341) and de-
fined as “cultural, political, and economic differences”, is still expected to play a vital role in 
the revised IP model. As noted by Johanson and Vahlne (2009: 1414), “the larger the psychic 
distance, other things being equal, the more difficult it is to build new relationships. This is 
the effect of the liability of foreignness.” 
While empirical findings on companies leapfrogging certain stages of the establishment chain 
(e.g. Hedlund & Kverneland, 1985), increasing observation of ‘born global’ firms (e.g. Knight 
& Cavusgil, 1996; Weerawardena et al., 2007) and country selection inconsistent with psychic 
distances (Madsen & Servais, 1997) may have served as catalysts for their revised perspective, 
Johanson and Vahlne (2009) did not provide a modified or new establishment chain. With 
regard to the aspect of leapfrogging, they actually denied market entry modes the ability to 
indicate the degree of market commitment and thereby indirectly admitted to the declining 
suitability of the establishment chain for explaining internationalization patterns. Criticism 
deriving from the observation of ‘born global’ firms was countered by arguing that ‘born 
globals’ are actually ‘born regionals’ as supported by recent studies (e.g. Rugman & Verbeke, 
2007) and that learning and trust-building as the key drivers of business operations still take 
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time. Regarding the psychic distance chain, Johanson and Vahlne (2009: 1421) claimed its 
ongoing validity even though “some companies and individuals have acquired more general 
knowledge of foreign environments, and perhaps this instils in them greater confidence in 
their ability to cope with psychic distance”. Respecting the standpoint of Johanson and 
Vahlne (2009), it seems appropriate to acknowledge the aforementioned major weaknesses of 
the model. At the same time, the model’s existence and ongoing relevance among leading IB 
scholars for more than thirty years alone suggests that it might serve as a powerful instrument 
for the study at hand. 
The original (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977) and the revised (Johanson & Vahlne, 2009) IP mod-
els have recently been subject to further examination. Schweizer, Vahlne and Johanson (2010), 
for example, carried out a comprehensive case study and thereby emphasized the relevance of 
entrepreneurship in internationalization processes. According to them, internationalization 
may be driven by entrepreneurial capabilities in exploiting contingencies of MNC stakehold-
ers. Later Vahlne, Ivarsson and Johanson (2011) incorporated configuration and coordination 
strategies of MNCs in the Uppsala model in order to better explain the entire globalization 
process of a firm. Most recently Vahlne et al. (2012) extended the original risk formula by 
internal uncertainty parameters that accompany internationalization processes and emerge 
from a corporate headquarters’ liability of outsidership vis-à-vis the business networks and 
actions of its foreign subsidiaries. By interpreting a parent company’s reluctance to approve 
subsidiary initiatives as a form of dealing with the “lack of knowledge and experienced uncer-
tainty”, Vahlne et al. (2012: 227) viewed the internal form of liability of outsidership as a 
potential restriction in firm internationalization. 
The Helsinki school (e.g. Luostarinen, 1979; Welch & Luostarinen, 1988; Luostarinen & 
Welch, 1990) had much in common with the Uppsala model but expanded the theory primari-
ly in two ways. With regard to the establishment chain it allowed for a broader range of mar-
ket entry and expansion modes and a more differentiated approach was taken when defining 
the psychic distance chain. In addition, the impact of various product categories (physical 
products, services etc.) was explicitly taken into account. Overall, the approach was based on 
a broader empirical base and showed numerous advantages compared to the scientific founda-
tion of the Uppsala model but gained relatively little attention in the literature of international 
management (Kutscher & Schmid, 2011). Due to a lack of fundamental differences to the IP 
model that are of relevance when examining the internationalization process of foreign sub-
sidiaries, findings will not be further detailed for the purpose of this study.  
Innovation-related internationalization models represent another research stream with an evo-
lutionary process perspective on firm internationalization. Studies of several IB researchers 
(e.g. Bilkey & Tesar, 1977; Cavusgil, 1980; Reid, 1980; Czinkota, 1982) were grouped by 
this school of thought even though they actually lack a uniform theory with regard to interna-
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tionalization processes. What all of them have in common, however, is their aim of explaining 
the development of firm exports from a behavioral perspective and their dealing with interna-
tionalization as innovational processes. The aforementioned IB scholars vary both in terms of 
number of stages as well as description of stages. They further deviate in their belief at what 
point a firm enters the next stage of internationalization, i.e. what incentives a firm needs to 
start or intensify its export activities (Andersen, 1993). Overall, the limited applicability of 
innovation-related internationalization models to exports is one of their major shortcomings. 
Nonetheless, their overall contribution to IB research is still significant as they incorporated 
the aspects of innovation and entrepreneurial behavior in research about internationalization 
processes (Aspelund & Madsen, 2009). 
2.3.3.3. Internationalization models with a revolutionary process perspective 
Based on the limitations of traditional internationalization theories, modern approaches are 
taking a different view on the process of firm internationalization. In contrast to a purely evo-
lutionary character of the IP or innovation-related models, Macharzina and Engelhard (1991) 
introduced a revolutionary process perspective. In their GAINS (‘gestalt approach of interna-
tional business strategies’) approach, Macharzina and Engelhard (1991) postulated that inter-
nationalization processes are characterized by phases of incremental development and funda-
mental change that displace each other in the course of time. As a result of inertia, firms do 
not achieve continuous adaptation to their environment, which incrementally augments their 
need for change. Quantum leap changes are then initiated by critical incidents. The GAINS 
paradigm therefore takes a different perspective than the learning-based incremental approach 
found in the Uppsala school of thought. Underlining a quantum rather than incremental view 
on the internationalization trajectories of the firm, Macharzina and Engelhard (1991: 31) not-
ed that the “regularities in adaptive behavior are evoked by imbalances and incongruities 
among environmental, structural and strategy-making variables. An initial key event causes 
such an imbalance which either requires or facilitates a series of subsequent environmental, 
structural and strategic changes. This event could be a decision such as to replace a top execu-
tive, introduce a new product or market strategy, modify the organizational structure or 
change administrative practices or procedures such as planning, control and information sys-
tems. After these adjustments have been made, the stress towards change is reduced until the 
next major unsettling incident.” Despite its truly alternative approach, the work of Macharzina 
and Engelhard (1991) did not receive significant international attention. One reason for this 
might be the model’s limited generalizability, which Macharzina and Engelhard (1991) them-
selves acknowledged.    
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2.3.3.4. Resource-based views 
The resourced-based view of the firm, which is considered to be the principal conceptual par-
adigm of strategic management at present (Birkinshaw & Pedersen, 2009), is based on the 
guiding principle that the set of capabilities and resources is crucial for determining the com-
petitiveness of a firm (Barney, 1991). Teece, Pisano and Shuen (1997) took on this idea when 
proclaiming that the competitive positioning of market participants is dependent on their ‘dy-
namic capabilities’. ‘Dynamic’ here stands for a continuous change of a company’s business 
environment whereas ‘capabilities’ relate to the challenge for strategic management in “ap-
propriately adapting, integrating, and re-configuring internal environment” (Teece & Pisano, 
1994: 196). In order to assert its competitive positioning in a marketplace a firm is therefore 
not only required to develop unique capabilities but also needs to constantly adapt its capabili-
ties to environmental change.   
Simon (2007) linked the aforementioned resource-based view with the aspect of firm interna-
tionalization by arguing that the internationalization process of a firm is the result of its re-
source base and its ability to develop resources (resource building) and to leverage resources 
(resource leveraging) in the international context. Following this approach, companies with 
weak capabilities for resource building and levering are expected to experience a rather evolu-
tionary and incremental internationalization path, as postulated by the Uppsala school. In turn, 
if these capabilities are available and adequately leveraged, companies may follow a radical 
and revolutionary internationalization process in line with the GAINS model of Macharzina 
and Engelhard (1991).  
2.3.4. Studies with static views and the subsidiary as core unit of analysis 
While IB research on subsidiaries of the MNC can be traced back to the 1960s, the systematic 
use of foreign sub-units as the core unit of analysis took almost another two decades (Birkin-
shaw & Pedersen, 2009). The focus in the following literature review will be set on HQ–
subsidiary relationships and subsidiary roles even though other aspects like MNC structures 
or strategies are also at least partially related to the topic of subsidiary internationalization. 
While studies about HQ–subsidiary relationships are expected to provide a better understand-
ing on how various MNC units are interlinked and how they interact, research on subsidiary 
roles should facilitate the obtaining of a broader picture of the set of functions and responsi-
bilities that foreign subsidiaries take in modern MNCs. The topic of subsidiary functions and 
responsibilities will be further enriched by studies on specialized roles with a particular focus 
on cross-border business operations. 
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2.3.4.1. HQ–subsidiary relationships 
One of the first IB literature stream that explicitly looked at foreign subsidiaries as the core 
unit of analysis was the examination of HQ–subsidiary relationships. According to Birkin-
shaw and Pedersen (2009), the aspects of subsidiary guidance and supervision as well as co-
ordination and integration received particular attention. Earlier studies on HQ–subsidiary rela-
tionships (e.g. Picard, 1980) already highlighted that the level of subsidiary decision-making 
autonomy and HQ–subsidiary exchange strongly differs from one MNC to another and equal-
ly from one subsidiary to another. Amongst others, the availability of parent company re-
sources, the performances of local subsidiary management and particular host market charac-
teristics were found to influence HQ–subsidiary relationships. The focus of the following par-
agraphs will therefore be set on literature that acknowledged the heterogeneity of MNCs and 
foreign subsidiaries and its impact on HQ–subsidiary relationships. Particular attention will 
thereby be drawn to the relevance of agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) for subsidiary 
management. 
Ghoshal and Nohria (1989) were one of the first IB scholars who requested and found empiri-
cal evidence for a more differentiated approach towards management and control of foreign 
subsidiaries. In their first study, Ghoshal and Nohria (1989) looked at 618 cases of HQ–
subsidiary relationships in European and North American MNCs and found evidence that the 
contextual conditions of a particular foreign subsidiary in the form of local resource configu-
rations and environmental complexity relative to other MNC units can be meaningfully classi-
fied into four generic situations. They referred to them as hierarchy, federative, clans and in-
tegrative. Ghoshal and Nohria (1989: 323) further revealed that each situation is associated 
with three different structural elements of HQ–subsidiary relationships: “(1) centralization, 
the lack of subsidiary autonomy in decision-making; (2) formalization, the use of systematic 
rules and procedures in decision-making; and (3) normative integration, consensus and shared 
values as a basis for decision-making”. Their contingency framework is shown in Figure 2-4 
below.  
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Figure 2-4: Fit structure of headquarters–subsidiary relations in each context 
 
Source: Ghoshal & Nohria (1989: 328) 
Five years later, Nohria and Goshal (1994) reexamined and extended the above-mentioned 
framework for headquarters–subsidiary relations. Relying on data from numerous foreign 
subsidiaries of 54 MNCs, Nohria and Goshal (1994) showed that the more differentiated cor-
porate management treats its affiliated companies in terms of centralization and formalization, 
the higher performance the MNC, as a whole, achieves. In addition, the study proved that a 
high level of shared values among corporate and subsidiary managers can also strengthen 
MNC performance.  While the added-value of their second study may appear marginal to the 
reader at first sight, it strongly contributed to IB research by explicitly comparing headquar-
ters–subsidiary relations with principal–agent relationships. Nohria and Goshal (1994: 492) 
noted in this context that “as the principal, the headquarters cannot effectively make all the 
decisions in the MNC since it does not possess and must, therefore, depend on the unique 
knowledge of the subsidiaries. At the same time, the headquarters cannot relinquish all deci-
sion-rights to the subsidiaries since the local interests of subsidiaries may not always be 
aligned with those of the headquarters or the MNC as a whole.” As the topic of subsidiary 
internationalization also involves a high degree of responsibility delegation to peripheral 





































Jensen and Meckling (1976) are widely seen as the founding fathers of agency theory. In their 
widely cited work, Jensen and Meckling (1976: 308) defined agency relationships as “a con-
tract under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to 
perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision making au-
thority to the agent”. Lacking goal congruency between the agent and its principal, however, 
was expected to result in relationship inefficiencies that the agent thrives to overcome at a 
certain cost. According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), such costs relate to monitoring efforts 
and/or incentive schemes aimed at aligning principal goals and resulting actions of both par-
ties. Academics further differentiated agency problems by moral hazard or hidden action and 
adverse selecting or hidden information. According to Darrough and Stoughton (1986: 501), 
“moral hazard arises when the action undertaken by the agent is unobservable and has a dif-
ferential value to the agent as compared to the principal. Adverse selection problems arise 
when the agent has more information than the principal.” In addition to moral hazard and ad-
verse selection, agency theory also refers to the problem of risk sharing in principal–agent 
relationships and varying risk approaches between the involved parties. Overall, agency theo-
ry uses the contract between principal and agent as the unit of analysis and thereby relies on 
several assumptions on humans, organization and information (Eisenhardt, 1989a: 58). A sol-
id overview of agency theory is shown in Table 2-4 below. 
Table 2-4: Overview of agency theory 
Key idea Principal–agent relationships should reflect efficient organization of infor-
mation and risk-bearing costs 
Unit of analysis Contract between principal and agent 
Human assumptions  Self-interest 
 Bounded rationality 
 Risk aversion 
Organizational assumptions  Partial goal conflict among participants 
 Efficiency as the effectiveness criterion 
 Information asymmetry between principal and agent 
Information assumptions Information as a purchasable commodity 
Contracting problems  Agency (moral hazard and adverse selection) 
 Risk sharing 
Problem domain Relationships in which the principal and agent have partly differing goals and 
risk preferences (e.g. compensation, regulation, leadership, impression man-
agement, whistleblowing, vertical integration and transfer pricing) 
Source: Eisenhardt (1989a: 59) 
Putting agency theory in the context of the MNC in general and HQ–subsidiary relationships 
in particular, agency problems are generally expected to arise if “subsidiary management 
makes decisions that are not congruent with those desired by headquarters, due to goal incon-
gruence between headquarters and the subsidiary and self-interested behavior on the part of 
subsidiary management” (O’Donnell, 2000: 526). In order to minimize agency problems in 
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HQ–subsidiary relationships, corporate management can rely on various instruments like 
headquarter supervision (e.g. expatriates) and bureaucratic monitoring mechanisms (e.g. 
monthly reports). In addition, it can use financial incentives for local management in order to 
align corporate and subsidiary interests (O’Donnell, 2000). 
2.3.4.2. General subsidiary roles 
Schools of thought regarding subsidiary roles, mandates and charters have taken different 
perspectives in the course of time. While early research viewed subsidiary roles as largely 
predetermined by headquarter strategies, modern approaches grant more strategic choice to 
subsidiaries of an MNC (Birkinshaw & Hood, 1998). Altogether various different parameters 
were used in order to categorize subsidiaries by their role in the MNC. Due to the multiplicity 
of studies and plurality of approaches towards subsidiary role classification, a certain degree 
of overlap in research findings was inevitable. In general, IB scholars applied two or more 
dimensions directly or indirectly linked to the subsidiary in order to carve out several role 
types. Morschett (2007: 242-243) provided a comprehensive overview of studies on subsidi-
ary roles and listed a total of 23 typology approaches. With the aim of focusing on aspects 
closely linked to subsidiary internationalization, i.e. encompassing the aspects of host market 
relevance, subsidiary capabilities and MNC contribution, the following literature review on 
subsidiary roles will be reduced to two different studies as outlined in Table 2-5. In addition, 
the work of Birkinshaw and Morrison (1995) will be touched upon as it sought to integrate 
various typology approaches. 
Table 2-5: Selected subsidiary role typologies 
Author Bartlett & Ghoshal (1986) Gupta & Govindarajan (1991) 
Dimensions  Strategic importance of local environment 
 Competence level of local organization  
 Inflow of knowledge from the rest of the 
corporation to the focal subsidiary 
 Outflow of knowledge from the rest of the 
corporation to the focal subsidiary 
Roles  Strategic leader 
 Contributor 
 Implementer 
 Black hole 
 Integrated player  
 Global innovator 
 Local innovator  
 Implementor 
Source: Own illustration, based on Bartlett & Ghoshal (1986), Gupta & Govindarajan (1991) 
Bartlett and Ghoshal (1986) applied a four-fold typology for subsidiary roles based on the 
degree of strategic importance of the local environment and the competence level of the local 
organization. In their case study they identified an increasingly differentiated approach to-
wards subsidiary management across the MNC, which fundamentally differed from traditional 
symmetrical and hierarchical management styles and which they referred to as dispersed re-
sponsibility. Bartlett and Ghoshal (1986: 88) came across companies that were “experiencing 
with ways of selectively varying their roles and responsibilities of their national organizations 
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to reflect explicitly the difference in external environments and internal capabilities” and that 
were “modifying central administrative systems to legitimize the differences”. Based on these 
findings, the following roles were defined: 
 Strategic leader (high strategic importance of local environment / high competence of 
local organization): active involvement in developing and implementing MNC strate-
gy, e.g. identification of business opportunities and threats and elaboration of adequate 
response behavior 
 Contributor (low strategic importance of local environment / high competence of local 
organization): distinct subsidiary capabilities, e.g. technology expertise, are leveraged 
across the MNC despite a relatively unimportant local market 
 Implementer (low strategic importance of local environment / low competence of local 
organization): business operations and MNC influence of the subsidiary are limited to 
national boundaries and local management is requested to exploit the company’s val-
ue-add and thereby contribute to its functioning 
 Black hole (high strategic importance of local environment / low competence of local 
organization): local subsidiary management is not capable of exploiting significant 
market potential. The role only temporarily constitutes a valid option, e.g. as a ‘senso-
ry outpost’ 
According to the social science citation index (SSCI), the work of Gupta and Govindarajan 
(1991) represents one of the most important contributions to subsidiary typology IB research 
(Harzing & Noorderhaven, 2006). Viewing the MNC as a network of transactions and select-
ing knowledge flows from several transaction types
3
, Gupta and Govindarajan (1991) used the 
magnitude and directionality of knowledge flows as determinants for subsidiary roles. Their 
approach was thereby significantly influenced by internalization theories of the MNC as un-
derpinned by their statements (1991: 772) that “knowledge can be transferred more effective-
ly and efficiently through internal organizational mechanisms rather than through external 
market mechanisms. This is so because external market transactions in knowledge are suscep-
tible to several market imperfections, including problems in recognizing and disclosing 
knowledge and negative externalities, such as the risk of creating a new competitor.” Based 
on this approach, Gupta and Govindarajan (1991) identified four subsidiary types that fulfill 
heterogeneous strategic functions in the international firm: 
                                                     
3
 e.g. capital and product flows. 
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 Integrated player (high inflow / high outflow of knowledge): comprehensively inter-
linked subsidiary that strongly contributes to the functioning of other MNC units while 
not being self-sufficient at the same time 
 Global innovator (low inflow / high outflow of knowledge): relatively self-sufficient 
subsidiary that possesses specialized expertise (e.g. technology) that other MNC units 
depend on 
 Local innovator (low inflow / low outflow of knowledge): relatively autarkic subsidi-
ary whose influence is generally limited to its host market 
 Implementor (high inflow / low outflow of knowledge): strongly input-dependent sub-
sidiary that predominately operates within national boundaries 
By outlining only two subsidiary typology approaches, inevitable repetitions and definitional 
overlaps already become apparent. For instance, Gupta and Govindarajan’s (1991) global in-
novator largely resembles Bartlett and Ghoshal’s (1986) contributor just as their implementor 
and implementer reveal similarities from the nomenclature itself. In an attempt to consolidate 
schools of thought in the field of subsidiary role, Birkinshaw and Morrison (1995) defined a 
three-fold typology. Local implementers, characterized by limited geographic, product and 
value-add scope, specialized contributors, equipped with considerable expertise in certain 
specific activities that are tightly coordinated within the MNC network, and finally world 
mandates, possessing a worldwide or regional responsibility for a product line or entire busi-
ness typically with a full product and a wide value-added scope. While Birkinshaw and Mor-
rison (1995) contributed to IB research by consolidating various typology approaches for sub-
sidiaries their strict focus on three subsidiary types, their limitation to market- and product-
related dimensions and their inability to provide empirical evidence for the defined subsidiary 
roles are viewed as major shortcomings (Morschett, 2007). 
2.3.4.3. Specialized subsidiary roles 
The continued relevance of traditional subsidiary typology approaches is highlighted by a 
recent reconceptualization of Bartlett and Ghoshal’s (1986) work by Rugman, Verbeke and 
Yuan (2011). In order to respond to major changes in today’s business environment predomi-
nately as a result of IT development leading to a specialization of activities at foreign subsidi-
aries, Rugman, Verbeke and Yuan (2011) asked for a more differentiated typology approach 
across the value chain. They proposed to thoroughly distinguish between locational ad-
vantages and subsidiary capabilities as it may be “inappropriate to assess the strength of a 
country’s location advantages, and a subsidiary’s opportunities for bundling these with inter-
nal resources, through a single, aggregate assessment that does not recognize differences 
across value chain activity sets” (Rugman, Verbeke & Yuan, 2011: 258).  
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Enright and Subramanian (2007) also relied on the aforementioned approaches when develop-
ing an organizing framework for MNC subsidiary typologies. Identifying simplicity and lack-
ing synthesizability as major shortcomings of past typology efforts, Enright and Subramanian 
(2007) used capability creation and capability utilization as well as geographical scope and 
product scope as determinants of subsidiary roles that are expected to build on one another. 
Their rather complex approach is justified by “increasing regionalization and globalization 
pressures across many industries” (Enright & Subramanian, 2007: 919), resulting in MNC 
units with “varied and differentiated roles and mandates, and a multitude of linkages with 
other entities in the home country and worldwide”. While the four-dimensional framework 
that is shown Figure 2-5 may appear over-structured at first sight, it encompasses relatively 
well the various options that foreign subsidiaries are facing with regard to capability creation 
and utilization and geographical and functional responsibility scopes. In addition, it equally 
accounts for increasing specialization of subsidiaries in modern MNC.   
Figure 2-5: Complete subsidiary typology formulation 
 
Source: Enright & Subramanian (2007: 912) 
The studies of Rugman, Verbeke and Yuan (2011) and Enright and Subramanian (2007) high-
lighted today’s challenge for IB scholars in dealing with the increasing complexity of subsidi-
ary roles and specialization of subsidiary functions that are frequently summarized in man-
dates (e.g. Cantwell & Mudambi, 2005) or charters (e.g. Galunic & Eisenhardt, 1996). As 
previously outlined, subsidiary specialization may thereby refer to numerous aspects like val-
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ue chain elements, product groups or geographies. While all of these aspects are crucial to the 
understanding of contemporary functioning of foreign subsidiaries, the responsibility scope of 
MNC units beyond host market borders is of particular interest to the study at hand. To what 
extent are foreign subsidiaries engaged in cross-border activities? What qualifies local man-
agement to participate in foreign market operations? 
2.3.4.4. Subsidiaries with foreign market development roles 
When assessing Bartlett and Ghoshal’s (1989) work on the transnational solution, Rugman 
and Verbeke (1992, 2001) extended the transaction cost theory to three dimensions, which are 
relevant for this study. First, they postulated that firm-specific (or ownership-specific) ad-
vantages (FSAs) may originate outside the parent company. In addition, they denied the exog-
enous character of country-specific (or locational) advantages (CSAs), stating that CSAs 
“may create dynamic benefits to the corporation as a whole” (1992: 763). Finally, Rugman 
and Verbeke (1992: 763) distinguished FSAs by their applicability across the MNC. While 
non-location-bound FSAs can be exploited globally by an MNC, location-bound FSAs “bene-
fit a company only in a particular location (or set of locations), and lead to benefits of national 
responsiveness”. By acknowledging the applicability of location-bound FSAs in a set of loca-
tions, Rugman and Verbeke (1992) already touched upon the aspect of region-bound FSAs, 
originating in the parent company’s home market or the host market of foreign subsidiaries, 
which they detailed in later studies (Rugman & Verbeke, 2004, 2005, 2007). Their three-tier 
approach towards FSA applicability, location-bound, region-bound and non-location-bound 
will be further detailed in a later section on regional headquarters. 
By differentiating FSAs by their applicability across the MNC, Rugman and Verbeke (1992, 
2001) aimed to emphasize the subsidiary’s ability to contribute to the MNC beyond their na-
tional borders. They further confronted one of the major weaknesses of internalization theo-
ries that FSAs and thus sources of MNC competitiveness exclusively originate in the parent 
company’s home market (Morschett, 2007). The core ideas of Rugman and Verbeke’s work 
(1992), which can also be classified as a resource-based view of the MNC (Birkinshaw et al., 
1998), are shown in Figure 2-6 below.  
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Figure 2-6: Sources of international competitive advantage – a transaction cost model 
 
Source: Rugman & Verbeke (1992: 764) 
According to Rugman and Verbeke (1992), CSAs can be used in three different ways in order 
to develop location- and non-location-bound FSAs and thus to contribute to the competitive-
ness of a firm: (1) leveraged use of CSAs linked to the parent company’s home market; (2) 
local use of CSAs associated with the subsidiary’s host market; (3) dual use of CSAs in both 
the home and host market. They further used the work of Bartlett and Ghoshal (1989) on the 
transnational solution in order to classify their four types of MNC configuration (global, in-
ternational, multinational and transnational) by the dimensions of CSA exploitation and FSA 
type. Finally, Rugman and Verbeke (1992) further built on Bartlett and Ghoshal’s (1986) 
four-fold subsidiary typology by modifying their two-by-two matrix dimensions. The strate-
gic importance of the local environment was thereby replaced with the “perceived potential of 
CSAs for MNE’s competitiveness” and the competence level of local organization with the 
“perceived contribution to FSA development for MNE’s competitiveness” (1992: 768).  
Rugman and Verbeke (1992, 2001) strongly contributed to IB research by distinguishing be-
tween location-bound and non-location-bound CSAs (Eden, 2005) and by acknowledging the 
ability of foreign subsidiaries to contribute to the MNC as whole. They did not, however, fur-
ther detail in what form, i.e. by the fulfillment of what functions and in what markets, local 
management can actually benefit other MNC units, including its parent company. Later litera-
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as well as regional and divisional headquarters therefore offer greater insight into the influ-
ence of subsidiaries across host market borders. In addition, Birkinshaw and Pedersen (2009: 
378) questioned the transferability of transaction-cost-based theory to the aspect of FSA ap-
plicability across the MNC by stating that Rugman and Verbeke (1992, 2001) tried “to make 
sense of a phenomenon through a theoretical lens that was not really designed for the task”.  
2.3.4.5. World product mandate 
The term world product mandate was first used by the Science Council of Canada (1980) 
when encouraging Canada-based subsidiaries of foreign MNCs to seek extended research and 
development, production and marketing responsibilities from their parent companies. Accord-
ing to Bonin and Perron (1986: 161), a world product mandate is defined as “an agreement 
between a multinational enterprise’s parent company and one of its subsidiaries to grant the 
subsidiary exclusive rights to produce and market a product and, if circumstances warrant, to 
pursue the necessary research and development activity. As a result of such agreements, the 
firm generally acquires greater managerial autonomy because it has, in fact, become the inter-
national centre for a product.” While the benefits of world product mandates for the host gov-
ernment in the form of augmented local value-add and for the foreign subsidiary in the form 
of extended responsibility are relatively straightforward, corporate management has to weigh 
advantages (e.g. local subsidies) and disadvantages (e.g. reduced control) of its decision. Ap-
plying internalization theories of the MNC, Rugman and Bennett (1982: 61) noted in this con-
text that “the choice to the MNC depends upon the relative cost of private R&D (protected by 
the internal market) against subsidized R&D in its subsidiary where the risk of loss of control 
is positive”. 
Pearce (1992) added more clarity to the relatively generic term of ‘world product mandates’ 
by looking into scopes of geographical and functional responsibilities a subsidiary actually 
fulfills. According to Pearce (1992), a foreign MNC unit can very easily be exclusively re-
sponsible for only a set of markets or a particular region and thus be geographically special-
ized. Morschett (2007: 549) supported this view when empirically demonstrating that subsidi-
aries with a global product responsibility represent a relative rare MNC phenomenon whereas 
subsidiaries that act as regional product specialists are frequently found in international firms. 
In addition, having responsibility for research and development, production and marketing 
does not imply that a foreign subsidiary necessarily needs to be fully self-sufficient but that 
the “key distinction is the ability of the subsidiary to take responsibility for securing the cru-
cial inputs” (Pearce, 1992: 45). Only a few attempts (e.g. Roth and Morrison, 1992) have been 
made in order identify subsidiary characteristics associated with global subsidiary mandates 
and these often resulted in rather counterintuitive results. Overall, it has never been proven 
that the world product mandate actually represents the most attractive specialization option 
(Birkinshaw, 1996).  
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2.3.4.6. Foreign center of excellence 
The term (foreign) center of excellence has been used in various forms by IB scholars in the 
past. Fratochii and Holm (1998), for example, viewed these centers as subsidiaries with a par-
ticular contribution to the MNC as whole, i.e. with an above-average value-add, leading to 
increased functional and/or geographical responsibility. Lyle and Zawacki (1997) referred to 
best practices or particular sets of capabilities that are found across the MNC. Criticizing both 
approaches for treating the “subsidiary as a whole” as well as for lacking precision, Frost, 
Birkinshaw and Ensign (2002: 997) defined centers of excellence as “an organizational unit 
that embodies a set of capabilities that has been explicitly recognized by the firm as an im-
portant source of value creation, with the intention that these capabilities be leveraged by 
and/or disseminated to other parts of the firm”. Analyzing 99 foreign subsidiaries in Canada, 
they further identified two influential factors for the subsidiary ability to become a foreign 
center of excellence for the MNC: parent company investment and local access to sources of 
competence, both within and outside of the MNC. Frost et al. (2002) therefore acknowledged 
the influence of external factors (customers, suppliers, competitors etc.) on the subsidiary’s 
role in the firm. 
Andersson and Forsgren (2000) already viewed external embeddedness of a subsidiary as a 
driver for centers of excellence in the MNC. Based on empirical studies they found that the 
more intense the linkages to external parties are, the more influential a subsidiary operates in 
the firm as a whole. Even though their analysis on centers of excellence was limited to R&D 
and technology contributions, it raised two highly interesting points. First, local adaptation of 
foreign subsidiaries appears to empower them to take on superior roles in the MNC. Anders-
son and Forsgren (2000: 344) stated in this context that “through these relationships, and 
maybe dependent on the psychic distance, the subsidiary can function as an important speak-
ing partner in discussions about the future orientation of the MNC”. Second, the study out-
come showed that corporate headquarters need to have sufficient understanding of the subsid-
iary’s operations, including its external network, in order to manage the transfer of capabili-
ties across the MNC accordingly. Highlighting the importance of external factors on the de-
velopment of such capabilities, Andersson and Forsgren (2000: 344) postulated that “the 
headquarters’ knowledge about the subsidiaries’ links to their most important customers and 
suppliers are critical, especially if these relationships are characterised by a high degree of 
external embeddedness”. 
2.3.4.7. Regional headquarters 
Another interesting aspect of specialized subsidiary roles is the wide existence of regional 
headquarters (henceforth ‘RHQ’), in which a foreign subsidiary manages and supervises one 
or several subsidiaries beyond its original host market. IB research in this field picked up in 
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the 1990s with the aim of bridging study findings on corporate headquarters and foreign sub-
sidiaries and shedding light on varying configurations of regional operations. Many scholars 
thereby based their work on the studies of Prahalad and Doz (1987) on the dual challenge for 
MNCs to respond to both, global pressure and local responsiveness. Lehrer and Asakawa 
(1994), for example, modified the integration-response framework of Prahalad and Doz 
(1987) by incorporating a regional perspective into the existing global and local view. They 
thereby split relationships across MNC units into two parts: (1) corporate headquarters and 
regional offices and (2) regional offices and foreign subsidiaries. According to their model, 
which is shown in Figure 2-7, the likelihood of regional structures is most distinct if strong 
pressure for regional responsiveness and integration exists at the same time. As noted later by 
Lehrer and Asakawa (1999: 272), “where strong pressures exist for both regional responsive-
ness (resulting in the delegation of important corporate tasks from world headquarters to the 
regional level) and for regional integration (requiring extensive coordination among country 
subsidiaries within a given region), the regional office can be expected to exercise an im-
portant administrative, headquarters-like function”. 
Figure 2-7: Modified integration-response framework of Prahalad & Doz (1987) 
 
Source: Lehrer & Asakawa (1999: 272) 
Understanding when and where an MNC should adopt global, regional and local structures 
also constituted the core of Schütte’s (1997) study on the challenges for European operations 
in Asia. According to his work (Schütte, 1997: 441), one precondition for the existence of 
RHQs is that “the benefits from regional integration must be higher than the cost of an RHQ 
as an additional organisational unit and hierarchical level, especially the cost associated with 
the loss of relative independence of the national units”. Adhering to the triadic model of Leh-
rer and Asakawa (1994), the role of regional headquarters is split into dealing with corporate 
management and dealing with local subsidiary management. While the former refers to func-
tions like strategy development, budget control or intelligence gathering, the latter relates to 




























































enhancing efficiency and effectiveness of regional operations. Based on his study findings, 
Schütte (1997) offered a framework to evaluate the suitability of a foreign subsidiary for 
RHQs. According to it and using Japan as an example, the setting up of regional organizations 
is only desirable if there is a close link between local and regional activities and if the local 
market, in this case Japan, is important to the global success of the firm.  
Rugman and Verbeke (2005) applied an interesting transaction-cost-based approach to the 
understanding of regional clusters in business operations. The starting point for their study 
was that a prerequisite for successful internationalization is the MNC’s ability to combine 
FSAs with CSAs in a particular host market. Such adaptation to foreign environments re-
quires investments “in the development of location-bound FSAs in foreign markets (leading 
to benefits of national responsiveness) to complement non-location-bound FSAs” as well as 
“in the development of new, non-location-bound FSAs in foreign subsidiaries” (Rugman & 
Verbeke, 2005: 12). Rugman and Verbeke (2005) further postulated that the more institutional 
and economic distance exists between home and host country, the higher the aforementioned 
investments or ‘adaptation costs’ are. As a result, redeploying non-location-bound FSAs in as 
well as tuning location-bound FSAs to a foreign market occurs at lower costs if the involved 
countries belong to a similar region. According to Rugman and Verbeke (2005: 14), “these 
FSAs can easily be made ‘region-bound’, to the extent that linking investments with high in-
stitutional and economy-related specificity can be avoided. In other words, it can be efficient 
for an MNE to expand within its home region; it does not need to go global.”  
Lower transactions costs are therefore the driver for the establishment of RHQs. In a later 
study, Rugman and Verbeke (2007) coined the term ‘liability of inter-regional foreignness’ 
when seeking to understand the increasing regionalization of world business (Rugman & 
Verbeke, 2004). They thereby argued that an “MNE’s operations in the host region function 
on the basis of an overall FSA bundle that may differ significantly from the one deployed in 
the home region” (2007: 204). The main contribution to IB research of Rugman and 
Verbeke’s studies (2004, 2005, 2007) is the recognition of ‘region-bound’ FSAs in addition to 
‘location-bound’ and ‘non-location-bound’ FSAs, which allows for a more differentiated ap-
proach towards FSA contribution of foreign subsidiaries across the MNCs. Aforementioned 
criticism of their transactions-cost-based approach to this topic (Birkinshaw & Pedersen, 
2009) remains unaffected. 
Enright (2005a) also touched upon the aspect of locational advantages of foreign subsidiaries 
that stretch beyond host market borders. According to Enright (2005a), locations of subsidiar-
ies “differ in their overall political and policy environments, quality of infrastructure, prox-
imity to customers, quality of life that they offer managers and their families, proximity to the 
firms’ other operations in the region, and the skills and capabilities found in the local work- 
force” and that these individual characteristics impact the role a subsidiary may obtain for a 
42 
specific region. Ambos and Mahnke (2010) differentiated the headquarters’ role by integra-
tive and entrepreneurial charters. While the integrative function relates to the coordination of 
“the MNC’s activities across the individual markets, and further achieving synergies by pool-
ing resources and centralizing value-added activities”, the entrepreneurial charter requires 
headquarter management “to scout and explore new business opportunities worldwide, to ini-
tiate new ventures across the globe, to stimulate and assist the local subsidiaries in under-
standing the changing nature of the business environment, and to help them integrate these 
changes into their business strategies” (Ambos & Mahnke, 2010: 406). According to Ambos 
and Mahnke (2010), the two types of charters need to be equally fulfilled by global, regional 
and divisional headquarters in order to avoid the risk of value destruction.  
2.3.4.8. Divisional headquarters 
Turning into an RHQ and thus taking responsibility for other MNC units beyond original host 
markets is not the maximum a foreign subsidiary can achieve along its evolutionary path. Al-
most two decades ago already, Forsgren, Holm and Johanson (1995) highlighted the increas-
ing existence of divisional MNC headquarters that are located abroad, i.e. no longer situated 
in the parent company’s home market. They further developed a model to explain the devel-
opment of divisional headquarters as a consequence of power relationships deployed by the 
internationalization of a company. Arguing that the “division HQ location is a relevant issue 
in relation to strategic behavior of the MNC, especially if one considers that managers are 
influenced by the local context in their decision process”, Forsgren et al. (1995: 476)  tested 
several hypotheses with a sample of divisions of Swedish multinationals. Throughout their 
study they set a strong focus on interests and power bases among various stakeholders of the 
MNC that are expected to influence the subsidiary’s ability to become a divisional headquar-
ters.  
Forsgren et al. (1995) further recognized ‘countervailing forces’ between subsidiary attraction 
and headquarter interest that are crucial to the understanding of divisional headquarters. While 
attraction force refers to a foreign subsidiary’s ability to coordinate foreign business opera-
tions, headquarter interest relates to the goal of maintaining close links among division heads. 
Overall, the higher the degree of divisional internationalization, the more likely a subsidiary is 
to turn into a divisional headquarters. On the other hand, the higher the degree of MNC inter-
nationalization, the less likely a subsidiary is to become a divisional headquarters. Birkinshaw, 
Braunerhjelm, Holm and Terjesen (2006) also drew attention to the topic of divisional head-
quarters when examining the relocation of business units and corporate headquarters abroad. 
They found evidence that the business unit’s degree of foreign operations and the attractive-
ness of an overseas market relative to the home market positively impact the development of 
divisional headquarters. In turn, they proved that high levels of interdependence between cor-
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porate and divisional headquarters as well as ownership concentration in the form of company 
shares negatively correlate with the setting up of business unit headquarters abroad.  
Benito, Lunnan and Tomassen (2011) recently further developed the topic when examining 
the location and relocation of foreign-based divisional headquarters in Norwegian MNCs. 
Norway was viewed as a small and peripheral European country. Applying agency, resource-
based as well as institutional theories, Benito et al. (2011) showed that the observed phenom-
enon is largely facilitated by efficiency advantages of co-locating with foreign subsidiaries. 
Such efficiency advantages appeared to further augment the more divisions exist in an MNC, 
i.e. the more divisionalized a company becomes. On the other hand, a negative correlation 
between headquarter relocation and the degree of corporate size as well as diversification was 
tested. Overall, Benito et al. (2011: 389) considered agency theory as the most suitable ap-
proach to understanding the topic and supported the aforementioned findings of Forsgren et al. 
(1995) by stating that “a division headquarter has agency relations both with subsidiaries (as a 
principal) as well as with corporate headquarters (as an agent), and our findings clearly show 
that there are good reasons both for locating divisional headquarters close to subsidiaries and 
for keeping them close to global headquarters”. 
  
44 
2.3.5. Studies with dynamic views and the subsidiary as core unit of analysis 
While the previous section aimed to provide an overview of subsidiary roles both within and 
beyond host market borders, the following excursus of literature seeks to add a dynamic 
viewpoint to subsidiary roles and responsibilities. The reflections will again be split into a 
general part on subsidiary evolution and a specific part on subsidiary evolution across borders. 
When approaching the research topic of subsidiary evolution, Bouquet (1999) offered a solid 
framework by subdividing it into evolution phases or stages and evolution drivers or determi-
nants. As the study deals with the shift of subsidiary roles from nationally-bound to cross-
border business activities, Bouquet’s (1999) framework will also be used in the following 
literature review. 
2.3.5.1. Subsidiary evolution stages 
Sargeant (1990) was one of the first IB scholars who split subsidiary development into differ-
ent evolutionary phases. Despite a highly simplistic approach and lacking empirical proof, his 
three-stage model for subsidiary evolution serves as a good starting point for the literature 
review. Analyzing the subsidiary’s relationship to its parent company over time, Sargeant 
(1990) separated evolutionary stages by childhood, adolescence and adulthood. In its early 
existence or childhood a subsidiary is strongly HQ-dependent with business activities limited 
to simple sales, service or production responsibilities. As the subsidiary grows with regard to 
sales and asset volume as well as headcount level it increasingly fulfills administrative tasks 
and is exposed to augmenting sales and profit pressure from corporate management. If subsid-
iary management achieves further growth, it reaches the final evolutionary stage, its adult-
hood.  
A more sophisticated stages model for subsidiary evolution that was also empirically backed 
was developed by Malnight (1995). According to Malnight (1995), a firm can pass through up 
to four stages in its evolutionary path: (1) appendage; (2) participation; (3) contribution; (4) 
integration. The original stage, appendage, is characterized by the exploitation of the parent 
company’s resources and capabilities in a particular host market. In the participation phase, 
foreign affiliates already carry out a broader set of tasks with the aim of serving individual 
local needs. When reaching the contribution stage, foreign subsidiaries generally benefit from 
an upgrade of local resources in terms of headcount as well as capabilities in order to face 
increasingly global challenges. Finally, throughout the integration stage a firm tries to com-
bine national and foreign activities through an integrated network and thereby to enhance 
global competiveness. 
Having outlined two relatively simple stage models for subsidiary evolution, their lack of a 
lifecycle perspective that accounts for mandate gains and potential mandate losses soon be-
comes apparent. In addition, they equally failed to outline what capabilities a foreign subsidi-
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ary actually needs in order to advance in its evolutionary path. According to Birkinshaw 
(1996), a lifecycle framework is inevitable when assessing subsidiary evolution as value-
adding activities migrate from one MNC unit to another for two reasons. First, and thereby 
referring to location-specific advantages found in transaction-cost-based theories of the MNC, 
altering comparative advantages in a particular country or region, e.g. in the form of rising 
labor costs, may result in modified local business operations at a foreign subsidiary. Second, a 
subsidiary may fail to adapt to environmental change, leading to a loss of distinctive capabili-
ties. Birkinshaw (1996: 490) noted in this context that “as market opportunities shift, the abil-
ity of the subsidiary to adapt its capabilities is liable to be constrained, both because of the 
specialized nature of those capabilities and because of parent company preconceptions regard-
ing the scope of the mandate. Failure to adapt may thus lead to mandate loss.” Birkinshaw 
(1996) therefore proposed a mandate lifecycle framework as shown in Figure 2-8 below. 
Figure 2-8: Mandate lifecycle framework 
 
Source: Birkinshaw (1996: 472) 
2.3.5.2. Subsidiary evolution determinants 
In addition to being one of the first IB scholars to elucidate the potential temporary nature of 
subsidiary mandates, Birkinshaw (1996) further identified a set of determinants for growing 
and declining responsibilities of foreign MNC units. His findings together with a selection of 
other relevant studies will be discussed in the next pages. In the past scientific research has 
either focused on examining the outcome of subsidiary initiatives potentially leading to man-
date modifications or directly addressed drivers for mandate development over time. The fol-
lowing pages will therefore encompass studies on particular one-time mandate changes, e.g. 
as a result of parent- and/or subsidiary-driven initiatives, as well as lifecycle observations and 



























Mandate gain: The process 
through which a subsidiary takes 
responsibility for a business, or 
element of a business, beyond its 
national market.
Mandate development: The 
process through which a 
subsidiary extends its mandate 
responsibility into a related 
product, market or functional area.
Mandate loss: The process 




IB scholars have taken different perspectives on determinants for the development of subsidi-
ary mandates in the past. According to Birkinshaw and Pedersen (2009: 371), heterogeneous 
viewpoints are primarily the result of multiple process stimuli as evolutionary paths of foreign 
MNC units “can be driven from within (i.e. through the initiative of subsidiary managers) or 
from without (i.e. investment from the parent company or external forces)”. Earlier studies 
(e.g. Birkinshaw, Hood & Young, 2005) had already demonstrated that subsidiary evolution 
can be driven by a combination of internal and external parameters, thus linking the afore-
mentioned two perspectives. Adhering to both scientific articles, the application of a holistic 
viewpoint across the MNC as well as across external networks appears necessary when seek-
ing to understand the phenomenon of subsidiary evolution in modern MNCs. 
Birkinshaw is generally seen as the IB scholar who first shifted the research focus for subsidi-
ary evolution onto the subsidiary itself (Rugman, Verbeke & Nguyen, 2011). His central idea 
was that the evolutionary path of a foreign MNC unit is not exclusively dependent on deci-
sions at corporate headquarters but that local subsidiary management can actually strongly 
shape its development over time. Awarding foreign subsidiaries a certain degree of entrepre-
neurship, Birkinshaw (1997: 207) defined subsidiary initiative as “an entrepreneurial process, 
beginning with the identification of an opportunity and culminating in the commitment of 
resources to that opportunity” that leads to “a new way for the corporation to use or expand its 
resources” (1997: 210). In his study, Birkinshaw (1997) further distinguished initiatives by 
their ‘locus of market opportunity’ into local, global, internal and hybrid. Birkinshaw (1997) 
paid particular attention throughout the study to facilitating conditions, process elements as 
well as intended initiative outcome for all four initiative types. The results, which were based 
on quantitative as well as qualitative empirical research, are summarized in Table 2-6 below. 
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Table 2-6: Types and characteristics of subsidiary initiatives 
Initiative  Local Internal Global  Hybrid  
Description Seeks to develop a new 
product, market or 
process through oppor-
tunities that are first 
identified in the subsid-
iary’s home market 
Promotes the redistribu-
tion of existing corpo-
rate assets or resources 
such that they are more 
efficiently deployed 
 
Seeks to build on an 
existing mandate or 
proven capability to 
meet a perceived inter-
national product or 
market opportunity 
Seeks to attract a 
global investment 








 High autonomy at 
first 






 Low autonomy 




tive in parent compa-
ny 









 Low autonomy 




spective in parent 
company 
Process  Low to moderate 
internal selling 
 Implicit approval 
process 
 High internal selling 
 Explicit approval 
process  
 Low internal selling 
 Implicit approval 
process 
 High internal sell-
ing 








 Rationalization of 
existing activities; in-
creased efficiency 
 Enhancement and 
international leverage 
of an existing product 
line or business 
 Optimum global 
siting of new val-
ue-adding activity 
Source: Birkinshaw (1997: 218, 224) 
Study findings of Birkinshaw (1997) revealed three very interesting characteristics of subsidi-
ary initiatives. First, facilitating conditions and rent-seeking as well as approval processes 
appear to significantly differ from one initiative type to another. Despite varying numbers of 
involved stakeholders or intended outcomes, e.g. new versus existing activities, one might 
have expected a slightly more homogeneous picture across subsidiary rent-seeking activities. 
Second, global market initiatives of subsidiaries, which largely resemble subsidiary interna-
tionalization, seemed to flourish best if the subsidiary shows a high degree of autonomy and 
only sporadically communicates with its corporate headquarters. While Birkinshaw (1997) 
stressed the inability of local managers to await headquarter approval for global initiatives, 
the reader would have most likely expected a higher degree of subsidiary–headquarter ex-
change as well as more pronounced internal selling efforts for cross-border business expan-
sion. Finally, for all initiative types a certain degree of proven subsidiary resources facilitated 
local efforts to obtain headquarter approval. It therefore appears that a minimum level of trust 
by corporate management is needed in order to delegate responsibility to foreign subsidiaries. 
The impact of local resources and capabilities is also marked by Birkinshaw et al. (1998) 
when investigating whether subsidiaries themselves are actually able to develop FSAs of the 
MNC. Based on empirical evidence from more than 200 foreign subsidiaries with local pro-
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duction facilities, Birkinshaw et al. (1998: 225) investigated what impact subsidiary-level 
(leadership, entrepreneurial culture), corporate-level (subsidiary autonomy, subsidiary–parent 
communication) and country- as well as industry-level (local competition, industry globaliza-
tion) factors have on the contributory role of a subsidiary. The impact was tested directly and 
indirectly through the constructs of specialized subsidiary resources and subsidiary initiatives. 
As a starting ground Birkinshaw et al. (1998) used a simple process model that is highlighted 
in Figure 2-9 below.  
Figure 2-9: Process model of subsidiary activities and subsidiary resources 
 
Source: Birkinshaw et al. (1998: 224) 
Birkinshaw et al. (1998: 225) further built on the idea that subsidiaries can contribute to FSAs 
of MNCs if they possess non-location-bound resources that are specialized and thus “superior 
to those available elsewhere in the corporation”, that are “recognized by the corporation” and 
that are “effectively utilized by the MNC”. Testing a set of hypotheses through a survey with 
subsidiary managers, Birkinshaw et al. (1998: 221) were able to derive the following three 
key findings: 
 Internal subsidiary resources in combination with initiative have a strong positive im-
pact on the subsidiary’s contributory role 
 Subsidiary initiative is strongly associated with the leadership and entrepreneurial cul-
ture in the subsidiary 
 Contributory role is strongly associated with subsidiary autonomy and a low level of 
local competition 
The work of Birkinshaw et al. (1998) strongly contributed to IB research in two somewhat 
interlinked dimensions. First, foreign subsidiaries are capable of strongly contributing to the 
MNC as a whole, leading to an area of influence beyond host market borders. Second, it is up 
to local subsidiary management not only to identify business opportunities of any kind but 
also to act upon them by seeking HQ approval for their exploitation. As noted by Birkinshaw 
et al. (1998: 236), “subsidiary managers understand their resources better than anyone else” 


















effectively”. One major shortcoming of their study is, however, that they did not include the 
parent company’s perspective in the analysis. 
Another approach for examining the outcome of subsidiary initiatives was taken by Birkin-
shaw and Ridderstråle (1999). Rather than looking at conditions that facilitate positive out-
comes of subsidiary initiatives, in most cases leading to positive subsidiary evolution, they 
looked into potential barriers for obtaining HQ approval. In their study, Birkinshaw and Rid-
derstråle (1999) referred to the subsidiary’s rent-seeking and the HQ’s approval process as 
‘fighting the corporate immune system’. The starting point for a rather negative view on the 
initiative approval process was that “the merits of any given initiative cannot be known in 
advance, so the expectations of actors within the organization of its likely value is such that 
they would prefer to make a type I error (reject a promising initiative) than a type II error (let 
through a rogue initiative)” (Birkinshaw & Ridderstråle, 1999: 150). Numerous subsidiary 
initiatives were examined, encompassing requests for intra-MNC (internal) as well as market 
responsibilities (external) in order to thoroughly sketch the ‘corporate immune system’ and to 
identify means for local subsidiaries to overcome barriers to initiatives.  
Regarding the first aim of the analysis to understand the nature of the ‘corporate immune sys-
tem’, Birkinshaw and Ridderstråle (1999) soon faced a relatively pronounced degree of com-
plexity. The complexity was largely due to asymmetrical viewpoints taken by corporate and 
subsidiary management on the subject. Nonetheless, they managed to come up with a two-
layer model that is shown in Figure 2-10 below. While manifestations refer to the actual re-
sponses of corporate managers to subsidiary initiatives, interpreted predispositions relate to 
the rationales for HQ actions or inactions. Study findings showed that ethnocentrism repre-
sents the key source of initiative failure and that rejection, delay or requests for greater justifi-
cation were responses that subsidiary management most often had to deal with.  
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Figure 2-10: Nature of the corporate immune system 
 
Source: Birkinshaw & Ridderstråle (1999: 158) 
In addition to ethnocentrism, subsidiary initiatives also failed to obtain HQ approval as a re-
sult of ‘suspicion of the unknown’ as well as ‘resistance to change’. Together with ethnocen-
trism, all three behavioral traits of HQ managers are by no means mutually exclusive as the 
aspect of general risk aversion towards granting new or delegating existing responsibilities to 
local subsidiary management characterizes them all. This is well summarized by Birkinshaw 
and Ridderstråle (1999: 154) when stating that MNC stakeholders generally “prefer to work 
within existing routines, throw their support behind low-risk projects, and resist ideas that 
challenge their own power base”. Moreover, the aforementioned predispositions did not only 
lead to HQ rejection, delay or a request for greater justification of subsidiary initiatives; local 
managers were also confronted with lobbying and rival initiatives by competing divisions 
and/or a lack of legitimacy of the initiative in other units. Both aspects were also highlighted 
by Galunic and Eisenhardt (1996) when examining the continuous battle for charter among 
MNC units in the corporate marketplace. 
When observing means to circumvent or to overcome corporate obstacles for subsidiary ini-
tiatives, Birkinshaw and Ridderstråle (1999: 175) identified three strategies of local manage-
ment for external initiatives, which are particularly important to the study at hand: (1) early 
generation of external market acceptance; (2) avoidance of all parts of the corporate immune 
system in early stages; (3) use of proven market acceptance to fight resistance from rival divi-
sions and other units. It therefore appears that the local subsidiary is best advised to thorough-
ly assess the business opportunity or to even conduct successful trials prior to seeking official 
Manifestations
Actions taken (or inaction) by corporate managers 
that provide resistance to the initiative
• Rejection, delay or request for greater justification by headquarters managers
• Lobbying and rival initiatives by competing divisions





• Suspicion of unknown
• Resistance to change
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approval from corporate management. While studies on subsidiary initiatives like Birkinshaw 
and Ridderstråle’s (1999) significantly contributed to the understanding of how a subsidiary is 
capable of growing its scope of responsibilities and what obstacles it is likely to face through-
out the initiative process, they are usually focused on the mandate gain rather than mandate 
preservation or potential loss. As outlined earlier, Birkinshaw (1996) was one of the first IB 
scholars to take a lifecycle perspective on the mandate evolution of foreign subsidiaries. The 
reasons for the approach were described earlier in this chapter, so that the focus will now be 
set on why some subsidiaries achieve long-lasting mandates or even extend them over time 
and other experience decreasing responsibility scopes and potential loss of functions.  
In his study, Birkinshaw (1996) looked at 31 cases of mandate gain, 25 cases of mandate de-
velopment and seven cases of mandate loss at six foreign subsidiaries. Mandate gains or alter-
ations were highly heterogeneous with regard to the primary mover or locus of initiative-
taking, motives as well as responsibility scopes. Mandate gains, for example, were generally 
driven by subsidiary management when it was related to market-seeking initiatives while re-
source- and efficiency-seeking initiatives often involved corporate management in the initia-
tive-taking process. With regard to mandate development, approximately one half of subsidi-
ary mandates encountered a scope extension in the observed period. As for mandate gain, 
market-seeking was the primary development motive, with local expertise one of the key fa-
cilitators. According to Birkinshaw (1996: 480), “these were cases in which the subsidiary’s 
mandate had led to the development of certain distinctive capabilities so that when the oppor-
tunity arose to make a subsequent investment in that area the subsidiary was able to offer the 
most attractive location”. Surprisingly, mandate losses were not exclusively driven by corpo-
rate management but in three cases also had local subsidiary management as the primary 
mover. The reason for parent-driven phase-outs was in all cases a lack of subsidiary resources 
so that the responsibility was withdrawn by the parent company. Subsidiary-driven mandate 
loss, on the other hand, was the result of lacking market demand or an inappropriate strategic 
fit to the overall subsidiary strategy. 
The study of Birkinshaw (1996) strongly contributed to IB research in general and to the liter-
ature stream of subsidiary evolution in particular in two different ways. First, he took a closer 
look at the sustainability of subsidiary mandates and identified two conditions in which they 
are at risk: lack of distinctive value-added or lack of strategic relatedness. Distinctive value-
added thereby refers to the ability of a foreign subsidiary to carry out a particular task better 
than any other MNC unit. Another way of looking at this phenomenon is the subsidiary’s de-
gree of contestability. If it is low, “no other subsidiaries within the MNC have the necessary 
capabilities for undertaking that mandate” (Birkinshaw, 1996: 492). Strategic relatedness, on 
the other hand, depends on the fit of the subsidiary’s mandate to the overall corporate strategy. 
While a subsidiary mandate may initially receive sufficient recognition and consequently re-
source allocation from corporate management, such headquarter attention can decline over 
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time, resulting in a ‘hazardous circumstance’ for the mandate continuity. Based on the two 
challenges for mandate preservation, Birkinshaw defined four generic mandate types using a 
two-by-two matrix as highlighted below in Figure 2-11. As a result, only large and integrated 
mandates represent a sustainable option, whereas all other types are exposed to a certain loss 
risk. 
Figure 2-11: Framework for subsidiary mandate types 
  
Source: Birkinshaw (1996: 487) 
The other contribution of Birkinshaw’s work (1996) is the identification of subsidiary capabil-
ities as a key driver for mandate development. Thoroughly contrasting continued and lost 
mandates, Birkinshaw (1996) argued that the specificity of local business and the existence of 
proven resources largely distinguish positive cases from negative ones. This observation 
found its expression in Birkinshaw’s (1996: 489) mandate definition “as a licence to apply the 
subsidiary’s distinctive capabilities to a specific market opportunity” and the potentially tem-
porary and transient nature of the phenomenon, which strongly impacted the definition of 
subsidiary internationalization that was described at the offset of this chapter. Moreover, 
Birkinshaw (1996) also listed a set of factors that can prevent subsidiaries from losing a man-





























MNC, and thus underlined the complexity of sketching a lifecycle model for subsidiary man-
dates. 
Despite his unquestionable contribution to IB research on foreign subsidiaries, Birkinshaw 
(1996) himself admitted to a set of study limitations that need to be briefly addressed. One 
major shortcoming is the study’s limited generalizability due to the relatively small sample of 
foreign subsidiaries that were all based in Canada. In addition, the study failed to incorporate 
the headquarters’ perspective in its survey, which is crucial for thoroughly understanding evo-
lutionary paths of cross-border subsidiary mandates. As noted by Birkinshaw (1996: 491), 
“the parent company motivations for allowing subsidiaries to build and retain mandates is still 
not adequately understood”. Birkinshaw (1996) therefore urged IB scholars to study this 
“poorly understood phenomenon” through multiple empirical settings. 
Drawing on the distinctiveness of subsidiary capabilities and only temporary assurance of 
mandate preservation, Birkinshaw and Hood (1998) theoretically developed a generic subsidi-
ary evolution process model that is worth mentioning for the study at hand. Throughout their 
work (Birkinshaw & Hood, 1998: 773), subsidiary evolution is viewed as the “enhance-
ment/depletion of capabilities in the subsidiary, coupled with an explicit change in the subsid-
iary’s charter” and a focus is set on the examination of interlinks between capability and char-
ter modification. Overall, subsidiary evolution can be driven by head-office assignment, sub-
sidiary choice as well as local environment determinism.  
According to Birkinshaw and Hood (1998), there are five evolutionary processes a subsidiary 
can pass through, which are shown in Table 2-7 below: (1) parent-driven investment; (2) sub-
sidiary-driven charter extension; (3) subsidiary-driven charter reinforcement; (4) parent-
driven divestment; (5) atrophy through subsidiary neglect. A core model assumption (Birkin-
shaw & Hood, 1998: 783) is thereby that capability and charter change can both represent 
influencing variables so that “capability change may lead or lag the change in the commensu-
rate charter, but, for evolution to have occurred, the charter must eventually reflect the under-
lying capabilities”. While situations 1 and 4 refer to a parent-driven charter change that sub-
sequently leads to a capability enhancement or depletion respectively, situations 2 and 5 relate 
to capability change at subsidiary level that eventually triggers a charter gain or loss. In the 
remaining situation, number 3, local subsidiary management is capable of maintaining its ex-
isting charter by sharpening and strengthening its existing capabilities. 
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Table 2-7: Five generic subsidiary evolution processes 
Contextual factors 
→ 
Situation Action Outcome 
Parent company factors 
 Competitive internal re-
source allocation 
 Decentralization of deci-
sion-making 
 Ethnocentrism of parent 
management 
Subsidiary factors 
 Track record of subsidiary 
 Credibility of subsidiary 
management 
 Entrepreneurial orientation 
of subsidiary employees 
Host country factors 
 Strategic importance of 
country 
 Host government support 
 Relative cost of factor in-
puts 




Parent: Decision to make invest-
ment; evaluation of various loca-
tions / Subsidiary: lobbying 
Establishment of new 
charter in subsidiary; 





Subsidiary: Identification of new 
opportunities; building capabilities; 
proposal to parent / Parent: Judg-
ment on subsidiary proposal 







driven search; upgrading of exist-
ing capabilities 
Reinforcement of existing 
charter in subsidiary 
Parent-driven 
divestment (4) 
Parent: Decision to divest; evalua-
tion of various locations / Subsidi-
ary: Lobbying 
Loss or diminution of 
charter in subsidiary; 




iary neglect (5) 
Subsidiary: Inaction; atrophy of 
capabilities / Parent: Judgment on 
subsidiary’s lack of competitive-
ness 
Loss or diminution of 
charter in subsidiary 
Source: Birkinshaw & Hood (1998: 785) 
One interesting aspect that Birkinshaw and Hood (1998) raised early in their article is the ex-
istence of internal competition for charter. Birkinshaw and Hood (1998: 782) thereby viewed 
the “latent mobility of charters and the competition between subsidiary units for charters” as 
“one of the fundamental drivers behind the subsidiary evolution process”. Surprisingly, the 
phenomenon is later only thoroughly reflected in situation 3, the subsidiary-driven charter 
reinforcement. There, local subsidiary management is pressured by external as well as internal 
competition from other sister subsidiaries, which subsequently leads to capability sharpening 
and strengthening efforts of the mandate possessing subsidiary. As such horizontal competi-
tion for corporate marketplace (Galunic & Eisenhardt, 1996) appears to be of significance, a 
slightly closer look will be applied to the topic in the following pages. The key questions in 
this context are how local managers are able to gain attention from headquarters when this is 
supposed to be a scarce and critical resource (Cyert & March, 1963) and how can a foreign 
subsidiary survive in the ongoing rent-seeking process (Mudambi & Navarra, 2004)?  
Regarding the degree of subsidiary influence within modern MNCs, Andersson et al. (2007: 
802) argued that the strength of the local business networks plays a major role in the “perpet-
ual bargaining process” between subsidiaries and headquarters and serves as a major power 
base to “influence strategic decisions” in the federative MNC. However, while strength of 
local business networks is solely viewed as a precondition, subsidiaries also need to provide 
technology within the MNC, i.e. to fulfill a contributory role. In turn, headquarters can “bal-
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ance or moderate the influence of strong subsidiaries” by obtaining a broad understanding of 
their business networks (Andersson et al., 2007: 802). Mudambi and Navarra’s (2004: 385) 
earlier findings also showed that “intra-MNC knowledge flows are a key determinant of sub-
sidiary bargaining power”, signaling likely benefits for foreign subsidiaries that are strongly 
integrated in the MNC as opposed to others that are executing autonomous functions. 
Mudambi and Navarra (2004) further claimed that subsidiary managers can leverage this 
power in order to pursue their individual or subsidiary-related targets. When putting findings 
in the context of subsidiary evolution the need for network integration has much in common 
with Birkinshaw’s (1996) postulation of strategic relatedness for the sustainability of subsidi-
ary mandates. 
Other than looking at particular power bases, Bouquet and Birkinshaw (2008) applied a more 
comprehensive view on subsidiary influence by subdividing it into subsidiary weight and 
voice. Headquarter attention is thereby defined as “the extent to which a parent company rec-
ognizes and gives credit to a subsidiary for its contribution to the MNE as a whole” (Bouquet 
& Birkinshaw, 2008: 579). Based on empirical evidence a positive correlation with headquar-
ter attention was found for the structural determinant, subsidiary weight, as well as the rela-
tional determinant, subsidiary voice. While subsidiary weight was broken down by strategic 
significance of local environment and strength of subsidiary within the MNE network, subsid-
iary voice was subdivided into initiative-taking and profile-building of the focal subsidiary. In 
addition a negative impact of geographic distance and pure focus on downstream activities, i.e. 
a limited value-add, on headquarter attention was proven. One major contribution of the study 
was to elucidate that headquarter attention can be shaped in a ‘top-down structural process’ 
based on subsidiary weight and in a ‘bottom-up relational process’ based on subsidiary voice. 
According to Bouquet and Birkinshaw (2008), especially the latter point is interesting as it 
implies that local management can influence decision-making processes at corporate level and 
thereby potentially shape the subsidiary’s role in the long run. This is seen as additional proof 
that subsidiary-specific advantages (henceforth ‘SSAs’) can indeed add to FSAs as initially 
proposed by Rugman and Verbeke (2001). 
The work of Rugman and Verbeke (2001) is also worth mentioning from an evolutionary per-
spective of subsidiary mandates. They identified ten FSA development process patterns in the 
MNC that have their origin in the firm’s home market, in any host market of affiliated subsid-
iaries or in the internal network. The study thereby not only highlighted the importance of 
peripheral MNC units to the functioning of the entire corporation but also revealed by what 
means local management can shape its role over time. Rugman and Verbeke (2001) ap-
proached the topic of the development and diffusion of FSAs and the role that foreign subsid-
iaries take in this process in three steps. First, they (2001: 239) developed a theoretical 
framework based on FSAs and CSAs as they are “most critical to describe and explain the 
international expansion patterns of any MNE”. The focus was thereby set on how CSAs, ei-
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ther non-location-bound (easy to diffuse across the MNC) or location-bound (difficult to dif-
fuse across the MNC), which are ‘endogenized’ by the MNC can result in additional or en-
hance existing FSAs. Second, they described ten core development and diffusion pattern of 
FSAs. Finally, and most interesting to this study, Rugman and Verbeke (2001) took a closer 
look at the creation and dissemination of FSAs in host country operations and thereby exam-
ined patterns that largely reflect aforementioned global, internal and local subsidiary initia-
tives (Birkinshaw, 1997). 
Building on Birkinshaw and Hood’s (1998) drivers for subsidiary roles, parent company as-
signment, subsidiary choice and local environment determinism, Rugman and Verbeke (2001) 
integrated two important aspects in their work, the distinction of non-location-bound or loca-
tion-bound FSAs and the existence of SSAs. Rugman and Verbeke (2001: 244) thereby ar-
gued that the MNC’s strength is more than the sum of non-location-bound or location-bound 
FSAs but is also embodied in SSAs in the form of local competencies and capabilities that can 
be applied across borders even though they are “characterized by mobility barriers (i.e., isolat-
ing mechanisms) that make full absorption difficult throughout the MNE”. In order to classify 
SSAs, Rugman and Verbeke (2001) identified four distinct characteristics that need to be met 
simultaneously. The loss of any one of these characteristics is expected to result in diminished 
contributory roles of a foreign subsidiary. The development of such advantages and its direct 
and indirect impact on subsidiary evolution is depicted in Figure 2-12 below. 
Figure 2-12: The development of subsidiary-specific advantages (SSAs) 
 
Source: Rugman & Verbeke (2001: 245) 
Rugman and Verbeke (2001) indisputably contributed greatly to a better understanding of 
subsidiaries as a source of advantage for the entire MNC. Nonetheless, they did not explicitly 
Drivers of subsidiary evolution:
 Parent company assignment 
 Subsidiary choice 
 Local environment determinism
Contingent factors for 
subsidiary-specific advantage development
1) internal knowledge mobility barriers
2) knowledge gap with other affiliates
3) perceived absence of negative externalities
4) high synergy intensity with non-location-bound FSAs











look at the diffusion and exploitation of MNC advantages in general and SSAs in particular 
on a regional scale. For the topic of subsidiary internationalization the question therefore aris-
es of what type of advantages are actually leveraged if the subsidiary is awarded with the re-
sponsibility to develop new territories beyond host market borders: location-bound FSAs, 
region-bound FSAs, non-location-bound FSAs or actually SSAs? 
A relatively recent study by Dörrenbächer and Gammelgaard (2010) bridged the aforemen-
tioned aspects of charter evolution, distinct subsidiary capabilities as well as intra-firm com-
petition among foreign subsidiaries very well. Based on an in-depth analysis of one case of 
charter removal at a Hungarian subsidiary of a German MNC, Dörrenbächer and Gammel-
gaard (2010) provided an inter-organizational network view of subsidiary charter develop-
ment. In their approach, intra-firm competition, which is viewed as the main basis for charter 
reallocation, is driven by high resource dispersion across the MNC and low resource depend-
ency of the parent company at the same time. For the individual foreign sub-unit the relative 
network centrality, based on its degree of resource specialization and external and internal 
network density, is decisive in the continuous battle for corporate marketplace. According to 
Dörrenbächer and Gammelgaard (2010: 214), “host country comparative disadvantages, a 
high dispersion of MNC resources and a low specialization of subsidiary resources, and a low 
degree of across and within density of network exchange relationships diminishes the subsidi-
ary’s degree of centrality in the MNC network and is likely to bring about a charter removal”. 
Even though observations were limited to one case of charter removal, Dörrenbächer and 
Gammelgaard (2010) developed a simple two-by-two matrix for subsidiary charter develop-
ment as outlined in Figure 2-13 below.  
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Figure 2-13: An inter-organizational network view of subsidiary charter development 
 
Source: Dörrenbächer & Gammelgaard (2010: 214) 
Recent work by Kähäri et al. (2010) also looked at the development of subsidiary charters and 
thereby focused on the fall of regional headquarters. Relying on a longitudinal study on Finn-
ish subsidiaries of MNCs, Kähäri et al. (2010) observed a reduction in RHQs of more than 
65% from 1998 to 2010. While the primary reasons for declining or diminishing regional 
headquarters status, as shown in Table 2-8 below, are relatively heterogeneous, the underlying 
motives revealed a clearer picture of the likely determinants for subsidiary responsibility.  
Table 2-8: Dynamics of the status of regional headquarters from 1998 to 2010 
RHQ status 2010 Fully or partially lost Ʃ 
Reason
4
 RHQ terminated RHQ relocated Other/unknown 
Growth of business 14 11 1 26 
Market contracting 1 0 7 8 
Parent MNC reorganization/restructuring 10 17 6 32 
Parent MNC regionalization 3 22 5 30 
Acquisition 7 7 11 25 
Other or unknown 3 12 8 23 
Missing 0 0 7 7 
Ʃ 34 50 49  
Source: Kähäri et al. (2010: 14) 
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According to the study, the sustainability of regional headquarters mandates is significantly 
influenced by host market business growth, by mergers and acquisitions, by internal restruc-
turing and reorganization projects and by a shifting geographical focus of corporate manage-
ment. Furthermore, regional headquarters responsibility appears to be relocated rather than 
terminated as well as more often fully than partially lost. Such observations led Kähäri et al. 
(2010: 24) to grant regional headquarters mandates a temporary character, defining it a “struc-
tural arrangement which exists for a limited period of time to fulfill a certain purpose, and 
once this purpose has been attained the RHQ may be dismantled”. While contributing to IB 
research on RHQs by underlining their often temporary and transient nature, Kähäri et al. 
(2010) failed to provide a lifecycle perspective on cross-border subsidiary mandates in gen-
eral and RHQ responsibility in particular. In addition to only looking at mandate losses, the 
impact of foreign market mandates that a subsidiary received prior to turning into an RHQ, 
e.g. sales and service responsibility, and how satisfactorily it fulfilled these tasks was not tak-
ing into consideration. 
2.3.5.3. Subsidiary internationalization 
While many of the aforementioned studies on subsidiary evolution touched upon the topic of 
cross-border participation of foreign subsidiaries, none of them explicitly looked at process 
drivers and restrictions of subsidiary internationalization. Forsgren et al. (1992) were one of 
the first IB scholars who investigated the role of foreign-based centers in Swedish MNCs with 
regard to subsequent firm internationalization. Foreign-based centers were thereby defined 
(Forsgren et al., 1992: 237) as subsidiaries that control “resources on which other parts of the 
firm depend for their operations”. A foreign-based center thus has “a strategic role and influ-
ence which goes beyond its local undertakings”. Forsgren et al. (1992: 240) labeled this stra-
tegic role and influence beyond original host markets ‘internationalization of the second de-
gree’ and defined it as the “proportion of the firm’s foreign activities which are carried out 
within centres, measured by the number of employees”.  
While the study strongly contributed to the inter-organizational network perspective of mod-
ern MNCs by viewing them as “loosely coupled, political systems rather than tightly bonded, 
homogeneous, hierarchically controlled systems” (Forsgren et al., 1992: 247) and by high-
lighting external networks of subsidiaries as sources of power, it did not directly address the 
topic of subsequent internationalization processes at subsidiary level. In addition, defining 
internationalization of the second degree as the relative importance of foreign function centers 
within the MNC may be misleading today. At a later stage Forsgren et al. (2005: 79) defined 
the term as “sub-units becoming more international in their external market exchanges, per-
haps by exporting to or importing from a third country”, a definition that better suits the de-
fined topic of the study.  
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Based on Hedlund’s (1986) concept of the heterarchical MNC, Taggart and Berry (1997) 
studied UK-based subsidiaries from manufacturing industries in order to identify determinants 
for cross-border subsidiary operations. Such operations were labeled as ‘second stage interna-
tionalization’. Second stage internationalization, the dependent variable, was measured in two 
different ways: export propensity of subsidiaries and decision-making autonomy of local sub-
sidiary management with regard to the markets to be served and R&D to be undertaken. Even 
though study findings offered a rather “confused picture”, Taggart and Berry (1997: 190) 
highlighted the importance of configuration strategies of MNCs (e.g. Prahalad & Doz, 1987) 
for understanding subsidiary internationalization, as it represents “a recognizable and stable 
quantum state of MNC subsidiaries that is informed and enlightened by both hierarchical and 
heterarchical methodologies”. 
Araujo and Rezende (2003) touched upon the topic of subsidiary internationalization when 
analyzing internationalization trajectories of MNC units. They argued (2003: 732) that the 
concept of “path dependence can be usefully deployed to capture the dynamics of internation-
alisation processes of experienced internationals”. According to Araujo and Rezende (2003), 
internationalization processes of foreign subsidiaries are the result of three types of relation-
ships: (1) relationships with external actors (customers, suppliers etc.) within or outside of the 
host market; (2) relationships with the MNC headquarters; (3) relationships with other subsid-
iaries of the MNC located inside or outside of the host country. They thereby argued that the 
evolution of a subsidiary may also be impacted by events outside of the host country, e.g. in 
the case of mergers or acquisitions at corporate level that lead to structural changes at subsidi-
ary level at a later stage. As noted by Araujo and Rezende (2003: 728), “the evolution of a 
subsidiary is likely to follow an incremental path if it is strongly influenced by the network 
context of its host country but events at the corporate level (e.g. cross-border mergers) could 
overlap with the trajectory in the host country and introduce important discontinuities in this 
evolution”. 
Understanding the internationalization process as a path-dependent sequence, Araujo and 
Rezende (2003) proposed analyzing them as paths in space and time. The aspect of space 
suggests that the path of a subsidiary is “affected by the relationships it articulates across dif-
ferent geographical contexts as well as the territorial scope of its operations” (Araujo & 
Rezende, 2003: 729). In addition, paths in time signal that “relationships are articulated in 
different temporal contexts and that changes in any of these relationships can reinforce an 
existing sequence or redirect it to new paths” (Araujo & Rezende, 2003: 730). One major con-
tribution of Araujo and Rezende (2003) to IB research was to significantly extend the view on 
internationalization processes of foreign subsidiaries. Rather than taking an exclusively in-
crementalist and host-market limited perspective, they urged future studies to acknowledge 
the existence of discontinuities and abrupt changes and to account for various types of rela-
tionships within and outside the MNC.  
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As outlined in the introductory part of this chapter, the examination of existing theory will be 
stopped at this stage in order to avoid an overly narrow approach at the beginning of the study. 
Despite the doubtless existence of further theory in related research topics, the past IB find-
ings outlined on the previous pages were sufficient to elaborate the research design, to guide 
the overall data collection process and to draw from a solid ground when conducting within- 




The study relied on multiple case studies using a retrospective perspective in order to contrib-
ute to the academic topic of subsidiary internationalization processes. The defined qualitative 
research method therefore not only corresponds to the relatively unexplored research topic but 
is also in line with the note of Blankenburg Holm et al. (2009: 4) on peripheral internationali-
zation processes in modern MNCs that “future research should study these issues empirically, 
preferably through case study methodologies and/or with longitudinal designs”. Throughout 
the preparatory work for the research endeavor the investigator was strongly inspired by the 
work of Pauwels, Lommelen and Matthyssens (2004) that analyzed the internationalization 
processes of service companies and thereby also relied on multiple case studies with a retro-
spective research perspective. In addition to having the same unit of analysis, namely interna-
tionalization processes, as well as a predominately dynamic study perspective, the work of 
Pauwels et al. (2004) further exhibited a similar number of cases as well as a clear focus on 
semi-structured interviews with key process stakeholders as the primary data source for the 
study. Moreover, from their experience a comprehensive guideline for multiple case study 
work was elaborated (Pauwels & Matthyssens, 2004) that turned out to be very helpful in de-
fining the basic architecture of the study and in executing the data collection and analysis un-
dertaking. 
This chapter will commence with a general review of qualitative research methods, encom-
passing their overall benefits and limitations. A closer assessment of comparative case study 
analysis will then be carried out in order to explain the suitability of case studies in general 
and multiple case studies in particular for the examination of internationalization processes at 
subsidiary level. Thereafter, the chosen research design will be outlined in more detail using 
four different dimensions. First, the case selection process is thoroughly described in order to 
explain the emergence of eleven cases of subsidiary internationalization processes at seven 
European MNCs in the manufacturing sector. Second, the overall data collection process is 
disclosed, in particular by listing various types of data collection methods as well as sources 
and by commenting on their relevance to the study as a whole. Third, the data analysis pro-
cess is thoroughly described, providing the underlying rationale for the selection of different 
analysis instruments and techniques and commenting on their impact on the interpretations 
that were drawn and mid-term theories that were developed in the course of the study. Finally, 
the multiple means for quality control in qualitative research and the extent to which quality-
ensuring techniques and instruments were used throughout the study are commented on.  
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3.2. Qualitative research 
According to Doz (2011: 582), IB is “a rich, open and complex field of study, partly because 
the world is intrinsically rich and complex, but also because IB is free from any single core 
paradigm, does not pursue a single dominant central research question and does not abide by 
generally accepted simplifying assumptions that would drive the choice of research methods 
and tightly bound areas of research relevance”. While such a description would actually sug-
gest a significant amount of qualitative research approaches in order to provide answers to 
‘how’ or ‘why’ research questions around the complex nature of the field of study, the reality 
is somewhat different. The vast majority of articles in leading IB journals is still based on 
quantitative research methods (Welch, Piekkari, Plakoyiannaki & Paavilainen-Mäntymäki, 
2011) despite strong lobbying from leading IB scholars for more qualitative study approaches 
(e.g. Birkinshaw, Brannen & Tung, 2011). 
But what are the reasons for a limited spread of qualitative research studies and to what extent 
could they actually contribute to IB research? What makes internationalization processes of 
foreign subsidiaries a study worth approaching with a qualitative research design? Before 
seeking to provide answers to the proposed questions a short definition of the term qualitative 
research seems appropriate. According to Van Maanen (1979: 520), “the label qualitative 
methods has no precise meaning in any of the social sciences. It is at best an umbrella term 
covering an array of interpretive techniques which seek to describe, decode, translate, and 
otherwise come to terms with the meaning, not the frequency, of certain more or less naturally 
occurring phenomena in the social world.” Other than quantitative research, scientists that opt 
for qualitative research designs often know little about their actual unit of analysis and there-
fore often set the breeding ground for later quantitative verifications and/or falsifications (Doz, 
2011). Given the complexity and multidisciplinary of IB research it is therefore even more 
surprising that qualitative approaches have not sufficiently staked their claim in the past.  
Various explanations are provided by IB scholars for underrepresented qualitative research 
studies in related journals. Generally, the complex nature and the time-consuming research 
character associated with qualitative research methods are expected to put off many scientists 
in the first place (Pauwels & Matthyssens, 2004). A widely-spread preference for ‘hard facts’ 
as opposed to qualitative mid-term theory development among journal editors (Birkinshaw et 
al., 2011) as well as the presence of methodological vagueness among a number of scientists 
(Dubois & Gadde, 2002) have led to only limited recognition and valuation of qualitative 
studies in IB research up until today. This phenomenon is particularly disappointing in the 
field of IB research as it encompasses multiple facets of cultures, people and organizations 
and their impact on business operations across the globe. When referring to the ‘first-
handedness’ of qualitative research and the comprehensive understanding of cross-border 
characteristics among the international scholar community, Birkinshaw et al. (2011:574) not-
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ed that “it is tragic not to leverage such basic research skills and competencies toward strong 
and novel contributions to IB research”. 
According to Doz (2011), qualitative methods can strongly contribute to IB research in sever-
al dimensions. First and most importantly, it can act as a catalyst for theory development that 
the field of study is currently lacking as a result of dominant theory borrowing and juxtaposi-
tions from other fields or disciplines (e.g. transaction cost theory). Second, qualitative re-
search can also contribute to theory testing by bringing “a variety of theoretical lenses to bear 
on the phenomenon being investigated” and by systematically comparing “the nature and ex-
tent of the insights provided by these various theories” (Doz, 2011: 584). Finally, qualitative 
research may also significantly facilitate the process of outlining and highlighting of multiple 
theory dimensions through comprehensive descriptions and can thereby serve as a meaningful 
instrument for effectively communicating theory findings. Doz’s (2011) listing is of particular 
interest to the study at hand as the chosen qualitative research design with multiple case study 
analysis was aimed at contributing to the IB topic of subsidiary internationalization by all 
three dimensions.  
The selection of a qualitative research method was predominately driven by a lack of process 
research on subsidiary internationalization up to this point (Blankenburg Holm et al., 2009). 
In addition, meaningful studies on internationalization processes of the first degree (e.g. Jo-
hanson & Vahlne, 1977) suggested applying and testing existing theory at the subsidiary level 
of modern MNCs. Finally, the unit of analysis, internationalization processes involving stake-
holders at various ends of the firm, clearly indicated the use of qualitative data sources. As 
already noted by Miles and Huberman (1994: 1) on the first page of their oft-cited book, qual-
itative research methods allow the researcher to “preserve chronological flows, see precisely 
which events lead to which consequences, and derive fruitful explanations”. Having thorough-
ly contrasted the advantages and disadvantages of quantitative and qualitative research meth-
ods for the study at hand, a qualitative research approach was eventually selected.  
3.3. Overall research design 
While the selection of qualitative research as the appropriate method for the study at hand was 
relatively straightforward, the detailing of the explicit research design required considerably 
more efforts by the author and will be outlined in the following pages. According to Yin 
(2009), three different aspects need to be thoroughly evaluated when selecting the adequate 
qualitative research method from a variety of options: 
 Type of research question(s) 
 Extent of control over actual behavioral events related to the topic 
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 Degree of focus on contemporary events 
When referring back to the four research questions outlined earlier in the introductory chapter 
of this study, the explorative nature of the overall study goal becomes apparent. All defined 
questions, no matter whether they begin with ‘how’ or ‘why’, already suggested the use of 
case studies, histories or experiments as they “deal with operational links needing to be traced 
over a certain amount of time, rather than mere frequencies or incidence” (Yin, 2009: 9). In 
order to further distinguish between case studies, histories and experiments, the desired extent 
of control over behavioral events served as a good indicator for the appropriate research de-
sign. Experiments are generally used when researchers can exert a certain degree of influence 
over behaviors and are generally applied in social sciences rather than IB research (Yin, 2009). 
As the deliberate study aim was to understand the reasoning for behaviors in the form of man-
agement initiatives and decisions in modern MNCs, the experimental approach was soon ex-
cluded from the list of potential research methods.  
Finally, histories as already suggested by their nomenclature deal with the ‘dead’ past as op-
posed to case studies, which generally look at contemporary events. While the former ap-
proach predominately relies on historic data sources (e.g. archives), the latter also relies on 
direct observations of the events being studied or on interviews with relevant stakeholders 
who were part of the phenomenon under study. Despite applying a retrospective study per-
spective and thus looking at historic events of subsidiary internationalization, the study focus 
is clearly set on contemporary events and relies on contemporary data sources like interviews, 
annual reports or company websites as primary and secondary data sources. Having thus thor-
oughly contrasted different qualitative research methods as strongly suggested by Yin (2009), 
a case study design was chosen in order to shed light on peripheral internationalization pro-
cesses and linked management decisions at corporate and subsidiary level.  
With the selection of a case study approach, however, a guiding research framework had not 
yet been created. In fact, two questions still had to be answered: is the approach based on one 
or several cases and does it involve a single or multiple units of analysis? With regard to the 
first question, the decision between single and multiple case studies predominantly depends 
on the type of case(s) being studied. According to Yin (2009), five rationales exist for the use 
of a single case of which none were identified for the study at hand. As a result of a lack of 
prior research in the field of peripheral internationalization processes, the author was not ca-
pable of judging the existence of critical, unique or representative cases, which would all have 
suggested the use of a single case study approach. 
Moreover, the author could not count on a revelatory case, i.e. with a unit of analysis that was 
previously inaccessible to IB research and that could have also indicated the use of a single 
case (Yin, 2009). Finally the author was not able to rely on a longitudinal research design, i.e. 
the study of the same phenomenon at different times, which might have also pled for the con-
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ducting of a single case study. While the examination of internationalization processes at sub-
sidiary level and cross-border subsidiary mandate development through longitudinal research 
designs would have certainly contributed to the overall research, it was simply not possible 
for the author due to time and cost constraints as well as a lack of willingness among partici-
pating companies to being observed over a longer period of time. As a result a retrospective 
multiple case study approach was chosen. Despite such a backward-looking perspective, it 
should be noted at this stage already that for each case the subsidiary mandate beyond original 
host markets was reviewed at different periods of the past in order to allow the sketching and 
contrasting of mandate development paths across different MNCs.  
Even though the aforementioned selection criteria of Yin (2009) helped to shift the investiga-
tor’s focus towards a multiple case research design, they were most certainly not decisive. In 
fact, the ‘black box’ character of subsidiary internationalization processes with lacking under-
standing about core process drivers and restrictions across multiple organizational units and 
countries urged the author to apply a broader and more diversified picture to the topic and to 
thereby lose a certain degree of analysis depth. This is very much in line with Pauwels and 
Matthyssens’ (2004: 5) postulation that “the only argument to switch from single to multiple 
case study research (at the risk of losing depth) is to create more theory-driven variance and 
divergence in the data, not to create more of the same”. Other aspects like limited generaliza-
bility and potential misinterpretations in single case study designs (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1986) or augmented external validity (Leonard-Barton, 1990) and enhanced robustness of 
multiple case study designs (Herriott & Firestone, 1983) were further considered by the au-
thor but did not serve as a core argument due to statistical insignificance of the chosen case 
sample. 
Figure 3-1: Selected research design: Multiple cases with a single unit of analysis 
 
Source: Own illustration, based on Yin (2009) 
Finally, the unit of analysis for all cases being investigated was subsidiary internationalization 
processes throughout the entire study. The chosen research approach as shown in Figure 3-1 
above can therefore be classified as a holistic case study not involving any further sub-units of 

















measures or data (Yin, 2009), were deliberately addressed by defining a set of adequate a-
priori constructs in order to steer the overall data collection process from the very start of the 
undertaking. Overall, a-priori constructs, which will be highlighted in more depth at a later 
stage of this chapter, helped the investigator to avoid an overly general approach on the one 
hand and to stay within feasible limits of a single student PhD study on the other. 
3.3.1. Case selection 
According to Eisenhardt (1989b: 537), the case selection process is crucial to the overall suc-
cess of a comparative case study design for three particular reasons: it “defines the set of enti-
ties from which the research sample is to be drawn”, it “controls extraneous variations” and it 
“helps to define limits for generalizing the findings”. While the contribution of this process 
would be maximized from infinite access to cases, the reality is somewhat different as the 
spectrum of potential cases is often constrained by several aspects. Nonetheless a significant 
amount of effort and time was spent by the investigator in order to come up with a suitable 
sample of cases for the topic of subsidiary internationalization. The overall process as well as 
its outcome will therefore be outlined in more depth in the following pages. 
Case sampling was carried out in three rounds. During the first stage, more than fifty North 
American and European firms in the manufacturing industry were approached in order to as-
sess the existence of cases of subsidiary internationalization and the company’s willingness to 
participate in the study. The industry sector as well as geography selection was clearly linked 
to a wide range of existing relationships of the investigator’s consulting company as well as 
personal experience and contacts of the investigator as a result of almost five years of consul-
tancy work prior to this study. Regarding specific industry segments within the manufacturing 
industry or value chain positioning, however, no limitations were set. As original equipment 
manufacturers (OEM) or original equipment suppliers (OES), the selected companies thus 
ranged from segments like construction and agricultural equipment to engines or trucks. 
Overall, it should be noted that the initial industry selection did not follow any scientific guid-
ance, e.g. the replication of manufacturing case companies from the Uppsala model (Johanson 
& Vahlne, 1977), but was predominately driven by access to decision-makers and their likeli-
hood of participating in the study. Nonetheless, during his prior consulting projects in various 
countries the author came across multiple cases of subsidiary internationalization, which 
strengthened his intention to search for examples in the manufacturing industry. 
Throughout the first round of sampling, the author paid particular attention to a high level of 
heterogeneity with regard to company size, ownership status as well as level of subsidiary 
delegation and internationalization experience. As a result, seven MNCs were identified that 
not only revealed one or several historic cases of subsidiary internationalization processes but 
that were also willing to participate in the study. The profiles of the participating companies 
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are shown in Table 3-1. While corporate headquarters of all companies were located in West-
ern Europe, the firms strongly varied with regard to further company characteristics. The final 
sample encompassed publicly-listed companies, family-owned enterprises as well as one rela-
tively independent unit of a larger conglomerate that significantly differed by company size. 
Sales volume of the largest company, for example, exceeded its counterpart at the smallest 
company more than tenfold. Furthermore, the level of internationalization experience, indicat-
ed by the time of first proactive and large-scale internationalization efforts of a company, as 
well as the relevance of affiliated subsidiaries, indicated by the mere number of foreign MNC 
units and the existence of regional headquarters, strongly differed from one case company to 
another.  In order to preserve requested confidentiality agreements that were signed with par-
ticipating firms at the offset of the study, case companies were labeled from ‘A’ to ‘G’ as il-
lustrated in Table 3-1 below. 
Table 3-1: Profiles of participating firms 
Source: Publicly available company information; expert interviews 
During the next case sampling phase, potential cases were further assessed and compared by 
shifting the focus to foreign subsidiary characteristics like location, local value-add as well as 
the region for extended market responsibility. Finally, the author sought a negative example, 
i.e. when a subsidiary requested market responsibility for outside its host market but eventual-
ly did not obtain headquarter approval for its initiative. Such sampling of extreme cases or 
polar types is expected to lead to “very clear pattern recognition of the central constructs, rela-
tionships, and logic of the focal phenomenon” (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007: 27). As sug-
gested by Yin (2009: 54), the study thus followed a replication as opposed to a sampling logic 
so that it “either (a) predicts similar results (a literal replication) or (b) predicts contrasting 
results but for anticipatable reasons (a theoretical replication)”. In total, the study examined 
internationalization processes at ten foreign subsidiaries of seven European manufacturing 
companies. The case sample thereby encompassed eleven initiatives for subsidiary responsi-
bility beyond original host markets, of which nine obtained HQ approval (cases #1 to #9) and 
two failed to obtain HQ buy-in (cases #10a and #10b). The latter negative case examples are 





Ownership status Sales MNC units (#) RHQ(s) 
A Northern Europe Conglomerate unit < €0.5 bn < 15 No 1990s 
B Central Europe Family-owned  < €0.5 bn < 15 No 2000s 
C Central Europe Publicly-listed  €0.5 bn – 2.0 bn 15 – 30 Yes 1980s 
D Central Europe Family-owned  > €2.0 bn > 30 No 1950s 
E Central Europe Publicly-listed  > €2.0 bn > 30 Yes 1970s 
F Central Europe Family-owned  €0.5 bn – 2.0 bn 15 – 30 Yes 1970s 
G Central Europe Family-owned  > €2.0 bn > 30 No 1960s 
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both referring to a French subsidiary that repeatedly failed to receive a market development 
mandate for Northern Africa. With the exception of two cases (#3 and #9), all foreign market 
mandates were subject to subsequent modifications initiated either by headquarter or subsidi-
ary management, which were further analyzed in the course of the study. The case sample, 
which is also characterized by its heterogeneity regarding subsidiary location and geograph-
ical mandate scope, is shown in Table 3-2 below.   
Table 3-2: Profiles of parent companies, foreign subsidiaries and investigated cases 
 
The overall case selection process took almost a year as cases were subsequently and only 
gradually added to the overall sample. The significant time gap allowed the investigator to 
incorporate findings from earlier cases into the sampling process, which strongly added to the 
overall quality (Yin, 2009). The more light that was shed into the ‘black box’ of subsidiary 
internationalization processes, the better the author could search for cases that would replicate 
or contrast with preliminary findings. Overall, cases were added to the sample until emerging 
frameworks and mid-term theories were backed by sufficient evidence. It should also be noted 
that time, resource and budget constraints also impacted the total number of cases. This is, 
however, in line with Eisenhardt’s (1989b: 545) note that “in practice, theoretical saturation 
often combines with pragmatic considerations such as time and money to dictate when case 
collection ends”. A further statement of Eisenhardt (1989b) that four to ten cases usually serve 
as an adequate sample for comparative case study analysis further supported the notion that a 
sound level of theoretical saturation was achieved at the end of the case sampling process. 
3.3.2. Data sources and collection methods 
One of the major strengths of a case study approach is its ability to draw from a variety of 
sources and thereby to allow data triangulation (Yin, 2009). In addition, case study research 
Firm Parent company 
location 
Case # Subsidiary 
location 




A Northern Europe 1 Poland Former CIS countries Yes Yes 
2 Spain Latin America Yes Yes 
B Central Europe 3 Singapore East Asia / Oceania Yes No 
C Central Europe 4 Austria Eastern Europe Yes Yes 
5 China Asia-Pacific Yes Yes 
D Central Europe 6 Singapore Southeast Asia Yes Yes 
E Central Europe 7 Singapore East Asia Yes Yes 
F Central Europe 8 USA Mexico Yes Yes 
G Central Europe 9 Brazil South America Yes No 
10a  France Northern Africa No - 
10b France Northern Africa No - 
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can involve qualitative data only, quantitative data only or both (Yin, 2009). Moreover, the 
data collection process can be enhanced by numerous methods like interviews, observations 
or documents and can be executed by a single or multiple investigators (Eisenhardt, 1989b). 
The benefits of multiple methods and investigators are twofold. First, it is expected to reduce 
potential measurement errors (Kumar, Stern & Anderson, 1993) and second it is likely to 
build upon the internal validity of the study by investigating a phenomenon from a number of 
different angles (Pauwels & Matthyssens, 2004). Finally, qualitative researchers can make use 
of computer software in order to facilitate the overall data storage and retrieval process (Miles 
& Huberman, 1994). Looking at the variety of options with regard to data sources and collec-
tion methods, the following pages are aimed at explaining the author’s rationale for the pur-
sued data gathering path. 
With regard to data sources of the study, semi-structured interviews with key process stake-
holders in the parent company and the focal subsidiary served as a main source of information. 
Only cases #9, #10a and #10b deviated from this norm in the sense that only exchange with 
an HQ representative was permitted. For these cases corporate management was unfortunately 
afraid that any exchange with local management on the study topic could dissuade local man-
agement from its core tasks (case #9) or may actually revive its wish to obtain extended geo-
graphical responsibility (cases #10a and #10b). An overview of interview partners across all 
eleven cases is offered by Table 3-3 below.  
Primary data input on the same topic from corporate and subsidiary management and there-
fore from both ends of the MNC, i.e. “synchronic primary data source triangulation” (Pauwels 
& Matthyssens, 2004: 6), was particularly important to the study as it allowed the investigator 
to “slice vertically through the organization, obtaining data from multiple levels and perspec-
tives” (Leonard-Barton, 1990: 249). The pronounced suitability of interviews for the under-
standing of change processes and management decisions (Gummesson, 2000) further encour-
aged the investigator to make them the core of the data sources for the study. A semi-
structured interview design was deliberately chosen in order to allow the interviewee to tell 
his story about the relatively unexplored topic of subsidiary internationalization and to expand 
the interview focus beyond previously defined aspects or proposed questions (Rubin & Rubin, 
1995). While an interview guideline that was sent out prior to the exchange helped the inter-
viewee to prepare for the topic and allowed for a structured approach, it was not by any means 




Table 3-3: Overview of interview participants and number of interviews 
In addition to gathering data from personal interviews, publicly available sources were used in 
order to extend and diversify the data set and thereby to allow additional perspectives. While 
company press releases, annual reports and newsletters in particular helped to build further 
evidence around the parent company’s perspective on the topic under study, sources like 
newspapers and journal articles were leveraged to provide an external and thus more objective 
view on the firm’s management decisions and actions. As suggested by Yin (2009), these 
documents helped to enrich the input from interviews at corporate and subsidiary level and 
served as a means to obtain a clearer picture of the overall setting of the investigated phenom-
ena (Marshall & Rossmann, 1999). Stating the usefulness of documents and web-based in-
formation, the investigator was aware of the fact that any document may be subject to indi-
vidual purposes and may therefore lead to further questions (Gummesson, 2000). Overall, the 
focus was clearly set on gathering qualitative data points from interviews as they were con-
sidered to be best suited to explain decision-making processes at corporate and subsidiary 
level. In addition, most other sources did not turn out to significantly enrich findings from 
interviews as they did not offer sufficient depth for the specific topic of subsidiary interna-
tionalization. However, data sources like annual reports and corporate or subsidiary websites 
greatly helped the author to quickly obtain a broad understanding of the case setting. An 
overview of all primary and secondary data sources is provided by Table 3-4 below.  
Firm Case # Parent company # of interviews Focal subsidiary # of interviews 
A 1 Group Sales Director  2 (including initial  
exploratory discussion) 
CEO 1 
2  CEO 1 
B 3 Director Marketing  2 (including initial  
exploratory discussion) 
CEO 1 
C 4 Senior Vice President, 
Head of Corporate 
Development  
2 (including initial  
exploratory discussion) 
CEO 1 
5 CEO 1 
D 6 Commercial Director  2 (including initial  
exploratory discussion) 
CEO 1 
E 7 Vice President Distri-
bution Sales  
2 (including initial  
exploratory discussion) 
CEO 1 
F 8 Head of Sales & Mar-
keting 
2 (including initial  
exploratory discussion) 
CEO 1 
G 9 Head of Sales  2 (including initial  
exploratory discussion) 
Not permitted - 
 10a  Not permitted - 
10b  Not permitted - 
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Table 3-4: Primary and secondary data sources with varying topic perspectives 






























sent confirmed sent confirmed 
1 √ √ - √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
2 √ √ - √ √ √ √ √ - √ √ √ 
3 √ √ √ √ - √ √ √ √ - √ √ 
4 √ √ - √ - √ √ √ √ - √ √ 
5 √ √ - √ - √ √ √ √ - √ √ 
6 √ √ √ √ - √ √ √ √ - √ √ 
7 √ √ - √ √ √ √ √ √ - √ √ 
8 √ √ - √ - √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
9 √ √ √ √ √ √ - - - √ √ √ 
10a √ √ √ √ √ √ - - - √ √ √ 
10b √ √ √ √ √ √ - - - √ √ √ 
Following each direct exchange with relevant process stakeholders an interview summary 
along with a request for approval or modification was sent to the interviewees. The aim of the 
summary was to enhance the credibility of interview findings and to avoid potential misun-
derstandings by the investigator. The column interview summary for parent company as well 
as focal subsidiary stakeholders was subdivided into ‘sent’ and ‘confirmed’ in order to high-
light the cases for which the proposed interview summary was confirmed by the interviewee 
either orally or in written form. While all but one recipient (case #2) at subsidiary level re-
sponded to the request, a reply from HQ representatives in cases #1, #2, #4, #5, #7 and #8 
could not be obtained. Due to the voluntarily nature of the study participation, however, the 
confirmation was not enforced by follow-up calls or additional e-mails.  
The number of conversations with selected MNC stakeholders in the form of telephone inter-
views, face-to-face meetings or e-mail correspondence varied from one case to another. None-
theless, each primary data source was tapped at least twice so that “diachronic primary data 
source triangulation” (Pauwels & Matthyssens, 2004: 6), i.e. subsequent input from the same 
source on the same topic, was also achieved throughout the data collection processes. Relying 
on primary and secondary data source triangulation as well as synchronic and diachronic pri-
mary data source triangulation, the study at hand fulfilled one of the key pillars for robust case 
study architectures as suggested by Pauwels and Matthyssens (2004). Another form of trian-
                                                     
5
 Press releases, company newsletters or company magazines. 
6
 Local websites with country-specific content. 
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gulation throughout the data collection process, observer or investigator triangulation, could 
not be achieved as the study was carried out by a single investigator. 
In order to prepare the data collection processes the investigator strongly relied on a-priori 
constructs and propositions. As suggested by Yin (2009), this approach helped the investiga-
tor to move in the right direction at the very beginning of the undertaking. It further facilitated 
the shaping of the initial design, e.g. the guideline for semi-structured interviews, and allowed 
a more accurate measurement of the data once it had been collected. At the offset of the study, 
the investigator did not know how many interview partners he would eventually generate or 
how often he could seek information from each source, so he wanted to maximize the inter-
view output and study contribution from the very start. The approach is very much in line 
with Mintzberg’s (1979: 585) recommendation for qualitative case study researchers to al-
ways “go into organizations with a well-defined focus” and to “collect specific kinds of data 
systematically”. Moreover, if a-priori constructs prove to be important in the course of the 
study, the researcher “has a firmer empirical grounding for the emergent theory” (Eisenhardt, 
1989b: 536).  
While the instrument provided significant guidance at the very start of the study, it should be 
clearly noted that all constructs and propositions were tentative and shifted as the PhD under-
taking unfolded. The selected approach is supported by Miles and Huberman (1994: 50) in 
their urging of early analysis as “it helps the field-worker cycle back and forth between think-
ing about the existing data and generating strategies for collecting new, often better, data”. 
The starting list of a-priori constructs and propositions is highlighted in Table 3-5 below. 
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Table 3-5: A-priori constructs at the offset of the study 
A-priori construct / proposition Aim Potential data source(s) Extant theory (ex-
cerpt) 
Knowledge flows at the focal subsidi-
ary  
Understand-




Semi-structured interviews Gupta & Govindarajan 
(1991) 
Autonomy of the focal subsidiary  Semi-structured interviews Birkinshaw (1997) 
Corporate entrepreneurship at the 
focal subsidiary 
Semi-structured interviews Knight (1997) 
Capabilities / profile of the focal sub-
sidiary  
Semi-structured interviews, 
websites, annual reports, other
7
 
Bouquet & Birkinshaw 
(2008) 
Strategic relevance of the focal subsid-
iary’s host market  
Semi-structured interviews, 
websites, annual reports, other
7
  
Bartlett and Ghoshal 
(1986)  
Value-add of the focal subsidiary Semi-structured interviews, 
websites, annual reports, other
7
 
Bouquet & Birkinshaw 
(2008)  
Degree of external embeddedness of 
the focal subsidiary 
Semi-structured interviews Forsgren et al. (2005) 
Altering network positioning of the 








Semi-structured interviews Johanson & Mattsson 
(1986) 
Altering levels of knowledge and 
network insidership in the MNC 
Semi-structured interviews Johanson & Vahlne 
(2009)  
Altering resource configurations with-
in the MNC 
Semi-structured interviews, 
websites, annual reports, other
7
 
Teece & Pisano (1994)  
Altering parameters outside the focal 
subsidiary (HQ, sister units, external) 
Semi-structured interviews Forsgren et al. (2005) 
Proven resources and trustworthiness 






Semi-structured interviews Bouquet & Birkinshaw 
(2008) 
Initiative channel / exchange setting Semi-structured interviews Shelby (1986) 
HQ knowledge about the subsidiaries’ 
external network 
Semi-structured interviews Andersson et al. 
(2007) 
Level of  exchange between HQ and 
focal subsidiary  
Semi-structured interviews Birkinshaw (1997)  
Based on the initially defined research questions and inspired by multiple streams of literature, 
the a-priori constructs were split into three different blocks. While overall information and 
data about the focal subsidiary, including its positioning within the MNC, was relevant for all 
three research questions, other constructs were only related to the identification of interna-
tional business opportunities at corporate or subsidiary level or to the allocation of resources 
to peripheral international business opportunities. In addition, the overall data collection pro-
cess was not limited to the defined constructs, even at the beginning of the study. Given the 
inductive character of the defined case study design, the investigator was at all stages open to 
new findings and theory. The guiding principle throughout the study was thus a continuous 
iteration between findings and existing theory. Such flexibility is shown for example by the 
                                                     
7
 Press releases, company newsletters or company magazines. 
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development of an additional research question and a detailed examination of the evolution of 
foreign market mandates at foreign subsidiaries that was not expected to represent a major 
part of the PhD study at the start of the research undertaking. 
With regard to data retrieval and storage, all semi-structured interviews, i.e. excluding initial  
exploratory discussions with HQ managers, were recorded with a voice recorder with the ex-
plicit permission of all interview partners. The author therefore followed Yin’s (2009: 109) 
argument that “audiotapes certainly provide a more accurate rendition of any interview than 
any other methods”. Following the initial data retrieval, recorded interviews were transcribed 
to a Microsoft Word document and uploaded to the specialized qualitative research software 
NVivo9
8
 in order to allow subsequent data coding and analysis. Throughout this process the 
author relied on external interview transcription services in order to cope with the vast amount 
of recorded data points and to stay within the initially defined timeframe of the study. All in-
terview transcripts were thoroughly examined and corrected if interview records were not 
adequately reproduced by external interview transcription services. While the overall record-
ing and transcribing process created a vast amount of raw data it was clear from the start that 
only certain parts of each interview were actually capable of contributing to the understanding 
of subsidiary internationalization. Nonetheless, the author was not able to rely on other means 
to execute a comprehensive data coding and analysis process for the study.   
3.3.3. Data analysis 
According to Eisenhardt (1989b: 539), data analysis is “the heart of building theory from case 
studies, but it is both the most difficult and the least codified part of the process”. The diffi-
culty in analyzing qualitative data points is due to the limited amount of guiding rules or fixed 
procedures that are offered to qualitative researchers. Yin (2009: 127) supported this point by 
stating that “much depends on an investigator’s own style of rigorous empirical thinking, 
along with the sufficient presentation of evidence and careful consideration of alternative in-
terpretations”. Given the complexity of qualitative data analysis, the following pages will be 
dedicated to illustrating the overall analysis process, from initial coding to subsequent inter-
pretation, and to describing and justifying the instruments and techniques that were chosen in 
order to develop sufficient support and evidence for the study findings. 
Data analysis involved within- and cross-case analysis, with the former preceding the latter. 
Within-case analysis strongly helped to deal with the vast amount of data at the early stage 
and provided the investigator with a rich familiarity with the individual case (Eisenhardt, 
1989b). While, as outlined above, there is no existence of standards or rules for such analysis, 
                                                     
8
 NVivo9 is a software for qualitative research and is aimed at helping researchers with unstructured information 
like documents, surveys, audio, video and pictures (more information is available at 
www.qsrinternational.com). 
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Miles and Huberman (1994: 50-89) suggested eight early analysis techniques that were thor-
oughly considered at the start of the analysis process. Due to time and resource constraints as 
well as insufficient suitability of certain aspects for the study at hand, not all eight methods 
were extensively used by the author. Nonetheless, this is in line with Miles and Huberman 
(1994), who highlighted potential benefits of each technique but did not state that exhaustive 
use should be made of them. Table 3-6 below provides an overview of the proposed analysis 
techniques and shows to what extent they were leveraged in the course of the study. 
Table 3-6: Use of techniques for within-case analysis throughout the study 
# Method Description Aim Use in study 
1 Contact sum-
mary sheet 
Single sheet with focusing or 
summarizing questions about 
the case 
Avoidance of getting lost in detail at 




Assigning descriptive or infer-
ential codes to information 
(often raw data) 
Avoidance of data overload through 
data packaging 
Yes 
3 Second-level / 
pattern coding 
Assigning explanatory or infer-
ential codes to information  
Identification of emergent themes, 
configurations or explanations 
Yes 
4 Memoing Write-up of ideas about codes 
and their relationships 
Bundling of data pieces into recog-
nizable clusters 
Limited 
5 Case analysis 
meeting 
Summary of current case status 
to another critical person 
Challenging of preliminary findings 
from an external perspective  
Yes 
6 Interim case 
summary 
Provisional synthesis of case 
data and findings 
Outlining of status quo and open 
issues until final case report  
Yes 
7 Vignette Description of a series of repre-
sentative or typical events  





Structured template to be gradu-
ally filled after each field visit 
Limiting descriptive material and 
encouraging reflective remarks  
No 
Source: Own illustration, based on Miles & Huberman (1994: 50-89) 
Throughout the within-case analysis process it soon became apparent that many of the pro-
posed techniques actually build on one another. The contact summary sheet, for instance, 
which was developed by making notes on crucial case elements immediately after each inter-
view, helped to guide the first and second-level coding process. Increasingly interpretative 
coding through triangulation of data sources from headquarter and subsidiary level allowed 
the author to transform initial notes from the contact summary sheet into interim case sum-
maries that were sent out to each interview partner for approval purposes. Other techniques 
like memoing or vignettes, which due to time constraints were only leveraged to a limited 
degree, thereby helped to sharpen initial process explanations.  
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After the first three cases a summary of preliminary findings along with an interim case report 
was sent to the guiding professor at the University of Fribourg in order to gain an additional 
perspective, i.e. from investigator triangulation and to make sure that the study is advancing in 
the right direction. This form of case analysis meeting proved to be of great help as the inves-
tigator was forced to bring initial ideas to paper and to obtain a critical review at the early 
stage of the study. In turn, he received valuable feedback from his experienced professor. A 
pre-structured case was not elaborated prior to analyzing case data, predominately as a result 
of the inductive research nature and thus lacking conceptual framework at this stage of the 
study. Overall, the data coding process marked the heart of the within-case analysis and will 
therefore be presented in more detail in the following pages.  
Table 3-7: Initial and predominately descriptive list of codes 




Opportunity-identification and initiative-taking  Locus 
Drivers 
Rent-seeking and responsibility-allocation  HQ–SUB exchange 
Drivers 
Mandate alteration  Mandate alteration 
Drivers 
Mandate outlook  Mandate outlook 
Drivers 
Following the data gathering from various sources, all information was uploaded to the soft-
ware NVivo9. At this stage data was not classified by relevance or explanatory character but 
exclusively by case number (cases #1 to #10b), source type (interview, annual reports, news-
paper article etc.) and perspective (corporate headquarters, focal subsidiary, external). As a 
next step the ‘raw data’ was comprehensively coded, which turned out to be a highly time-
consuming but unavoidable task, especially for case study analysis. Adhering to Miles and 
Huberman (1994: 57), coding was carried out in three rounds. First, descriptive codes were 
added to relevant paragraphs of interview transcripts or other documents. The main purpose 
of the activity was to classify document sections into various phases of peripheral internation-
alization processes and to equip them with main topic themes. Initial coding thus entailed on-
ly limited degrees of interpretation. Table 3-7 above shows the initial list of codes that were 
consistently differentiated by source type and thus topic perspective. 
As a next step, defined themes and sub-themes were further examined moving from predomi-
nately descriptive coding to increasingly interpretative coding. The investigator thereby relied 
on previously defined a-priori constructs from literature in the field of internationalization 
processes and other related topics as thoroughly outlined earlier in this chapter. As shown in 
Table 3-8 below, the second round of data coding resulted in a slightly modified set of sub-
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themes as well as the need for additional sub-sub-themes. The differentiation by perspectives 
was maintained for the second coding round. It should be noted that the first and second lists 
of codes only represent snapshots of the overall coding process. In fact, in between these two 
lists significant effort and time was spent on coding and recoding in order to reach a point that 
reflected the contents observed in eleven cases of subsidiary internationalization well. 
Table 3-8: Second and increasingly interpretative lists of codes 





Initiative facilitator Target market size / growth 
Cross-border knowledge / networks 









Strategic priority / focus 
Subsidiary-related factors 
  
Subsidiary capabilities / trustworthiness 
Subsidiary networks 
Externally-related factors Target market size / growth 







HR / organizational change 
Processes  
Results 
Drivers of mandate gain 
  
Subsidiary capabilities / trustworthiness 
Host / target market characteristics 
Drivers of mandate loss 
  
  
Subsidiary capabilities / trustworthiness 
Host / target market characteristics 
Target market company presence 
After the early analysis phase, the author sought to understand in more depth the causal rela-
tions between process elements of subsidiary internationalization. The desired outcome of this 
form of within-case analysis was the identification of individual case patterns. In the words of 
Yin (2009: 134), pattern-matching logic “compares an empirically based pattern with a pre-
dicted one (or with several alternative predictions). If the patterns coincide, the results can 
help a case study to strengthen its internal validity.” Again, Miles and Huberman (1994) of-
fered a set of methods for a better understanding of what events are taking place, how they are 
evolving and why they are proceeding in a particular form. Their emphasis is thereby set on 
ways to display data points so that the investigator can more easily attribute meaning to them. 
While all of their suggestions were thoroughly evaluated, the author chose the following three 
techniques that proved to be of great help throughout the process: (1) critical incident charts; 
(2) event-state networks; (3) case dynamics matrixes. For all three techniques the author re-
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lied on time-ordered displays as they are “preserving the historical chronological flow and 
permitting a good look at what led to what, and when” (Miles & Huberman, 1994: 110). 
As the three techniques made up the core of the within-case analysis, which is described in 
detail in the following chapter, a closer look at their principles and objectives and how they 
were leveraged in the course of this study seems appropriate. According to Pettigrew (1997: 
338), a process is “a sequence of individual and collective events, actions, and activities un-
folding over time in context”. In the same article Pettigrew (1997: 338) further stated that the 
main objective of a processual analysis is to “account for and explain the what, why and how 
of the links between context, processes and outcomes”. In order to carve out the ‘what’ aspect 
of processual analysis the author relied on critical incidents charts that allowed the extraction 
of important events, actions and activities from a vast amount of qualitative data points and to 
select those incidents that play a critical role for subsidiary internationalization. Critical role 
thereby equally relates to setting the breeding ground for subsidiary internationalization pro-
cesses, for stimulating actions or behavior of process stakeholders and for determining the 
direction of mandate evolution.   
In all critical incident charts that are first shown in Figure 4-1 in the next chapter, time goes 
horizontally, generally from the establishment of the focal subsidiary until the current outlook 
of HQ management on future mandate development. In line with the time axis the chart is 
horizontally further split into initial mandate gain, composed of an opportunity-identification 
and a responsibility-allocation phase, and mandate development, composed of a mandate de-
velopment and mandate outlook part. With the exception of mandate outlook, which refers to 
actions or activities anticipated by process stakeholders, the chart exclusively outlines histori-
cal incidents. Vertically the chart is further broken down by the type of process stakeholder, 
i.e. whether events, actions and activities were carried out or planned by HQ personnel, by 
subsidiary management or by elements outside the MNC. Finally it is worth mentioning that 
the charts represent a synopsis of qualitative data points provided by interviews with corpo-
rate and subsidiary management as well as external sources. They therefore already contain a 
certain degree of analytical consolidation of multiple perspectives. 
According to Miles and Huberman (1994: 115), critical incident charts allow the investigator 
to “limit an event listing to those events seen as critical, influential, or decisive in the course 
of some process”. For the topic of subsidiary internationalization it meant that only those in-
cidents were highlighted that directly or indirectly impacted opportunity-identification, initia-
tive-taking, rent-seeking and responsibility-allocation processes and thus strongly shaped the 
evolutionary path of cross-border subsidiary mandates. Overall, critical incident charts not 
only helped to extract the most relevant information from a pile of data but also allowed the 
influential and decisive process elements to be carved out. In addition, putting these critical 
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incidents into chronological order empowered the investigator to get a first picture of potential 
causal relationships. 
Nonetheless, when elaborating critical incident charts it soon became apparent that incidents 
can be of different natures. While some incidents related to explicit and immediate actions of 
process stakeholders within and outside the MNC, others referred more to altering conditions 
that took place over longer periods of time. Especially evolutionary process elements that 
were identified across the entire case sample lacked an event character, so it was difficult to 
assign a specific date to them. Event-state networks, which are first illustrated in Figure 4-2 of 
the next chapter, thereby emerged as a meaningful instrument. They were predominately de-
veloped in order to approach the ‘how’ aspect of processual analysis, i.e. to illustrate how 
process elements are linked to each other. The objective of an event-state network is generally 
twofold. First, it allows a differentiation between events (shown as boxes) that “imply speci-
ficity and a narrow time span” and states (shown as bubbles) that “imply more diffuseness, 
less concreteness, existence over a longer time” (Miles & Huberman, 1994: 115). For subsidi-
ary internationalization, states may serve as facilitating conditions or links between actual 
process elements. Second, by connecting boxes and bubbles, event-state networks helped to 
clarify causal relationships between incidents. Similar to critical incident charts, event-state 
networks maintain the differentiation between the type of process stakeholder, i.e. corporate 
headquarters (displayed in grey), local subsidiary (displayed in white) and elements outside 
the MNC (displayed in shaded grey). Event-state networks can also be viewed chronically 
from left to right. Due to shortage of space, however, sequences are also displayed from top to 
bottom and vice versa so that the time axis should only be viewed as indicative. 
Critical incident charts and event-state networks helped the author to clearly understand and 
carve out ‘what’ was happening in each case and ‘how’ internationalization processes unfold-
ed. In addition, by continuously differentiating between the locus of incidents as well as 
events and states (corporate headquarters, focal subsidiary and external) both techniques also 
added clarity on ‘where’ process elements were taking place. They did not, however, provide 
sufficient guidance on ‘why’ the internationalization process of a foreign subsidiary unfolded 
in a particular form. Case dynamics matrixes, which are first outlined in  
Table 4-4 of the next chapter, finally combined the outcome of the two aforementioned tech-
niques and added an explanatory description to stimuli, causes and effects related to processes 
of subsidiary internationalization and evolutionary paths of cross-border subsidiary mandates. 
They therefore represent the most complex within-case analysis technique and seek to holisti-
cally explain the ‘what’, ‘why’ and ‘how’ aspects of processual analysis. Miles and Huberman 
(1994: 148) urged qualitative researchers to make use of this instrument as it “displays a set of 
forces for change and traces the consequential processes and outcomes”.  
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For each critical incident that happened within or outside the MNC, case dynamics matrixes 
outline the individual trigger, cause and effect on corporate as well as subsidiary level. They 
therefore allowed an understanding of individual case patterns, which serve as the basis for 
cross-case analyses that are outlined in depth in chapter 5 (Figure 5-1). Case dynamics ma-
trixes can take various forms (Miles & Huberman, 1994: 151) and the focus of those used in 
this study were to clearly understand what events stimulated subsidiary internationalization, 
what facilitating conditions or rationales made process stakeholders take the initiative and 
what impact these initiatives had on HQ and subsidiary personnel. 
Following the within-case analysis process, identified individual case patterns were thorough-
ly compared with each other. Key to such “literal and theoretical replication across cases” 
(Pauwels & Matthyssens, 2004: 7) or cross-case analysis (Miles & Huberman, 1994) is look-
ing at data points and blocks in many divergent ways. By doing so, Eisenhardt (1989b) urged 
case study investigators to take advantage of three tactics that were all used in the course of 
the study. First, define categories or dimensions that separate cases from each other and allow 
the investigator to identify within-group similarities and intergroup differences. Even though 
this task was already initiated throughout the case sampling process with the aim of identify-
ing similar as well as polar cases, it was significantly intensified for the purpose of cross-case 
analysis. As highlighted in Table 3-9 below, a total of nine categories were used in order to 
develop initial cross-case patterns.  
Table 3-9: Categories and classification of cases for cross-case analysis 
# Category Classification of cases 
1 Locus of initiative-taking Parent company (cases #5, #6, #7 and #9), subsidiary (cases #1, #2, #3, 
#4, #8, #10a and #10b) 
2 Date of initiative-taking Before subsidiary establishment (cases #3, #6 and #7), past subsidiary 
establishment (cases #1, #2, #4, #5, #8, #9, #10a and #10b) 
3 Outcome of initial request Positive (cases #1 to #9), negative (cases #10a and #10b) 
4 Functional mandate scope  Market responsibility (cases #1, #2, #3, #4, #6 and #9), regional HQ 
(cases #5, #7 and #8) 
5 Subsequent mandate devel-
opment 
Extension (cases #2, #4, #5, #6, #7 and #8), reduction (cases #1 and #7), 
preservation (cases #3 and #9) 
6 HQ mandate outlook Positive (case #5), negative (cases #1, #2, #3, #4, #6, #7, #8 and #9) 
7 HQ–subsidiary relative dis-
tance 
Low (cases #1, #2, #4, #10a and #10b), high (cases #3, #5, #6, #7, #8 
and #9) 
8 MNC relative size Small (cases #1, #2 and #3), medium (cases #4, #5 and #8), high (cases 
#6, #7, #9, #10a and #10b) 
9 MNC relative foreign market 
experience 
Low (cases #1, #2 and #3), medium (cases #4 and #5), high (cases #6, 
#7, #8, #9, #10a and #10b) 
Having elaborated a set of case differentiation criteria, the second cross-case analysis tech-
nique of Eisenhardt (1989b) of selecting case pairs and listing process similarities and differ-
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ences represented the logical next step. While all categories directly or indirectly helped the 
author to gradually craft cross-case patterns, categories 3 to 6 were particularly well-suited for 
this task for different reasons. Contrasting two negative to nine positive cases, for instance, 
helped to identify minimum requirements that a foreign subsidiary needs to fulfill in order to 
reach beyond national borders. Comparing foreign market mandates with regard to their func-
tional scope shed light on what HQ-related, subsidiary-related as well as external factors de-
termine how far foreign market responsibility can eventually stretch. Looking at positive as 
well as negative mandate alterations following the initial responsibility gain further revealed 
process drivers beyond those identified at the offset of the subsidiary internationalization pro-
cess. Putting numerous cases with negative HQ outlook on local foreign market mandates in 
contrast to one single positive outlook helped to get an idea about the sustainability of such 
mandates and the degree of influence that local subsidiary management actually plays in the 
overall process. The final advice for cross-case analysis from Eisenhardt (1989b) – to separate 
data by different data sources and to hereby look at the evidence from various perspectives – 
was actually used from the very start of the analysis process, as data coding was persistently 
differentiated by perspectives and thus by data source. 
Once a pattern model of internationalization processes of foreign subsidiaries had emerged 
from within- and cross-case analyses it was thoroughly compared to IB and related literature 
streams. The aim of such analytical generalization was to strengthen internal validity, general-
izability and theoretical level of the chosen inductive case study approach. This task is partic-
ularly important for theory-building research as the investigator backs his findings on only a 
limited number of cases (Eisenhardt, 1989b). The benefits of this task are highlighted by 
Pauwels and Matthyssens (2004: 7), who stated that “the outcome of this analytical generali-
sation may indicate incompatibility with existing theories, which requires additional research, 
or overlap, which indicates that the ‘new’ mid-range theory is nothing more than a (partial) 
rephrasing of an existing theory”. Adhering to this statement, the investigator paid particular 
attention to finding confirming as well as conflicting literature for his pattern models in order 
to gradually develop a mid-range theory for peripheral internationalization processes and the 
evolution and sustainability of subsidiary mandates beyond original host markets. 
Triangulation of perspectives to the same data set, also referred to as theory triangulation (Pat-
ton, 2002), was initially based on a-priori constructs, as outlined earlier in this chapter. None-
theless, due to the relatively unexplored research topic of subsidiary internationalization it 
soon became apparent that further theory was needed for the comparison of emerging patterns. 
Amongst others, risk dimensions in internationalization processes (e.g. Figueira-de-Lemos et 
al., 2011), cross-border and regional applicability of firm-, subsidiary- or country-specific 
advantages (e.g. Rugman & Verbeke, 1992, 2001, 2004, 2005, 2007) as well as the temporary 
nature of subsidiary mandates (e.g. Birkinshaw, 1996) that were initially not taken into con-
sideration proved to be of great help to challenge and add meaning to preliminary study find-
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ings. Other studies like corporate entrepreneurship (e.g. Knight, 1997) or communication 
means (e.g. Shelby, 1986) that were expected to play a significant role in the process did not 
turn out to be of great significance. Nonetheless, their lack of relevance also revealed many 
particularities of subsidiary internationalization processes, e.g. lacking influenceability by 
subsidiary management, and therefore also contributed to the development of mid-term theory 
in the field of study.  
Despite the fact that the study was carried out by a single investigator, triangulation among 
different evaluators was at least partially achieved. Following the analysis of cases #1 to #3, 
an interim case summary report along with initial cross-case analysis was sent to the guiding 
professor, which resulted in meaningful input with regard to the analysis approach in general 
and the contrasting of findings with literature in particular. Following within- and cross-case 
analysis of all eleven cases, another interim case summary report along with preliminary case 
study findings was submitted to the professor, which again resulted in constructive feedback 
in particular regarding previous studies worth comparing to the preliminary findings. Finally, 
it is worth mentioning that the software NVivo9 was intensively used throughout the entire 
analysis, which significantly facilitated the coding process and the comparison of qualitative 
data points. In addition, the software allowed the investigator to link data points from all 
sources and thus to apply a truly holistic view on the topic. 
3.3.4. Quality control 
Limited generalizability of the chosen case study approach (Yin, 2009) made the investigator 
aware of the necessity to maximize trustworthiness of his study from the very start of the un-
dertaking. According to Lincoln and Guba (1985), trustworthiness in qualitative research de-
pends on the study’s credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability. In the fol-
lowing pages, each quality criterion will therefore be briefly illustrated. In addition, proposed 
strategies for enhancing trustworthiness in qualitative research by different scholars will be 
outlined along the four dimensions and the extent to which the investigator made use of these 
strategies throughout the study highlighted.  
Guba (1981) named truth value, applicability, consistency and neutrality as the four pillars 
that determine the trustworthiness of any scientific undertaking. It has long been acknowl-
edged, however, that the criteria for assessing the rigor in scientific research are different for 
quantitative and qualitative research approaches. While the trustworthiness of quantitative 
studies using a positivist stance is generally evaluated along the dimensions validity (both 
internal and external, reliability and objectivity, the judging of qualitative approaches apply-
ing a non-positivist epistemological stance requires a different set of evaluation criteria due to 
varying underlying assumptions and study aims (Bradley, 1993). Lincoln and Guba (1985) 
therefore suggested assessing the trustworthiness of qualitative research based on its overall 
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credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability. The four general pillars of scien-
tific rigor and its varying evaluation criteria for quantitative and qualitative research are 
shown in Table 3-10 below. 
Table 3-10: Evaluation criteria for the trustworthiness of scientific research 
Trustworthiness pillar Criterion for quantitative research Criterion for qualitative research 
Truth value Internal validity Credibility 
Applicability External validity Transferability 
Consistency Dependability Dependability 
Neutrality Confirmability Confirmability 
Source: Own illustration, based on Guba (1981), Lincoln & Guba (1985) 
According to Bradley (1993: 436), credibility refers to the “adequate representation of the 
constructions of the social world under study and can be assessed both in terms of the process 
used in eliciting those representations and in terms of the credibility of those representations 
for the community under study”. Despite the fact that Bradley (1993) was referring to qualita-
tive studies in the field of social sciences, it can be simply transferred to the IB research in 
general and to studies on internationalization processes of foreign subsidiaries in particular. 
The challenge for the study at hand is therefore to “obtain and demonstrate truth-value” by 
thoroughly describing the research subject, approach and all derived findings to the reader 
(Pauwels et al., 2004: 194). A high level of transparency along the entire PhD study is there-
fore generally seen as a good means to augment the overall credibility of any scientific under-
taking. In order to satisfy the trustworthiness criterion of transferability, in turn, the investiga-
tor needs to demonstrate to what extent the study findings can be applied to different settings 
or another context. Bradley (2003: 436-437) states that “this is a judgment that can be made 
only by comparing the two contexts, the burden of which falls not on the researcher but on 
those who wish to make the comparison. The researcher’s responsibility is to provide enough 
data, through rich, ample description, to allow these judgments to be made.” Again, structural 
coherence and sufficient degree of documentation both impacting the transparency level of 
the scientific research undertaking are viewed as instruments for obtaining a sufficient degree 
of transferability.  
The third criterion, dependability, is concerned with the stability and consistency of findings 
(Guba, 1981). For this, the investigator must thoroughly describe all data gathering, analysis 
and interpretation methods that eventually led to the presented study findings. It is thereby 
necessary to prove to the reader the coherence of the internal process and to what extent he or 
she has accounted for altering conditions in the phenomenon under study (Bradley, 2003). In 
other words, in a non-positivist epistemological stance study findings cannot be easily repli-
cated in another setting. The aim of a high degree of dependability in qualitative research is 
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therefore to demonstrate that throughout the research process the existence of changing pa-
rameters has consistently been taken into consideration and that sufficient time and effort was 
spent in order to obtain a thorough understanding of the phenomenon under study.  
Finally, confirmability refers to the objectivity and neutrality of study findings. If confirma-
bility is relatively pronounced, an unbiased reader should “arrive at comparable conclusions 
given the same data and research context” (Krefting, 1991: 221). This again requires a maxi-
mum level of transparency along all steps of the scientific endeavor. To establish dependabil-
ity and confirmability, Lincoln and Guba (1985) proposed audits that thoroughly describe the 
overall research process (dependability audit) and the interpretations and findings drawn from 
executed data analyses (confirmability audit). The two-stage auditing process therefore not 
only involves the documentation of raw data, e.g. in the form of interview transcripts, but also 
the documentation of the theory development process, e.g. in the form of different coding 
stages or the shift from simpler time-ordered displays to more complex case dynamics matrix-
es. In total, Lincoln and Guba (1985) named six categories of records that can be used in the 
course of a dependability and confirmability audit: (1) raw data; (2) data reduction and analy-
sis products; (3) data reconstruction and synthesis products; (4) process notes; (5) materials 
related to intentions; (6) instrument development information. 
Guba (1981), Lincoln and Guba (1985), Krefting (1991) and Pauwels et al. (2004) offered a 
helpful overview of possible techniques and methods for enhancing the trustworthiness of 
qualitative research along the aforementioned criteria of credibility, transferability, dependa-
bility and confirmability for the study at hand. While the first three researchers as educational 
scientists (Guba, 1981; Lincoln & Guba, 1985) and occupational therapist (Krefting, 1991) 
applied a more general and non-IB perspective to the topic, Pauwels et al. (2004) explicitly 
looked at internationalization processes in modern MNCs.  
  
86 
Table 3-11: Instruments and techniques for quality control used in the course of the study 
Criterion  Method Use in study 
Credibility Prolonged 
engagement 
 Repeated interviews with same stakeholders 
 In-depth industry knowledge of investigator  
Peer examina-
tion 
 Multiple exchange with guiding professor & industry expert 
 Paper submissions to and acceptance at leading scientific conferences (Acad-
emy of Management 2012 /European International Business Academy 2012) 
Member check-
ing 
 Repeated interviews with same stakeholders 
 Distribution of interview summaries to each interviewee with request for ap-
proval 
Negative case  Evaluation of two negative cases at one MNC 
Referential 
adequacy 
 Documentation of all raw data in NVivo9 software for qualitative research 
 Extensive case descriptions and documentation of raw data and interpretation 
stages 






 In-depth theoretical chapters and detailed summary of data gathering, analysis 
and interpretation processes 
Transfera-
bility 
Documentation  Detailed case descriptions, theoretical chapters and rich chain of evidence 
Nominated 
sample 
 Heterogeneous case sample 
 Gradual and subsequent case selection process 




Audit  Raw data storage (e.g. interview records and transcripts, annual reports) 
 Data reduction & analysis products (e.g. interview summaries, case reports) 
 Data reconstruction & synthesis products (e.g. time-ordered displays/case 
dynamics matrixes) 
 Process notes (e.g. documented coding levels, summaries in NVivo9 software) 
 Materials related to intentions & dispositions (e.g. interim/final study exposé) 
 Instrument development information (e.g. standardized interview guideline) 
Traceability  Dense description of research design and approach (in this chapter) 
Recoding  Documentation of descriptive & interpretative coding stages (in this chapter) 
Peer examina-
tion 
 Multiple exchange with guiding professor & industry expert 
 Paper submissions to and acceptance at leading scientific conferences (Acad-
emy of Management 2012 /European International Business Academy 2012) 
Triangulation  Triangulation of data collection methods 
Confirma-
bility 
Audit  Please refer to all instruments and techniques used for the dependability audit 




Combining the input from various sources proved to be of great help and allowed the investi-
gator to define an adequate set of quality enhancement techniques for the study at hand. In 
summary, almost all techniques proposed by Pauwels et al. (2004) and the majority of those 
suggested by Guba (1981), Lincoln and Guba (1985) and Krefting (1991) were leveraged by 
the investigator in order to maximize the trustworthiness of the applied qualitative research 
                                                     
9
 Investigator triangulation for data analysis and interpretation only. 
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approach. It should further be noted that the vast majority of quality criteria was identified at 
the very beginning of the study and that quality control therefore constituted a guiding princi-
ple throughout the entire study. An overview of applied quality control techniques, which will 
be explained in more detail in the following pages, is provided by Table 3-11 above. 
Lincoln and Guba (1985: 290-330) listed prolonged engagement, peer examination, member 
checking, negative case analysis, triangulation and referential adequacy as core instruments 
for establishing credibility in qualitative research endeavors, of which all have been fulfilled 
in the course of the study at hand. The overall data gathering process took more than a year, 
largely due to repeated exchange with key process stakeholders at the different case compa-
nies. In addition, cases were gradually and subsequently added to the study sample in order to 
maximize advantages of theoretical sampling. Finally, at the offset of the study the investiga-
tor could already count on almost five years of experience in the manufacturing industry and 
in foreign market development strategies from his prior consulting work. Prolonged engage-
ment for the purpose of understanding industry mechanisms was therefore not needed. With 
regard to obtaining peer review, the investigator relied on highly constructive feedback from 
his guiding professor, predominately encompassing aspects of existing theory, research meth-
odology as well as data interpretation. Multiple member checks were again achieved through 
introductory and follow-up conversations with HQ management as well as interview summar-
ies that were sent to all stakeholders at both the parent company and the focal subsidiary and 
commented on by the majority of recipients. 
Further adding to the credibility of the study case sampling involved from the very start the 
search for a negative example, i.e. where a foreign subsidiary sought but did not obtain for-
eign market responsibility. As expected, the identification of negative cases proved to be even 
more difficult than the pursuit of positive counterparts. However, two cases were eventually 
identified that allowed for a different viewpoint on drivers and restrictions in subsidiary inter-
nationalization processes. In addition, all input used during the data analysis and interpreta-
tion phase is recorded in the NVivo9 software to allow referential adequacy. Moreover, the 
study counts on four different types of triangulation. First, multiple research streams were 
examined in order to develop a-priori constructs at the offset and to interpret findings at a 
later stage of the study, guaranteeing theory triangulation. Second, relying on primary and 
secondary data source triangulation of data collection methods was achieved. Third, using 
different sources within the same data collection method, e.g. in the form of interviews at cor-
porate and subsidiary level, likewise satisfied the criterion of data source triangulation. Final-
ly, leveraging the guiding professor for peer examination resulted in triangulation of investi-
gators even though this form of triangulation was limited to data analysis and interpretation 
processes. In addition to the instruments proposed by Lincoln and Guba (1985), Guba (1981) 
also suggested structural coherence for credibility enhancement. For the study at hand in-
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depth theoretical chapters and a detailed summary of data gathering, analysis and interpreta-
tion processes were elaborated in order to avoid potential inconsistencies. 
With regard to transferability strategies, Lincoln and Guba (1985) offered significantly lower 
advice to scholars with a qualitative research design. Viewing the transfer of study findings to 
other fields as not the core responsibility of the researcher, they simply proposed an extensive 
description of all study elements so that a third person can execute the desired transfer of find-
ings. Having adhered to this advice, further instruments were searched for and eventually used 
for the study. A nominated sample (Krefting, 1991), also referred to as theoretical sampling 
(Pauwels et al., 2004), which is seen as a core method for the strengthening of the transfera-
bility of study findings, was used for the examination of internationalization processes of for-
eign subsidiaries. As a result, the final case sample revealed significant heterogeneity levels 
regarding for example company size, global MNC presence or functional and geographical 
scope of subsidiary mandate. Finally, Pauwels and et al. (2004) also viewed theory triangula-
tion and constant iteration between literature and preliminary findings as a driver for transfer-
ability. Both instruments were extensively used in this study. 
As outlined above, enhancing the dependability and confirmability in qualitative research can 
be achieved through audits with six different categories (Krefting, 1991). For the examination 
of subsidiary internationalization processes all six of them were used in order to augment the 
overall trustworthiness of the study. Raw data in the form of interview records and transcripts 
were stored on the computer of the investigator and could be easily retrieved for auditing pur-
poses. Data reduction and analysis products are found in the NVivo9 software on the comput-
er of the author in the form of cases summaries or in the following study chapter as case re-
ports so that a third party could easily use them for dependability and confirmability audits. 
Moreover, records on data reconstruction and synthesis products exist in the form of time-
ordered displays and case dynamics matrixes in the following chapter on case description and 
analyses. In addition, process notes were shown earlier in this chapter when the shift from 
first level and predominately descriptive coding to second level and increasingly interpretative 
codes is highlighted. Finally, materials related to intentions and dispositions and instrument 
development information are provided by varying types of study exposés and standardized 
interview guidelines respectively. 
In addition to facilitating potential future auditing needs, the trustworthiness criterion of de-
pendability was also addressed through an extensive description of all process elements, a 
coding recoding procedure, peer examinations as well as triangulation of data collection 
methods, of which the latter was explicitly proposed by Pauwels et al. (2004). Confirmability 
for the qualitative research approach was further strengthened by all four types of triangula-
tion that were detailed earlier in this chapter. In summary, numerous trustworthiness-
enhancing instruments and methods along the dimensions credibility, transferability, depend-
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ability and confirmability were used in order to guarantee a high level of scientific rigor. 
While some instruments and methods, like interview records, could not be integrated in the 
study due to capacity limitations, it should be noted that the investigator is willing to provide 
any reader with all necessary information to assess the trustworthiness of this study. Having 
said this, the author is also aware of the fact that there are additional facilitators for quality 
control like triangulation of observers of the phenomenon under study that were not leveraged 
in the course of the PhD undertaking due to overall resource and time constraints. 
Finally, it is worth mentioning that the study was corrected by a native English speaker
10
 in 
order to avoid any errors caused by insufficient language skills of the German author. While 
the corrections significantly contributed to the quality of the study they did not impact its con-
tent by any means. 
  
                                                     
10
 For more information please refer to www.englischkorrekturlesen.com. 
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4. Case descriptions and within-case analyses 
4.1. Introduction 
This chapter aims to provide the reader with an extensive description of each case of subsidi-
ary internationalization, encompassing a brief overview of the case company and the focal 
subsidiary as well as a description of historic internationalization processes and future out-
looks for related cross-border subsidiary mandates. Each case description will be split into the 
initial mandate gain and subsequent mandate modifications, including a current outlook for 
mandate development. Finally, the outcome of the three most relevant within-case analysis 
techniques – critical incident charts, event-state networks and case dynamics matrixes – will 
be outlined for each case. While critical incident charts should help the observer to quickly 
obtain a broader picture of the core process items, the subsequent illustration of event-state 
networks should enable third party investigators to get a sound understanding about what 
states or events caused subsidiary internationalization processes to unfold in a particular form. 
Finally, case dynamics matrixes should allow for differentiated perspectives from the parent 
company and the focal subsidiary on stimuli, causes and effects related to internationalization 
processes of foreign subsidiaries. 
The following case descriptions already constitute a summary of all raw data that was used in 
the course of the study. While the investigator as described in detail in the previous chapter 
drew study findings on a set of data sources like company magazines, newspaper articles or 
corporate websites, the case summaries are predominately the outcome of semi-structured 
interviews with MNC stakeholders from the parent company and the focal subsidiary. Given 
the subjective nature of the recapitulation of the internationalization process at both ends of 
the MNC, the author combined both views in this chapter and also relied on the remaining 
data sources that provided additional and third party perspectives on the topic. Cases #9, #10a 
and #10b deviate from this approach as the investigator was not allowed to carry out inter-
views with subsidiary management in Brazil and France, so that case findings are mainly lim-
ited to the headquarters perspective. 
4.2. Eleven cases of subsidiary internationalization 
As already outlined in the last chapter, the study at hand rests on a total of eleven cases of 
subsidiary internationalization at seven Western European MNCs from the manufacturing 
industry. Several subsidiaries therefore belong to the same MNC, as will be outlined in this 
chapter. Each case, however, exhibits particular incidents and process elements that will be 
thoroughly described in the following pages.  
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4.3. Case #1: The internationalization process of a Polish subsidiary into 
former CIS markets 
4.3.1. Case description 
Case #1 refers to the internationalization process of the Polish subsidiary of a Northern Euro-
pean manufacturing company (Case Company A) into the former CIS markets of Russia, 
Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan. The functional scope of the requested and eventually re-
ceived foreign market mandate was limited to sales and service responsibilities. Since the 
initial subsidiary request and following parent company approval in the late 2000s, the man-
date scope has been reduced by corporate management due to unsatisfying results. In fact, the 
parent company has retaken ownership of market development in former CIS markets so that 
the subsidiary’s cross-border mandate, even though not yet officially announced, has largely 
been dissolved. Looking ahead, the subsidiary is expected to experience a further decline of 
responsibility or even an official mandate loss for former CIS markets as a result of specific 
HQ plans for the region in focus. Key characteristics for Case #1 are summarized in Table 4-1 
below. 
Table 4-1: Key characteristics of Case #1 
 
Case Company A is a Northern European original equipment manufacturer (OEM) in the 
manufacturing industries sector. The company started business after the First World War and 
has since then been characterized by a set of ownership changes. Today, Company A belongs 
to a larger conglomerate in Northern Europe and thus benefits from improved access to finan-
cial resources. With an annual turnover of less than €500 million, Company A represents a 
relatively small enterprise in the total case sample. The firm is organizationally split into three 
different divisions. The division in focus represents the largest unit, accounting for more than 
70% of company revenues. The company covers the entire value chain, ranging from R&D, 
sourcing and production up to logistics and spare parts delivery. Despite relying on input from 
certain suppliers, the company develops, manufactures and markets its products in the home 
region as well as abroad. A broad company overview is provided in Table 4-2 below. 
Parent company location Initial mandate gain (year) 
Northern Europe Sales and service responsibility (2008) 
Focal subsidiary location Mandate development (year) 
Poland Reduced functional scope / unofficial mandate loss (2010) 
Mandate coverage Mandate outlook (year) 
Former CIS markets Full (official) mandate loss (2011) 
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Table 4-2: Firm profile of Case Company A (cases #1 and #2) 
 
Most revenues are still generated in the home market and other Western European markets. In 
the case of local company presence, products are distributed through own subsidiaries. Oth-
erwise selected national importers are used in order to develop company presence abroad. In 
both cases, end-customers are managed by dealers in the respective markets. The main inter-
nationalization process of the company started in the 1990s when it acquired several competi-
tors with sales offices and production facilities abroad. In addition to selective company ac-
quisitions it also set up new offices in foreign markets through greenfield approaches. Today, 
the firm is equipped with several foreign production facilities and more than ten sales and 
service offices in Europe, Africa and North America. Nonetheless, given its late international-
ization start and its still limited international presence, the relative internationalization experi-
ence of Company A compared to other enterprises in the case sample is low. 
The Polish subsidiary of case Company A was founded in the early 1990s by a European 
competitor. At that time, the focal subsidiary was already used as a sales hub for developing 
selected Eastern European markets. It additionally served as a low-cost production plant for 
lower quality products well-suited to meet local and regional customer requirements and fi-
nancial resources. Company A purchased the focal subsidiary towards the end of the 1990s 
and integrated it into the existing group structure. The main rationale for the acquisition was 
the subsidiary’s location in Eastern Europe, allowing it to serve traditional markets in Western 
Europe as well as former CIS markets at a later stage. Moreover, Company A was attracted by 
the presence of production facilities for low-cost products suited for markets outside of West-
ern Europe. Finally, local production facilities were expected to lower the overall cost struc-
ture of the company. At the time of the acquisition the parent company was facing serious 
financial difficulties, mainly as a result of escalating salary levels in the home country and 
thus looked for means to lower the cost structure across the group. An overview of the focal 
subsidiary is provided by Table 4-3 below.  
Firm profile (as of 2010) 
Type Original equipment manufacturer (OEM) 
Ownership status  Conglomerate unit 
Sales  < €0.5 bn 
N° of foreign subsidiaries  < 15 
Existence of regional headquarters  No 
Expansion / internationalization start 1990s 
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Table 4-3: Subsidiary profile of Case #1 
 
At the end of the 2000s Company A decided to largely invest in the focal subsidiary with the 
aim to extend and modernize local production facilities. As a result the focal subsidiary has 
turned into one of the most relevant units within the company, representing one of the key 
producers and suppliers of components as well as end-products. Around the same time local 
management obtained extended sales responsibility for former CIS markets. The current sub-
sidiary CEO has belonged to the entity since its inauguration at the beginning of the 1990s. 
He has therefore experienced all major corporate changes personally, including the extended 
responsibility for former CIS markets. 
4.3.1.1. Initial mandate gain 
Opportunity-identification and initiative-taking 
The opportunity to market former CIS markets from the focal subsidiary was identified by 
local management in Poland in 2008. As a next step the opportunity was presented to the par-
ent company in the course of a routine country visit and official responsibility for an extended 
geographical mandate requested. The locus of opportunity-identification and initiative-taking 
was set at the foreign subsidiary and therefore at the business ‘frontline’ to former CIS mar-
kets. The subsidiary’s initiative to request extended geographical responsibility for former 
CIS markets was thereby triggered and facilitated by incidents within and outside the organi-
zation. These incidents are further characterized by gradual, long-term developments that can 
be viewed as facilitating conditions in the course of the opportunity-identification and of ab-
rupt changes that represent the actual initiative trigger. 
Due to geographical proximity the Polish subsidiary was exposed to former CIS markets from 
its inauguration at the beginning of the 1990s. This characteristic remained unchanged when 
Company A acquired the focal subsidiary towards the end of the 1990s. Irrespective of the 
host-market orientation, the focal subsidiary gradually developed market experience and ex-
ternal networks reaching into neighboring former CIS markets. This was additionally support-
ed by similar product requirements of the host and former CIS markets. Following its takeo-
ver, the focal subsidiary was requested to carry out product and spare parts delivery to cus-
Subsidiary profile (as of 2010) 
Date of inauguration Early 1990s 
Company belonging Late 1990s (through takeover) 
Location / host market Poland  
Value-add  R&D, sourcing, production, sales and after-sales 
Responsibility for other markets  Yes (former CIS markets) 
Responsibility for foreign sub-units  No 
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tomers not only in Poland but also in former CIS markets. The new role added to the market 
experience in the target regions. When equipment markets in the former CIS region experi-
enced a strong growth momentum from 2006 until 2008, the subsidiary faced increasing order 
entry from and product delivery to customers in former CIS countries. As a result of its lim-
ited mandate the focal subsidiary was forced to forward all customer orders from markets 
outside of Poland to the parent company until reentering the process for product delivery and 
other after-sales-related matters at a later stage. It was then that top management at the focal 
subsidiary questioned the efficiency of the customer handling process and came to the conclu-
sion that fully steering the process from Poland was the more suitable approach. Process inef-
ficiencies are thus considered to represent the core initiative trigger for subsidiary internation-
alization.  
In the course of further reflection on the opportunity to manage former CIS markets from the 
focal subsidiary, the aspect of geographical and cultural proximity further strengthened the 
local management’s opinion. In fact, one sales manager at the focal subsidiary spoke Russian, 
a capability that was distinct at Company A and seen as a key success factor for developing 
former CIS markets. In addition, the focal subsidiary already possessed a small and well-
functioning network with customers in these markets that supported its perception of being 
best suited for managing the former CIS region. In summary, evident process inefficiencies 
triggered the initiative-taking process for extending the geographical scope of the focal sub-
sidiary eastwards into former CIS markets. Regional market growth in the target region can be 
viewed as an external facilitating condition. Subsidiary-related characteristics in the form of 
cross-border business networks and Russian language skills and country-related aspects of 
geographical and cultural proximity represented additional supporting factors. 
Rent-seeking and responsibility-allocation  
The subsidiary initiative was first presented in 2008 at a regular monthly management meet-
ing with middle management from the parent company. The exchange took place at the sub-
sidiary premises in Poland. Later the request was passed on to the top management at the cor-
porate headquarters. The content of the request was purely qualitative, not involving any 
business case calculations or preliminary trial results. No additional resources were requested 
in the course of the decision-making process. The subsidiary request was approved by corpo-
rate management and the overall approval process took approximately six months. 
The financial pressure that prevailed at Company A at the end of the nineties and that led to 
the acquisition of the focal subsidiary continued to influence management decisions at corpo-
rate headquarters. When former CIS markets showed strong market growth from 2006 on-
wards, the company became aware of the huge potential for equipment sales in the region. 
Seeing other competitors moving into the markets by opening local sales offices further 
strengthened the urge for growth participation. HQ management then defined former CIS 
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markets as a focus area for company growth. Limited financial capabilities, however, prevent-
ed the management from copying competitors’ moves in the form of setting up local offices or 
even local assembly or production facilities. It was widely acknowledged at the parent com-
pany that former CIS markets could only be developed with a Russian-speaking salesperson. 
Confronted with the subsidiary request, which was backed up with subsidiary-specific capa-
bilities of Russian language skills and country-specific advantages of geographical and cultur-
al proximity, HQ management therefore seriously looked into the matter. The relatively long 
decision-making process was largely driven by the amount of other key topics on the man-
agement’s agenda at that time. 
The main reason for granting extended market responsibility to the focal subsidiary in Poland 
was the strong growth in former CIS markets. In addition, the presence of a Russian-speaking 
salesman as well as the geographical and cultural proximity to the target markets in combina-
tion with similar regional product requirements facilitated the decision-making process. 
Moreover, the overall risk level was relatively low as company presence in target markets was 
still limited and local market potential widely acknowledged. Finally, strong HQ involvement 
in other topics and thus central resource constraints might have also facilitated the manage-
ment decision to use local resources for the opportunity exploitation.  
4.3.1.2. Mandate evolution 
Mandate development 
In the execution of the extended geographical mandate the focal subsidiary experienced a loss 
of responsibility in early 2010. Even though the loss was not officially communicated it has 
become noticeable since then through a gradually increasing involvement of HQ personnel in 
the development of former CIS markets. In addition, major decisions regarding market devel-
opment are no longer prepared or taken by local management in Poland. While back-office 
support is still provided by the Polish subsidiary, sales personnel in former CIS markets report 
directly to the parent company. The involvement of corporate management and thus reduced 
subsidiary responsibility was mainly triggered by a lack of subsidiary capabilities for manag-
ing personnel outside the host market and poor results in former CIS markets. HQ manage-
ment became aware of the unsatisfying performance by talking to sales personnel in former 
CIS markets as well as looking into the overall sales figures. 
Following the official mandate gain it became apparent that one Russian-speaking salesperson 
in Poland is not sufficient in order to develop the vast geographical scope of the former CIS 
markets. It was then decided in the corporate headquarters to hire an additional salesman 
working directly out of the Ukraine. When the focal subsidiary did not succeed in providing 
the additional salesman with sufficient support, corporate management increased its involve-
ment and established a direct link to the salesman in the Ukraine. Officially, however, the 
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mandate was not altered and the Ukrainian salesman remained on the payroll of the focal sub-
sidiary.  
When as a result of the global financial crisis former CIS markets deteriorated from 2009 on-
wards, HQ management significantly reduced its efforts in the region. In the course of the 
following reflection phase it was acknowledged that the focal subsidiary not only lacked the 
capability to drive projects and manage personnel outside its host market but also has no cul-
tural understanding and suitability for former CIS markets. Cultural proximity that initially 
served as a major argument for allocating extended geographical responsibility did not prove 
to be as distinct as expected. HQ management thereby admitted to a misinterpretation of 
country- and subsidiary-specific advantages at the initial responsibility delegation in 2008. As 
former CIS markets are gradually recovering, corporate management is at present looking for 
a salesperson working out of Moscow to be responsible for the entire CIS region. While for 
tax and cost advantages again remaining on the payroll of the focal subsidiary, the new person 
will have a direct link to the parent company. 
Mandate outlook  
Looking ahead and assuming strong and relatively stable growth rates for former CIS markets, 
HQ management plans to set up a local office in Russia that will serve as regional headquar-
ters for former CIS markets. In addition, local assembly facilities could also be beneficial in 
order to avoid high tax burdens on imports and to achieve competitiveness versus other OEMs 
that produce or assemble locally. In the event of a subsidiary opening with or without produc-
tion facilities in one of the former CIS markets, the focal subsidiary in Poland is expected to 
entirely lose its extended geographical mandate. The main reasons for a full and official loss 
of cross-border responsibility for the Polish subsidiary in the event of the opening of a new 
office in former CIS markets are excessive risks of setting up sub-subsidiaries as well as the 
fact that subsidiaries always directly report to the parent company. While a lack of proven 
resources of the focal subsidiary for such tasks was not mentioned by corporate management, 
it might have further supported the HQ view. 
4.3.2. Within-case analyses 
As outlined in the previous chapter of this study, the author relied on extensive within-case 
analyses in order to develop a thorough understanding of the case content and to elaborate 
individual case patterns. While using numerous analysis methods like multi-stage coding of 
raw data or interim case reports and meetings, a critical incident chart as initially shown in 
Figure 4-1, an event-state network as first depicted in Figure 4-2 and a case dynamics matrix 
as originally outlined in  
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Table 4-4 were particularity helpful when crafting individual case patterns. The following 




Figure 4-1: Critical incident chart for Case #1 
 
Opportunity-identification Responsibility-allocation Mandate outlookMandate development
= critical incident HQ = corporate headquarters SUB = focal subsidiary EXT = external / outside of MNC
HQ
SUB
 SUB founded 
by major 
competitor
 Acquisition of SUB including all 
local production facilities
 Allocation of product 
delivery responsibility for 
few customers in former CIS 
markets to SUB
 Outlook: Set-up of local 
sales office with or 
without assemble facility 
in Russia managed from 
HQ
 Identification of process inefficiencies 
of dual management of CIS 
customers from HQ and SUB
 First contacts 
with customers 
in former CIS 
markets  Awareness of potential of 
Russian-speaking salesman
 Decision to produce low-cost product 
range for Polish and Eastern European 
markets at SUB
 Proposition to manage 
former CIS markets from 
Polish SUB 
 HQ approval of SUB 
request
 Installation of local sales manager in 
Ukraine managed by SUB
 Outlook: installation of 
additional resources in 
former CIS markets and 
opening of a local sales 
office with or without 
assemble facility in 
Russia most likely 
managed from HQ 
 Top management 
involvement in a set of 
important corporate 
decisions (between initial 
request of SUB and HQ 
approval)
EXT  Strong market growth and increasing presence of 
Western OEMs in former CIS markets
 First dealer contacts in 
former CIS markets
1990s 2011Time
 Financial crisis 
impacting former 
CIS markets
Dissatisfaction with business development 
in former CIS markets
 Slow-down of activities in 
former CIS markets
 Challenges to bring local 
production quality up to expected 
quality levels
 Renewal of CIS activities with sales 
manager from Moscow
 Confrontation with 
increasing demand 
for locally produced 
machines
 Overall cost 
pressure due to 
rising salary 
levels
Initial mandate gain Mandate evolution
 Gradual recovery of 
former CIS markets
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Figure 4-2: Event-state network for Case #1 
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in former CIS markets
Decision to slow-down 
engagement in former CIS 
markets
Decision to renew 
engagement in former 
CIS markets
Decision to hire additional 
sales manager in Russia 
responsible for managing all 
former CIS markets and 
directly reporting to HQ 
Growing awareness of strong 





Outlook: installation of 
additional resources in 
former CIS markets and 
opening of a local sales 
office with or without 
production facility in 
Russia most likely 
managed from HQ 
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Table 4-4: Case dynamics matrix for Case #1 
Critical incidents  
(locus / period) 
Initial mandate gain Mandate evolution 
Opportunity-identification Responsibility-allocation Mandate development Mandate outlook 
Focal SUB estab-
lished (EXT / 
1990s) 
Focal SUB ac-
quired (HQ / 
1990s) 
Strong growth in 
former CIS markets 
(EXT / 2000s) 
Market responsibility 
request for former CIS 
markets (SUB / 2000s) 
Approval of SUB request 
(HQ / 2000s) 
Realignment of engage-
ment in former CIS 
markets (HQ / 2010s) 
Plan to set up office in 
Russia managed by HQ 
(HQ / Plan) 
HQ Incident 
Trigger 
 n/a  Cost pressure  n/a  n/a  Focal SUB request  Recovery of former 
CIS markets from prior 
financial crisis 
 Increased import 
duties and production 





 n/a  Low salary 
level in Eastern 
Europe 
 Existence of 
local produc-
tion facilities 
 n/a  n/a  Low risk due to high 
market potential and 
weak company presence 
 Language skills, geo-
graphical and cultural 
proximity of focal SUB 
 Unsatisfying business 
development results 
and lacking cultural fit 
of focal SUB 
 Avoidance of tax 
burden 
 Limited trust in focal 
SUB capabilities 
 Excessive risk of 
regional HQ construct 
Incident 
Effect 
 n/a  Proximity to 
former CIS 
markets and 
access to local 
production site 




 Need to decide on 
market approach for 
former CIS markets 
 Reduced control   Regained (unofficial) 
direct access to former 
CIS markets 




 n/a  n/a  n/a  Existence of process 
inefficiencies 
 Possession of cross-
border networks and 
language skills 




 n/a  n/a  n/a  Optimize market 
penetration 
 n/a  n/a  n/a 
Incident 
Effect 
 Access to former 
CIS markets  
business network 
development 
 Receipt of 
product deliv-
ery mandate 
for former CIS 
markets 
 Significant order 
and delivery in-
crease  identifi-
cation of process 
inefficiencies 
 n/a  Increased market respon-
sibility 
 Unofficial mandate 
loss 
 Official mandate loss 
for former CIS mar-
kets 
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4.4. Case #2: The internationalization process of a Spanish subsidiary into 
Latin America 
4.4.1. Case description 
Case #2 refers to the internationalization process of the Spanish subsidiary of a Northern Europe-
an manufacturing company (Case Company A) into Latin America. The functional scope of the 
requested and eventually received foreign market mandate was limited to sales and service re-
sponsibilities. The geographical mandate has been slightly extended since the initial subsidiary 
request and parent company approval and now also includes Chile. Looking ahead, the subsidi-
ary’s cross-border mandate may terminate if the localization degree in South America is aug-
mented through the establishment of local company presence. Key characteristics for Case #2 are 
summarized in Table 4-5 below. 
Table 4-5: Key characteristics of Case #2 
The Spanish subsidiary represents an affiliated unit of Case Company A that was described in 
detail for Case #1 (Table 4-2). The focal subsidiary was founded in the 1960s as a subsidiary of a 
close competitor. At that time the motive for establishing the subsidiary was to be equipped with 
a small-scale assembly in Southern Europe and thus to avoid taxes on finished machinery. From a 
sales perspective the subsidiary was assigned to develop Southern European markets. In the early 
2000s Company A acquired the focal subsidiary in order to expand its product portfolio and thus 
to better meet the needs of Southern European customers. In the course of its evolution the focal 
subsidiary has significantly gained and lost charter on the production as well as the sales side. 
While additional production was shifted to the subsidiary shortly after its acquisition, it was to a 
large degree withdrawn again at a later stage. Today, the production scope of the focal subsidiary 
is limited to certain group components. The production loss was accompanied by an almost com-
plete management dismissal. These two serious incidents had their origin in disappointing results 
concerning production quality and delivery times in the previous years. In addition, local man-
Parent company location Initial mandate gain (year) 
Northern Europe Sales and service responsibility (2007) 
Focal subsidiary location Mandate development (year) 
Spain Extended geographical scope into Chile (2010) 
Mandate coverage Mandate outlook (year) 
Latin America Full mandate loss (2011) 
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agement failed to operate profitably. A broad overview of the subsidiary is provided by Table 4-6 
below.  
Table 4-6: Subsidiary profile of Case #2 
As a result of increasing pressure from the parent company, local management initiated an exten-
sive restructuring program towards the end of 2000s in order to regain profitability and to avoid 
excessive financial dependency from the group. While the restructuring program is showing first 
results and the overall level of group collaboration has improved, HQ trust in local management 
capabilities is still relatively low. In the course of the restructuring program the focal subsidiary 
successfully requested market responsibility for Latin America. While the extended mandate ini-
tially excluded Chile it was added at a later stage. Today, the focal subsidiary looks after markets 
in Spain and Latin America.  
4.4.1.1. Initial mandate gain 
Opportunity-identification and initiative-taking 
The opportunity for a decentralized market development for Latin America through the Spanish 
subsidiary was identified by local subsidiary management. While in a first step and without offi-
cial HQ buy-in existing contacts and networks in Latin America were refreshed, the extended 
geographical mandate was officially requested around 2007. The locus of opportunity-
identification and initiative-taking was thus set at the focal subsidiary in Spain. 
As a result of its long presence in Southern Europe, the focal subsidiary also developed a small 
customer network in Latin America. The main reasons for occasional customer requests from this 
geographically distant region were similar product requirements as well as similar cultural back-
ground including the same language for most markets. At the end of the 1990s the subsidiary 
actually possessed running agreements with importers in three Latin American markets and had 
gained extensive market knowledge and experience in the course of time. With the takeover by 
Company A the focal subsidiary immediately lost market responsibility for Chile as the mother 
Subsidiary profile (as of 2010) 
Date of inauguration 1960s 
Company belonging Early 2000s (through takeover) 
Location / host market Spain  
Value-add  R&D, sourcing, production, sales and after-sales 
Responsibility for other markets  Yes (Latin America) 
Responsibility for foreign sub-units  No 
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company was equipped with a strong local importer that was granted exclusivity status. For all 
other Latin American markets no decision was made regarding organizational responsibilities so 
that a dual market penetration was temporarily carried out. Lacking HQ focus and increasingly 
tied resources at subsidiary level due to new production responsibilities meant that the overall 
efforts were rather limited. When a subsidiary salesman was about to retire in 2004, local man-
agement decided to refresh existing contacts in Latin America. It was thus decided to spend some 
of the salesman’s remaining company time on assessing potentials and potentially refreshing con-
tacts in the region. The decision was not accompanied by an official HQ request and did not re-
sult in a significant increase in market presence in Latin America. 
The incidents of full management dismissal in combination with the loss of production in the 
mid-2000s strongly impacted the subsidiary. In order to satisfy HQ requests for improved profit-
ability levels the new subsidiary management initiated a restructuring program with the intention 
of lowering costs and identifying additional revenue sources. The initiative led, amongst other 
changes, to a reorganization of the sales department, freeing the resources of one sales manager. 
Considering sales as well as margin limitations in Southern European markets, the subsidiary 
requested HQ permission for partly assigning one sales manager for Latin America around 2007. 
While organizational change represents the core initiative trigger, target market growth in combi-
nation with economic pressure as well as existing market knowledge and networks are viewed as 
facilitating conditions. 
Rent-seeking and responsibility-allocation 
The exchange between HQ and subsidiary about the market responsibility was relatively informal. 
It did not involve any official meeting between representatives from both sides and was carried 
out by means of telephone calls and e-mail correspondence. The content of the subsidiary request 
was purely qualitative, not involving any business case calculation or preliminary trial results. No 
additional resources were requested at this stage. When corporate management of Company A 
received the subsidiary request in the mid-2000s it was dealing with a lot of corporate issues and 
developing Latin American markets did not represent a key priority. However, due to strong re-
gional market growth from 2006 onwards, HQ management was aware of the significant local 
market potential.  
Given the company’s limited presence in Latin America and the overall low risk level of the un-
dertaking with no involvement of additional resources, HQ management quickly approved the 
request. The country-specific advantages of language and cultural proximity were the main ar-
guments for a decentralized market development approach. In addition, network positioning in 
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Latin America was perceived to be less distinct at the parent company than at its counterpart in 
the focal subsidiary. The previous trial phase when the focal subsidiary used its retiring sales 
manager for contact refreshment in Latin America might have further supported the HQ percep-
tion that its subsidiary in Spain is actually better suited for developing company presence down 
there. The overall process was strongly facilitated by a lack of HQ focus for Latin America that 
resulted from overall resource constraints. 
4.4.1.2. Mandate evolution 
Mandate development 
The initial mandate allocation did not include the Chilean market as HQ management still had 
strong connections with the local importer at the time of the decision. In 2010 the focal subsidi-
ary also received market responsibility for the remaining Chilean market. No subsidiary request 
preceded the HQ decision. It was exclusively taken by corporate management. The mandate al-
teration was triggered by an upcoming retirement of the responsible HQ sales manager for Chile. 
In the course of evaluating replacement options the existing approach was questioned and a de-
centralized market penetration through the focal subsidiary in Spain selected. 
The HQ’s reasoning for extending the geographical mandate of the focal subsidiary into Chile 
was threefold. First of all low sales volumes to Chile and overall disappointing relationships with 
the local importer did not suggest a continuation with the status quo. In addition, local manage-
ment in Spain had at least partially demonstrated its ability to participate in Latin American mar-
kets and was already equipped with a dedicated, Spanish-speaking salesman for the region. Final-
ly, overall financial resources were constrained so that corporate management had to focus its 
human and financial resources on a limited number of markets. Latin America did not represent 
one of the prioritized markets.  
Mandate outlook 
Looking ahead and assuming strong and relatively stable growth rates for Latin America, Com-
pany A still doubts that it will significantly increase its commitment in this far-distant region. If 
at some future stage Company A decides to establish a company presence in Latin America it is 
believed that the focal subsidiary would lose its mandate for the entire region. A new sub-unit 
would most likely directly report to the parent company in Europe and would look after all re-
maining markets in the region. The main reason for not significantly extending the company 
commitment to markets in Latin America is financial constraint. Reluctance in setting up sub-
subsidiaries is largely the result of excessive risks, driven by a relatively low organizational ma-
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turity with regards to subsidiary management and ongoing doubt in the capabilities of local per-
sonnel.  
4.4.2. Within-case analyses 
On the next pages the outcome of the following three within-case analysis techniques for Case #2 
will be illustrated: (1) critical incident chart as shown in Figure 4-3; (2) event-state network as 
shown in Figure 4-4; (3) case dynamics matrix as shown in Table 4-7. 
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Figure 4-3: Critical incident chart for Case #2  
 
Opportunity-identification Responsibility-allocation Mandate outlookMandate development
1960s 2011Time
HQ
SUB  SUB founded by 
close competitor
 Acquisition of 
SUB
 Decision to shift 
final production for 
certain product lines 
to SUB
 Decision to grant 
responsibility for Chile 
to SUB 
 Outlook: maintaining 
commitment  and 
delegation levels for 
Latin America; in the 
event of resource 
availability opening of 
Latin American 
subsidiary managed 
from the parent 
company
 Initiation of extensive 
restructuring program 
at SUB
 Occasional exchange 
with customers from 
Latin America
 Assignment for retiring salesman to 
refresh and develop contacts in 
Latin America
 HQ approval for SUB 
request with the 
exception of Chile 
 HQ decision on focus 
areas for future sales
 Outlook: install additional 
resources for market 
development in Latin 
America; in case of 
additional subsidiaries in 
Latin America loss of 
extended geographical 
responsibility expected
EXT  Strong market growth and presence of Western OEMs in Latin 
America 
Withdrawal of final 
production from 
SUB to sister SUB
 Dismissal of most top 
management personnel at SUB 
due to unsatisfying results
 Reorganization of 
sales department
 Official request to SUB 
to become profitable
 Official request to 
manage Latin America 
from SUB
 Deteriorating relationships 
with Chilean importer
 Upcoming retirement 
of HQ area sales 
manager responsible 
for Chile
 Increasing sales to Latin 
America
 Periodic contacts with 
market participants in 
Chile
= critical incident HQ = corporate headquarters SUB = focal subsidiary EXT = external / outside of MNC
Initial mandate gain Mandate evolution
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Table 4-7: Case dynamics matrix for Case #2 
Critical incidents  
(locus / period) 
Initial mandate gain Mandate evolution 




focal SUB (EXT 
/ 1960s) 
Acquisition of focal 
SUB (HQ / 2000s) 
Production withdrawal 
from focal SUB (HQ / 
2000s) 
Strong market growth 
in Latin America 
(EXT / 2000s) 
Allocation of market responsibil-
ity for Latin America w/o Chile 
to focal SUB (SUB & HQ / 
2000s) 
SUB responsibility 
extended into Chile 
(HQ / 2010s) 
Consideration to set 
up HQ managed 
office in Latin 
America (HQ / Plan) 
HQ Incident 
Trigger 
 n/a  Unknown  Economic results 
 Low production 
quality 






 n/a  Unknown  Improve group re-
sults 
 Augment pressure on 
focal SUB 
 n/a  Low risk due to high market 
potential and weak company 
presence 
 Resource constraints at parent 
company 
 Cultural proximity 
 Deteriorating 
importer relations 
 Proven SUB re-
sources in Latin 
America & HQ re-
source constraints 
 Significant Latin 
American market 
potential 
 Limited trust in 
SUB resources 
 Excessive risk 
Incident 
Effect 
 n/a  Enhanced access to 
Spanish-speaking 
markets 
 Lacking confidence 
in focal SUB capabil-
ities 
 Increasing aware-
ness of Latin 
American markets 
 Reduced control 
 Further loss of focus for Latin 
American markets 
 Reduced control  Regained direct 




 n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  Reorganization of sales de-
partment due to restructuring 
program  freed resources 
 Latin American market growth 
and cross-border networks 




 n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  Search for additional revenue 
sources 
 Justify subsidiary existence  
 n/a  n/a 
Incident 
Effect 
 Exposure to 
Latin Ameri-
can markets 
 network & 
knowledge 
development 
 Loss of Chilean 
market mandate 






 Loss of revenue 
sources 
 Initiation of restruc-
turing program 
 Identification of 
alternative revenue 
sources (sales to 
Latin America) 
 New market responsibility and 
revenue sources 
 Possibility to regain HQ confi-
dence 
 Lacking access to attractive 
market in Chile 
 Further market 
responsibility 
 Improved reputa-
tion at parent com-
pany 




4.5. Case #3: The internationalization process of a Singaporean subsidiary 
into East Asia, Australia and New Zealand 
4.5.1. Case description 
Case #3 refers to the internationalization process of the Singaporean subsidiary of a Central Eu-
ropean manufacturing company (Case Company B) into East Asian markets as well as Australia 
and New Zealand. The focal subsidiary was equipped with an extended geographical reach from 
its inauguration and its functional scope was limited to sales and service responsibilities with 
some additional warehouse functions. Due to its recent establishment the initial mandate gain of 
the focal subsidiary remains unmodified. While the mandate may only be slightly functionally 
extended in the future, the focal subsidiary is likely to experience a geographical mandate decline 
if the company decides to open additional subsidiaries in the covered region. Key characteristics 
for Case #3 are summarized in Table 4-8 below. 
Table 4-8: Key characteristics of Case #3 
 
Case Company B is a Central European original equipment manufacturer (OEM) in the manufac-
turing industries sector. Business started in the years following the First World War and has 
grown to an annual turnover of approximately €500 million. Throughout its existence the firm 
has maintained its family-owned status. With regards to value-add, Company B is involved in the 
process of value creation encompassing research and development, sourcing, production as well 
as sales and after-sales. Despite ongoing globalization, enterprise sales are still predominately 
generated in Western Europe. Declining relevance of the company’s home market however is 
noticeable and markets in Asia have gained the focus of corporate management in the course of 
the last decade. Internationalization of the first degree, i.e. developing new markets from the cor-
porate HQ, started around the turn of the millennium. Today, Company B has a company pres-
ence in three continents and is equipped with one foreign production facility. End-customer man-
agement is carried out by national dealers. An overview of Case Company B is provided by Ta-
ble 4-9 below. 
Parent company location Initial mandate gain (year) 
Central Europe Sales and service responsibility (2010) 
Focal subsidiary location Mandate development (year) 
Singapore Initial mandate has not been altered yet (n/a) 
Mandate coverage Mandate outlook (year) 
East Asia, Australia, New Zealand Reduction of geographical scope (2011) 
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Table 4-9: Firm profile of Case Company B 
 
The Singaporean or focal subsidiary of Case Company B was founded relatively recently through 
a greenfield approach. It currently serves as Company B’s Far East and Oceania sales and after-
sales hub. Prior to the subsidiary opening, markets in East Asia as well as in Australia and New 
Zealand were managed from an area sales manager located at the headquarter premises in Central 
Europe. A closer look at the subsidiary characteristics can be obtained from Table 4-10 below. 
Table 4-10: Subsidiary profile of Case #3 
4.5.1.1. Initial mandate gain 
Opportunity-identification and initiative-taking 
The opportunity for a decentralized market development for East Asia, Australia and New Zea-
land through the focal subsidiary in Singapore was identified by local subsidiary personnel. The 
request was communicated by today’s CEO of the focal subsidiary in the course of a job inter-
view with the owners of Company B in 2010. Even though HQ management had envisioned the 
opening of an office in Asia prior to the interview it is generally believed that the applicant’s 
proposition represented the actual process trigger. The locus of opportunity-identification and 
initiative-taking was therefore set at the focal subsidiary. The initiative was triggered by the HQ 
replacement needs of Company B for an area sales manager covering markets in East Asia, Aus-
tralia and New Zealand from the headquarter premises in Central Europe. The vacant position led 
Firm profile (as of 2010) 
Type Original equipment manufacturer (OEM) 
Ownership status  Family-owned  
Sales  < €0.5 bn 
N° of foreign subsidiaries  < 15 
Existence of regional headquarters  No 
Expansion / internationalization start 2000s 
Subsidiary profile (as of 2010)  
Date of inauguration 2010 
Company belonging: 2010 (greenfield approach) 
Location / host market Singapore  
Value-add Sales, after-sales, warehousing and spare parts 
Responsibility for other markets  Yes ( East Asia, Australia and New Zealand ) 
Responsibility for foreign sub-units  No 
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to the application of today’s CEO of the focal subsidiary, who proposed the opening of a local 
sales office in Singapore as opposed to following the former centralized market approach. 
The subsidiary initiative in the form of the applicant’s proposition was strongly facilitated by the 
past working experience of today’s CEO. Due to his market knowledge and contacts in the region 
he perceived a decentralized exploitation approach as beneficial. His experience also helped him 
to quickly estimate cost advantages of the proposed subsidiary opening. Finally, strong regional 
growth in most Asian markets strongly supported his initiative.  
Rent-seeking and responsibility-allocation 
The exchange between HQ and subsidiary about the extended market responsibility of the subsid-
iary in Singapore took place in the course of a job interview that was set up in order to replace 
one employee at the parent company. Initially, the aim was therefore not to evaluate the possibil-
ity of a new office in Asia. Looking at the quick decision by the owners of Company B, the rent-
seeking process must be viewed as relatively informal and straightforward. No business case cal-
culations or any other number-based argumentation were needed. The decision was rather the 
result of a positive gut-feeling than of a thorough weighing of the advantages and disadvantages 
of both approaches.   
Company B set up its first overseas sales subsidiary at the turn of the millennium. Very quickly 
headquarters management identified the suitability of local personnel in order to reach out into 
attractive neighboring markets. Local management therefore received official mandate for devel-
oping markets outside its original host market shortly after its inauguration. When company B’s 
second foreign subsidiary was opened around the mid-2000s it was immediately granted an ex-
tended geographical responsibility. At the time of the opening of the focal subsidiary in Singa-
pore in 2010 HQ management was therefore already familiar with extended geographical subsid-
iary mandates and had experienced predominately good results with the approach. A certain level 
of organizational maturity with regards to delegating market responsibility to foreign sub-units 
had therefore already been established at Company B when the opening of the focal subsidiary 
was decided. 
After years of strong growth, equipment markets in North America and Europe significantly de-
clined from 2008 onwards and for most areas did not recover until 2010. As a result, Company B 
was forced to slow down production and actually introduce short-term work at corporate head-
quarters in mid-2009. Markets in East Asia constituted an exception at that time, experiencing 
ongoing market growth and being relatively immune from the global financial crisis. Many Euro-
pean and North American OEMs thus intensified their activities in the Asian region in order to 
112 
compensate for reduced demand in their home markets. The management of Company B also 
viewed this approach as beneficial in order to get off lightly through the crisis and to reduce ex-
cessive dependency on traditional markets.  
While a geographical sales focus was set for the future it was not clear to HQ management how 
to maximize participation in emerging Asian markets. The existing approach with an HQ-based 
area sales manager had proved both its strengths and limitations. Even though the geographical 
distance limited the company from fully participating in most Asian markets it was able to obtain 
a decent market understanding and first customer contacts through the centralized approach. In 
markets with similar cultural backgrounds like Australia the company actually managed to turn 
into the dominant market participant. In order to fully participate in the growth momentum in 
other Asian markets, however, HQ management was aware of the necessity to get closer to its 
customers. In addition to geographical proximity the aspect of cultural proximity, including lan-
guage, also played a significant role. Strong growth rates in Asia, simultaneously declining tradi-
tional markets and limitations with the existing market approach resulted in a high level of open-
ness when confronted with the proposition to open a new subsidiary in Singapore. In addition, the 
sub-critical size of Singapore and past experience and existing contacts of today’s CEO beyond 
the host market further facilitated the HQ approval. 
4.5.1.2. Mandate evolution 
Mandate development 
Due to the relatively recent mandate gain the geographical and functional scope of subsidiary 
responsibilities beyond host markets has not been altered yet.  
Mandate outlook 
Looking ahead and assuming stable market conditions, the possibility to install local sales teams 
in neighboring Asian markets where demand justifies added resources is considered at HQ and 
subsidiary level. Whether a newly developed sales team would report to the focal subsidiary or 
directly to the HQ strongly depends on customer priorities and process efficiencies. If a new for-
eign subsidiary was to be set up in the region it would most likely report to the parent company, 
resulting in at least a partial loss of market responsibility for the focal subsidiary. The main ra-
tionale for a potential loss of geographical responsibility is an excessive size of neighboring mar-
kets that would suggest the opening of a new sub-unit in the region. At present, all foreign sub-
sidiaries directly report to the parent company so that it is not expected that in this case corporate 
management would deviate from this norm. The mandate of the focal subsidiary is therefore seen 
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as a temporary construct with the aim of obtaining initial market experience and getting a foot-
hold in attractive markets. Transforming the focal subsidiary into a regional headquarters and 
thus providing it with management responsibility for other foreign sub-units in the region is not 
envisioned by HQ management. The main reason for the reluctance towards sub-subsidiary con-
structs is excessive risk. Corporate management including company owners prefer to have a di-
rect link to its affiliated foreign subsidiaries. 
4.5.2. Within-case analyses 
On the next pages the outcome of the following three within-case analysis techniques for Case #3 
will be illustrated: (1) critical incident chart as shown in Figure 4-5; (2) event-state network as 
shown in Figure 4-6; (3) case dynamics matrix as shown in Table 4-11. 
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Figure 4-5: Critical incident chart for Case #3 
 




 Job start of today’s SUB 
CEO at another European 
company in Singapore with 
extended geographical 
responsibility
 Opening of first 
foreign subsidiary
EXT  Significant market growth in East Asia and, as a result of the global financial crisis, 
strong demand decline in traditional markets in Europe and North America
 Job quitting of HQ area 
sales manager for East 
Asia, Australia and New 
Zealand
Opening of additional 
foreign subsidiary with 
extended geographical  
responsibility
 Increasing sales in East Asia, 
Australia and New Zealand
 Application of today’s 
CEO for vacant 
position at parent 
company
 Execution of job interviews for 
installation of new area sales 
manager
 Decision to open local sales and 
service office in Singapore with 
extended geographical mandate 
for East Asia, Australia and New 
Zealand
 Outlook: further augment 
SUB’s responsibility scope 
in Singapore; if regional 
market demand requires the 
opening of additional sales 
offices in East Asia, 
Australia and New Zealand 
new entities would be 
directly managed from the 
parent company
 Outlook: gradually develop 
knowledge levels at focal 
SUB and reduce HQ 
dependency; install local sales 
teams in key neighboring 
markets; turn into regional 
HQ by managing other 
foreign subsidiaries in the 
region
 Provision of supra-
regional market 
responsibility to first 
subsidiary
 Proposition to work out of Singapore for 
market development of East Asia, Australia 
and New Zealand (presented in the course 
of the job interview)
= critical incident HQ = corporate headquarters SUB = focal subsidiary EXT = external / outside of MNC
Initial mandate gain Mandate evolution
 Gradual development of 
knowledge and networks in 
East Asia of today’s SUB 
CEO
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Figure 4-6: Event-state network for Case #3 
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Temporary installations of salesmen in core 
markets abroad (e.g. India)
Outlook: further augment 
responsibility scope at 
focal SUB in Singapore; 
if regional market 
demand requires the 
opening of additional 
sales offices in East Asia, 
Australia and New 
Zealand they would be 
directly managed from 
the parent company
Outlook: gradually develop knowledge 
levels at focal SUB and reduce HQ 
dependency; install local sales teams in 
key neighboring markets; become 
regional HQ managing other foreign 








Extensive training of 
focal SUB personnel 
at parent company




Table 4-11: Case dynamics matrix for Case #3 
Critical inci-
dents  
(locus / period) 
Initial mandate gain Mandate evolution 
Opportunity-identification Responsibility-allocation Mandate outlook 
Opening of foreign 
subsidiaries with 
extended GEO scope 
(HQ / 2000s) 
Work of future SUB 
CEO in Asia (SUB / 
2000s) 
Market growth in 
Asia and decline in 
USA and Europe 
(EXT / 2000s) 
Application / interview with 
future SUB CEO  proposi-
tion to open local sales office 
(HQ / 2010s) 
Set-up local sales office in 
Singapore with ext. GEO 
scope (HQ / 2010s) 
Plan to set up office(s) 
in Asian directly re-




 Unknown  n/a  n/a  Job application of future 
SUB CEO 
 Applicant’s proposition 






 Unknown  n/a  n/a  HR replacement needs at 
corporate HQ 
 Existing knowledge / 
networks of applicant 
 Regional growth and 
geographical distance 
 Cost advantages 
 Relevance / exces-
sive market size of 
neighboring markets 







tion and subsidiary 
management) 
 n/a  Awareness of 
Asia potential 
 Need to search 
for new revenues 
sources 
 Need to assess possibility to 
set up local sales office ver-




 Reduced HQ control 
 Regained direct 
market access 
 Reduced uncertainty 
and risk level 
SUB Incident 
Trigger 
 n/a  Unknown  n/a  HR replacement at corporate 
HQ 
 Application for vacant posi-
tion 





 n/a  Unknown  n/a  Leverage existing 
knowledge / networks  
 Remain stationed in Singa-
pore 
 n/a  n/a 
Incident 
Effect 
 n/a  Development of Asian 
market knowledge and 
networks as well as 
willingness to work 
locally in Asia of fu-
ture focal SUB CEO 
 Increasing mar-
ket knowledge 
and networks of 
future focal SUB 
CEO in Asia 
 n/a  Opportunity to develop 
white spots with strong 
market potential 
 Turn into important SUB 
at Company B 
 Need to demonstrate 
capabilities for re-
gional HQ role; oth-
erwise (partial) loss 
of market responsi-
bility in Asia 
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4.6. Case #4: The internationalization process of an Austrian subsidiary 
into Eastern Europe 
4.6.1. Case description 
Case #4 refers to the internationalization process of the Austrian subsidiary of a Central European 
manufacturing company (Case Company C) into Eastern Europe. The functional scope of the 
requested and eventually received foreign market mandate was thereby initially limited to cross-
border key account management for a single Austrian client. Since the initial mandate gain the 
scope of foreign market responsibilities of the focal subsidiary has already been extended twice, 
both functionally and geographically into Eastern Europe. If Company C decides to established 
local presence in any of the three Eastern European markets currently covered by the subsidiary 
mandate, local management is likely to experience a reduction of the geographical scope. Key 
characteristics for Case #4 are summarized in Table 4-12 below. 
Table 4-12: Key characteristics of Case #4 
 
Case Company C is a Central European original equipment manufacturer (OEM) in the manufac-
turing industry delivering its end-products to customers worldwide. It is organizationally split 
into two different business divisions units with significantly varying prices per unit. Company C 
has always been family-owned, a characteristic that has significantly influenced its corporate phi-
losophy in the past. As a result of its ownership status the company possesses a relatively ethno-
centric management style where major decisions are predominately taken in the corporate HQ. 
Nonetheless the company has realized the need to participate in growth outside its home market 
and identified the benefits of using local resources in its foreign subsidiaries for this goal. The 
main internationalization process of the firm started in the 1980s with the expansion into nearby 
markets in Europe. Towards the end of the 20
th
 century the company also started to tap into mar-
kets outside of Europe. The focus here was set on Asia. Sales are carried out directly or via spe-
Parent company location Initial mandate gain (year) 
Central Europe International key account management for single Austrian client (2000) 
Focal subsidiary location Mandate development (year) 
Austria  International key account management for all Austrian clients (2001) 
 Sales and service responsibility for three Eastern European markets (2008) 
Mandate coverage Mandate outlook (year) 
Eastern Europe Reduction of geographical scope (2011) 
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cialized dealers and sales partners, based on market requirements and local company presence. 
An overview of Case Company C is provided by Table 4-13 below. 
Table 4-13: Firm profile of Case Company C (cases #4 and #5) 
 
With regards to managing foreign subsidiaries the company initially allocated exclusive host 
market responsibility to local management. In certain cases customer contact and thus sales re-
sponsibility for a specific market was actually maintained by the parent company despite the 
availability of local sales managers. With increasing internationalization and complexity of its 
operations, corporate management realized the need to allow management of foreign subsidiaries 
to take responsibility beyond their original host markets. 
The focal subsidiary in Austria represents one of the oldest foreign sub-units of Company C and 
was founded in the early 1990s. It is a sales and service subsidiary without any production or 
assembly facilities. In the course of its existence however, the focal subsidiary has developed a 
certain level of sales engineering that differentiates itself from other pure sales and service sub-
sidiaries. Initially, the focal subsidiary focused on increasing the overall machine park and im-
proving sales and after-sales services. The geographical scope was limited to Austria. By the be-
ginning of the 21
st
 century sufficient machine population was developed to allow the focal sub-
sidiary to be profitable and to act relatively autonomously from corporate management. With the 
internationalization of Austrian companies the geographical scope of the focal subsidiary was 
also extended. Today, the focal subsidiary is one of the major revenue and profit contributors of 
Company C, conducting global key account management (KAM) for all Austrian customers. In 
addition, it obtained full geographical sales and after-sales responsibility for three Eastern Euro-
pean markets. A closer look at the subsidiary characteristics can be obtained from Table 4-14 
below.  
Firm profile (as of 2010) 
Type Original equipment manufacturer (OEM) 
Ownership status  Publicly-listed  
Sales  €0.5–2.0 bn 
N° of foreign subsidiaries  15–30 
Existence of regional headquarters  Yes 
Expansion / internationalization start 1980s 
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Table 4-14: Subsidiary profile of Case #4 
 
Looking ahead, the focal subsidiary is expected to maintain its mandate for managing Austrian 
clients on a global scale. With regards to being responsible for a set of Eastern European markets, 
however, HQ management might experience a mandate decline in the future. This is largely due 
to lacking local production facilities. The long-term vision of local management to become the 
group’s regional HQ for Eastern Europe is not shared by personnel in the parent company.  
4.6.1.1. Initial mandate gain 
Opportunity-identification and initiative-taking 
The opportunity to manage one particular customer outside the home market was identified by 
the focal subsidiary in Austria. As the initiative-taking of the focal subsidiary was mainly trig-
gered by a customer complaint, the presence of external conditions needs to be taken into consid-
eration in this context. The locus of opportunity-identification and initiative-taking was at the 
focal subsidiary and thus at the business frontline. With the opening of Eastern European econo-
mies at the beginning of the 1990s Austrian companies increasingly participated in regions out-
side their home market. Despite extending the geographical scope into Eastern Europe, major 
decisions of these companies continued to be taken in their corporate headquarters in Austria. In 
addition, mostly Austrian expatriates were installed as country managers for these new markets. 
Market development in Eastern European was therefore large influenced by Austrian personnel 
that favored exchanging business matters with people of a similar background.  
By the time of the customer complaint around 2000, the focal subsidiary had built up well-
functioning customer service in Austria providing local management with an excellent standing 
among top management of its customers. As a result of these externally proven resources most 
customers actually aimed to involve the focal subsidiary in their internationalization process from 
the start. Confronted with the customer complaint and knowing the customer preferences, the 
CEO of the focal subsidiary proposed corporate management to manage the single client on a 
Subsidiary profile (as of 2010) 
Date of inauguration Early 1990s 
Company belonging: Early 1990s (through greenfield approach) 
Location / host market Austria  
Value-add  Sales engineering, sales and after-sales 
Responsibility for other markets  Yes (several Eastern European markets) 
Responsibility for foreign sub-units No (only for a small servicing location) 
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global scale. While apparent process inefficiencies need to be stated at the core initiative trigger, 
regional market growth as well as subsidiary networks reaching beyond the original host market 
can be viewed as facilitating conditions. Due to its ability to satisfy customers in its home market, 
local management had already built up a reputation that served beyond Austrian borders. 
Rent-seeking and responsibility-allocation 
The rent-seeking process in 2000 turned out to be relatively informal. Once the customer had 
approached the management of the focal subsidiary the idea of managing Austrian customers 
beyond the host market was exchanged with the corporate management. Afterwards an additional 
conversation between the particular customer and HQ management took place. Both exchanges 
did not involve any trials or large business case calculations and the subsidiary proposition was 
quickly approved. The main reasons for providing the focal subsidiary with extended market re-
sponsibility were a combination of external preferences and externally as well as internally prov-
en resources of local management. As the customer explicitly requested to be managed globally 
by the focal subsidiary and as local management had a history of delivering what it had promised, 
the outcome of the subsidiary request was predictable. Moreover, country-specific advantages in 
terms of geographical proximity and cultural understanding can be viewed as facilitating condi-
tions that helped to obtain HQ buy-in. When assessing the subsidiary request HQ management 
had to realize that its network position for this particular client was less distinct than of its Aus-
trian subsidiary and that the latter was in a better position to satisfy the expressed customer needs. 
In addition, the parent company was keen on participating in the growth momentum in Eastern 
Europe that was strongly driven by Austrian clients. 
4.6.1.2. Mandate evolution 
Mandate development 
In 2001, shortly after receiving global responsibility for one particular Austrian customer, the 
mandate scope was extended to all Austrian clients. From this point onwards the focal subsidiary 
was responsible for the global key account management of all Austrian clients. More recently, in 
2008, the subsidiary mandate was further extended in that local management obtained sales and 
service responsibility for three markets in Eastern Europe. Independent of customer origin the 
focal subsidiary is exclusively assigned to grow company presence in these new markets. Other 
than the initial mandate gain the following responsibility extensions were exclusively initiated by 
corporate management and thus did not involve any initiative-taking or rent-seeking behavior by 
the focal subsidiary. While the first mandate extension was triggered by apparent process ineffi-
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ciencies of dealing with Austrian clients from the parent company, no particular trigger is known 
for extending the subsidiary mandate into three Eastern European markets. In both cases, howev-
er, cross-border knowledge and networks of local management as well as proven resources are 
viewed as major facilitating conditions throughout the initiative-taking process. Providing the 
focal subsidiary with global sales and service mandate for all Austrian customers was the result 
of a well-functioning pilot case with the initial client as well as increasing HQ perception that a 
decentralized approach was better suited to satisfying the rather particular needs of Austrian cus-
tomers. Existing process inefficiencies in combination with proven subsidiary resources in Aus-
tria can be viewed as the reason for the extended subsidiary mandate.  
In contrast to the relatively straightforward first case of mandate alteration, corporate manage-
ment had at least three options for intensified market development in Eastern Europe independent 
of customer origin. Other than relying on the focal subsidiary it could have taken the traditional 
centralized approach through sales personnel from the parent company or could have used other 
subsidiaries in the region. Distinct knowledge and network position of the focal subsidiary de-
termined HQ management to rely on local resources in Austria. As a result of its legitimized bor-
der-crossing into Eastern European markets with the presence of Austrian customers, the focal 
subsidiary had built up specific market knowledge and contacts in the region that differentiated it 
from other units in the group including the parent company. Proven resources expressed by pro-
nounced customer satisfaction levels further supported HQ management in the desired approach.  
Mandate outlook 
Looking ahead and independent of regional market development the focal subsidiary is expected 
to maintain its global mandate for Austrian clients. This is due to distinct capabilities of the focal 
subsidiary that will not be substituted by any personnel in the parent company or other sister 
companies in the near future. In addition, results are up to this point highly satisfying, so a devia-
tion from the defined approach is not expected. With regard to managing other subsidiaries and 
thus turning into a regional HQ for Eastern Europe, the focal subsidiary is facing a rather un-
promising outlook. Despite the opening of new subsidiaries in Eastern Europe over recent years 
the focal subsidiary has not yet obtained responsibility for managing other sub-units in the region. 
This phenomenon is not expected to change in the future as the focal subsidiary does not possess 
local production facilities. Due to the project nature of Company C’s business with relatively 
high unit prices, customers prefer to have a direct link to the involved production entity. Custom-
ers do not differ between the parent company and producing sub-units in the home market or 
abroad. Any introduction of sub-structures would lead to inefficient process flows and would 
potentially alienate customers.  
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In general, corporate management believes that responsibility for managing other sub-units of 
Company C can only be obtained if the focal subsidiary possesses local production or assembly 
facilities. Sufficient value-add can therefore be seen as a precondition for reaching a next level of 
global responsibility. As management at the parent company does not envision the establishment 
of local production or assembly facilities in Austria, the chances of turning into a regional HQ are 
therefore drifting towards zero. In addition, the focal subsidiary would lose geographical respon-
sibility if one of its supervised Eastern European markets reaches a critical market size that initi-
ates HQ management to open a new subsidiary. 
4.6.2. Within-case analyses 
On the next pages the outcome of the following three within-case analysis techniques for Case #4 
will be illustrated: (1) critical incident chart as shown in Figure 4-7; (2) event-state network as 
shown in Figure 4-8; (3) case dynamics matrix as shown in Table 4-15. 
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Figure 4-7: Critical incident chart for Case #4 
 




 Sales to Austria through 
external distributor
EXT
 Opening of Austrian 
SUB
 Installation of new 
CEO at SUB 
 Strengthening of customer 
service in Austria
 Intensified collaboration 
with key Austrian 
customers
 Opening of Eastern European economies with 
increasing presence of Austrian companies
 Handling of a major Austrian 
customer complaint related to 
issues outside the host market
 Request to exclusively 
support global operations 
for a particular Austrian 
customer 
Decision to delegate global key 
account management for specific 
customer to SUB
 Delegation of KAM responsibility 
for all Austrian clients to focal SUB 
 Constant improvement of customer services in 
Eastern Europe including foreign machinery 
support, dealer training etc. 
Allocation of market 
responsibility for several 
markets in Eastern Europe
 Outlook: further grow 
company presence 
eastwards; turn into 
regional HQ for Eastern 
Europe, potentially 
managing other 
subsidiaries in the region
 Outlook: leverage focal 
SUB for enhancing 
company presence in 
Eastern Europe and 
maintaining strong links to 
global Austrian customers; 
loss of geographical 
mandate scope in case of the 
opening of new entities in 
the covered area
 Gradual increase of headcount levels 
especially in the field of after-sales 
personnel
 Exchange with 
Austrian customer on 
SUB request
 Serious complaint from an important Austrian customer
= critical incident HQ = corporate headquarters SUB = focal subsidiary EXT = external / outside of MNC
Initial mandate gain Mandate evolution
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Figure 4-8: Event-state network for Case #4 
  
1990s 2011




Opening of focal 
SUB
Increased presence of 




service and development of 
strong customer networks in 
Austria
Installation of new 
CEO at Austrian 
SUB












suitability of SUB 
proposal
Allocation of global 
key account 
management for 
Austrian client to 
focal SUB
Implementation of well-
functioning global key 












European markets to 
focal SUB
Development of market 
experience and business 
networks in additional 
Eastern European 
markets







Extension of global service responsibility 
for all Austrian clients to focal SUB
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Table 4-15: Case dynamics matrix for Case #4 
 Initial mandate gain Mandate evolution 
Critical incidents  
(locus / period) 
Opportunity-identification Responsibility-allocation Mandate development Mandate outlook 
Opening of Eastern 
European econo-
mies (EXT / 1990s) 
Focal subsidiary 
founded (HQ / 
1990s) 
Service complaint of 
major Austrian cus-
tomer (EXT / 2000s) 
Global key account man-
agement for Austrian client 
for focal SUB (HQ / 2000s) 
Global KAM for all 
Austrian clients to 
focal SUB (HQ / 
2000s) 
Geographical responsi-
bility for three Eastern 
European markets to 
focal SUB (HQ / 2000) 
Unaltered or poten-
tially reduced subsid-




 n/a  Unknown  n/a  SUB request  n/a  Unknown  Set-up of addition-










 n/a  Explicit customer wish 
 Geographical and cultur-
al proximity 
 Trust in SUB capability 
 Eastern European market 
growth 




 Proven SUB 
resources 
 Existing presence 
and proven resources 
of focal SUB in the 
region 
 Geographical prox-
imity of focal SUB 
 Maintain direct 
link to clients  
avoid process inef-
ficiencies 




 Aim to exploit 
new market po-
tential 






ty to Austrian 
customers 
 Need to change 
existing approach 




 Deviation from tradi-
tional subsidiary man-
agement approach 
 Increased relevance of 
SUB 
 Reduced HQ control 
 Less HQ control 
and augmented 
risk 
 Increased SUB 
recognition 
 Reduced direct 
market access and 
increased SUB de-
pendency 
 Augmented risk level 
 Preservation of 








 n/a  n/a  n/a  Enlarge SUB mandate to 
increase customer satis-
faction 
 n/a  n/a  n/a 
Incident 
Effect 







 Opportunity to 
demonstrate local 
capabilities 
 Proposition to 
manage customer 
on a global scale 
 Increased visibility at 
HQ management 
 Further and official 
development of 
knowledge and networks 
outside host market 






 Enhanced SUB 
mandate 





 Limited future 
perspectives and 
potential loss of 
responsibility 
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4.7. Case #5: The internationalization process of a Chinese subsidiary into 
Asia-Pacific 
4.7.1. Case description 
Case #5 refers to the internationalization process of the Chinese subsidiary of a Central European 
manufacturing company (Case Company C) into the Asia-Pacific region. The functional scope of 
the foreign market mandate was thereby initially limited to cross-border sales and service respon-
sibilities. Since then, the focal subsidiary has also received responsibility for managing other 
MNC units in the region and has thus turned into a regional HQ of Company C. Moreover, the 
mandate is expected to further expand in the future. Key characteristics for Case #5 are summa-
rized in Table 4-16 below. 
Table 4-16: Key characteristics of Case #5 
 
The Chinese subsidiary represents an affiliated unit of Case Company C that was described in 
detail for Case #4 (Table 4-13). The subsidiary was established as a small-scale representative 
office at the turn of the millennium. The main driver for the opening of a local sales office was 
the extraordinary Chinese market growth that most Western OEMs tried to participate in. In addi-
tion, government regulations at that time facilitated sales of Western high-tech equipment, result-
ing in a highly attractive business environment for Company C. Favorable regulative conditions, 
however, changed in the following years and corporate management realized the necessity to 
produce locally in order to further exploit the vast market potential in China. Local production 
facilities were set up where final assembly for the Asia-Pacific region is carried out to this day. 
At the same time the mandate of the Chinese subsidiary was extended to the Asia-Pacific region. 
Since its inauguration, subsidiary headcount has increased more than twenty-fold, turning the 
sub-unit into one of the largest of Company C. Key subsidiary facts are outlined in Table 4-17 
below. 
Parent company location Initial mandate gain (year) 
Central Europe Sales and service responsibility (2005) 
Focal subsidiary location Mandate development (year) 
China Regional HQ for Asia-Pacific (2010) 
Mandate coverage Mandate outlook (year) 
Asia-Pacific Extended functional scope (2011) 
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Table 4-17: Subsidiary profile of case #5 
 
Since 2010 it is also responsible for another sub-unit in the Asia-Pacific region, thus truly turning 
into a regional headquarters of Company C. HQ influence remained high through the entire pro-
cess and has not been significantly reduced to this day. Looking ahead, the focal subsidiary is 
expected to obtain responsibility for another sub-unit in the Asia-Pacific region and to develop 
into a major purchasing platform of Company C. 
4.7.1.1. Initial mandate gain 
Opportunity-identification and initiative-taking 
The opportunity for expanding the territorial scope of the focal subsidiary in China into markets 
in the Asia-Pacific region was exclusively identified by personnel in the corporate HQ. The locus 
of opportunity-identification and initiative-taking was at the parent company and thus not at the 
business frontline in Asia. The initiative trigger for extending the geographical scope of the focal 
subsidiary was the opening of local production facilities in China in 2005. At that time the host 
market China was not perceived to possess sufficient demand due to its political instability so 
that an extended geographical mandate was aimed to mitigate sub-critical market sizes. 
Rent-seeking and responsibility-allocation 
As mentioned above, the mandate allocation followed HQ considerations only. The main reason 
for extending the geographical responsibility from China into all of Asia-Pacific was the signifi-
cant increase in value-add through local production facilities. The huge investment in a far-
distant region confronted HQ management as well as company owners with risk levels that 
strongly exceeded internationalization steps of the past. As a result, decision-makers urged for 
decisions and actions that would reduce uncertainty levels to an acceptable level. Increasing the 
subsidiary scope into other markets was thereby seen as an appropriate means to secure utiliza-
Subsidiary profile (as of 2010) 
Date of inauguration Early 2000s 
Company belonging Early 2000s (through greenfield approach) 
Location / host market China  
Value-add  R&D, sourcing, production sales and after-sales 
Responsibility for other markets  Yes (Asia-Pacific region) 
Responsibility for foreign sub-units  Yes  
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tion levels of the production plant. The overall relevance of risk and uncertainty elements was 
further highlighted by the installation of an HQ manager as chairman of the focal subsidiary. 
At the same time, corporate management was aware of the strong market growth in the Asia-
Pacific region and the similar regional customer requirements with regards to product quality and 
purchasing price. If the focal subsidiary was therefore to deliver products into neighboring mar-
kets it should also be responsible for managing the entire customer relationship throughout the 
product lifecycle, including after-sales services as well as spare parts delivery. In summary, the 
main HQ rationales for an extended subsidiary mandate were sub-critical host market size as well 
as strong market growth and similar product requirements in the overall region. 
4.7.1.2. Mandate evolution 
Mandate development 
Following the initial mandate gain in 2005, activities of the focal subsidiary did not alter much. 
Local management continued to focus on the Chinese market and did not proactively seek oppor-
tunities in neighboring regions. Tapping into new regions in Asia-Pacific was further carried out 
by an employee from the parent company who simultaneously served as a chairman of the focal 
subsidiary. Despite limited local efforts to grow company presence outside of China the subsidi-
ary mandate was further extended in 2010, when local management was granted responsibility 
for another sales subsidiary in the Asia-Pacific region. Precondition for a positive mandate evolu-
tion was the HQ decision at the end of the 2000s to open another foreign sub-unit in Southeast 
Asia. The initiative was triggered by the request of an external distributor, who suggested the 
opening and managing of another small regional office. Personnel from the focal subsidiary in 
China, however, were excluded from the entire initiative-taking and decision-making process at 
the parent company. 
HQ personnel also managed the opening of the new Asian subsidiary together with the external 
distributor. At this stage it was widely believed that the focal subsidiary’s task to get production 
in China running was challenging enough for local management. In addition, HQ management 
was not certain about the suitability of local personnel in China for establishing and later manag-
ing the new Asian sub-unit. This perception radically changed with the installation of an experi-
enced expatriate as a new CEO of the Chinese subsidiary. This new CEO possessed a very good 
reputation within HQ management, providing them with sufficient certainty levels in order to 
decentralize the entire management of a foreign sub-unit. The initiative trigger was therefore the 
human resources change at the focal subsidiary. 
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The HQ’s reasoning for turning the focal subsidiary into the regional HQ for Asia-Pacific in 2010 
and thus providing it with responsibility for another sub-unit was manifold. In addition to the 
presence of an expatriate, local production facilities and regional product requirements need to be 
viewed as reasons for an extended subsidiary mandate. As the newly formed subsidiary would – 
due to regional product similarities – be exclusively supplied with products from the focal subsid-
iary it should also report to the relevant producing entity. The presence of cross-disciplinary HQ 
functions at the focal subsidiary (financing, accounting, supply chain etc.) further supported the 
HQ’s opinion. 
Mandate outlook 
Looking ahead and assuming strong and relatively stable growth rates for Asian markets the 
mandate of the focal subsidiary is expected to be further extended in the future. In addition to 
receiving responsibility for one or potentially several additional subsidiaries in the region, the 
focal subsidiary is also expected to turn into one of the core purchasing platforms of Company C. 
HQ involvement is however not expected to decline in the future. This holds especially true when 
looking at the future plans for the subsidiary. While it is expected to receive responsibility for 
another sub-unit in the region, initial subsidiary management will again be executed by an HQ 
representative. Only when external uncertainty levels with regards to market dynamics are over-
come is responsibility delegation to the Chinese subsidiary likely to take place. In addition, unsat-
isfying results in the Chinese home market might actually prevent local management from ob-
taining enhanced responsibility scopes. 
In addition to outwards internationalization, corporate management also aims to utilize the Chi-
nese subsidiary for obtaining improved sourcing conditions. With the allocation of global sourc-
ing responsibility to Chinese management the role of the focal subsidiary will further increase. 
From its current role as a regional headquarters it is thus expected to turn into one of the most 
important stakeholders with regards to internal material flows. The main reason for further geo-
graphical mandate extension is continued market growth in neighboring countries while the HQ 
motivation for turning the focal subsidiary into the group’s sourcing platform are local cost ad-
vantages. Preconditions for mandate extension are in both dimensions the presence of HQ func-
tions and sufficient levels of local value-add. 
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4.7.2. Within-case analyses 
On the next pages the outcome of the following three within-case analysis techniques for Case #5 
will be illustrated: (1) critical incident chart as shown in Figure 4-9; (2) event-state network as 
shown in Figure 4-10; (3) case dynamics matrix as shown in Table 4-18. 
 131 
Figure 4-9: Critical incident chart for Case #5 
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Figure 4-10: Event-state network for Case #5 
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Table 4-18: Case dynamics matrix for Case #5 
Critical inci-
dents  
(locus / period) 
Initial mandate gain Mandate evolution 
Opportunity-identification Responsibility-allocation Mandate development Mandate outlook 
Opening of small-scale 
focal SUB office in 
China (HQ /  2000s) 
Establishment of local 
production facilities at 
focal SUB (HQ / 2000s) 
Allocation of extended geo-
graphical responsibility to focal 
SUB (HQ / 2000s) 
Opening of additional 
SUB in East Asia 
managed by HQ per-
sonnel (HQ / 2000s) 
Allocation of sub-
sidiary responsibil-
ity to focal SUB 
(HQ / 2010s) 
Further grow focal SUB man-
date with regard to regional HQ 
and group purchasing platform 
(HQ / Plan) 
HQ Incident 
Trigger 
 Strong Chinese mar-
ket growth 
 Attractive incentives 
for Western high-tech 
imports 
 Altering regulations 
harming Western im-
ports 
 Moves of peer compet-
itors 
 Opening of local production 
facilities 
 Request from exter-
nal dealer 
 
 Installation of 
experienced ex-
patriate as CEO 






 Benefit from attrac-
tive local conditions 
 Extend revenue 
sources beyond tradi-
tional markets in Eu-
rope and North 
America 
 Reduce production 
costs, avoid import 
taxes and achieve local 
competitiveness 
 Participate in expected 
future market growth 
 Secure plant utilization 
 Leverage local production 
for similar regional product 
requirements and significant 
growth in the region 
 Obtain buy-in of company 
owners for huge investment 
 Strong regional 
growth 
 Lacking trust in SUB 
capabilities 
 Sufficient task for 
focal SUB to devel-
op China 
 Reduced internal 
uncertainty 
through reliance 
on proven and 
culturally similar 
resources 
 Ongoing potential in Asia-
Pacific region with similar 
product requirements 
 Increasing global cost pres-
sure due to predominately 




 Exposure to a rela-
tively high risk due to 
dependency on local 
government decisions 
 Huge investment and 
thus strongly increased 
risk level 
 New dimension of 
internationalization 
 Intensification of HQ in-
volvement at focal SUB 
 Intensified efforts in Asia-
Pacific region 
 Continued limitation 
of focal SUB on 
Chinese market 
 Set-up of region-
al HQ without 
excessive risk 
increase 
 Increased (at least tempo-









 n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a 
Incident 
Effect 
 Exposure to Chinese 
market  local net-
work and knowledge 
development 
 Augmented local 
value-add  
 Increased relevance 
within MNC 
 None immediately (ongoing 
focus on Chinese host mar-
ket) 
 Ongoing focus on 






 Development of additional 
HQ-like functions 
 Further gain of relevance 
within the MNC 
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4.8. Case #6: The internationalization process of a Singaporean subsidiary 
into Southeast Asia 
4.8.1. Case description 
Case #6 refers to the internationalization process of the Singaporean subsidiary of a Central Eu-
ropean manufacturing company (Case Company D) into Southeast Asia. The functional scope of 
cross-border activities that were ceded to the focal subsidiary from its inauguration was limited to 
cross-border sales and service responsibilities. While the functional scope of the mandate has 
remained unaltered to this day the geographical scope has been extended into Vietnam. Looking 
ahead, the mandate is expected to decline in the event of the establishment of additional subsidi-
aries in the region. Key characteristics for Case #6 are summarized in Table 4-19 below. 
Table 4-19: Key characteristics of Case #6 
 
Case Company D is a Central European original equipment manufacturer (OEM) delivering end-
products into various industry segments on a global scale. It is organizationally split into different 
business divisions and the case in focus refers to one business division in the manufacturing in-
dustry. Company D has been a family-owned business since its foundation, a characteristic that 
has strongly impacted the company philosophy and management style to this day. The interna-
tionalization of Company D started in the 1950s with the setting up of sales and production facili-
ties in various markets across Europe. In the 1970s Company D entered a new stage of interna-
tionalization by opening its first overseas offices. Since then a global network of home market 
and foreign subsidiaries with or without production facilities has been established. Sales are car-
ried out directly or via specialized dealers and sales partners based on market requirements and 
local company presence. Further information about Company D is presented in Table 4-20 below.  
Parent company location Initial mandate gain (year) 
Central Europe Sales and service responsibility (1995) 
Focal subsidiary location Mandate development (year) 
Singapore Extension of geographical scope into Vietnam (2002) 
Mandate coverage Mandate outlook (year) 
Southeast Asia Reduction of geographical scope (2011) 
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Table 4-20: Firm profile of Case Company D 
 
With regards to the management of subsidiaries, Company D generally aims for a decentralized 
approach. While this certainly holds true for day-to-day operations, all major decisions are still 
taken in the corporate or divisional headquarters. In addition, the use of expatriates in foreign 
sub-units continues to serve as a valid instrument for overcoming uncertainty about external mar-
kets and/or internal competencies. The business division of this particular case slightly deviates 
from this norm. Divisional management has gradually shifted over time to a truly decentralized 
management style. This phenomenon is underlined by the advancement of local managers into 
leading positions abroad and declining relevance of temporary expatriates at the same time. 
The sales subsidiary in Singapore was established in the 1990s with the initial aim of improving 
after-sales offerings for local and regional customers. Singapore was seen as an appropriate hub 
for reaching out to many Southeast Asian markets. Overall, the subsidiary in Singapore does not 
represent one of the most important sub-units when looking at pure sales volumes. Nonetheless, 
HQ management views its host market and neighboring markets as having a high strategic im-
portance. Key subsidiary facts are outlined in Table 4-21 below. 
Table 4-21: Subsidiary profile of Case #6 
 
Firm profile (as of 2010) 
Type Original equipment manufacturer (OEM) 
Ownership status  Family-owned  
Sales  > €2.0 bn 
N° of foreign subsidiaries > 30 
Existence of regional headquarters No 
Expansion / internationalization start 1950s 
Subsidiary profile (as of 2010) 
Date of inauguration 1990s 
Company belonging 1990s (through greenfield approach) 
Location / host market Singapore  
Value-add Sales and after-sales 
Responsibility for other markets  Yes (Southeast Asia) 
Responsibility for foreign sub-units  No 
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To this day, the mandate of the focal subsidiary is limited to sales and service functions for mar-
kets around Singapore and local management does not oversee other sub-units beyond its host 
market. While the subsidiary’s initial geographical scope was limited to Thailand, Indonesia and 
Malaysia, the local management developed networks in Vietnam at a later stage. As the subsidi-
ary is not expected to turn into a regional HQ or manage other subsidiaries in Southeast Asia at 
any point in the future, however, it might actually lose sales and service responsibility for some 
of its market. If ongoing regional growth suggests the opening of another subsidiary, local man-
agement would be exempted from the mandate for this particular market.   
4.8.1.1. Initial mandate gain 
Opportunity-identification and initiative-taking 
The focal subsidiary received an extended geographical mandate for markets in Southeast Asia 
from the start, i.e. with its inauguration in 1995. The locus of opportunity-identification and initi-
ative-taking was therefore set at the corporate headquarters of Company D. The initiative for 
opening a sales and service subsidiary in Singapore and providing it with extended geographical 
responsibility was predominantly triggered by external factors. While no explicit trigger other 
than the opening of the subsidiary was mentioned by either HQ or subsidiary management, strong 
regional growth can be viewed as the main facilitator in the process. Increased servicing need of 
numerous small customers in the region made corporate management aware of the necessity to be 
locally present and to develop adequate servicing solutions for the entire region.  
Rent-seeking and responsibility-allocation 
The decision to grant extended geographical responsibility for Southeast Asia to the focal subsid-
iary was made prior to its inauguration and the decision-making process thus did not involve any 
exchange between the focal subsidiary and HQ management. Strong regional market growth, 
sub-critical size of individual markets as well as geographical distance are considered to be the 
main reasons for allocating an extended territorial mandate for Southeast Asia to the focal subsid-
iary. Regional markets had experienced a strong growth momentum before corporate manage-
ment decided to increase its regional commitment with the opening of a sales and service subsidi-
ary in Singapore. At the same time the individual size of markets in Southeast Asia was insuffi-
cient to justify the establishment of a local presence. Providing a new office with extended mar-
ket responsibility therefore served the purpose of achieving minimum levels of market volume. In 
addition, geographical distance to the home market was so pronounced that long-term satisfaction 
of regional customers could only be achieved through enhanced customer proximity. Finally, it 
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was acknowledged at the corporate headquarters that local personnel at the focal subsidiary 
would be in a better position to understand regional business practices. 
4.8.1.2. Mandate evolution 
Mandate development 
Since its inauguration in 1995 the focal subsidiary has managed to further grow company pres-
ence in Singapore and neighboring markets. In addition, it achieved initial exposure and machin-
ery sales to customers in Vietnam in 2002. The focal subsidiary thus served as a means for Com-
pany D to enter a completely new market. While the focal subsidiary was responsible for several 
markets in the region from the very start, the opportunity to enter Vietnam was identified at a 
later stage. The locus of opportunity-identification was thereby at the focal subsidiary and thus at 
the business frontline to Vietnam. Following the collapse of the former communist economy in 
Vietnam at the turn of the millennium, increasing demand from this particular market was notice-
able. Initially, the focal subsidiary was contacted by Vietnamese sales agents that were looking 
for high-tech equipment for specific projects. The initiative to exploit market potential in Vi-
etnam was therefore triggered by external customers. 
The process of obtaining allowance for the Vietnamese market did not involve any formal proce-
dures. As the focal subsidiary already possessed responsibility for Southeast Asia, HQ manage-
ment was only informed about new customers in Vietnam and about the first machinery delivery 
to this market. No official request or rent-seeking behavior from local management was therefore 
needed. The HQ rationale for granting extended market responsibility to the focal subsidiary was 
twofold, involving subsidiary- and country-specific elements. First, local subsidiary had demon-
strated that it was capable of gaining market knowledge and developing networks across borders. 
Second, geographical and cultural proximity of the focal subsidiary to Vietnam was seen as a key 
argument for allowing Singapore to develop this new market.  
Mandate outlook 
The focal subsidiary is expected to further develop the company’s presence in Vietnam and other 
markets in Southeast Asia. If at some stage one of these markets reaches a certain sales volume 
that would suggest the opening of a new local sub-unit, HQ management believes that the focal 
subsidiary would lose its mandate for this specific market. It is thus not expected to turn into a 
regional HQ for Southeast Asia, which would allow local management to look after other subsid-
iaries in the region. Since the first internationalization steps of Company D, subsidiaries always 
report to their corresponding corporate or divisional headquarters so that there is no reason for 
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assuming a deviation from this approach. While this form of standardization is largely the result 
of risk-reducing efforts of corporate management, cost aspects also play a significant role. The 
setting up of a sub-subsidiary would imply a strong increase in fixed costs (additional computer 
and data systems, personnel training, increased auditing needs etc.). The potential benefits (re-
duced distances, tax benefits etc.) are not believed to offset the involved costs of such a construct. 
In addition, local value-add of subsidiary plays an important role in this context. While sales and 
service subsidiaries are generally expected to maintain a very lean organizational structure with 
limited support functions, a foreign subsidiary with production or assembly facilities might al-
ready be equipped with certain functions that are essential for managing other sub-units. In com-
bination with similar product needs in a region, the construct of sub-subsidiaries is then more 
likely to obtain HQ buy-in. Despite the existence of foreign producing entities, the approach of 
affiliating sub-units to foreign producing entities is generally not seen at Company D. It is be-
lieved that, with regards to subsidiary evolution, the aspect of risk is of particular importance. 
While as a result of proven local subsidiary resources, external market uncertainty and internal 
uncertainty about subsidiaries’ capabilities might decline over time, the setting up of a sub-
subsidiary might easily surpass the maximum risk level for a specific market or a specific subsid-
iary. In addition, subsidiary development is strongly impacted by overall resource constraints of 
the company as a whole. While being situated in a not-prioritized region might benefit a subsidi-
ary in obtaining increased market responsibility at the start, it may also limit this unit from mov-
ing its responsibility scope to a significantly higher level. 
4.8.2. Within-case analyses 
On the next pages the outcome of the following three within-case analysis techniques for Case #6 
will be illustrated: (1) critical incident chart as shown in Figure 4-11; (2) event-state network as 
shown in Figure 4-12; (3) case dynamics matrix as shown in Table 4-22. 
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Figure 4-11: Critical incident chart for Case #6 
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Figure 4-12: Event-state network for Case #6 
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Table 4-22: Case dynamics matrix for Case #6 
Critical incidents  
(locus / period) 
Initial mandate gain Mandate evolution 
Opportunity-identification Mandate development Mandate outlook 
 Opening of focal SUB with extended 
geographical mandate for Southeast 
Asia (HQ / 1990s) 
Augmentation of local 
personnel / expertise 
(SUB / 1990s) 
Nomination of local employ-
ee as focal SUB manager 
(HQ / 2000s) 
Initial sales into 
Vietnam (SUB / 
2000s) 
Mandate loss of focal SUB in event 
of the opening additional subsidiaries 
in Southeast Asia (SUB / plan) 
HQ Incident 
Trigger 
 Regional market growth 
 Geographical distance 




 Enhance customer proximity and 
improve local customer service for 
numerous small-scale customers 
 Achieve critical sales volume through 
combined markets 
 Exploit regional market potential 
 n/a  Increasing existence of 
local know-how 
 Proven SUB resources 
 Allow a local strategy / 
management approach 
 n/a  Maintain control level and limit 
SUB independence 
 Stick to common practices and 
have direct reporting link of sub-
sidiaries to relevant headquarters 




 Enhanced exposure to Southeast Asian 
markets 
 Increased risk level due to extended 
geographical SUB mandate 
 Increasing independ-
ence of focal SUB 
 Declining expatriate 
relevance and control 
over focal SUB 
 Reducing influence  
increased uncertainty lev-
els 






 No rent-seeking behavior of focal 




 n/a  Repeated expertise 
drain in event of ex-
patriates departure 






 n/a  Develop long-term 
strategy 
 Enhance know-how 
level at focal SUB 






 Exposure to Southeast Asian markets 
 development of regional market 
knowledge and networks 
 Strengthening of 
SUB positioning 
 Reduction of HQ-
dependency 
 Further decoupling from 
HQ influence  enhanced 
decision-making autarky 




 Limited opportunities for future 
responsibility development (func-




4.9. Case #7: The internationalization process of a Singaporean subsidiary 
into East Asia 
4.9.1. Case description 
Case # 7 refers to the internationalization process of the Singaporean subsidiary of a Central Eu-
ropean manufacturing company (Case Company E) into East Asia. Since initially obtaining wid-
ened territorial responsibility for logistics in East Asia with the establishment of the focal subsid-
iary, the foreign market mandate has been extended and reduced several times, both functionally 
and geographically. Looking ahead, the mandate is expected to further decline. Key characteris-
tics for Case #7 are summarized in Table 4-23 below. 
Table 4-23: Key characteristics of Case #7 
 
Case Company E is an original equipment supplier (OES) in the manufacturing industry deliver-
ing components into various business segments worldwide. It is listed on the stock exchange with 
its corporate headquarters situated in Central Europe. The internationalization of Company E 
started in the 1970s with the aim of improving service times and quality levels for local end-
customers. The initial rationale for internationalization was thus related to service rather than 
sales or production. Since then, a network of subsidiaries and distributors has been developed 
worldwide. Company E is today equipped with sales and service subsidiaries in all continents and 
possesses production sites in America, Asia and Europe. Customers are original equipment man-
ufacturers (OEMs) or their end-customers for after-sales offerings. From an HQ perspective, sub-
sidiaries are treated as distributors. Further information about Company E can be found in Table 
4-24 below. 
Parent company location Initial mandate gain (period) 
Central Europe Logistics responsibility for East Asia excluding India (mid-1970s) 
Focal subsidiary location Mandate development (period or year) 
Singapore  Gaining of full market responsibility for East Asia excluding India (early 1990s) 
 Gaining of full market responsibility for India (mid-1990s) 
 Gaining of regional HQ status for East Asia (late 1990s) 
 Partial loss of strategic regional HQ function to Chinese subsidiary (2007) 
 Closure of two Southeast Asian subsidiaries under supervision (2009) 
 Loss of responsibility for China and Northeast Asia (2011) 
Mandate coverage Mandate outlook (year) 
East Asia Reduction of geographical scope (2011) 
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Table 4-24: Firm profile of Case Company E 
 
Due to its long-lasting global presence, Company E shows a high degree of organizational ma-
turity with regard to managing its global operations. This characteristic is expressed by a relative-
ly pronounced level of subsidiary autonomy and the installation of local managers in leading po-
sitions abroad. Company E recently introduced a new sales organization in order to further en-
hance its ability to respond to local customer needs. Already today certain divisional headquarters 
of Company E are located outside the home market, further indicating the willingness of corpo-
rate management to fully achieve a decentralized management style.  
The sales subsidiary in Singapore was one of the first overseas subsidiaries of Company E. Due 
to the growing number of customers in East Asia, Company E was confronted with logistics re-
quirements that it was no longer able to satisfy from the HQ. The initial task for the focal subsid-
iary was therefore to ameliorate regional logistic processes with regards to product supply as well 
as spare parts delivery. Despite functional limitations the focal subsidiary held responsibility for 
the entire East Asian region from the very start. Key subsidiary facts are outlined in Table 4-25 
below. 
Table 4-25: Subsidiary profile of Case #7 
 
Firm profile (as of 2010) 
Type Original equipment supplier (OES) 
Ownership status  Publicly-listed  
Sales  > €2.0 bn 
N° of foreign subsidiaries  > 30 
Existence of regional headquarters  Yes 
Expansion / internationalization start 1970s 
Subsidiary profile (as of 2010) 
Date of inauguration Mid-1970s 
Company belonging: Mid-1970s (through greenfield approach) 
Location / host market Singapore  
Value-add Sales engineering, sales, logistics and after-sales 
Responsibility for other markets  Yes (India & Southeast Asia) 
Responsibility for foreign sub-units  Yes 
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While initially representing a pure logistics hub with an extended geographical mandate, the sub-
sidiary’s scope of responsibilities, both externally and internally, has significantly increased over 
time. In addition to developing extensive sales and after-sales capabilities, local management has 
also built up upstream-related know-how for sales and application engineering in order to satisfy 
individual regional product demand. This is in particularly remarkable as the focal subsidiary is 
not equipped with local production facilities. In addition, local management took over responsi-
bility for regional processes that terminated in the focal subsidiary. One of these functions, for 
example, was independent order and stock management. Ownership of original HQ functions 
facilitated the later nomination as regional HQ for East Asia. Having gradually broadened its ge-
ographical and functional scope, the focal subsidiary also experienced certain mandate reductions 
in the course of its evolution. While the mandate reduction was predominantly the result of HQ 
management decisions, they were also driven by local management. Today, the focal subsidiary 
is responsible for markets and subsidiaries in Southeast Asia and India. Looking ahead and as-
suming an augmented presence in India and enhanced local value-add, management in Singapore 
considers a mandate loss for India a likely evolution scenario. 
4.9.1.1. Initial mandate gain 
Opportunity-identification and initiative-taking 
The decision to open the focal subsidiary in Singapore as a logistics hub for Company E’s Asia 
operations in the mid-1970s was purely HQ-based. Local management was immediately 
equipped with an extended geographical responsibility so that the locus of opportunity-
identification and initiative-taking was set at the parent company. Originally the functional scope 
was strictly limited to logistics support. At the time of the subsidiary opening Company E already 
possessed a small marketing office in Singapore. The initial company presence in Singapore and 
the initial mandate extension for markets in East Asia thus dates back longer than the actual 
opening of the focal subsidiary. The HQ decision to open a subsidiary in Singapore was predom-
inantly triggered by a large Singaporean end-customer that requested enhanced logistics and ser-
vicing solutions. At this time Company E also possessed smaller clients in neighboring markets 
and thus delegated extended territorial responsibility to the focal subsidiary from the very start. 
Only accumulated market volumes in East Asia justified the establishment of company presence 




Rent-seeking and responsibility-allocation 
As the mandate extension into markets in East Asia was decided prior to the focal subsidiary 
opening, no exchange between HQ and local management took place throughout the entire deci-
sion-making process. Regional market growth in Southeast Asia, sub-critical host market sizes as 
well as geographical and cultural proximity are generally seen as main reasons for equipping the 
focal subsidiary with extended territorial reach.  
4.9.1.2. Mandate evolution 
Mandate development 
Since obtaining responsibility for all logistics-related functions in East Asia, the focal subsidiary 
experienced extensions as well as reductions of its supra-national mandate. The following man-
date alterations are highlighted:  
 Gaining of full market responsibility for East Asia excluding India (early 1990s) 
 Gaining of full market responsibility for India (mid-1990s) 
 Gaining of regional HQ status for East Asia (late 1990s) 
 Partial loss of strategic regional HQ function to Chinese subsidiary (2007) 
 Closure of two Southeast Asian subsidiaries under supervision (2009) 
 Loss of responsibility for China and Northeast Asia (2011) 
As outlined above, Company E managed the East Asian region from two separate locations in 
Singapore throughout the 1970s and 1980s. While the marketing office with predominantly ex-
patriate personnel continued to act as a proxy for the marketing department at the parent company, 
the focal subsidiary defined itself as a rather independent entity within the group. Over time sub-
sidiary management developed know-how that significantly exceeded its initial job description as 
a regional logistics hub. It got involved in the overall sales process (offerings, contracting etc.) as 
well as following after-sales and spare part requests. In addition, local customer preferences and 
thus deviant product requirements forced the focal subsidiary to develop specialized expertise in 
the field of sales and application engineering in order to satisfy local demand. Throughout this 
process the focal subsidiary developed a unique selling proposition within Company E that 
strongly helped to obtain a broadened scope of functional responsibilities.  
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In the early 1990s corporate management decided to integrate the marketing office into the focal 
subsidiary, thus further strengthening its positioning. As a result of the integration, local man-
agement had obtained full responsibility for markets in East Asia, covering all downstream-
related functions (sales, after-sales and spare parts) as well as certain upstream-related responsi-
bilities like sales and application engineering. While inefficient local processes due to the pres-
ence of two offices in Singapore can be viewed as both initiative-trigger and decision-making 
rationales, other reasons for mandate extension were growing competence levels, increased re-
gional networks as well as proven resources of local management.  
The decision to include India in the territorial responsibility scope of the focal subsidiary in the 
mid-1990s and thus to further extend its foreign market mandate was purely HQ-driven. No ex-
plicit trigger for this shift of responsibilities other than lacking success with a HQ market devel-
opment approach is known. The HQ’s reasoning for granting market responsibility for India to 
the focal subsidiary in Singapore had three major components. First of all, local management in 
Singapore had proven that it was capable of developing new markets. Second, due to sub-critical 
size and low mechanization levels, India did not represent one of the focus areas at that time. 
While it was therefore neither a big risk nor a significant loss for corporate management to trans-
fer responsibility to the focal subsidiary, it was clearly aimed at better serving the Indian market 
in order to be ready if strong market growth is finally accompanied by increased product sophis-
tication. Finally, corporate management believed that local resources in Singapore were not only 
geographically closer to India but were also culturally better suited to dealing with Indian busi-
ness practices. Sub-critical market size and geographical as well as cultural proximity therefore 
represented the main reasons for broadening the subsidiary mandate in the described dimension. 
When in the late 1990s sales volumes and subsequently installed bases in neighboring Asian 
markets exceeded a certain level, corporate management considered the opening of additional 
sales and service subsidiaries in East Asia. In addition to HQ initiatives, local management in 
Singapore also requested the establishment of new sub-units in the region in order to comply with 
the global service standards of Company E. Finally, a large firm takeover resulted in the incorpo-
ration of two Asian subsidiaries. With the exception of the firm acquisition, past initiative trig-
gers are no longer known. In all cases however, newly opened or recently acquired sub-units in 
East Asia were immediately put under the responsibility of local management in Singapore. The 
focal subsidiary thus turned into Company E’s regional HQ for East Asia.  
The headquarters’ rationale for introducing sub-subsidiary structures was threefold. First, geo-
graphical and cultural proximity continued to constitute a significant advantage of a decentralized 
market development approach. Second, local management had gained considerable standing 
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among corporate executives over the years. Finally and most important, however, the subsidiary 
had not only developed specialized expertise in the field of sales and applications engineering but 
had also taken over responsibility for regional processes like order and stock management that 
terminated at the focal subsidiary, i.e. did not require any HQ involvement at all. Ownership for 
such HQ-like functions strongly helped the focal subsidiary to obtain responsibility for managing 
other sub-units in the region. It should also be noted that at the same time corporate management 
appointed an East Asian HQ chairman responsible for looking after the far-distant operations. 
The aspect of increasing risk and uncertainty levels perceived at the parent company therefore 
clearly accompanied the mandate extension process. 
After a continuous increase in geographical and functional responsibilities the focal subsidiary 
had to experience its first mandate reduction in 2007 when corporate management decided to 
shift the strategic regional headquarters function from Singapore to China. The initiative trigger 
for externally promoting the Chinese subsidiary and thereby devaluing its counterpart in Singa-
pore was the increasing relevance of the Chinese market. The new market significance was un-
derlined by the opening of local production facilities in China in the previous year. In addition, 
the responsibility shift coincided with the initial public offering (IPO) of Company E. It is there-
fore possible that turning the Chinese subsidiary into the strategic headquarters for Asia also 
served as a means to highlight the future company focus to external investors. 
The main rationale for allocating additional responsibility to the Chinese subsidiary was continu-
ous national market growth and increasing local value-add. Due to its significant year-over-year 
market growth, China turned into the key market in Asia, where Company E aimed for a strong 
positioning. The pressure was reflected by the opening of local production facilities in order to 
benefit from cost advantages and to enhance local product fit in the year before. At the time of 
the responsibility shift in 2007 the Chinese subsidiary was not only equipped with a significantly 
larger host market than its Singaporean counterpart but it also had its own production facilities, 
which the focal subsidiary could not offer. Growing independence of the Chinese subsidiary from 
its responsible regional headquarters in Singapore was therefore inevitable. 
The mentioned severance process was not entirely driven by the Chinese subsidiary or the corpo-
rate headquarters but was also the result of recognition of local management in Singapore that the 
Chinese market was actually too big and the operations of the Chinese subsidiary too complex to 
be exclusively monitored from Singapore. Prior to this official shift of responsibilities, local sub-
sidiary management had already established three sub-regions for its territory (China, Northeast 
Asia and Southeast Asia including India). In addition to introducing regional sub-structures the 
focal subsidiary had also ceded certain responsibilities to the Chinese subsidiary, providing it 
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with a higher level of independence. From an operational perspective the HQ announcement 
therefore had little impact on the business of the focal subsidiary. Finally, Company E’s initial 
public offering (IPO) most likely also influenced the decision of corporate management to offi-
cially nominate the Chinese subsidiary as the strategic regional headquarters for Asia. At that 
time, growing relevance of the emerging Chinese market dominated the agenda of economists 
and financial market participants so that the company announcement served as a means to satisfy 
expectations of potential external investors. 
In 2009 local management in Singapore proposed the closure of two subsidiaries in the region. 
The request was approved by corporate management and these particular markets are now served 
by external distributors. The closure of two Asian subsidiaries was exclusively driven by local 
management in Singapore. This is worth mentioning as the initiative actually reduced the subsid-
iary mandate in the way that its number of reporting sub-subsidiaries declined. The main ra-
tionale for the closure was local management’s desire to fulfill global compliance standards of 
Company E. While compliance standards represent the principal rationale for subsidiary closures, 
the overall market size in East Asia also needs to be taken into consideration. Due to ongoing 
regional growth, markets had reached such magnitude that local management was increasingly 
confronted with resource constraints that asked for a prioritization of efforts.  
Only recently in 2011, HQ management announced the introduction of a new sales organization, 
whereby the number of worldwide regions was extended from three to ten. As a result the focal 
subsidiary not only entirely lost responsibility for China but it was also exempted from its man-
date for Northeast Asia. The geographical scope was reduced to Southeast Asia and India. The 
main trigger for a new sales organization was ever-growing demand in East Asia that resulted in 
overall process inefficiencies with numerous sub-subsidiary structures. Corporate management 
was convinced that establishing smaller regions with direct reporting links to the relevant head-
quarters represents the adequate approach in order to achieve necessary degrees of customer 
proximity. Newly defined regions still encompass markets with other sub-units of Company E so 
that the construct of sub-subsidiaries and thus regional headquarters still exists. In this context the 
regional HQ mandate of the focal subsidiary was reduced to Southeast Asia and India. 
Mandate outlook 
Looking ahead, the focal subsidiary itself anticipates the loss of geographical responsibility for 
India. Its regional headquarters function for Southeast Asia is however expected to remain with 
the focal subsidiary. Similar to the recent mandate loss for China, the huge market size of India 
and gradually increasing local value-add of the Indian subsidiary are considered to represent the 
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main rationale for establishing a new region. HQ management has identified India as a key future 
market and has underlined this belief through the opening of a global R&D center in India. It is 
expected that local production facilities will follow in order to better suit local market demand. 
4.9.2. Within-case analyses 
On the next pages the outcome of the following three within-case analysis techniques for Case #7 
will be illustrated: (1) critical incident chart as shown in Figure 4-13; (2) event-state network as 
shown in Figure 4-14; (3) case dynamics matrix as shown in Table 4-26. 
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Figure 4-13: Critical incident chart for Case #7 
 




EXT  Increasing logistics and servicing demand from 
new customers in East Asia
 Opening of SUB in Singapore as 
logistics hub for East Asia (1st
subsidiary in the region)
 Significant recruitment of local 
employees and gradual increase of 
local management know-how 
beyond logistics (sales, service, 
contracting etc.)
 Augmenting special offer requests from 
new customers in East Asia
Development of regional networks and 
distinct capabilities for regional customers 
(e.g.  sales & application engineering)
 Introduction of Asian sub-regions 
ceding of responsibilities to Chinese 
SUB (1st sub-region)
 Decision to close two 
subsidiaries in East Asia
 Acquisition of US 
competitor with local 
presence in East Asia
 Strong market 
growth in East Asia, 
especially China and 
India
 Increasing sales to neighboring markets and 
augmenting installed bases
 Further development 
of HQ-like functions
 Global financial crisis particularly 
impacting traditional triad markets; 
ongoing Asian market growth
 Opening of small representative 
office with HQ expatriates for the 






 Decision to 
provide focal 
SUB with full 
market mandate 
for East Asia 
(excl. India)
 Initial public 
offering (IPO)
 Shift of Asian 
strategic HQ from 
Singapore to China
 Opening of new 
local production 
facilities in China




Modification of global 
sales organization  loss 
of China / Northeast Asia 
mandate for SUB
 Shift from regional to 
divisional global reporting 
structure
 Outlook: based on 
market development 
focal SUB’s mandate 
may extend or decline




 Opening of subsidiaries 
in East Asia managed 
by SUB  granting of  
regional HQ status / 
nomination of HQ 
chairman for SUB
 Lifting China to a higher-
level market priority
 Outlook: further develop 
Southeast Asia and 
India; anticipated loss 
of responsibility for 
India in case of 
excessive market size 
and sufficient local 
value-add
 Overall pressure for strong 
return on investments (ROI) 
from global financial markets
 Further ceding of 
responsibilities to Northeast 
Asia (2nd sub-region)
= critical incident HQ = corporate headquarters SUB = focal subsidiary EXT = external / outside of MNC
Initial mandate gain Mandate evolution




Figure 4-14: Event-state network for Case #7 
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growth in East Asia
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Table 4-26: Case dynamics matrix for Case #7 
Critical incidents  
(locus / period) 
Initial mandate gain Mandate evolution 
Opportunity-identification Mandate development Mandate outlook 
Opening of focal SUB 
in Singapore as East 
Asian logistics hub 
(HQ / 1970s) 
Integration of representa-
tive / marketing  
office into focal SUB 
 (HQ / 1990s) 
Allocation of Indian 
market responsibility to 
focal SUB (HQ 1090s) 
Nomination of focal SUB 
as regional HQ (HQ / 
2000s) 
Shift of Asian 
strategic HQ from 
Singapore to China 






sibility loss for 




 Increasing sales 
volumes to East Asia 
and augmenting in-
stalled basis 
 Large account in 
Singapore 
 Increasing capabilities 
of focal SUB person-
nel 
 Apparent process 
inefficiencies with two 
local offices 
 Unknown  Opening of sales offic-
es in Asia 
 Acquisition of compa-
nies with Asia pres-
ence 
 Company IPO 
 Prior establish-
ment of three 
Asian sub-




 Ceding of 
functions by 
focal SUB to 






 Participate in region-
al market growth 
 Enhance customer 
proximity & amelio-
rate local processes 
 Establish a single 
customer and internal 
touch point in the re-
gion 
 Bundle resources and 
capabilities 
 Strong Indian market 
growth 
 Cultural fit of focal 
SUB  
 Unsatisfying HQ 
results & proven 
SUB resources 
 Regional networks and 
market knowledge of 
SUB personnel 
 SUB value-add (HQ-
like functions) 
 Use of expatriate for 
focal SUB 
 Value-add of 
Chinese SUB 
 Strong Chinese 
market growth 






 Disguising of 
ROI figures 
 Excessive 
market size in 
India 






ment to Asian mar-
kets 
 Reduced control 
 Further strengthening  
of focal SUB 
 Integration of add. HQ 
functions at focal SUB 
 Further geographical 
decentralization 
 New dimension of 
internationalization  
high degree of respon-
sibility delegation 
 Shifting HQ 









 n/a  n/a  n/a  Request for opening 
sub-units in the region 




 n/a  n/a  n/a  Leverage regional 
networks 
 n/a  n/a  n/a 
Incident 
Effect 
 Build-up of regional 
networks & market 
knowledge  dis-
tinct capabilities 
 End of responsibility 
clash with rep. office 
 Full responsibility for 
East Asia 
 Additional market in 
portfolio 
 Augmented rele-
vance in MNC 
 Increased MNC rele-
vance and augmented 
autarky level 
 No operational 
impact at first 
 Official loss of 
mandate for 
China & N.E. 
Asia 




4.10. Case #8: The internationalization process of a US subsidiary into Latin 
America 
4.10.1. Case description 
Case #8 refers to the internationalization process of the US subsidiary of a Central European 
manufacturing company (Case Company F) into Latin America. Since initially obtaining widened 
territorial responsibility for sales and service in Mexico, the mandate has been modified several 
times so that today local management in the US not only looks after Latin American markets but 
also holds management responsibility for a Brazilian sub-unit of Company F. The local subsidi-
ary had previously failed to obtain HQ approval for opening and managing a subsidiary in Mexi-
co. Looking ahead, the mandate may be significantly reduced if local production facilities and 
cross-border reach of the subordinate Brazilian subsidiary are achieved. Key characteristics for 
Case #8 are summarized in Table 4-27 below. 
Table 4-27: Key characteristics of Case #8 
 
Case Company F is a Central European original equipment manufacturer (OEM) in the manufac-
turing industry organized into different business units. The case in focus thereby refers to the 
largest business unit, accounting for more than 75% of total company revenues. Company F is 
global market leader in different niche segments, mainly competing with large European and 
Asian OEMs as well as smaller regional market participants. Since its foundation Company F has 
been privately-owned, a characteristic that has strongly impacted its management style and cus-
tomer approach in the past. Despite constant business internationalization as well as professional-
ization, major decisions were predominantly taken in the parent company and were based as 
much on the personal gut-feeling of the company founder as on thorough business case calcula-
tions. Key company characteristics are highlighted in Table 4-28 below: 
Parent company location Initial mandate gain (year) 
Central Europe Sales and service responsibility of Mexico (1999) 
Focal subsidiary location Mandate development (year) 
USA  Lacking HQ approval for becoming regional HQ for North America (2005) 
 Gain of sales and service responsibility for the Americas (2007) 
 Gain of regional HQ responsibility for the Americas (2009) 
Mandate coverage Mandate outlook (year) 
Latin America Reduction of geographical and functional scope (2011) 
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Table 4-28: Firm profile of Case Company F 
 
Company F generates most of its revenues outside its home market. The internationalization pro-
cess started in the 1970s with the opening of first subsidiaries in markets across Europe. The abil-
ity to assemble locally in order to meet regional demand characterized newly established sub-
units at that time. In the following years further European as well as overseas subsidiaries with or 
without production facilities were established. Today, Company F is present in all major markets 
worldwide. Sales are done directly or via specialized dealers and sales partners based on market 
requirements and local company presence. While initially showing strong HQ influence on global 
operations, Company F gradually shifted to a more decentralized management style. This is not 
only due to new regions gaining relevance in combination with declining traditional markets but 
is also the result of increased organizational maturity with regards to delegating responsibilities 
to foreign sub-units. Company F was strongly hit by the financial and economic crisis from 2008 
onwards. A global restructuring program was implemented that significantly reduced headcount 
levels, especially at the parent company. In addition, the top management of Company F was 
almost entirely replaced at that time. In an effort to improve global resource efficiency, Company 
F recently decided to restructure its sales structure, allocating further market and organizational 
responsibility to key subsidiaries abroad.  
The US subsidiary was established in the 1980s through the acquisition of a local competitor. The 
main rationale for the takeover was to use the local company as a hub for distributing European-
made equipment. The integration of existing products of the target company played only a subor-
dinate role in the decision-making process. When the focal subsidiary did not manage to suffi-
ciently participate in the strong US market growth, Company F was faced with the option of ei-
ther abandoning the market or significantly modifying the local market approach. It was then 
decided to start over and to relocate the US subsidiary and to establish new local production facil-
ities. Major components still came from the parent company but the overall degree of local con-
tent was significantly increased. In addition, a new local manager was installed as CEO of the 
Firm profile (as of 2010) 
Type Original equipment manufacturer (OEM) 
Ownership status  Family-owned  
Sales  €0.5–2.0 bn 
N° of foreign subsidiaries 15–30 
Existence of regional headquarters  Yes 
Expansion / internationalization start 1970s 
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subsidiary, further indicating the company’s commitment to a truly decentralized and US market 
approach. A quick overview of the key subsidiary characteristics is provided by Table 4-29 below. 
Table 4-29: Subsidiary profile of Case #8 
 
The geographical scope of the focal subsidiary was initially strictly limited to the United States 
with only some exports to Canada. In 1999 the focal subsidiary obtained official HQ approval for 
looking after the Mexican market. A later request to open and manage a sub-unit in Mexico was 
however rejected by HQ management. At the same time, the focal subsidiary increasingly partic-
ipated in markets in Latin America. While initially establishing a dual market responsibility for 
Latin America, the focal subsidiary obtained exclusive responsibility at a later stage. Only recent-
ly, it received official management responsibility for another producing sub-unit in Brazil. Look-
ing ahead, the focal subsidiary may lose its RHQ status if sufficient levels of value-add and 
cross-border reach of the Brazilian subsidiary are realized. 
4.10.1.1. Initial mandate gain 
Opportunity-identification and initiative-taking 
The opportunity to develop the bordering Mexican market from the USA was identified by sub-
sidiary management at the end of the 1990s. Following a short trial phase the extended geograph-
ical mandate was officially requested from the corporate HQ in 1999. The locus of opportunity-
identification and initiative-taking was therefore set at the focal subsidiary in the US. The subsid-
iary initiative to extend its geographical scope into Mexico was triggered and facilitated by exter-
nal as well as internal factors. The main global competitor already supplied the Mexican market 
from its US production facility and was showing good market results. As a result, Company F’s 
Mexican importer complained about European products failing to fit its market. While competitor 
moves and market growth in Mexico can be viewed as facilitating conditions in the initiative-
taking process, external customer requests and complaints with regard to market fit of European-
made equipment ultimately triggered local management’s willingness to act. 
Subsidiary profile (as of 2010) 
Date of inauguration Early 1980s 
Company belonging Early 1980s (through acquisition of local competitor) 
Location / host market USA  
Value-add  R&D, sourcing, production, sales and after-sales 
Responsibility for other markets  Yes (Latin America) 
Responsibility for foreign sub-units  Yes 
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Rent-seeking and responsibility-allocation 
The request to obtain market responsibility for Mexico was officially submitted to HQ manage-
ment. Further details on the exchange setting are no longer known by interviewed personnel from 
the parent company and the focal subsidiary. Key rationale for equipping the focal subsidiary 
with cross-border reach was HQ management’s awareness of the increasing relevance of the 
Mexican market. Due to the rapid internationalization process of Company F however, it was not 
capable of giving a considerable amount of attention to Mexico so that it was open to a decentral-
ized market development approach considering a reduced geographical distance. Furthermore, 
prior to involving HQ management in the objective of obtaining extended geographical responsi-
bility for Mexico, local management tested the viability of its request. At the time of the petition 
in 1999 it could thus argue that it was actually better suited for supplying the Mexican market 
than the European-based parent company. In addition, the subsidiary had demonstrated strong 
results in the past when local management significantly increased sales and market share in the 
US. Finally, certain personnel changes in the HQ helped the proposed approach to proceed. 
4.10.1.2. Mandate evolution 
Mandate development 
Since enlarging the subsidiary mandate southwards beyond the original host market, the mandate 
has been further modified as a result of focal subsidiary initiatives. In addition, one subsidiary 
petition was rejected by corporate management. The following initiatives of subsidiary manage-
ment in the US for extended geographical responsibility will be highlighted:  
 Opening and management of a subsidiary in Mexico (negative outcome) 
 Market responsibility for the Americas (positive outcome) 
 Opening and management of a producing subsidiary in Brazil (positive outcome) 
The idea to open a sales subsidiary in Mexico that would report directly to the focal subsidiary in 
the USA was triggered by the upcoming retirement of the Mexican importer around 2005. Due to 
the lack of a succession plan, subsidiary management in the US evaluated the possibility of tak-
ing over the importer’s business and turning it into another foreign subsidiary of Company F. 
Despite the subsidiary’s ability to significantly grow market share in Mexico, the request to take 
over the Mexican importer and to manage the resulting foreign sub-unit was rejected by HQ 
management. The main reasons for a negative outcome were a lack of organizational maturity in 
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the delegation of functions and responsibilities to foreign subsidiaries, the fear of corporate man-
agement of imbalanced power structures as well as personal and emotional elements within HQ 
management. Today, it is acknowledged by corporate as well as subsidiary management that at 
the time of the subsidiary request the parent company did not tolerate excessively strong subsidi-
aries and that markets were actually taken away from a foreign subsidiary if local sales figures 
were approaching parent company levels. 
Despite the subsidiary’s failure to obtain HQ approval for the Mexican cross-border initiative it 
succeeded with its following petition in 2007. Company F had already achieved company pres-
ence in South America in the 1970s with the opening of a subsidiary with small-scale assembly 
facilities in Brazil. Due to serious production inefficiencies as well as a lack of economic viabil-
ity, however, the Brazilian subsidiary was closed around 2000. As a result, corporate manage-
ment not only lost focus for Brazil but increasingly also for the entire region. The shift of focus 
was further supported by strong market growth and satisfying company results in Asia. When 
Latin American dealers recognized the lack of focus for their particular market they started to 
order machines from the US subsidiary. Sporadic orders thus served as an initial trigger for the 
subsidiary’s request to obtain market responsibility for Latin America. Prior failing of local man-
agement to obtain corporate management approval for the opening of a subsidiary in Mexico in 
2005 is further considered to be a facilitating condition in the initiative-taking process. Having 
accepted but never fully understood the HQ decision, US subsidiary management awaited the 
installation of a new CEO at the parent company to renew its foreign market ambitions. 
HQ buy-in for a decentralized exploitation of markets in Latin America was partly obtained in the 
mid-2000s and fully received in 2007. Local management in the US actually gained HQ approval 
in a similar form as its initial permission for exports to Mexico. First, sales to target markets were 
carried out without official permission of the parent company. Such an approach was largely fa-
cilitated by a lack of HQ focus for the region at that time. In addition, strong market fit of US-
made products facilitated new sales into the region. Once a certain sales level in the new region 
was crossed an agreement with dual reporting structures was elaborated with HQ management. 
As the sales manager for South America was a full-time employee of the US subsidiary however, 
new contacts were predominately linked to the focal subsidiary. When a new CEO was installed 
at Company F in 2007 the US subsidiary finally seized the opportunity to request and to obtain 
full responsibility for all markets in North and South America. Proven local resources resulting 
from strong historic sales, good relations with the new CEO as well as matching regional product 
requirements are seen as the main reasons for an extended geographical mandate.  
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As soon as an exclusive mandate for all American markets was obtained in 2007 the focal subsid-
iary identified the vast market sales potential in Brazil. The sum of all other markets did not even 
add up to the single market volume in the Brazilian territory. Due to huge tax burdens on import-
ed equipment however, it was practically impossible to compete against national and internation-
al market participants with local production facilities. When a new firm CEO was installed in 
2009, the US subsidiary proposed to establish company presence in Brazil. In the course of initial 
exchanges on this topic, HQ management only agreed to the necessity of opening a sales and ser-
vice subsidiary in Brazil. Nonetheless, throughout the search for an adequate location the focal 
subsidiary continued to evaluate the possibility for local production in order to avoid high tax 
burdens. While the CEO replacement can be viewed as the initiative trigger, cross-border market 
knowledge and networks of the US subsidiary constituted additional facilitators. In addition, the 
need for additional revenue sources of the focal subsidiary in order to offset reduced turnover in 
the home market are seen as an initiative driver in the process. This need was caused by the glob-
al financial crisis from 2008 onwards that strongly impacted the US market. Looking after other 
sub-units therefore represented a means to justify maintaining headcount levels.  
The crisis from 2008 onwards forced Company F to significantly reduce headcount levels, espe-
cially in the parent company. As a response to sudden resource constraints, HQ management de-
cided to grant additional responsibility to key foreign subsidiaries. The sales structure was simpli-
fied and reduced to three regions, each managed by the most influential sub-unit in the region. In 
the course of this reorganization the focal subsidiary’s Americas mandate was confirmed. The 
HQ structure was supposed to remain as lean as possible, allowing subsidiaries to outperform 
their parent company in terms of sales volume and production output. The decision to link the 
new subsidiary in Brazil to the US subsidiary was thus only logical and the introduction of sub-
subsidiary structures accepted in this context.  
In addition, the focal subsidiary in the US was still awaiting recovery of its home market and 
therefore showed sub-critical levels of resource utilization at the time of the decision. The deci-
sion-making process therefore involved practical aspects of resource availability and efficiency. 
Furthermore, Company F had already failed to establish local production facilities in Brazil using 
a centralized approach in the 1980s. It was therefore not surprising that for a second attempt an 
alternative approach was chosen. Finally, due to the availability of production facilities at the US 
subsidiary, HQ management was convinced of the local management’s capability of setting up 
assembly facilities in Brazil. Sufficient value-add was therefore a precondition for opening and 
managing the new foreign sub-unit. Other aspects like subsidiary-related advantages such as 
market knowledge or Spanish-speaking personnel played only a minor role in the process. From a 
 159 
cultural perspective it is believed that the mentality in the US is not excessively compatible with 
Brazilian business practices.  
Mandate outlook 
Looking ahead, the focal subsidiary is expected to preserve or lose its current geographical and 
functional responsibility in Central and South America. The mandate evolution will strongly be 
influenced by the future market growth in Brazil and bordering countries as well as the develop-
ment of local production facilities at the Brazilian subsidiary. If regional sales in Brazil and in 
neighboring countries exceed a certain level at some stage in the future it is possible that the local 
subsidiary in Brazil itself would turn into a regional headquarters for South America and poten-
tially Central America. In this case, the US subsidiary would not only lose its extended territorial 
responsibility for Latin America but it would also experience the removal of its RHQ mandate. 
4.10.2. Within-case analyses 
On the next pages the outcome of the following three within-case analysis techniques for Case #8 
will be illustrated: (1) critical incident chart as shown in Figure 4-15; (2) event-state network as 
shown in Figure 4-16; (3) case dynamics matrix as shown in Table 4-30. 
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Figure 4-15: Critical incident chart for Case #8 
 




 Acquisition of US company with 
small production facilities and 
predominantly national sales (SUB)
EXT
 Shift of SUB location and 
opening of new US 
production facilities
 Sales of predominantly 
European-made machinery in 
USA and Canada with 
relatively low market 
penetration 
 Opening of US 
production site of 
major European 










 Opening of subsidiary 
in South America
 Strong exports of 
competitor to Mexico
 Allocation of Mexican market 
responsibility to focal SUB
 Request to open sub-
subsidiary in Mexico




 Closure of South 
American 
subsidiary
 Small-scale sales 
into South America
 Requests and complaints from 
South American dealers
 Decision on dual 
market responsibility 
for Central and South 
America
 Global financial crisis particularly impacting 
triad markets and ongoing growth in South 
America in particular in Brazil




 Plan to reopen 
Brazilian subsidiary with 
local production 
facilities
 Decision to open Brazilian 
subsidiary with local production 
facilities managed by SUB
 Reorganization 
of global sales 
structure
 Outlook: potentially 
create new South 
American sales region 
managed from Brazil if 
sufficient regional sales 
volume and local value-
add is achieved
 Start local 
production in 
Brazil
 Outlook: maintain 
geographical mandate 
for Americas and 
responsibility for 
Brazilian subsidiary Occasional exports 




 Augmentation of dedicated 
workforce for Latin America
 Sporadic requests and complaints 
about lacking product-fit of European 
machinery from Mexican dealers 
 Request to obtain 
official responsibility  
for Mexico
 CEO replacement 
at HQ
 Installation of 
new CEO at HQ









 Retirement of 
Mexican importer
= critical incident HQ = corporate headquarters SUB = focal subsidiary EXT = external / outside of MNC
Initial mandate gain Mandate evolution
 Request to exclusively 
manage Latin America
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Figure 4-16: Event-state network for Case #8 
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Table 4-30: Case dynamics matrix for Case #8 
Critical inci-
dents  
(locus / period) 
Initial mandate gain Mandate evolution 
Opportunity-identification Responsibility-allocation Mandate development Mandate outlook 
Sporadic exports to Mexico 
and installation of Spanish-
speaking salesman (SUB / 
1990s) 
Request & allocation of 
market responsibility for 
Mexico to focal SUB 
(SUB & HQ / 2000s) 
Request & rejection 
for opening Mexican 
subsidiary managed 
by focal SUB (SUB 
& HQ / 2000s) 
Request & allocation 
of full Americas 
responsibility to focal 
SUB (SUB & HQ 
2000s) 
Financial crisis in 
triad markets / 
ongoing growth in 
Latin America 
(EXT / 2000s) 
Opening of produc-
ing sub-unit in 
Brazil managed by 




market from focal 
SUB (HQ / Plan) 
HQ Incident 
Trigger 
 n/a  Focal SUB request  Focal SUB request  Focal SUB request  n/a  SUB request to 






 n/a  Proven resources 
 Superior machinery fit 
 Geographical distance 






 Change of HQ 
CEO 




 n/a  New sales organ-
ization 











 Gradual shift of Mexican 
dealer focus towards fo-
cal SUB 
 Reduced control 
 Increased focal SUB 
power 
 No change of 
status quo 
 Limited control 
over Americas re-
gion 
 Declining home 
market relevance 











 Sporadic requests of 
Mexican dealers 
 Competitor’s success in 
Mexico 
 Satisfying small-scale 
trial prior to official 
request 
 Upcoming retire-
ment of local im-
porter and lack of a 
succession plan 
 Requests from and 
unofficial sales to 
unsatisfied dealers 
in South America 
 n/a  Home market 
crisis and a lack 
of competitive-






 Evaluate possibility of 
mandate extension  
make trial and build 
proof 
 Develop business 
beyond the US 
 Increase MNC rele-
vance 
 Further grow 
business of focal 
SUB 
 Gain additional 
MNC relevance 
 Increase reach of 
focal SUB 
 Limit US depend-
ency 
 n/a  Secure resource 
utilization 





 Network extension into 
Mexico 
 Possibility to prove 
resources and organiza-
tional fit for Mexico 
 Increased sales and 
market exposure to 
Spanish-speaking Lat-
in American markets 
 Need to look for 
additional revenue 
sources  South 
America 
 Responsibility for 
markets with 
strong growth and 
limited company 
presence 
 Major headcount 
reductions 
 Search for new 
markets 
 Development 
into regional HQ 







4.11. Case #9: The internationalization process of a Brazilian subsidiary in-
to South America 
4.11.1. Case description 
Case #9 refers to the internationalization process of the Brazilian subsidiary of a Central Europe-
an manufacturing company (Case Company G) into South America. Since initially obtaining 
widened territorial responsibility for technical dealer and importer support in South America, the 
mandate has not yet been modified. While the focal subsidiary might benefit from a minor man-
date extension with regard to sales and service responsibilities, it is actually expected to experi-
ence a loss of foreign market responsibility in the event of unsatisfying management performance 
or the opening of new subsidiaries in South America. Key characteristics for Case #9 are summa-
rized in Table 4-31 below. 
Table 4-31: Key characteristics of Case #9 
 
Company G is a Central European original equipment manufacturer (OEM) participating in dif-
ferent manufacturing segments. Since its foundation in the early 20
th
 century Company G has 
maintained its family-owned status, a characteristic that impacts the management style to this day. 
While most revenues are still generated in Europe, Company G increasingly participates in strong 
market growth in Asia and South America. Company G is equipped with a dominating position-
ing in different niche segments with technology leadership as its major selling proposition. The 
internationalization process of Company G started in the 1970s and is characterized by a mix of 
greenfield approaches as well as selected company takeovers. Company G today possesses pro-
duction entities in most continents and is present with numerous sales and service offices around 
the world. Sales are initially carried out through affiliated companies and importers with end-
customer contacts managed by local dealers. Production entities generally hold responsibility for 
manufacturing a specific product or product range, which is later sold to affiliated companies and 
importers on a global scale. Key company characteristics are highlighted in Table 4-32 below:  
Parent company location Initial mandate gain (year) 
Central Europe Technical dealer and importer support (2010) 
Focal subsidiary location Mandate development (year) 
Brazil Initial mandate has not been altered yet (n/a) 
Mandate coverage Mandate outlook (year) 
South America Reduction of geographical scope (2011) 
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Table 4-32: Firm profile of Case Company G (cases #9, #10a and #10b) 
 
Company G possesses a rather ethnocentric management style where major decisions are taken in 
the parent company. With regards to managing foreign sub-units, Company G thus follows a risk-
averse approach, which is reflected in several company characteristics. First, HQ management 
provides foreign sub-units with only limited geographical and functional responsibility. With the 
exception of one particular setting, no affiliated company including producing entities has ever 
had responsibility for managing other sub-units of the group. In addition, few subsidiaries are 
equipped with a sales mandate that reaches beyond the original host market. Second, R&D is 
almost exclusively carried out in the parent company. Third, Company G has implemented strict 
reporting structures in order to monitor its foreign subsidiaries. Finally, despite ongoing interna-
tionalization and increasing relevance of markets outside of Europe, the corporate language re-
mains the language of the home market. As the overall business is flourishing on a global scale it 
is not expected that Company G will change its management style in the near future. 
The focal subsidiary in Brazil was set up a long time ago with the aim of developing new markets 
as well as extending the international production footprint of Company G. It possesses large pro-
duction facilities and delivers its end-products to markets worldwide. The main recipients of end-
products, however, are importers in markets in South America. In addition to importers and deal-
ers, the Brazilian subsidiary also supplies products to another sales subsidiary of the group in a 
neighboring market. A brief overview of the key subsidiary characteristics is provided by Table 
4-33 below.  
Firm profile 
Type Original equipment manufacturer (OEM) 
Ownership status  Family-owned  
Sales > €2.0 bn 
N° of foreign subsidiaries > 30 
Existence of regional headquarters  No 
Expansion / internationalization start 1960s 
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Table 4-33: Subsidiary profile of Case #9 
 
Until recently the subsidiary’s mandate was limited to marketing products in the home market 
and supplying other subsidiaries or importers without additional responsibility. Today, local 
management also looks after importers and dealers in South America for technical support and 
training. The extended geographical mandate does not cover another South American market, 
where a sister subsidiary has been present for many years. Looking ahead, the focal subsidiary 
might gain or lose functional responsibility for neighboring markets based on its performance.  
4.11.1.1. Initial mandate gain 
Opportunity-identification and initiative-taking 
The idea to equip the subsidiary in Brazil with responsibility beyond the host market in South 
America was identified in the corporate HQ in 2010. The locus of opportunity-identification and 
initiative-taking was thus set at the parent company. Altering human resources need to be stated 
as a core initiative trigger. The responsible HQ employee for the development of South American 
markets was about to leave the company and no adequate replacement had been found.  
Rent-seeking and responsibility-allocation 
The decision to delegate technical dealer and importer support for selected South American mar-
kets was purely HQ-based and did not involve any exchange between personnel from the parent 
company or the focal subsidiary. In general Company G does not equip its foreign subsidiaries 
with extended geographical mandates. The deviant thinking in this particular case was predomi-
nantly the result of temporary human resource constraints in the parent company. In addition, 
geographical proximity and sufficient local value-add in combination with similar product re-
quirements in South America further supported HQ management in selecting a decentralized 
market development approach. Due to the presence of local production facilities in Brazil it was 
Subsidiary profile (as of 2010) 
Date of inauguration 1970s 
Company belonging 1970s (through greenfield approach) 
Location / host market Brazil  
Value-add  Sourcing, production, sales and after-sales 
Responsibility for other markets  Partly (South America) 
Responsibility for foreign sub-units No 
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expected that personnel at the focal subsidiary would possess sufficient product know-how in 
order to satisfy the technical support needs of dealers and importers in neighboring markets. 
4.11.1.2. Mandate evolution 
Mandate development 
Due to the relatively recent initial mandate gain the geographical and functional scope of the fo-
cal subsidiary regarding foreign territories has not been altered yet.  
Mandate outlook 
Looking ahead and assuming stable market growth for South America, the focal subsidiary will 
most likely experience a reduction in its current geographical responsibility. The current decen-
tralized approach is still considered an interim solution that may either be abandoned or intro-
duced as a standard procedure at Company F. If the focal subsidiary in Brazil is capable of offer-
ing strong technical support beyond national borders it is expected to maintain its current man-
date and may even augment its functional scope into sales and service responsibilities in the re-
gion. As HQ management does not consider results up to this point as satisfying, however, the 
chances of losing the mandate are relatively high. In addition, if regional market growth justifies 
the opening of another subsidiary in South America, the focal subsidiary would immediately lose 
all responsibility for this particular market. As foreign sub-units are expected to directly report to 
the HQ there is no reason for anticipating a deviant approach in the case of the focal subsidiary. 
Turning into a regional HQ therefore does not represent an evolutionary path for the focal subsid-
iary regardless of its performance. Poor performance and critical market sizes in combination 
with relatively low organizational maturity with regard to delegating responsibilities to foreign 
sub-units can be classified as drivers for future mandate reductions of the focal subsidiary. 
4.11.2. Within-case analyses 
On the next pages the outcome of the following three within-case analysis techniques for Case #9 
will be illustrated: (1) critical incident chart as shown in Figure 4-17; (2) event-state network as 
shown in Figure 4-18; (3) case dynamics matrix as shown in Table 4-34: Case dynamics matrix 
for Case #9. 
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Figure 4-17: Critical incident chart for Case #9 
   





 Opening of subsidiary in 
Brazil (SUB) with local 
production facilities; 
geographical responsibility 
limited to host market
 Company exit of HQ sales manager for South 
America leading to human resources 
constraints at the parent company
 Despite global production mandate 
delivery of most end-products to 
neighboring markets in South America
 Global financial crisis particularly impacting triad 
markets and ongoing growth in South America, 
especially in Brazil 
 Opening of additional 
subsidiary in South 
America
Decision to grant SUB with extended 
geographical responsibility for technical 
importer and dealer support in all South 
American markets but the one with existing 
company presence
 Increasing sales in South America due to 
significant market growth in Brazil and 
neighboring countries
 Outlook: loss of responsibility in 
case of unsatisfying results; 
potentially increased functional 
scope of importer and dealer 
support in case of strong 
subsidiary performance; loss of 
geographical responsibility if 
market size justifies the opening 
of an additional subsidiary in 
South America; development 
into regional HQ not envisioned
 Acknowledgement 
of similar product 
requirements in 
South America
= critical incident HQ = corporate headquarters SUB = focal subsidiary EXT = external / outside of MNC
Initial mandate gain Mandate evolution
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Figure 4-18: Event-state network for Case #9 
 
Exit of sales manager at the parent 
company  looking after markets in 
South America without company 
presence
Failure to find adequate 
replacement HQ sales 
manager
Allocation of extended geographical responsibility 
with regard to technical importer and dealer support 
for South American markets without company 
presence to focal SUB 
Questioning of new approach but 
ongoing  lack of alternatives
Outlook: loss of responsibility in case of 
unsatisfying results; potentially increased functional 
scope of importer and dealer support in case of 
strong subsidiary performance; loss of geographical 
responsibility if market size justifies the opening of 
an additional subsidiary in South America; 
development into regional HQ not envisioned
Opening of subsidiary in 
Brazil with local 
production facilities 
(focal SUB)
As a result of global production 
mandate exposure to 
neighboring markets in South 
America
Establishment of additional 
subsidiary in South America
Global financial crisis 
particularly impacting  
traditional triad markets; 
ongoing growth in South 
America, especially Brazil
Increasing sales 
especially to South 
American markets
Augmenting awareness of 
similar regional product 
requirements across South 
America
1970s 2011
First collaboration with neighboring 
importers and dealers with mixed 
results




Table 4-34: Case dynamics matrix for Case #9 
Critical incidents  
(locus / period) 




Opening of focal SUB in 
Brazil with local production 
facilities (HQ / 1970s) 
Opening of additional 
subsidiary in South Ameri-
ca  (SUB / 1990s) 
Global financial crisis 
impacting triad markets 
and ongoing growth in 
South America in particular 
in Brazil (EXT / 2000s) 
Increasing sales in 
South America due to 
significant regional 
market growth (SUB / 
2000s) 
Decision to manage 
importers and dealers 
in South America 
from Brazil  (HQ / 
2010s) 
Mandate evolution de-
pending on subsidiary 
performance; SUB de-
velopment into RHQ not 
envisioned (HQ / Plan) 
HQ Incident 
Trigger 







 Extend international 
production footprint 
 Suit local product re-
quirements and participate 
in local and regional mar-
ket growth 
 Unknown  n/a  n/a  Lacking alterna-
tives 
 Regional product 
similarities 
 Maintain direct access 
and reporting struc-
tures between sub-




 Enhanced exposure to  
Latin American markets 
 Further diversification of 
production sites and 
product portfolio 
 Unknown  Declining home market 
size and significance 
 Increasing focus on 
emerging markets like 
South America 
 Increasing awareness 
of similarities in re-
gional product re-
quirements 
 Decreased control  n/a 
SUB Incident 
Trigger 
 n/a  n/a  n/a  External product 
demand 




 n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a 
Incident 
Effect 
 Exposure to neighboring 
markets in South America 
 Interference with neigh-
boring subsidiary 
 Opportunity to turn into 
regional HQ in South 
America 
 Enhanced positioning 
within the MNC 
 Increased regional sales 
 Increased HQ recog-
nition due to attrac-





 Limited development 
options 
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4.12. Cases #10a and #10b: The failed requests of a French subsidiary to de-
velop markets in Northern Africa 
4.12.1. Case description 
Cases #10a and #10b both refer to the internationalization efforts of a French subsidiary of a Cen-
tral European manufacturing company (Case Company G) into Northern Africa. In both instances 
subsidiary management did not succeed in obtaining HQ approval for their foreign market initia-
tive, so they constitute the negative examples in the case sample. Having already failed twice, the 
focal subsidiary is not expected to obtain extended geographical responsibility for markets in 
Northern Africa in the future. Key characteristics for cases #10a and #10b are summarized in 
Table 4-35 below. 
Table 4-35: Key characteristics of Cases #10a and #10b 
 
The French subsidiary represents an affiliated unit of Case Company G that was described in de-
tail for previous Case #9 (Table 4-32). The subsidiary was established in the 1980s when HQ 
management was giving consideration to the increasing relevance of the French market to the 
overall group. Prior to the opening it was managed by a strong importer that possessed a wide 
dealer network. At one point Company G decided to build up its own local office. The focal sub-
sidiary represents a pure sales and service entity and does not possess any production or assembly 
facilities. From a pure sales perspective the focal subsidiary represents one of the strongest sub-
units of the group. Since its foundation local management has shown very satisfying sales results 
with dominating market positioning in France. Today’s subsidiary CEO is French and has a high 
level of experience in the African region. The sales mandate of the focal subsidiary is limited to 
France and does not cover further neighboring or other French-speaking countries. Key subsidi-
ary characteristics are summarized in Table 4-36 below.  
Parent company location Initiatives for extended geographical responsibility (year) 
Central Europe  Sales and service responsibility for Northern Africa – rejected (2007) 
 Sales and service responsibility for Northern Africa – rejected (2008)  
Focal subsidiary location Mandate development (year) 
Brazil n/a 
Mandate coverage Outlook (year) 
South America Extended geographical responsibility for focal subsidiary not expected (2011)  
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Table 4-36: Subsidiary profile of Cases #10a and #10b 
4.12.1.1. Initial mandate gain 
Opportunity-identification and initiative-taking 
The opportunity for managing markets in Northern Africa from the subsidiary in France was in 
both cases identified by local management. The locus of opportunity-identification and initiative-
taking was therefore at the focal subsidiary. Both initiatives of the focal subsidiary were triggered 
by changing local human resources. While in the first case the subsidiary CEO was about to leave 
the company, the second case was characterized by the installation of a new CEO. In the context 
of these organizational changes, subsidiary management aimed to enlarge its territorial responsi-
bility southwards into Northern Africa.  
Rent-seeking and responsibility-allocation 
The request was both times submitted in the course of a regular country visit and therefore did 
not involve any particular setting. As the petitions were immediately rejected they did not involve 
a significant amount of rent-seeking efforts by the focal subsidiary. The opportunity to enter mar-
kets in Northern Africa was identified a long time ago by corporate management of Company G. 
Since then Northern African markets have been developed by a dedicated sales manager in the 
parent company. As Northern Africa does not possess extraordinary sales potential it does not 
represent one of the core markets or regions from the perspective of the parent company. In addi-
tion, it is doubtful that increased efforts would lead to a significant sales boost in the region. The 
main argumentation of local management was that due to cultural proximity as well as existing 
networks and contacts in the region it was actually better suited to exploit the Northern African 
market potential from France. It was further noted that one needs to understand the mentality of 
Company G’s home market and of France likewise in order to strongly promote sales in these 
Subsidiary profile (as of 2010) 
Date of inauguration 1980s 
Company belonging 1980s (through acquisition of French importer) 
Location / host market France  
Value-add  Sales and after-sales 
Responsibility for other markets No 
Responsibility for foreign sub-units  No 
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markets. A key success factor for doing business in Maghreb countries is the ability to develop a 
sustainable local network that allows interesting projects or tenders to be identified. 
To this day, HQ management has always rejected the subsidiary request and it is not expected 
that this opinion will change in the future. The reasoning of corporate management behind the 
decision is manifold. First of all it is expected that an extended geographical mandate would only 
distract local management from its core business in France. It is believed to be easier to grow 
subsidiary sales by winning market share in France than by developing outside markets with sub-
critical potential. Second, the focal subsidiary is not equipped with adequate process expertise 
and warehouse facilities in order to carry out exports as efficiently as is currently done by the 
parent company. Third, corporate management already possesses a French sales manager who 
looks after Northern Africa and is equally capable of understanding local mentalities and devel-
oping networks in the region. Finally, HQ management believes that due to past hegemonial am-
bitions of the French, market participants in Northern Africa would actually prefer to be served 
from a market other than France. The fact that the subsidiary requests might have also followed 
personal motives of local CEOs, in one case to achieve a milestone upon exiting the company 
and in the other case to extend responsibility scopes at the start of a new business experience, 
might have further influenced the HQ decision.  
4.12.1.2. Mandate evolution 
Looking ahead, the focal subsidiary is expected to maintain its geographical mandate that is lim-
ited to its French host market. As all reasons for rejecting past subsidiary requests still exist, it is 
not expected that the subsidiary mandate will alter in the future. 
4.12.2. Within-case analyses 
On the next pages the outcome of the following three within-case analysis techniques for Cases 
#10a and #10b will be illustrated: (1) critical incident chart as shown in Figure 4-19; (2) event-
state network as shown in Figure 4-20; (3) case dynamics matrix as shown in Table 4-37: Case 
dynamics matrix for Cases #10a and #10b.
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Figure 4-19: Critical incident chart for Cases #10a and #10b 
 





 Opening of sales subsidiary in 
France (SUB) with market 
responsibility limited to the 
host market
 Continuation of 
successful market 
penetration in France
 Positioning as top-
selling subsidiary of 
Company F
 Installation of French 
sales manager for 
markets in Northern 
Africa working from the 
parent company
 Upcoming management 
change at focal subsidiary
 Strong market growth in regions outside 
home market  increasing relevance of far 
distant subsidiaries
 Request to look 
after markets in 
Northern 
Africa
 Rejection of SUB request for 
extended geographical responsibility 
in Northern Africa
 Ongoing company 
internationalization including 
overseas production facilities 




 Installation of new 
SUB CEO
 Renewed request for extended 
geographical responsibility in 
Northern Africa
 Renewed rejection of SUB 
request  Outlook: leave focal 
SUB mandate 
unaltered  no 
extended 
geographical 
mandate in the future
= critical incident HQ = corporate headquarters SUB = focal subsidiary EXT = external / outside of MNC
Initial mandate gain Mandate evolution
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Figure 4-20: Event-state network for Cases #10a and #10b 
 
Upcoming retirement of CEO at 
focal SUB
Gradual development of 
strong host market 
positioning 
Establishment of French 
subsidiary (focal SUB)
Strong market growth 
in regions outside 
home market 
increasing relevance of 
far distant subsidiaries
Development into one of the 
top-selling foreign 




markets in Northern 
Africa working 
from the parent 
company
Reaching sales 
boundaries in French 
host market
Request to look after markets in 
Northern Africa
Rejection of focal 
SUB request
Installation of new focal SUB 
CEO with experience in 
Maghreb countries
Renewed request to look 
after markets in Northern 
Africa
Renewed rejection of 
focal SUB request
Outlook: leave focal 
SUB mandate 
unaltered  no 
extended geographical 
mandate in the future
1980s 2011
Search for additional 
revenue sources




Table 4-37: Case dynamics matrix for Cases #10a and #10b 
Critical incidents  
(locus / period) 
Initial mandate gain Mandate evolution 
Opportunity-identification Responsibility-allocation (Rejected) Mandate outlook 
Opening of focal SUB 
with market responsibility 
limited to French host 
market  (HQ / 1980s) 
Ongoing internationali-
zation including setting 
up of overseas produc-
tion facilities  (SUB / 
1990s) 
Focal SUB request & HQ rejection 
for extended geographical responsi-
bility (HQ & SUB / 2000s) 
Renewed focal SUB request & HQ 
rejection for extended geographical 
responsibility (HQ & SUB / 2000s) 
No alteration of focal SUB 
mandate  no extended 
geographical mandate in 
the future (HQ / plan) 
HQ Incident 
Trigger 
 Upcoming retirement 
of local importer 




 Maintain and develop 
positioning in French 
market 
 Participate in market 
growth outside home 
region 
 Expand international 
production footprint 
 Potential distraction from im-
portant home market 
 Existence of French-speaking 
salesman at parent company 
 Inadequate processes at focal SUB 
 French hegemonial history 
 Personal ambitions of local man-
agement 
 Lacking sales potential in target 
market and potential distraction from 
important home market 
 Existence of French-speaking sales-
man at parent company 
 Inadequate processes at focal SUB 
 French hegemonial history 
 Personal ambitions of local man-
agement 
 No advantage in provid-





 Direct access to im-
portant French market 
 Extended global 
market exposure 
 Ongoing management of Northern 
Africa from the parent company 
 Ongoing management of Northern 




 n/a  n/a  Management change at focal sub-
sidiary 






 n/a  n/a  Obtain new revenue sources  
enlarge responsibility scope 
 Find new revenue sources 





 Increasing development 
of networks in France 
and sporadic exposure 
to other French-
speaking countries 
 Declining relevance 
of focal SUB in the 
overall group 
 Continuation of limited develop-
ment options 
 Continuation of limited development 
options 




5. Cross-case analyses and discussion 
5.1. Introduction 
Following the detailed case descriptions and within-case analyses in the previous part of the 
study the initial section of this chapter is designed to compare individual case patterns across all 
eleven cases of subsidiary internationalization processes. The aim of such cross-case analysis 
(Miles & Huberman, 1994) is to come up with robust patterns of cross-border subsidiary respon-
sibilities and associated mandate development paths. The main challenge is thereby not only to 
come up with case similarities and differences but to also shed light on the question on why some 
incidents replicate each other whilst others unfold in a particular and deviant form. In doing so, 
the investigator strongly relied on the advice of Eisenhardt (1989b: 540) “to select categories and 
dimensions, and then to look for within-group similarities coupled with intergroup differences”. 
In the subsequent discussion part, findings of cross-cases analyses will then be thoroughly com-
pared to confirming as well as conflicting literature in order to develop mid-range theories for 
internationalization processes of foreign subsidiaries. As suggested by Pauwels and Matthyssens 
(2004) the task is accompanied by a constant iteration between preliminary findings and literature 
that is expected to strengthen the degree of analytical generalization of findings from qualitative 
cases studies. While the last chapter was largely characterized by descriptive elements this chap-
ter clearly represents the core of this PhD study from an analytical standpoint. It should be noted 
at this stage that the reader may not find some of the content outlined earlier in the literature re-
view or the case descriptions directly in the following pages. Nonetheless, only the thorough un-
derstanding of individual case patterns and related prior research findings enabled the investiga-
tor to develop robust cross-case patterns, to put them into the context of earlier findings and even-
tually to make substantial contribution to IB research. 
Cross-case analyses and subsequent discussions will be both split into the initial mandate gain 
and the subsequent mandate evolution. In addition they will both contain a sub-chapter on man-
date lifecycles in which findings from the two elements, initial mandate gain and the subsequent 
mandate evolution, are merged in order to come with a comprehensive perspective on interna-
tionalization processes of foreign subsidiaries.  
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5.2. Comparative analysis of case data 
5.2.1. Overview 
Eleven cases of internationalization processes of foreign subsidiaries that were analyzed in the 
course of this PhD study revealed a total of 36 initiatives related to cross-border subsidiary re-
sponsibilities. Of these, eleven HQ- or subsidiary-driven initiatives are associated with initial 
foreign market responsibilities of foreign MNC units. Another fifteen initiatives refer to subse-
quent modifications of previously obtained cross-border subsidiary mandates that can again be 
driven by corporate or subsidiary management. The final group relates to ten initiatives, which 
corporate management are expected to carry out at some stage in the future. While the examina-
tion of initial mandate gains and subsequent mandate alterations is therefore based on historic 
incidents, mandate outlooks are solely based on current expectations of future developments. Due 
to internal and external factors that may impact current prospects, mandate outlooks inevitably 
embody a certain degree of uncertainty and vagueness.  
Table 5-1 below provides an overview of the main initiative characteristics and is chronologically 
split into initial mandate gains, subsequent mandate developments and future mandate outlooks. 
Due to varying initiative outcomes and lengths of mandate existence, only seven cases also allow 
a better understanding of mandate modifications following the initial gain. The level of contribu-
tion to the study therefore differs from one case to another and is strongly linked to the date of the 
initial mandate gain. In addition to exhibiting varying mandate types regarding geographical and 
functional responsibility scopes, the case sample reveals different loci of initiative-taking, vary-
ing initiative outcomes and resulting mandate impacts, as well as multiple directions of responsi-
bility transfer across the MNC. The latter aspect indicates that cross-border subsidiary responsi-
bilities may represent the introduction of new MNC activities or the transfer of responsibilities of 
existing operations from one MNC unit to another. In turn, mandate decline can relate to the ter-
mination of existing activities or to their transfer from the focal subsidiary to another MNC entity. 
In order to allow for direct references, initiatives for decentralized market development are listed 
by their case number followed by their initiative number in chronological order as outlined in 
Table 5-1 below. Mandate outlooks are characterized by the end letter ‘x’ in order to illustrate 
their tentative character.  
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Table 5-1: Overview of initiatives for subsidiary internationalization 
Initiative # Sub loca-
tion 
Initiative (scope, locus, outcome, mandate impact and responsibility transfer direction) 














1.0 Poland Sales mandate for former CIS markets SUB Positive Gain HQ  
2.0 Spain Sales mandate for Latin America (w/o Chile) SUB Positive Gain HQ 
3.0 Singapore Sales mandate for East Asia / Oceania SUB Positive Gain HQ 
4.0 Austria Global KAM mandate for Austrian client SUB Positive Gain HQ/SUB 
5.0 China Sales mandate for Asia-Pacific HQ Positive Gain HQ  
6.0 Singapore Sales mandate for Southeast Asia HQ Positive Gain HQ 
7.0 Singapore Logistics mandate for East Asia HQ Positive Gain HQ  
8.0 USA Sales mandate for Mexico SUB Positive Gain HQ 
9.0 Brazil Dealer support mandate in South America HQ Positive Gain HQ 
10a.0 France Sales mandate for Northern Africa SUB Negative Rejected HQ 













1.1 Poland Sales mandate for former CIS markets HQ Positive Reduction HQ 
2.1 Spain Sales mandate for Chile HQ Positive Extension HQ 
4.1 Austria Global KAM mandate for all Austrian clients HQ Positive Extension HQ/SUB 
4.2 Austria Sales mandate for Eastern Europe HQ Positive Extension HQ 
5.1 China Regional HQ mandate for Asia-Pacific HQ Positive Extension HQ 
6.1 Singapore Sales mandate for Vietnam SUB Positive Extension New 
7.1 Singapore Sales mandate for East Asia (excl. India) HQ Positive Extension SUB 
7.2 Singapore Sales mandate for India HQ Positive Extension HQ 
7.3 Singapore Regional HQ mandate for East Asia SUB Positive Extension HQ  
7.4 Singapore Strategic regional HQ mandate for East Asia HQ Positive Reduction SUB 
7.5 Singapore Regional HQ mandate over two sub-units SUB Positive Reduction Exit 
7.6 Singapore Regional HQ mandate for China/Northeast Asia HQ Positive Reduction SUB 
8.1 USA Regional HQ mandate for North America SUB Negative Rejected n/a 
8.2 USA Sales mandate for Central/South America SUB Positive Extension HQ 













1.x Poland Sales mandate for former CIS markets HQ Expected Loss SUB 
2.x Spain Sales mandate for Latin America HQ Expected Loss SUB 
3.x Singapore Sales mandate for Southeast Asia HQ Expected Reduction SUB 
4.x Austria Sales mandate for Eastern Europe HQ Expected Reduction SUB 
5.x China Regional HQ mandate for Asia/Pacific HQ Expected Extension HQ 
6.x Singapore Sales mandate for Southeast Asia HQ Expected Reduction SUB 
7.x Singapore Regional HQ mandate for India HQ Expected Loss HQ 
8.x USA Regional HQ mandate for South America HQ Expected Reduction HQ/SUB  
9.x Brazil Additional subsidiary in South America HQ Expected Reduction HQ 
 10.x France Dealer support mandate in South America SUB Expected Rejected HQ 
Key for those that are not self-explanatory: Locus: HQ = parent company and/or corporate headquarters, SUB = 
focal subsidiary. Impact: Gain = Initial mandate gain, Rejection = HQ rejection of subsidiary request, Extension = 
geographical and/or functional mandate extension, Reduction = geographical and/or functional mandate reduction, 
Loss = mandate loss. From/to: HQ = parent company and/or corporate headquarters, SUB = sister subsidiary. 
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When looking at Table 5-1 the heterogeneity of cases becomes apparent. The case sample em-
bodies Asian, American and European subsidiaries. As the related parent companies are based in 
Europe, highly varying geographical and cultural distances characterize the following cross-case 
analysis. In addition, while the majority of subsidiary mandates covers neighboring markets or 
regions, others are linked to far-distant territories with relatively little cultural overlap. Further 
adding to the heterogeneity of cases, the functional scope of cross-border mandates differs from 
one case to another and from one evolutionary stage to another. While observed primary initia-
tives often refer to particular value chain aspects like sales and service functions or to the global 
KAM of a single customer, cross-border subsidiary mandates are later often linked to significant 
functional scopes like regional HQ responsibilities. The evolution of functional scopes over time 
therefore appears to be highly relevant to the study at hand. 
The majority of examined initiatives took a positive outcome either as they were identified by 
HQ management or as a result of successful rent-seeking efforts by local subsidiary management. 
The case sample, however, also features three unsuccessful subsidiary petitions for extended ge-
ographical reach. Two HQ rejections (#10a.0 and #10b.0) refer to the aim of a French subsidiary 
to obtain market responsibility for Northern Africa. In the remaining incident (#8.1), local US 
subsidiary management was not allowed to open and manage a Mexican subsidiary and thereby 
to functionally extend its existing cross-border mandate to a regional HQ status. In addition to 
failed subsidiary requests, the case sample also illustrates initiatives for declining or dissolving 
subsidiary responsibility. The majority of these incidents were obviously driven by corporate 
management. Nonetheless, in one incident (#7.5) the subsidiary itself actually suggested the clo-
sure of two Asian subsidiaries and thus the reduction of its regional HQ mandate.  
Another interesting aspect of subsidiary internationalization is marked by the transfer of foreign 
market responsibilities across modern MNCs. Thirty-four out of 36 initiatives are linked to a shift 
of cross-border mandates to or from the focal subsidiary to other MNC units. Other MNC units 
can be the parent company or sister subsidiaries situated in a different host market. This alone 
shows that subsidiary internationalization is not necessarily associated with the development of 
new markets but very often relates to the transfer of existing market responsibilities across the 
MNC. This phenomenon strongly differentiates subsidiary internationalization from internation-
alization of the first degree. In fact, in only one incident (#6.1) did a foreign subsidiary obtain 
cross-border responsibility for a market which had not previously been served by the company. 
The other occurrence (#7.5) without intra-MNC responsibility transfer relates to the aforemen-
tioned closure of two Asian subsidiaries, which was not absorbed by any other MNC entity. 
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The following pages are designed to elaborate cross-case patterns for process stimuli and out-
come rationales for initiatives related to cross-border subsidiary responsibilities. The selected 
approach relies on three steps. First, processes for the initial gaining of multinational subsidiary 
mandates will be highlighted, encompassing opportunity-identification and initiative-taking as 
well as rent-seeking and responsibility-allocation processes. Second, processes for subsequent 
mandate evolution will be examined across cases, embracing the observation of historic mandate 
developments and the examination of future mandate prospects. A broad overview of the out-
come of this cross-case analysis is provided by Figure 5-1 below. Based on the initial two steps, a 
simple framework for evolutionary paths of foreign market subsidiary mandates (Figure 5-3) is 
drawn that displays the internationalization processes of the foreign subsidiaries across eleven 
cases.  
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HQ rationale for denial of subsidiary request
 Lacking regional market attractiveness (10a.0, 10b.0)
 Inferior subsidiary FSAs/CSAs to HQ (10a.0, 10b.0)




 Low risk level (1.0, 2.0, 3.0, 4.0, 6.0, 7.0, 8.0)
 Justification of investment needs (5.0)
 Resource constraints (9.0)
HQ rationale (host-market related)
 Regional market attractiveness 
(1.0, 2.0, 3.0, 4.0, 5.0, 6.0, 7.0, 8.0, 9.0)
 CSAs in the form of geographical proximity 
(1.0, 3.0, 4.0, 5.0, 6.0, 7.0, 8.0, 9.0)
 CSAs in the form of cultural proximity 
(1.0, 2.0, 3.0, 4.0, 6.0, 7.0, 9.0)
 CSAs in the form of regional customer require-
ments (1.0, 2.0, 3.0, 4.0, 6.0, 7.0, 8.0, 9.0)
 Sub-critical market size  (3.0, 5.0, 6.0, 7.0)
HQ rationale (subsidiary-related)
 FSAs in the form of language skills (1.0, 8.0)
 FSAs in the form of sales skills (4.0, 8.0)
 FSAs in the form product expertise (9.0)
 FSAs in the form local value-add (5.0, 8.0, 9.0)
 FSAs in the form cross-border networks (1.0, 2.0, 
3.0, 4.0, 8.0)
Triggers
 Process inefficiencies (1.0, 4.0, 8.0)
 Organizational / HR change (2.0, 3.0, 10a.0, 10b.0)
Facilitators
 Regional market attractiveness (1.0, 2.0, 3.0, 4.0, 8.0)
 Cross-border networks of focal subsidiary (1.0, 2.0, 3.0, 4.0, 8.0, 10a.0, 10b.0)
Triggers
 Organizational / HR change (5.0, 6.0, 7.0, 9.0)
Facilitators
 Regional market attractiveness (5.0, 6.0, 7.0, 9.0)
 Sub-critical host market size (5.0, 6.0, 7.0)
 Regional customer requirements (9.0)
Request setting
 Regular country visit (1.0, 10a.0, 10b.0)
 Telephone, email (2.0, 4.0)
 Job interview (3.0)
 Dedicated meeting (8.0)
Subsidiary  requestn=7
Initial mandate gainn=9



















HQ rationale for denial of subsidiary request
 Lacking organizational maturity (8.1)
 MNC power imbalances (8.1)
 Personal issues (8.1)
HQ rationale for reduced geographical 
and/or functional responsibility
 Insufficient FSAs in the form of sales 
skills (1.1)
 Limited CSAs in the form of cultural 
understanding (1.1)
Triggers
 Organizational / HR change (2.1, 
5.1, 7.1, 7.3, 7.4, 7.6, 8.1, 8.2, 8.3)
 Results (1.1, 4.1, 4.2, 7.2)
 Altering economic environment (6.1)
 Compliance risk (7.5)
HQ rationale for extension to regional HQ
 FSAs in the form local value-add (5.1, 7.3, 8.3)
 FSAs in the form cross-border networks (7.3, 8.3)
 FSAs in the form of proven capabilities (7.3, 8.3)
 Installation of expatriates at subsidiary (5.1, 7.3)
 Economic pressure (8.3)
HQ rationale for extended geographical 
and/or functional responsibility
 FSAs in the form cross-border networks and proven 
capabilities (2.1, 4.1, 4.2, 6.1, 7.1, 7.2, 8.2)
 CSAs in the form of location, culture, customers (6.1, 7.2)
 Process inefficiencies (7.1)
 Lacking HQ focus (2.1, 6.1, 7.2, 8.2)
HQ rationale for reduced regional HQ status
 Inferior subsidiary CSAs to rival MNC unit (7.4, 7.6)
 Inferior subsidiary CSAs FSAs to rival MNC unit (7.4, 7.6)
 Compliance risks (7.5)




 FSAs in the form 
local value-add (5.x)
 CSAs in the form of 
location, customers, 
low labor costs (5.x)
HQ rationale
 Enhanced localization degree in target area (3.x, 4.x, 6.x)
 Lacking organizational maturity (3.x, 4.x, 6.x, 9.x)
 Lacking FSAs in the form of local production (4.x)
 Lacking FSAs in the form of proven capabilities (9.x)
 Inferior subsidiary FSAs/CSAs to rival MNC unit (7.x, 8.x)
HQ rationale
 Enhanced localization degree 
in target area (1.x, 2.x)
 Inferior subsidiary FSAs/CSAs 
to rival MNC unit (1.x, 2.x)




5.2.2. Initial mandate gain 
The initial extension of subsidiary responsibilities beyond host market borders usually involves 
two core process stages. The process offset is marked by opportunity-identification in and initia-
tive-taking for a foreign market, which is then followed by a separate rent-seeking and decision-
making phase. Rent-seeking efforts by subsidiary management generally only exist if the oppor-
tunity for decentralized foreign market development is identified and pursued by local manage-
ment. In this case the focal subsidiary seeks to obtain HQ approval for allocating existing or new 
resources to a foreign territory. As outlined above, subsidiary internationalization is not restricted 
to the development of previously unserved markets and regions. A precondition is that, from the 
focal subsidiary’s perspective, requested foreign market responsibility symbolizes the initial bor-
der crossing of local business operations.   
In accordance with the aforementioned stages associated with initial subsidiary internationaliza-
tion, the following comparative analysis of case data and individual case patterns will be split 
into an opportunity-identification and initiative-taking as well as a rent-seeking and responsibil-
ity-allocation process. Throughout the first part the aim is to understand what mechanisms trigger 
initiative-taking for cross-border subsidiary responsibility at any MNC level. In the following 
part the investigator seeks to shed light on the underlying HQ rationale for selecting a decentral-
ized as opposed to a traditional and thus HQ-managed market development approach. Relatively 
heterogeneous case characteristics facilitate the development of solid cross-case patterns and al-
low a better understanding of drivers and restrictions at the offset of subsidiary internationaliza-
tion processes. 
5.2.2.1. Opportunity-identification and initiative-taking  
A total of eleven initiatives for extended geographical responsibility of foreign MNC units were 
analyzed in the course of the PhD study. This section describes how opportunities for subsidiary 
internationalization were originally identified and subsequently pursued, i.e. how they were stim-
ulated and what made MNC stakeholders eventually act upon them. In addition, initiatives across 
all cases will be contrasted with regard to their locus and timing in order to gain a better under-
standing about where in the MNC and at what stage of subsidiary evolution opportunities are 
identified and pursued.  
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Key for those that are not self-explanatory: Locus: HQ = parent company and/or corporate headquarters, SUB = 
focal subsidiary. Primary trigger = specific incident that stimulated initiative-taking of HQ or subsidiary manage-
ment. Primary and additional facilitator = events or states that facilitated initiative-taking at HQ or subsidiary level. 
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A thorough overview of initial processes of subsidiary internationalization is provided by Table 
5-2 above. In addition to highlighting the locus and time, relative to the establishment of the focal 
subsidiary, of opportunity-identification and initiative-taking processes, Table 5-2 illustrates what 
specific events stimulated and what conditions facilitated subsidiary internationalization. Even 
though observed cases sometimes disclose more than one specific initiative trigger and often 
more than two facilitating conditions, the summary is deliberately focused in order to avoid dis-
traction from the key process items.  
Ignoring initiative triggers and facilitators for a moment, examined initiatives illustrate a high 
level of heterogeneity regarding the locus and timing of process initiation. While in the majority 
of initiatives (#1.0, #2.0, #3.0, #4.0, #8.0, #10a.0 and #10b.0) the opportunity to develop foreign 
markets from a foreign subsidiary was identified by local subsidiary management, the remaining 
ones (#5, #6, #7 and #9) are characterized by a locus of opportunity-identification at the parent 
company. One key message is therefore that internationalization processes of foreign subsidiaries 
can be initiated locally, i.e. at the business frontline to foreign markets, as well as centrally by 
HQ management often far away from the actual arena. Moreover, in three instances (#3.0, #6.0 
and #7.0) the decision to provide foreign subsidiaries with responsibility beyond national borders 
was taken prior to the inauguration of the MNC unit itself. The mere presence of these cases al-
ready leads to the second key observation that reaching a certain stage in the evolutionary path of 
foreign subsidiaries does not represent a prerequisite for obtaining extended geographical reach. 
In fact, some foreign sub-units are equipped with this status from their very start.  
Having outlined some fundamental differences of initiatives for subsidiary internationalization 
regarding their locus and timing relative to the subsidiary establishment, the following pages will 
take a closer look at initiate triggers and facilitators and thus at the core process drivers. Overall, 
the examined initiatives illustrate remarkable similarities for process triggers and facilitators de-
spite their case particularities. While, as may be expected, the actual initiative trigger differs from 
one case to another, its categorization allows a clearer picture about case similarities and differ-
ences. Eight initiatives (#2.0, #3.0, #5.0, #6.0, #7.0, #9.0, #10a.0 and #10b.0) that were stimulat-
ed by altering organizational structures or human resource configurations are accompanied by 
three initiatives (#1.0, #4.0 and #8.0) that were triggered by apparent process inefficiencies. 
Changing organizational structures refer twice (#6.0 and #7.0) to the opening of the focal subsid-
iary, in one instance (#5.0) to the upgrade of the focal subsidiary with local production facilities 
and in one case (#2.0) to a reorganization of the focal subsidiary’s sales team. Modified human 
resource configurations relate to the exit of the HQ sales manager responsible for the market in 
focus (#3.0, #4.0 and #9.0) or CEO replacement at the focal subsidiary (#10a.0 and #10b.0). 
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Highlighting the relevance of altering human resource configurations for subsidiary international-
ization processes, the sales manager in case #9 notes:  
“Our company is characterized by a rather prudent approach towards change. Any exit of hu-
man resources therefore marks a point where existing procedures may be questioned and new 
approaches potentially tested.”11 
Overall, initiatives are characterized by abrupt changes and revolutionary aspects that made cor-
porate or subsidiary management propose alternative market development approaches. Initiatives 
#1.0 and #8.0 slightly deviate from this norm as process inefficiencies had existed over a longer 
period of time and unlike initiative #4.0 no specific incident is recorded that made local subsidi-
ary management propose decentralized market development approaches. When broadening the 
perspective on initiative facilitators that precede the actual initiative-taking process at HQ or sub-
sidiary level, however, gradual and evolutionary process elements of subsidiary internationaliza-
tion become apparent. For all examined cases subsidiary or corporate management was long 
aware of the size and growth of the market for which extended geographical responsibility was 
requested and/or granted. Growing awareness at either end of the MNC of the target market or 
region therefore not only appears to accompany most internationalization processes of foreign 
subsidiaries but also seems to augment the proclivity of MNC stakeholders for foreign market 
development by any means. 
When further comparing facilitating conditions, a differentiation regarding the locus of oppor-
tunity-identification needs to be made. All initiatives that were taken by foreign subsidiaries 
(#1.0, #2.0, #3.0, #4.0, #8.0, #10a.0 and #10b.0) have cross-border knowledge and networks of 
local management in common. Subsidiary management had thus already developed business rela-
tionships with market participants in the focus market or region prior to launching its request. 
The development of cross-border networks therefore gradually occurred over time and did not 
necessarily follow the intentions of local subsidiary personnel. In case #4, for example, the inter-
nationalization process of Austrian companies into Eastern Europe resulted in cross-border exten-
sions of existing contacts for the focal subsidiary. Cases #2 and #8 demonstrate that the process 
can be considerably influenced by the focal subsidiary. In both cases local management conduct-
ed unofficial small-scale sales beyond the US and Poland respectively prior to seeking official 
HQ approval. In this context the CEO of the US subsidiary in case #8 notes: 
                                                     
11
 Original quotation in German: „Die Organisation ist sehr vorsichtig und Veränderungen gehen wir immer sehr 
langsam an. Und dann führt das Ausscheiden des Mitarbeiters natürlich dazu, dass man sich hinterfragt und 
schaut, wie man gewisse Dinge in Zukunft anders machen kann.” 
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“I think it was the way of our former CEO of entering a market without 
getting permission for doing so.” 
The observed similarities across eleven cases of subsidiary internationalization suggest two inter-
esting findings. First, due to certain country-specific characteristics, foreign subsidiaries are able 
to extend their networks into foreign territories without officially holding a related mandate. Sim-
ilar to Rugman and Verbeke (1992), such host-market-related CSAs are linked to a specific mar-
ket or set of markets, accessible to all market participants and at the same time not or only to a 
very limited degree influenceable by involved stakeholders. Witnessed host-market-related CSAs 
in the case sample were geographical proximity, cultural similarities including language, and 
comparable customer preferences related to products and services. While only the Polish, Singa-
porean and Austrian subsidiaries in initiatives #1.0, #3.0 and #4.0 could count on all three CSA 
types, all other subsidiary-driven initiatives exhibit at least two different CSA kinds. Despite no 
geographical proximity to South American markets, the Spanish subsidiary in case #2, for exam-
ple, could rely on cultural similarities, in particular language, as well as comparable product re-
quirements in its host and target markets. Observed CSAs seem to enable foreign subsidiaries, 
without any form of initiative-taking to gradually extend their network embeddedness beyond 
host market borders. At the same time, local management can actively speed up the process of 
obtaining foreign market knowledge and insidership, as witnessed in cases #2 and #8. Independ-
ent of management intentions, the statement of the subsidiary CEO in case #1 summarizes the 
aforementioned aspects very well:  
“Maybe we cannot treat them better but we understand them better. […] And it is also the same 
kind of people, Slavic people, who buy many things in Poland.” 
In all subsidiary-driven initiatives for foreign market responsibility, local management views its 
network position in and its knowledge about a foreign market or region as superior to other units 
of the organization. It is convinced it is best suited to grow business networks and thus company 
presence in a particular foreign market. Local subsidiary management therefore appears to be 
able to leverage host-market-related CSAs in order to develop subsidiary capabilities or FSAs 
over time. FSAs can refer to market development capabilities and market knowledge or insid-
ership, which are exclusively linked to local subsidiary management and differentiate it from 
other MNC units including the parent company. Being aware of the presence and distinctiveness 
of FSAs at the focal subsidiary, local management therefore appears to be tempted to request 
permission to exploit these assets. As noted above, the development process of FSAs can but 
does not have to follow local management intentions and therefore shows highly varying process 
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speeds. Regarding the development of FSAs through the local presence of CSAs, the subsidiary 
CEO of case #3 remarks: 
“I have developed these capabilities, my Asia expertise, during my time in this area. […] This 
has only a little to do with the actual product but rather relates to cross-cultural understanding 
and diplomatic relationships that are needed in order to get in touch with people and to deal with 
them appropriately.”12 
Looking only at subsidiary-driven initiatives would leave the observer with the impression that 
knowledge and network development exclusively take place in the subsidiary’s host market. This 
would be in line with Johansson and Vahlne’s (1977) postulation that learning, as the key driver 
of internationalization processes, occurs at the business frontline. The remaining four initiatives 
(#5.0, #6.0, #7.0 and #9.0), however, clearly demonstrate that subsidiary internationalization can 
be driven by corporate management even prior to the actual opening of the focal subsidiary. Par-
ticularly striking about this fact is that all HQ-driven initiatives show different facilitating condi-
tions than their subsidiary-driven counterparts.  
While regional market volume and growth continue to facilitate the initiative-taking process, the 
aspect of sub-critical host market size appears to be of particular significance at corporate levels. 
In cases #6 and #7 limited host market size, referring to Singapore, meant that the opening of a 
local sales and service subsidiary could only be justified by stretching its geographical scope into 
neighboring markets. Even though in case #5 the sub-critical host market size relates to China, 
the principle remains unaltered. China may have already represented a huge market at that time 
but HQ management was afraid of facility underutilization due to any local political turmoil. In 
all three cases, economic aspects made corporate management consider alternative market devel-
opment approaches. A host market limitation in combination with attractive regional markets 
may thus enhance HQ awareness of extending foreign subsidiary mandates. This phenomenon is 
highlighted by a simple line in the company magazine in case #3 about the reasoning for opening 
a sub-unit in Singapore and equipping it with an Asian sales mandate from the very start: 
“Given the positive developments in the market and an increasing demand from the Asian region, 
Company B founded the subsidiary.” 
                                                     
12
 Original quotation in German: “Ich habe mir diese Fähigkeiten, meine Asienexpertise, im Laufe der Zeit, die ich 
vorher in der Region verbracht habe, angeeignet. […] Das hat weniger mit Produkten zu tun, als mit interkultu-
rellen und diplomatischen Beziehungen, welche Sie brauchen, um überhaupt an Leute ranzukommen und mit 
Leuten umzugehen.” 
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The HQ-driven initiative #9.0 clearly stands out from the crowd as it highlights a facilitating 
condition that was up to this point only identified in subsidiary-driven initiatives. This points to 
another interesting aspect of subsidiary internationalization. When HQ management was faced 
with resource constraints due to the upcoming exit of the HQ sales manager for South America, it 
sought alternative options. Having noticed considerable product similarities across South Ameri-
can markets it decided to equip local management in Brazil with the responsibility for technical 
importer and dealer support in the entire region. Host-market CSAs in the form of similar cus-
tomer requirements for products and services made HQ management aware of the subsidiary’s 
suitability for serving the entire region. By providing technical support to dealers in the Brazilian 
host market, local subsidiary management also developed FSAs appropriate for managing cross-
border territories. In this particular case, local management might not have been aware of their 
distinct positioning within the MNC, so it was corporate management that decided to leverage 
these assets. The relevance of CSAs and their impact on subsidiary resources therefore seem to 
also play an important role when subsidiary internationalization is initiated by corporate man-
agement. 
Based on previous cross-case analyses, the following nine key observations of opportunity-
identification and initiative-taking processes in subsidiary internationalization were made: 
1) Subsidiary internationalization can be triggered from within and outside of the MNC 
2) Subsidiary internationalization can be initiated at different MNC levels 
3) Subsidiary internationalization can be initiated prior to the subsidiary’s establishment 
4) Subsidiary internationalization can involve evolutionary (facilitating conditions) and 
revolutionary (triggers) process elements 
5) Sufficient market attractiveness is likely to accompany subsidiary internationalization 
6) Host-market-related CSAs like geographical proximity may stimulate subsidiary interna-
tionalization  
7) Host-market-related limitations like insufficient size may stimulate subsidiary interna-
tionalization 
8) Host-market-related CSAs may allow foreign subsidiaries to develop FSAs in the form of 
network embeddedness into foreign markets 
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9) Resulting subsidiary-related FSAs that stretch beyond the host market may stimulate sub-
sidiary internationalization 
5.2.2.2. Rent-seeking and responsibility-allocation  
Building on the previous section on the opportunity-identification and initiative-taking phase of 
subsidiary internationalization, the subsequent rent-seeking and responsibility-allocation process-
es will be thoroughly contrasted across cases in the following pages. While the overall case sam-
ple is dominated by successful initiative outcomes that allow the investigation of underlying pro-
cess drivers, two failed subsidiary requests for foreign market responsibility (cases #10a and 
#10b) further provide insight into potential process restrictions. The following reflections will be 
carried out with the intention of defining robust cross-case patterns that are capable of providing 
answers to why some subsidiaries succeed while others fail in obtaining managerial influence 
beyond national borders. By doing so, special attention will be drawn to the aspect of perceived 
risk levels among corporate managers, which seems to significantly influence the overall deci-
sion-making process.  
The rent-seeking and responsibility-allocation process for extended geographical responsibility 
generally encompasses two major elements: first, the exchange setting, i.e. how the subsidiary 
initiative is submitted to corporate management, and second, for what reasons a foreign subsidi-
ary receives or fails to receive its initial foreign market mandate. While the former aspect only 
exists if the process is initiated by local subsidiary management, the latter accompanies all initia-
tives no matter where the locus of opportunity-identification or initiative-taking is set. An over-
view of eleven initiatives for cross-border subsidiary responsibility is provided by Table 5-3 be-
low. In addition to the initiative locus and the exchange setting, the summary further encom-
passes the initiative outcome or subsidiary impact, the mandate origin, i.e. from where in the 
MNC the mandate is received, as well as three underlying HQ rationales. The mandate origin 
highlights whether the foreign market responsibility was previously carried out by the parent 
company or any other MNC unit or whether subsidiary internationalization refers to the devel-
opment of a completely new market.  
Finally Table 5-3 also provides information about the level of risk that corporate management 
attributes to the delegation of cross-border responsibility to the focal subsidiary and the relative 
MNC positioning of the focal subsidiary for the specific market development task. Relative sub-
sidiary value-proposition is thereby based on host-market-related CSAs and subsidiary-related 
FSAs and is viewed against the parent company and other sister subsidiaries. 
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Table 5-3: Initiative outcomes and HQ decision-making rationales for initial mandate gains 
Key for those that are not self-explanatory: Locus: HQ = parent company and/or corporate headquarters, SUB = 
focal subsidiary. Exchange setting = how the subsidiary initiative is submitted to HQ management. Transfer (from) = 
from where in the MNC the mandate is received. HQ rationales = HQ reasoning for selecting a decentralized market 
development approach. HQ risk = level of risk that HQ management attributes to the delegation of responsibilities. 
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When looking at Table 5-3 the column for ‘Transfer (from)’ is likely to attract the reader’s eyes. 
As the PhD topic deals with internationalization processes of foreign subsidiaries one would ex-
pect that they are linked to the development of markets or regions in which the MNC was not yet 
present. The case sample, however, reveals the complete opposite picture. Ten out of the eleven 
initiatives involve the transfer of existing market development activities from the parent company 
to the focal subsidiary. Moreover, the remaining initiative (#4.0) constitutes the shift of global 
customer management for a particular client from corporate headquarters and sister subsidiaries 
to the focal subsidiaries. However, the level of prior market development varied from one case to 
another. While in some instances (#1.0 and #5.0) it did not surpass the response to unsolicited 
orders, all other initiatives are characterized by significant market presence at the offset of sub-
sidiary internationalization. It can thus be stated that from an MNC perspective subsidiary inter-
nationalization does not automatically result in broadened global reach. 
In terms of subsidiary impact, eight out of the eleven initiatives involve geographically extended 
sales mandates of a foreign subsidiary. The remaining initiatives are either related to cross-border 
key account management (KAM) for a single Austrian client (#4.0), to technical importer and 
dealer support in South America (#9.0) or to logistics responsibility beyond the Singaporean host 
market (#7.0). It therefore appears that initial internationalization processes are often related to 
functionally limited responsibilities. Nine out of the eleven initiatives are further characterized by 
positive initiative outcomes that led to a geographical extension of existing subsidiary activities. 
The case sample only contains two failed subsidiary requests (#10a.0 and #10b.0), which are 
linked to the French subsidiary of Case Company G that repeatedly failed to obtain market re-
sponsibility in Northern Africa.  
The nine-to-two ratio outlined above with regard to positive and negative initiative outcomes 
respectively would at first sight indicate that a significant proportion of foreign subsidiaries may 
benefit from foreign market responsibility. The fact that only seven out of around fifty corporate 
managers that were approached at the offset of the study were aware of cross-border subsidiary 
responsibilities in their MNC, however, illustrates instead that only a few subsidiaries actually 
obtain multinational reach. It is acknowledged that questioned corporate managers might have 
overseen extended subsidiary responsibilities or might have responded in this way in order to 
avoid study participation but the number nonetheless strongly backs this indication. It is therefore 
assumed but by no means examined in the course of the study that in addition to a lack of suffi-
cient value-proposition, foreign subsidiaries may also stay within host market borders because 
they simply do not strive for additional responsibility or because they or their respective HQ do 
not take decentralized market development approaches into consideration at all.   
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While none of the HQ-driven initiatives (#5.0, #6.0, #7.0 and #9.0) involved any particular ex-
change with local subsidiary management and as a result of budget authority took a positive out-
come, the remaining initiatives exhibited some form of rent-seeking efforts by local management 
and a particular setting in which the request was put forward to HQ management. For three initia-
tives (#1.0, #10a.0 and #10b.0) the proposition was made in the course of a regular country visit 
by corporate management, for another two (#2.0 and #4.0) the request was purely exchanged by 
e-mail and telephone and for the remaining one (#3.0) the petition was actually submitted sponta-
neously in the course of a job interview. Only in one case (#8.0) did the initiative actually involve 
a dedicated meeting in order to present and discuss the subsidiary request. In addition, no cases 
involved any form of business case calculation or similar feasibility studies. Looking at the 
communication of subsidiary requests, it therefore appears as if the exchange setting and form of 
cross-border responsibility requests play only a subordinate role in the decision-making process. 
The overall decision-making process actually seems to be relatively informal, so the exchange 
settings associated with subsidiary initiatives for extended geographical responsibility will not be 
further detailed for the purpose of this study. 
Identifying cross-case patterns of HQ rationales for delegating market responsibility to affiliated 
foreign subsidiaries, however, is crucial for understanding drivers and restrictions of subsidiary 
internationalization. In line with previously examined opportunity-identification and initiative-
taking processes, observed rationales for responsibility delegation strengthen the belief that suffi-
cient attractiveness of target markets with regard to volume and growth
13
 represents a prerequisite 
for obtaining cross-border reach. All initiatives that attained HQ approval fulfilled such precondi-
tions. In addition, the two failed subsidiary petitions (#10a.0 and #10b.0) specifically lack market 
size and growth in Northern Africa, i.e. in the requested territory. The aspect of minimum target 
market size and growth is further highlighted by the involved corporate manager at Company G 
when commenting on the repeated rejection of the subsidiary request to reach beyond host market 
borders in France: 
“Even if local management succeeds in tripling sales to this region it would not have made a 
large impact. With this energy it can achieve far more in its French host market.”14 
In addition to highlighting the need for sufficient market attractiveness, the statement further re-
veals a continuous search by corporate management for optimized resource deployment across 
                                                     
13
 Study is limited to market-seeking rationales for subsidiary internationalization; other rationales could be resource-, 
efficiency- as well as strategic-asset-seeking (Dunning, 1993). 
14
 Original quotation in German: “Selbst wenn er da den Umsatz verdreifacht, hätte ihm das nicht viel gebracht. Mit 
der Energie hätte er in Frankreich wesentlich mehr bewirken können." 
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the entire MNC. Resources should be utilized for markets and regions that are expected to offer 
the highest input–output ratio. While no comparisons to other foreign sub-units were made in any 
case interview, it can be expected that the parent company’s desire for optimized resource alloca-
tion also applies to internationalization processes of foreign subsidiaries. While attractive markets 
therefore appear to represent the prerequisite for any form of internationalization, they alone do 
not explain subsidiary internationalization. Initiative outcomes further highlight that foreign sub-
sidiaries need to offer a certain value-proposition that qualifies them for foreign market develop-
ment and simultaneously differentiates them from other MNC units. Such value-proposition that 
makes corporate headquarters opt for a decentralized market development approach in the first 
place seems to be the sum of host-market-related CSAs like geographical proximity, cultural sim-
ilarities or comparable product and service needs of customers in the region. This was mentioned 
by the HQ sales manager in case #2 when providing rationales for developing South American 
markets through the Spanish subsidiary: 
“Another good reason is language. Even though most importers have one English-speaking per-
son, it is always difficult if no-one on our side speaks Spanish or Portuguese. […] There is also 
the advantage of cultural proximity. It helps to find agreements.” 
Having outlined the relevance of regional market attractiveness and host-market CSAs in the 
course of subsidiary internationalization, the aspect of certain host-market ‘limitations’ also ap-
pears to be of significance. For initiatives #3.0, #5.0, #6.0 and #7.0, insufficient host market size 
and thus demand is not only viewed as a stimulus for subsidiary internationalization as outlined 
earlier in this chapter but is also referred to as the main HQ rationale for extending subsidiary 
mandates beyond host market borders. In attractive regions with relatively small countries like in 
Southeast Asia (initiatives #3.0, #6.0 and #7.0), the establishment of a focal subsidiary can only 
be justified with a covered area larger than Singapore. Initiative #5.0 appears to deviate from this 
logic as it exhibits China as the host market, which does not necessarily imply limited host mar-
ket size. Nonetheless, in the eyes of the company owner, the setting up of local production facili-
ties would only be reasonable if they serve an entire region. 
Obtaining HQ buy-in appears to be further facilitated by subsidiary-related FSAs in the form of 
cross-border knowledge and networks, market development expertise or extended local value-add. 
In the course of initiative #4.0, for example, local subsidiary management could count on strong 
relationships with the Austrian customer in focus, which strongly facilitated the obtaining of HQ 
approval. Prior to initiative #8.0 the focal subsidiary had already demonstrated its foreign market 
development capabilities by unofficially exporting into Mexico on a small scale. In addition, it 
could rely on enhanced local value-add as products suitable for the Mexican market were pro-
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duced locally. The study, however, also contains three cases (#3, #6 and #7) where extended geo-
graphical responsibility was granted to the focal subsidiary prior to its actual inauguration. 
Aforementioned subsidiary-related FSAs can thus be viewed as facilitating conditions but not as 
prerequisites at the early stage of subsidiary internationalization. In all three incidents, corporate 
management was not (#6.0 and #7.0) or only to a very limited degree
15
 (#3.0) aware of the capa-
bilities of future subsidiary personnel. This view is further supported by a rather negative view of 
corporate management on the capabilities and the overall business approach of local subsidiary 
management throughout initiative #1.0. Despite granting extended geographical responsibility to 
the focal subsidiary in Poland, the relevant HQ manager in case #1 notes in this context: 
“They are very dependent on input from outside of their subsidiary because they can't take deci-
sions themselves or develop products for outside their home market.” 
While attractive markets in the region together with host-market-related CSAs may qualify for-
eign subsidiaries for developing new markets, obtaining extended geographical responsibility 
also appears to highly depend on involved risk levels perceived by corporate management. The 
risk can relate to adverse selection of a particular foreign market as well as adverse selection of a 
subsidiary to carry out foreign market development. At first sight only adverse selection of a sub-
sidiary appears to be relevant to this study as it is directly linked to the question of using local 
resources and thus relying on alternative market development approaches. However, any oppor-
tunity, no matter by which MNC unit it is eventually pursued, is likely to be contrasted to other 
opportunities across the MNC before receiving necessary resources. The aspect will not be fur-
ther detailed in the course of the study as the investigator was not able to contrast foreign market 
development opportunities to other opportunities that were existent at that time of decision but 
will be kept in mind when drawing conclusions from case study findings. A very good summary 
on the risk dimensions found in internationalization processes of foreign subsidiaries is provided 
by the HQ representative in case #6: 
“Two uncertainty types characterize this process: uncertainty about what the subsidiary is actu-
ally doing and how well it is executing its task and uncertainty about how the market is develop-
ing. […] In addition, limited availability of resources always impacts the process.”16 
                                                     
15
 Based only on impressions from a single job interview. 
16
 Original quotation in German: „Es gibt dabei immer zwei Arten von Unsicherheit. Die Unsicherheit darüber, was 
die Tochtergesellschaft macht und wie gut sie es macht und die Unsicherheit wie entwickelt sich der Markt. […] 
Die Begrenztheit der Ressourcen spielt dabei auch immer eine Rolle.“ 
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While the topic of resource efficiency and internal competition for resources was already touched 
upon when investigating the two failed subsidiary initiatives (#10a.0 and #10b.0), the statement 
further highlights two interesting particularities of subsidiary internationalization. First, subsidi-
ary internationalization is likely to extend the risk dimension by internal commitment and uncer-
tainty parameters. Second, host-market-related CSAs and potentially linked subsidiary-related 
FSAs seem to influence uncertainty levels perceived by corporate management. Both aspects are 
exemplified by contrasting two HQ-driven and successful initiatives (#5.0 and #9.0) with two 
subsidiary-driven and failed requests (#10a.0 and #10b.0). In all four incidents corporate man-
agement felt relatively reluctant to delegate foreign market responsibility to local subsidiary 
managers. It even viewed its value-proposition for fulfilling the task superior to the focal subsidi-
ary. So why did local management in two of these cases receive and in another two fail to obtain 
cross-border responsibility?  
While in the course of the two failed subsidiary requests in cases #10a and #10b corporate man-
agement could still count on adequate resources at HQ level, it faced insuperable resource con-
straints in case #9. In case #5 the foreign market mandate for the Chinese subsidiary initially only 
existed on paper and was exclusively designed to calm down company owners when facing up-
coming investment needs for local production facilities. It therefore appears that perceived or 
maximum tolerated risk levels may be impacted by parameters other than host-market-related 
CSAs and subsidiary-related FSAs. 
With regard to the appearance of internal uncertainty parameters, three initiatives (#9.0, #10a.0 
and #10b.0) linked to Company G provide further interesting insights. In the eyes of HQ man-
agement, for example, the risk of losing market share in France in incidents #10a.0 and #10b.0 
clearly outweighed any potential advantages associated with allowing the French subsidiary to 
allocate resources to relatively unimportant markets in North Africa. The subsidiary’s value-
proposition, mainly driven by host-market CSAs in the form of language, was therefore consid-
ered to be insufficient. In case #9, corporate management is still unsure whether the benefits from 
providing technical dealer support in South America through its Brazilian subsidiary eventually 
offset the associated risks in the form of potential dealer dissatisfaction. It views the current con-
struct as a temporary phenomenon suitable for overcoming current resource constraints but likely 
to dissolve in the near future.  
Regarding additional influencing parameters for uncertainty levels, all positive initiatives for ex-
tended geographical responsibility of foreign subsidiaries (cases #1 to #9) have CSAs as one of 
the main HQ motives in common. It therefore seems that CSAs like geographical and cultural 
proximity or regional product similarities are capable of lowering external uncertainty levels per-
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ceived by corporate management. In addition, subsidiary-related FSAs like cross-border networks 
or market development expertise that are often the result of leveraged CSAs are further stated as 
rationales for decentralized market development approaches. Putting it differently, increased del-
egation of responsibilities or internal commitment appears to offer the parent company the possi-
bility to lower the involved risk level of the undertaking. Foreign subsidiaries are thus likely to 
offer a value-proposition for the development of foreign markets that is superior to traditional 
internationalization approaches from corporate headquarters. With regard to delegating market 
development in Eastern Europe for a major customer to the Austrian subsidiary, HQ management 
in case #4 states: 
“Our local management had developed a good service in Austria that the client could however 
not rely on abroad. […] And one has to keep in mind that the Austrian companies had sent Aus-
trian employees into these markets. The aspect of language, Austrian style, also represented an 
advantage.”17 
Combining the aspects of altering internal and external uncertainty levels, corporate management 
seems to opt for a decentralized market development approach if it is capable of lowering the 
involved risk level. If CSAs of a particular host market and FSAs of a specific foreign subsidiary 
are insufficient for causing an overall risk decrease, corporate management is likely to develop a 
market centrally from the HQ (cases #10a and #10b), to unofficially maintain traditional ap-
proaches (case #5) or to view the subsidiary mandate as only a temporary construct (case #9).  
In all other cases the risk of delegating cross-border responsibility to a foreign subsidiary was 
perceived to be relatively low by corporate management as it was related to an attractive market 
or region and did not require additional resources. In fact, the decision only represented a minor 
reallocation of existing resources so that in the event of failure one could easily step back from it 
and restore the original approach. The aforementioned mechanism is exemplified in case #1, 
where market responsibility for the former CIS region was granted to the Polish subsidiary de-
spite serious concerns about local management capabilities. Local CSAs in the form of geograph-
ical proximity and cultural understanding in combination with local FSAs in the form of Russian 
language skills appear to more than offset increasing risk levels as a result of responsibility dele-
gation to an untrusted management team. 
                                                     
17
 Original quotation in German: „Wir hatten mit unserer Organisation in Österreich einen sehr guten Service und der 
Kunde hatte diesen Service in seinem Auslandgebiet nicht. […] Man muss natürlich auch wissen, dass die gro-
ßen österreichischen Gesellschaften, die haben auch Österreicher in diese Länder entsandt. Somit ist die Sprache 
an und für sich dort, das Österreichische, wieder ein Vorteil.“ 
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Based on previous cross-case analyses, the following nine key observations of rent-seeking and 
responsibility-allocation processes in subsidiary internationalization were made: 
1) Subsidiary internationalization does not necessarily relate to the development of new 
markets but can also represent a shift of responsibilities across the MNC 
2) At the offset of subsidiary internationalization cross-border mandates are often character-
ized by limited functional scopes 
3) Only a limited number of foreign subsidiaries seem to benefit from foreign market re-
sponsibilities 
4) Cross-border or regional market attractiveness appears to represent a prerequisite for sub-
sidiary internationalization 
5) Host-market-related CSAs or limitations alone can facilitate cross-border responsibilities 
of foreign subsidiaries 
6) The existence of subsidiary-related FSAs seems to further augment a subsidiary’s chances 
of obtaining additional geographical reach 
7) Delegating cross-border responsibility to foreign subsidiaries is likely to impact uncer-
tainty levels perceived at HQ level 
8) Host-market-related CSAs and subsidiary-related FSAs appear to constitute a subsidiary’s 
value-proposition for foreign market development  
9) Subsidiary internationalization seems to be facilitated by host-market-related CSAs and 




5.2.3. Mandate evolution 
Following the initial mandate gain for extended geographical responsibility, the observed cases 
also feature subsequent mandate extensions as well as reductions. Mandate modifications can 
relate to countries and regions as well as to functional responsibilities along the value chain of 
manufacturing companies, starting with research and development and finishing with after-sales 
services. As a result, local subsidiary management may benefit from additional geographical 
reach, from enhanced functional depth of its cross-border business operations or from a combina-
tion of both. In turn, foreign subsidiaries are also facing full or partial loss of their geographical 
coverage as well as reductions in the functional scope of their multinational operations. The loss 
can result in a transfer of responsibilities from the focal subsidiary to the parent company or to 
other affiliated subsidiaries or in an MNC-wide cancellation of operations for the covered region. 
Similarly, mandate extensions of a particular subsidiary can also result in declining responsibility 
scopes of other MNC units. For the study at hand, achieving regional HQ status represents the 
final stage of mandate evolution.
18
 In this case a foreign subsidiary not only looks after foreign 
markets or regions but also possesses cross-border authority over other MNC units. At the same 
time it is still dependent on HQ decisions and budget approvals.  
In addition to examining historic mandate alterations, the outlook of corporate and subsidiary 
management on likely future mandate development scenarios will also be reviewed in this section. 
While future expectations, due to their only tentative nature, are always to be treated with suffi-
cient caution, they allowed a broader picture to be obtained on long-term strategies for multina-
tional subsidiary mandates in modern MNCs. Moreover, they helped to apply a lifecycle view to 
the study topic, which would not be possible for examined cases with an exclusively retrospec-
tive approach. Adhering to the two different tasks, the following pages will be split into a man-
date development part based on historic mandate alterations and a mandate outlook section based 
on future expectations of various MNC stakeholders about the development of cross-border sub-
sidiary responsibilities. While the first part seeks to shed light on mechanisms of mandate evolu-
tion in either direction, the second part aims to add a lifecycle perspective to the topic of subsidi-
ary internationalization.  
5.2.3.1. Mandate development 
The case sample exhibits a total of fifteen initiatives for mandate modification at seven foreign 
subsidiaries. While cases #1, #2, #5 and #6 have only ever encountered a single mandate varia-
                                                     
18
 Divisional or corporate HQ functions that subsidiaries may also obtain were not identified in the case sample and 
were not subject to research for the study at hand. 
 199 
tion, cases #4, #7 and #8 are characterized by multiple mandate alterations as well as failed sub-
sidiary requests for further augmented foreign market responsibility. Due to their only recent 
mandate gain, the Singaporean subsidiary in case #3 and its Brazilian equivalent in case #9 have 
not yet experienced any form of responsibility modification. In addition, the French subsidiary in 
cases #10a and #10b never managed to obtain extended market responsibility for Northern Africa 
in the first place, making the examination of subsequent mandate alterations equally impossible. 
The overall aim of this section is to develop robust cross-case patterns that allow a better under-
standing of the evolution of subsidiary mandates beyond host market borders. The focus in the 
following pages will therefore be set on understanding what mechanisms drive mandate devel-
opment processes and why some foreign subsidiaries benefit from mandate extensions whilst 
others are facing mandate reductions and even losses. In line with the analysis approach of sub-
sidiary internationalization processes taken at the offset, initiatives for mandate alterations will 
first be examined across cases regarding their overall process triggers and facilitators. The main 
objective here is to obtain a solid picture of how and where in the MNC mandate development 
opportunities are identified and pursued. In a next step, underlying HQ rationales for extending, 
reducing or not being willing to alter existing subsidiary mandates will be thoroughly examined 
in order to understand why corporate management allows some subsidiaries to advance in their 
evolutionary path and forces others to stagnate or decline. Throughout both exercises cross-case 
observations will constantly be compared to earlier findings about initial mandate gains in order 
to identify similarities and particularities of different evolution phases.  
Table 5-4 below provides an overview of the initiation of fifteen mandate development processes 
including their triggers, facilitators and loci of initiative-taking. In line with previous sections, 
initiatives are labeled by their case number chronologically followed by the initiative number. 
Before commencing with detailed cross-case analyses, four overall aspects of mandate evolution 
are immediately eye-catching. First, the simple fact that all cross-border subsidiary mandates that 
were granted to local management before 2010 were exposed to subsequent mandate modifica-
tions already indicates a limited firmness of the overall construct. The temporary nature of this 
mandate type is further supported by case #7, which features a total of six changes in the subsidi-
ary’s foreign market responsibilities since the initial mandate gain in the 1970s. The equal pres-
ence of mandate extensions and reductions in the same case further gives the phenomenon of 
subsidiary internationalization a potentially transient character.  
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Key for those that are not self-explanatory: Locus: HQ = parent company and/or corporate headquarters, SUB = 
focal subsidiary. Primary trigger = specific incident that stimulated initiative-taking of HQ or subsidiary manage-
ment. Primary and additional facilitator = events or states that facilitated initiative-taking at HQ or subsidiary level. 
Second and further adding to the transformation ability of multinational subsidiary mandates, 
opportunity-identification and initiative-taking processes for mandate evolution exhibit signifi-
cantly fewer facilitating conditions than for initial mandate gains. It therefore appears that exist-
ing cross-border mandates of foreign subsidiaries are relatively susceptible to minor changes 
within and outside the MNC. The initial request for or delegation of cross-border subsidiary re-
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sponsibility equally featured various revolutionary process elements. They were all, however, 
further accompanied by multiple facilitating conditions that only gradually and over time made 
MNC stakeholders aware of alternative market development approaches. Third, the evolution of 
cross-border subsidiary mandates is not necessarily related to new markets or regions but is often 
associated with the functional scope of the mandate. Foreign subsidiaries therefore gain or lose 
responsibility for different value chain elements for a market already covered by the existing 
mandate. In addition, they may obtain regional HQ status for this territory so that they fulfill tra-
ditional HQ functions in a distant region. Mandate evolution is thus more than just adding or tak-
ing markets to or from existing responsibility scopes. It is very much concerned with the depth of 
cross-border operations.  
Finally and in contrast to initial opportunity-identification and initiative-taking processes, man-
date evolution appears to be strongly HQ-driven. While only four out of the eleven initial subsid-
iary internationalization processes originated in the parent company, the ratio changes to ten out 
of the fifteen initiatives for subsequent mandate development processes. The case sample thus 
illustrates that mandate development, like initial mandate gain, can be initiated at either end of 
the MNC. More interestingly, however, case observations suggest that HQ management often 
proactively participates in the evolution of cross-border subsidiary mandates. This is in contrast 
to initial mandate gains, in which HQ management largely confined itself to assessing the viabil-
ity of local initiatives.  
When specifically looking at triggers and facilitators of fifteen initiatives for altering cross-border 
subsidiary mandates, other meaningful aspects of subsidiary internationalization unfold. First of 
all and similar to initial mandate gains, organizational change or altering human resource config-
urations play an important role in stimulating mandate evolution processes. A total of nine initia-
tives share this specific trigger type. Human resource aspects range from the replacement of cor-
porate or subsidiary personnel (#2.1, #8.2 and #8.3) or the installation of expatriates (#5.1) to 
upcoming importer or dealer retirements (#8.1). Organizational change occurs in the form of 
merging sub-units (#7.1), the establishment or integration of new subsidiaries (#7.3), an initial 
public offering (#7.4) or the restructuring of global sales organizations (#7.5). Abrupt changes 
and revolutionary process elements therefore also seem to be found along evolutionary paths of 
cross-border subsidiary mandates. 
Unlike the initial mandate request or delegation, however, business results suddenly also seem to 
impact mandate evolution, both as change trigger and facilitator. Results can refer to the perfor-
mance of the focal subsidiary and its associated stakeholders or to other MNC units. Moreover, it 
can encompass satisfying as well as underperforming results. One initiative (#1.1) for mandate 
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change, for example, was triggered by a lack of salesman support in former CIS markets by the 
Polish subsidiary. In case #4, both HQ initiatives (#4.1 and #4.2) were stimulated by very satisfy-
ing cross-border customer management that made personnel at the parent company reflect on 
extending the subsidiary’s mandate scope. Another mandate modification (#7.2) was triggered by 
unsatisfying sales result of HQ management in the fast-growing Indian market. Finally the initia-
tive to equip the Spanish subsidiary with a mandate for Chile (#2.1) was at least facilitated by a 
lack of success with the HQ approach. It therefore appears that proven as well as unproven re-
sources and linked capabilities are more relevant for mandate evolution than for prior initial 
mandate gains.  
Relatively fewer facilitating conditions for mandate changes than for initial mandate gains were 
already mentioned at the offset of this section. A closer look at the limited sample and a focus on 
subsidiary-driven initiatives, however, disclose another important element of mandate evolution. 
All subsidiary requests for extended or reduced geographical and functional responsibilities (#6.1, 
#7.5, #8.1, #8.2 and #8.3) were facilitated by cross-border networks and market knowledge of 
local subsidiary management. Comparable to initial subsidiary internationalization processes, 
multinational business relationships made local management gradually aware of its suitability for 
extended cross-border responsibilities. The aspect of foreign business relationships or network 
insidership therefore not only seems to play an important role at the offset of subsidiary interna-
tionalization processes but also in subsequent mandate modifications.    
Having looked into process triggers and facilitators, the examination of HQ rationales for modi-
fying cross-border subsidiary mandates is further needed to obtain a comprehensive picture of 
process mechanisms and evolutionary paths. While as outlined earlier the pure multitude of ob-
served alterations already suggests a temporary and/or transient nature of this mandate type, the 
actual reasons for extensions and reduction are more complex. Table 5-5 below provides an over-
view of fifteen mandate development initiatives encompassing their initiative locus, their out-
comes or subsidiary impacts and the underlying HQ rationale. In addition, it provides further in-
formation about the transfer direction of foreign market responsibilities across the MNC. Across 
the case sample, mandate evolution was predominantly associated with a shifting distribution of 
responsibilities among MNC units. Mandate alterations #6.1 and #7.5 constitute an exception 
from this norm as they relate to the development of a completely new market or to a full aban-
doning of existing foreign market activities respectively. Moreover, the table illustrates the risk 
level perceived by corporate management throughout the decision-making process. In the case of 
mandate extension, risk refers to the transfer of additional responsibilities to the focal subsidiary. 
In the case of mandate decline, risk relates to keeping subsidiary management with the existing 
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foreign market responsibility. Finally, the overview also highlights the value positioning of the 
focal subsidiary for the specific function, which is viewed relative to other MNC units. 
While Table 5-5 largely resembles Table 5-3 on outcomes and decision-making rationales for 
initial mandate gains, two apparent modifications were made. First, the column for exchange set-
ting was removed. The omission is due to the irrelevance of this element for initial subsidiary 
internationalization processes as well as the lack of any mention of it by any MNC stakeholder in 
the context of subsequent mandate alterations. Given the lack of study focus on this aspect of 
subsidiary internationalization, however, it is not certain that the exchange setting only has a lim-
ited impact on subsidiary internationalization processes. A lack of data points simply restrained 
the study from further exploring the matter. The second modification relates to the columns for 
underlying HQ rationales for initiative outcomes that were reduced to a total of two. The reason-
ing was that the precondition for internationalization in the form of foreign market attractiveness 
was still valid across all examined cases.  
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Table 5-5: Initiative outcomes and HQ decision-making rationales for mandate alterations 
Key for those that are not self-explanatory: Locus: HQ = parent company and/or corporate headquarters, SUB = 
focal subsidiary. Transfer (from/to) = transfer direction of foreign market responsibilities across the MNC. HQ ra-
tionales = HQ reasoning for mandate modification. HQ risk = level of risk that HQ management attributes to the 
delegation of responsibilities at the time of initiative-taking. SUB value-proposition = relative MNC positioning of 










Primary HQ  
rationale 






1.1 HQ (Unofficial) functional & geo-
graphical mandate loss for 
former CIS markets 





High < HQ / > 
other SUB 
2.1 HQ Geographical mandate exten-
sion  into Chile 




Low > HQ / > 
other SUB  
4.1 HQ Functional extension of global 








Low > HQ / > 
other SUB  
4.2 HQ Functional & geographical 
mandate extension into Eastern 
Europe 




Low > HQ / > 
other SUB 
5.1 HQ Functional extension to RHQ 
for Asia-Pacific 
HQ FSAs (value-add) Use of ex-
patriates 
High = HQ / > 
other SUB 
6.1 SUB Geographical mandate exten-
sion into Vietnam 




Low > HQ / > 
other SUB 
7.1 HQ Functional mandate extension 
in East Asia to sales & service 
Other 
SUB 





Low > HQ / > 
other SUB  
7.2 HQ  Geographical mandate exten-
sion of into India 





Low > HQ / > 
other SUB  
7.3 HQ Functional mandate extension 
to East Asian RHQ 




High > HQ / > 
other SUB 









High > HQ / < 
other SUB  
7.5 SUB Functional mandate reduction 
(closure of two subsidiaries 
under supervision) 





High > HQ / > 
other SUB  
7.6 HQ Functional & geographical 
mandate reduction for China 
and Northeast Asia 
Other 
SUB 





High > HQ / < 
other SUB 
8.1 SUB n/a (initiative for  North Ameri-
can RHQ mandate rejected) 




Low > HQ / > 
other SUB  
8.2 SUB Geographical mandate exten-
sion into Latin America 




Low = HQ / > 
other SUB  
8.3 SUB Functional mandate extension 
to Americas RHQ 




High = HQ / > 
other SUB 
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The case sample of this study contains a total of fifteen mandate development initiatives. Of these, 
eleven initiatives refer to mandate extension, only three to mandate reduction (#7.4, #7.5 and 
#7.6) and a single one to (unofficial) mandate loss (#1.1). The sample further relates to eight ini-
tiatives (#1.1, #4.1, #5.1, #7.1, #7.3, #7.4, #7.5 and #8.3) for modified functional scopes in a giv-
en foreign territory, four initiatives (#2.1, #6.1, #7.2 and #8.2) for altering geographical coverage 
within the same functional responsibilities and three initiatives (#4.2, #7.6 and #8.1) for a combi-
nation of geographical and functional mandate adjustments. While all ten HQ-driven initiatives 
(#1.1, #2.1, #4.1, #4.2, #5.1, #7.1, #7.2, #7.3, #7.4 and #7.6) due to the parent company’s budget 
authority experienced a positive outcome, one out of five subsidiary-driven initiatives (#6.1, #7.5, 
#8.1, #8.2 and #8.3) did not succeed in obtaining HQ approval. In this incident (#8.1) the US 
subsidiary was not allowed to open and manage a Mexican sub-unit and thereby to turn into the 
North American regional HQ of Company F.  
Having found no evidence for the relevance of the exchange setting in HQ decision-making pro-
cesses, the timing of the subsidiary request seems to be able to impact the initiative outcome. 
While local subsidiary management in case #8 initially failed to obtain HQ approval to open and 
manage a Mexican subsidiary (#8.1), it later managed to receive full Americas sales and service 
responsibility (#8.2) and only recently to turn into the company’s regional HQ for the Americas 
(#8.3). In fact, the subsidiary’s value-proposition for market development in Mexico in the course 
of the primary mandate alteration request was probably most distinct. In this first incident, how-
ever, HQ management was still protecting its home base from rising affiliated units and aiming to 
maintain existing power balances so that additional market responsibility or even regional HQ 
status was not granted to US subsidiary management.  
In the subsequent successful initiatives the subsidiary’s value-proposition to manage the entire 
Americas region was not or only marginally superior to its HQ counterpart but timing might have 
made the difference. The first successful initiative (#8.2) was launched shortly after the installa-
tion of a new CEO at corporate headquarters who was personally convinced of the focal subsidi-
ary’s suitability to manage the entire region. In the other incident (#8.3), US subsidiary manage-
ment again took advantage of a CEO replacement in combination with the company’s overall 
restructuring efforts in order push their initiative through. In this context the CEO of the focal 
subsidiary in case #8 states: 
“It came to the point where the new CEO took over. He had experience with South America as he 
had worked in Brazil for some time. […] He had firsthand knowledge of the South American 
market, and I think he had a better appreciation for the success that we were having.” 
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When comparing HQ rationales for initially granting extended territorial liability to foreign sub-
sidiaries and for later altering these mandates, differences are eye-catching. While in the initial 
process host-market-related CSAs take a superior and subsidiary-related FSAs a subordinate role, 
the picture is almost completely reverse in subsequent processes of mandate evolution. Eleven 
out of the fourteen mandate alterations were primarily the result of the focal subsidiary’s FSAs. It 
therefore seems that in order to grow a foreign market mandate, foreign subsidiaries need to pos-
sess a certain level of subsidiary-related FSAs. In addition, the three mandate alterations (#7.4, 
#7.5 and #7.6) that do not exhibit subsidiary-related FSAs as the primary HQ rationale are all 
referring to declining responsibility scopes of the Singaporean subsidiary in case #7. In fact, 
while one incident (#7.5) is of a particular nature as the closure of two Southeast Asian subsidiar-
ies was the result of increasing compliance risks, the two others (#7.4 and #7.6) also feature 
FSAs as the primary HQ rationale for altering existing mandate scopes. Rather than referring to 
FSAs of the focal subsidiary, however, FSAs in the form of local production facilities are linked 
to the Chinese sister subsidiary.   
Cross-case observations further suggest that in the course of mandate evolution the exclusive 
presence of host-market-related CSAs is not sufficient to grow geographical and functional re-
sponsibility scopes beyond host market borders. In fact, insufficient development of subsidiary-
related FSAs in the form of cross-border network insidership or sales expertise on the basis of 
CSAs and potentially unsatisfying results is likely to cause a mandate decline. While the mere 
existence of host-market-related CSAs might allow a foreign subsidiary to gain the initial expo-
sure to foreign markets, it does not seem to be sufficient for maintaining the mandate. Insufficient 
FSA development by subsidiary management and potential earlier overestimation of CSAs by 
HQ management is very clearly seen in case #1. When explaining the unofficial mandate loss of 
the Polish subsidiary for former CIS markets
19
, the manager concerned made the following 
statement three years after the initial mandate gain: 
“So we have not succeeded yet but we have learned a lot of things in terms of how we now be-
lieve what is the right thing to move on over there. That is driven from here and the reason why it 
is not driven from Poland is because the person down there has good market knowledge but he is 
not someone who drives a new project. That person is too much of the old school. He gets scared 
if the customer pushes him a bit. What we did back in 2008 is not viewed as sustainable any more. 
One person with a Polish background working into CIS markets is not sufficient.” 
                                                     
19
 Reduced responsibility scopes for former CIS markets have not yet been officially communicated to the focal 
subsidiary in Poland and any personnel working in these markets has remained on the subsidiary’s payroll. The 
influence of local management in Poland, however, has already been reduced to a minimum as market develop-
ment for former CIS market is predominately planned and monitored at corporate headquarters. 
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As outlined in the introductory part of this section, all ten successful initiatives for mandate ex-
tension show significantly varying contents or magnitudes. In some cases the mandate is extend-
ed to another country without altering the responsibility scope. Others involve a further delega-
tion of value chain functions to the foreign sub-units for the same territory. In three incidents 
(#5.1, #7.3 and #8.1) the mandate change actually turned the focal subsidiary into a regional HQ 
and thus made local management in charge of other MNC units. In case #5 a Chinese subsidiary 
turned into the company’s regional HQ for East Asia and Oceania, in case #7 a Singaporean sub-
unit received the same status for East Asia and in case #8 a US subsidiary obtained sub-unit au-
thority for the Americas. While all cases exhibit significantly varying host market characteristics, 
in particular regarding size, they have one particular subsidiary-related FSA and one particular 
host-market-related CSA in common: enhanced local value-add (FSA) and region-specific prod-
uct requirements (CSA). Enhanced local value-add does not necessarily mean local assembly or 
production facilities but the fulfillment of functions that clearly surpass the scope of pure sales 
and service subsidiaries as indicated by case #7. With regard to enhanced capabilities of his Sin-
gaporean subsidiary, the respective HQ manager remarks: 
“Until the establishment of regional subsidiaries, which can be viewed as ‘sub-subsidiaries’  
from an HQ perspective, numerous processes had evolved at subsidiary level in Singapore that 
eventually terminated there. […] for example stock management. […] This represents a major 
step as such HQ-like functions are needed for the setting up of sub-subsidiaries. Otherwise we 
could have established direct reporting links from the subsidiary in Indonesia to the parent com-
pany.”20 
The reason for turning a foreign subsidiary with local production facilities into a regional HQ in 
an area that shares similar customer and product requirements appears rather self-explanatory at 
first sight. Nonetheless, case #1 shows that despite possessing its own manufacturing facilities 
and being located in a region with similar product requirements, local management may not even 
be capable of maintaining its sales mandate if its lacks other FSAs. Nonetheless, assuming suffi-
cient levels of FSAs like cross-border network insidership, the presence of local production sites 
appears to augment corporate management’s proclivity to grant foreign subsidiaries a regional 
HQ status. Supporting this observation, the relevant subsidiary manager in case #5 comments on 
its sudden responsibility extension: 
                                                     
20
 Original quotation in German: „Bis zur Gründung von regionalen Töchtern, welche aus HQ-Sicht Enkel darstellen, 
sind sukzessive relativ viele Prozesse entstanden die bei der Tochtergesellschaft in Singapur dann auch enden 
[…] z.B. Stock-Management. […] Das ist auch noch einmal ein wichtiger Schritt, weil für eine Gründung von 
Enkeln in der Tochter schon Funktionen erforderlich waren, die originär HQ sind. Sonst hätten wir auch einfach 
sagen können, dass Indonesien eine Tochter der Zentrale ist.“ 
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“I think it is pretty simple. If we manufacture a product and deliver it into a certain region then 
we should also be entirely responsible for this territory.” 
Having already mentioned a lack of local management skills in case #1, the single failed subsidi-
ary request (#8.1) for mandate extension in the case sample further spoils the somewhat simplis-
tic statement above that local production facilities in combination with regional product require-
ments inevitably allows regional HQ constructs. In fact, despite local production facilities and 
similar regional product requirements, US subsidiary management did not obtain HQ buy-in for 
the proposed opening and management of a Mexican subsidiary at that time. Several years later 
however, it turned into the regional HQ for the entire Americas region (#8.3). So what changed in 
between the two incidents?  
In between the two subsidiary requests for mandate extension, Company F experienced its inter-
nationalization peak. At the same time it was also faced with a comprehensive restructuring pro-
gram that was caused by the global financial crisis and that led to significant headcount reduc-
tions, especially at the parent company. During this period the organization was therefore not 
only confronted with increasing internationalization of its business but also with declining rele-
vance of its parent company. In addition, certain top-management personnel at the parent compa-
ny that were keen on limiting subsidiary power in principal left the company in the mentioned 
period. In summary, the internationalization experience as well as the organizational maturity 
with regard to delegating responsibilities to and exploiting local resources of foreign sub-units 
had augmented. With regard to the negative outcome of the subsidiary request (#8.1), the HQ 
sales manager believes that at that time a philosophy predominated at Company F that sub-units 
should not look after other sub-unit. This is supported by his following statement: 
“In terms of pure sales volume America was for a long time the number two following its Ger-
man headquarters, but eventually surpassed its counterpart. […] As a consequence, markets 
were simply taken away from the US entity. […] At that time such prestige thinking was noticea-
ble in the sense that the German entity needs to claim the first place. Now, however, this is no 
longer relevant.”21 
It is therefore very likely that lacking organizational maturity regarding MNC power balances 
actually impeded local US management from succeeding with its first initiative for mandate ex-
tension. A severe crisis particularly impacting home markets in Europe several years later made 
                                                     
21
 Original quotation in German: „Amerika war umsatzseitig ja lange Zeit die Nummer 2 hinter Deutschland, hat es 
aber in einem Jahr sogar geschafft Deutschland zu überholen. […] Da hat man ganz einfach eins gemacht, man 
hat Amerika Märkte weggenommen. […] Es gab damals halt ein gewisses Prestige-Denken, also der deutsche 
Standort muss die Nummer 1 sein. Mittlerweile ist es nicht mehr relevant.“ 
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corporate management accept regional headquarters and therefore also foreign centers of power 
and gravity. These case observations allow two different considerations that are equally important 
to the study. First, as a result of increasing organizational maturity and/or human resource altera-
tions, perceived risk levels at corporate level had been reduced to such an extent that regional HQ 
mandates were suddenly acceptable at Company F. Or second, the global crisis and linked re-
source constraints had forced corporate management to accept MNC constructs that previously 
surpassed its maximum tolerable risk level. Most likely, a combination of both aspects best ex-
plains the situation. 
The crucial relevance of risk in the course of initial mandate gains for cross-border subsidiary 
responsibilities was highlighted earlier in this chapter. Its decisive role for obtaining regional HQ 
statuses and thus for multinational mandates with significant functional depth, which was identi-
fied in case #8, is further supported by cases #5 and #7. In both incidents the presence of en-
hanced local value-add and regional product requirements may have qualified foreign subsidiar-
ies in China and Singapore to turn into a regional HQ. There were both, however, characterized 
by a particular facilitating condition that made HQ management bear the risk of delegating sub-
unit management to a foreign subsidiary: the use of expatriates. While local subsidiary manage-
ment never mentioned this aspect and was therefore probably not aware of it, the parent company 
explicitly installed expatriates in order to look after far-distant developments. In both cases the 
mandate extension represented the first establishment of a regional HQ in the firm. Any uncer-
tainty and thereby risk-reducing element like the presence of known personnel therefore seems to 
augment the proclivity of corporate management to grant significant scopes of responsibility to 
foreign subsidiaries. In this context the responsible HQ manager of case #5 states: 
“I could not delegate this task to our local CEO as market knowledge and assessment of the Chi-
nese are simply too different. This would have not worked. Some personal constellations did not 
allow for it so we sent the CEO of our Czech entity to China for three years.”22 
Interesting insights into evolutionary paths of cross-border subsidiary mandates are offered by 
case #7. The focal subsidiary advanced from a small Asian logistics hub to Company E’s regional 
HQ for East Asian operations. The development is of particular interest as the focal subsidiary 
lacks its own assembly or production facilities. At the peak of its cross-border mandate, local 
subsidiary management was in charge of the entire East Asian region, looking after numerous 
                                                     
22
 Original quotation in German: „An den chinesischen Geschäftsführer konnte ich das nicht anhängen, weil die 
Einschätzungen und Marktkenntnisse eines Chinesen einfach zu unterschiedlich sind. Das hätte nicht funktio-
niert. Das waren insbesondere persönliche Konstellationen die das nicht möglich gemacht haben und dann haben 
wir den Geschäftsführer von unserer tschechischen Gesellschaft für 3 Jahre nach China geschickt.“ 
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affiliated subsidiaries with or without production facilities. Over recent years however, the sub-
sidiary in Singapore has experienced a gradual reduction of its foreign market responsibilities. 
While the mandate reduction was partly the result of decisions taken in the parent company it was 
also driven by local management itself. Throughout this process, responsibilities were predomi-
nately shifted to the sister subsidiary in China. The question is therefore what factors allowed 
subsidiary management to reach the final stage of cross-border responsibility, the regional HQ 
status? And even more interestingly, what made HQ management take functional and geograph-
ical responsibilities from the focal subsidiary and transfer them across the MNC at a later stage? 
The answer to the first question is relatively easy and has been partly provided earlier in this sec-
tion. Obtaining sales and service responsibility for East Asia (#7.1) and additional geographical 
responsibility for India (#7.2) was largely the result of the focal subsidiary’s FSAs in the form of 
cross-border knowledge and networks as well as proven logistics and later sales expertise. In or-
der to become East Asia’s regional HQ (#7.3), local management was further required to demon-
strate enhanced local value-add in the form of HQ functions and corporate management felt im-
pelled to make use of an expatriate. Having quickly sketched the upward evolutionary path of the 
Singaporean subsidiary, providing a thorough explanation for its downturn requires a look be-
yond aspects of the parent company and the focal subsidiary. In fact, rival MNC units suddenly 
appear to play a very important role in this process. 
The first mandate reduction (#7.4) was related to the shift of the strategic regional HQ function 
for East Asia from the focal subsidiary in Singapore to its sister subsidiary in China. The transfer 
of responsibility was officially announced at the time of Company E’s initial public offering 
(IPO). From an operational perspective the functional loss had very little impact on the focal sub-
sidiary’s business as local management was still looking after the entire region including the Chi-
nese subsidiary. Nonetheless, the shift already demonstrated the increasing relevance of the Chi-
nese market to Company E that HQ management also wanted to highlight to the financial mar-
kets. Moreover, prior to the IPO, huge production facilities were set up in China in order to suit 
local and potentially regional customer needs. With regards to CSAs in the form of host market 
size and growth as well as FSAs in the form of local value-add, the Chinese subsidiary had al-
ready overtaken its Singaporean counterpart by that time. 
Due to its declining relative value-proposition for managing Company E’s East Asian operations, 
additional responsibility loss was inevitable. Local management only recently experienced this 
second blow to its foreign market mandate when it had to cede further responsibilities for North-
east Asian markets to the Chinese subsidiary and its remaining China responsibility to corporate 
headquarters (#7.6). The responsibility shift was largely the result of increasing Asian market size 
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in general and China in particular that led to the restructuring of the global sales organization. For 
the managing of increasingly relevant markets in Asia the Singaporean subsidiary was simply too 
small and lacked sufficient local value-add in the form of its own production facilities. The sub-
stantial mandate reduction did not even surprise local management in Singapore. Prior to this 
official announcement, subsidiary management had steadily backed down from its China respon-
sibility as a result of increasing process complexity. The subsidiary in Singapore had neither the 
resources nor the capabilities to manage the immense undertaking that company E was conduct-
ing in the covered area. However, the loss of responsibilities was by no means the result of un-
derperforming subsidiary results but exclusively linked to growing market sizes in the covered 
region as well as augmenting local value-add of rival MNC units. With regard to lost responsi-
bilities of China and Northeast Asia the subsidiary manager in Singapore states: 
“This is a natural process. You have more and more business and you have more and more re-
sponsibility so that you simply have to divide the work further.” 
In between the two major mandate reductions, the local subsidiary in Singapore also experienced 
the loss of management responsibility for two Southeast Asian subsidiaries (#7.5). However, in 
this case the focal subsidiary itself proposed closing the sub-units in light of potential compliance 
risks. Reduced responsibility levels were therefore not related to increasing value-propositions of 
rival MNC units or declining value-add of the focal subsidiary but were the mere result of the 
local precautionary measures. Nonetheless, the incident underlines very well that at a certain 
stage of mandate evolution a focal subsidiary no longer exclusively thrives for mandate extension 
but comes up to its regional HQ responsibility and decides what is best for the region and there-
fore for the MNC as a whole.  
Following the cross-case analyses the following eleven key observations of the evolution of mul-
tinational subsidiary mandates were made: 
1) Multinational subsidiary mandates are likely alter over to time 
2) Cross-border subsidiary responsibilities appear to shift across MNC units 
3) Mandate evolution can relate to geographical and/or functional responsibility changes 
4) Corporate management appears to proactively participate in mandate evolution 
5) Subsidiary management appears to have limited influence on mandate evolution 
6) Business results at either MNC level seem to stimulate mandate evolution 
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7) Host-market-related CSAs do not appear to be sufficient for developing existing mandates 
8) FSA development on the basis of CSAs seems to add to mandate sustainability 
9) Risk and uncertainty levels at HQ appear to increase with mandate magnitude 
10) Mandate evolution exhibits risk-influencing parameters other than CSAs or FSAs 
11) Subsidiaries with cross-border responsibilities are exposed to intra-MNC competition 
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5.2.3.2. Mandate outlook 
The previous evaluation of fourteen mandate alterations as well as one unapproved modification 
request has clearly indicated that cross-border subsidiary mandates are subject to change. While 
the magnitude and multitude of these changes are very well illustrated by cases #1 and #7, in 
which cross-border mandates are either already (unofficially) terminated or exist for more than 30 
years, none of the other cases allow a lifecycle perspective to the topic of subsidiary internation-
alization to be applied. This is due to negative outcomes of subsidiary requests in the first place 
(cases #10a and #10b), relatively recent initial mandate gains (cases #2, #3, #5 and #9) with little 
or no modification up to this point and exclusively positive mandate developments (cases #4 and 
#8) that raise the question whether the trend will last. At the end of each semi-structured inter-
view, MNC stakeholders were therefore asked to provide an outlook on likely future develop-
ments of cross-border subsidiary mandates. While in this point corporate and subsidiary perspec-
tives naturally often diverged, numerous overlapping opinions were nonetheless observed. For 
the study at hand, however, the HQ outlook is valued relatively higher than the parent company’s 
as its budget authority will eventually decide in which direction the focal subsidiary is moving. 
Before entering cross-case analyses for provided mandate outlooks it should once again be noted 
that all standpoints are to be treated as tentative as they may change in the future due to external 
or internal factors. It should be further stated that all outlooks are based on the assumption of 
increasing market attractiveness of and growing company sales in markets and regions covered 
by the cross-border mandate of the focal subsidiary. Growing market size in covered regions is 
therefore also seen as the likely initiative trigger or the facilitating condition for future mandate 
change. 
In total, the case sample features eight multinational subsidiary mandates with negative outlooks 
and only one with a positive future projection. In addition, for cases #10a and #10b HQ manage-
ment believes that any subsidiary request for extended reach into North Africa will fail again in 
the future. With regard to the dominating negative outlooks, three are referring to complete man-
date losses (cases #1, #2 and #9), another three to reduced geographical responsibilities (cases #3, 
#4 and #6) and the remaining two to a partial (#7) and full (#8) loss of regional HQ status that 
encompasses both geographical and functional responsibilities. The sole exception from this 
trend is marked by case #5 in which local management is expected to obtain responsibility for 
another subsidiary in the region of Asia and Oceania and to turn into one of the company’s main 
sourcing platforms. An overview of all mandate outlooks is provided by Table 5-6 below.   
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Table 5-6: HQ outlook on future evolution of subsidiary mandates 
Key for those that are not self-explanatory: View: HQ = parent company and/or corporate headquarters, SUB = focal 
subsidiary. Transfer (from/to) = transfer direction of foreign market responsibilities across the MNC. HQ rationales 
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Table 5-6 represents a shortened and combined summary of initiative triggers and facilitators as 
well as initiative outcomes and HQ decision-making rationales compared to the separate over-
views for previous initial mandate gains and subsequent mandate developments. In addition to 
highlighting only a single and common mandate development trigger or facilitator it also illus-
trates the outlook perspective, the subsidiary impact as well as the transfer direction of responsi-
bilities across the MNC. Finally, the overview lists up to three HQ rationales for modifying sub-
sidiary mandates in either direction and with either magnitude. Outlooks are ordered by the case 
number and the letter ‘x’ in order to indicate that the expected mandate modification may repre-
sent one of potentially several responsibility alterations.     
As noted above, all outlooks have in common increasing market attractiveness of and growing 
company sales in markets and regions covered by the cross-border mandate as initiative stimulus. 
One question that quickly arises from such case similarity is whether local management actually 
has a significant amount of influence on the evolutionary process of its foreign market mandate. 
The fact that foreign subsidiaries are responsible for growing the company presence in these are-
as would lead the observer to affirm the question at first. A closer look across all cases, however, 
suggests that the possibility for foreign subsidiaries to impact mentioned processes is fairly lim-
ited. While local management can grow company sales to a specific region overall, macroeco-
nomic factors like market maturity or political stability tend to have a significantly stronger im-
pact on the overall market attractiveness. In fact, only in case #1 can the expected (official) man-
date loss be directly linked to poor subsidiary performance. In all other cases of expected man-
date decline, local management does not appear to be capable of averting its fate. Limited local 
management influence in the course of mandate evolution is highlighted by the following state-
ment of the HQ representative in case #3: 
“It is likely that we will set up a new subsidiary in India if market size justifies this approach. 
[…] This entity will then report to the parent company. […] Local management therefore cur-
rently fulfills a pioneering task in markets, which are still under development.”23 
 
 
                                                     
23
 Original quotation in German: „Es ist wahrscheinlich, dass tatsächlich mal eine Tochtergesellschaft in Indien ge-
gründet wird wenn der Markt ausreichend groß ist. […] Diese wird dann an die Zentrale berichten. […] Deshalb 
ist das im Moment auch sicherlich dort eine Pionierarbeit, die geleistet wird für solche Märkte, die sich noch im 
Aufbau befinden.“ 
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The statement further indicates that the evolution of certain subsidiary mandates may be prede-
fined and that cross-border subsidiary responsibilities are limited in their life span. In cases #1
24
, 
#2, #3 and #6 the parent company appears to leverage its foreign subsidiary in order to get a first 
glance into distant markets and to build the basis for future local market development. Any new 
MNC unit in the covered area would directly report to the respective HQ, resulting in a loss of 
geographical responsibility for the focal subsidiary. While for both Singaporean subsidiaries in 
cases #3 and #6 the geographical mandate reduction may be limited to the market in which a new 
sub-unit is established, the impact for the Polish and Spanish subsidiaries in cases #1 and #2 
would be more severe. Any opening of sister subsidiaries in their covered area is likely to result 
in a full mandate loss. This is due to the superiority of CSAs in the form of geographical proximi-
ty, cultural similarities including language as well as comparable customer requirements in the 
host market of new sub-units. Any new entity in former CIS markets would therefore also receive 
responsibility for the entire region, just as any South American subsidiary would directly benefit 
from extended geographical reach.  
What all four cases have in common, however, is that corporate management would always es-
tablish direct ties to any new foreign sub-unit and would thus not allow indirect reporting links 
through the existing subsidiary in the region. This further holds true for case #9, where sub-units 
in principal remain under direct responsibility of their parent company. The setting up of a re-
gional HQ did not represent an option for any of the interviewed managers from the parent com-
pany and excessive risk was frequently named as the underlying reasoning. In addition, some HQ 
representatives simply stated that they have never thought of regional headquarters as an option 
for foreign market development but that they are also not convinced that it actually suits their 
company needs. The standpoint is very well summarized by the HQ manager in Case #2 when 
being asked whether a new entity in South America would be managed by the Spanish subsidiary 
or the parent company: 
“Most likely from the headquarters. […] That would be my expectation because nothing else has 
been tried yet.” 
Looking at the relative size and limited number of foreign subsidiaries one might easily assume 
that the parent company in cases #1 and #2 is simply missing sufficient global presence that 
would justify the introduction of sub-subsidiaries. One could further argue that due to its relative-
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 Even though the Polish subsidiary is expected to officially lose its sales and service mandate for former CIS mar-
kets due to poor performance, the relevant HQ management stated that it would, independent of its performance, 
experience a responsibility loss if another sub-unit of Company A was to be established in any of the former CIS 
markets. 
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ly low internationalization experience the corporation lacks organizational maturity with regard 
to delegating crucial responsibilities to foreign sub-units. The establishment of a regional HQ 
would then greatly exceed tolerable risk levels among corporate management. While case #3 with 
an equally limited global footprint of the overall organization further backs this viewpoint, cases 
#6 and cases #9 actually pinpoint that there are more barriers to mandate development than inter-
nationalization experience and organizational maturity. In fact, parent companies in cases #6 and 
cases #9 initiated their internationalization processes in the 1970s already, are now equipped with 
numerous subsidiaries across all continents but nonetheless lack the presence of full-scale
25
 re-
gional headquarters. So what factors hinder foreign subsidiaries in these companies to reach ad-
vanced evolutionary stages and obtain responsibility for other sub-units in their region? 
MNCs in cases #6 and cases #9 are both typical small and medium-sized corporations in the 
manufacturing sector that are positioned as global market leaders for many of their ‘niche’ prod-
ucts. While by now strongly relying on external demand and internal output from numerous pro-
ducing sub-units from outside their home region, decision-making powers have largely been kept 
with the parent company. Such an ethnocentric management style is well highlighted by three 
MNC characteristics of case #9. First, research and development is almost exclusively carried out 
in the parent company, which impedes foreign sub-units in increasing their influence by contrib-
uting to this essential value chain element. Second, corporate management has implemented strict 
reporting structures in order to closely monitor its foreign subsidiaries, which further limits their 
room to maneuver. Finally, despite the global presence, corporate management refuses to intro-
duce English as the corporate language, so the opportunities for local management to obtain a 
contributory role are further dependent on individual language skills. Cases #6 and #9 therefore 
show that independent of CSAs, FSAs, global company presence or organizational maturity, cer-
tain management styles alone can restrain foreign subsidiaries from functionally growing their 
multinational mandates.   
Having identified evolutionary boundaries, predefined development paths as well as limited life 
spans of multinational subsidiary mandates across a total of five cases (#1, #2, #3, #6 and #9), the 
question arises whether the remaining cases largely share observed characteristics or whether 
they feature fundamentally different evolution processes. Case #4 may fundamentally differ from 
aforementioned situations with regard to subsidiary performance (versus case #1), corporate in-
ternationalization experience and organizational maturity (versus cases #1, #2 and #3) or man-
agement styles (versus cases #6 and #9) but focal subsidiary management appears to be equally 
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 Both companies have one regional HQ-like structure in Africa and Northern Europe respectively; HQ management 
would not qualify them as such, however, as they are predominately the result of particular market conditions ra-
ther than of strategic decisions. 
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limited in growing its foreign market responsibility beyond a certain stage. Despite continuously 
proving its capabilities for global KAM of important Austrian customers and foreign market de-
velopment in Eastern Europe, the Austrian subsidiary is not expected to earn the status of a re-
gional HQ anytime in the future. In fact, it will actually lose foreign market responsibility if 
Company C sets up new subsidiaries in the covered area.  
Gloomy prospects for the cross-border mandate of the Austrian subsidiary in case #4 are in par-
ticular astonishing as its parent company is equipped with significant internationalization experi-
ence and organizational maturity with regard to delegating responsibilities to foreign subsidiaries. 
Only recently, corporate management turned the Chinese subsidiary into the regional HQ for 
Asia and Oceania (case #5). So what is the Austrian subsidiary lacking? Despite showing strong 
subsidiary-related FSAs for cross-border knowledge and networks as well as sales and service 
expertise, which led to positive mandate evolution up to this point, the Austrian subsidiary does 
not exhibit sufficient value-add in the form of local assembly or production facilities. The ability 
to strongly contribute to the MNC’s overall product output therefore appears to represent a sub-
sidiary-related FSA decisive for reaching higher levels of foreign market responsibility. Again, 
possibilities for local subsidiary management to influence corporate decisions on global produc-
tion sites are fairly limited. A subsidiary’s need for sufficient local value-add in order to obtain 
regional HQ status is highlighted by corporate management in case #4 when commenting about 
likely process inefficiencies in cases of its absence: 
“The contractual relationship with the customer is not managed by the Austrian subsidiary but 
by one of our larger entities that is equipped with its own production facilities. […] If the Austri-
an subsidiary takes it over, we would end up with a sort of tri-party agreement, which only com-
plicates matters.”26 
The impact of local production facilities on evolutionary paths of cross-border subsidiary man-
dates is further illustrated by case #5, which exclusively displays a positive mandate outlook 
across the entire case sample. Having obtained market responsibility for Asia and Oceania and 
regional HQ status by managing a Southeast Asian subsidiary, the mandate is now expected to be 
functionally enlarged by the supervision of another small regional sub-unit as well as the respon-
sibility for sourcing a significant part of company C’s production inputs. While China or host-
market-related CSAs in the form of market size and growth, labor costs or geographical location 
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 Original quotation in German: “Also das Vertragsverhältnis des Kunden besteht nicht mit der Tochtergesellschaft, 
sondern mit einer der größeren Einheiten, die selber produzieren. […] Wenn man dieses gänzlich der österrei-
chischen Gesellschaft übergibt, würde schlussendlich ein Dreiecksverhältnis entstehen, welches das Geschäft 
kompliziert.“ 
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therefore allowed local subsidiary management to receive necessary resources for their own pro-
ducing entities, the subsidiary-related FSA of local value-add now constitutes the reason for its 
prosperous future outlook. Once again, subsidiary influence appears to be relatively low as corpo-
rate management is still not fully convinced by local management skills in China and therefore 
seeks to limit risks through the extensive use of expatriates. 
The relevance of sufficient local value-add is finally underlined by the future mandate outlook of 
the two remaining cases #7 and #8. In both incidents, however, the perspective needs to be ex-
tended from the focal subsidiary to sister subsidiaries and thus to the MNC as a whole. In case #8, 
for example, local production facilities have strongly facilitated the focal subsidiary’s desire in 
the US to manage a Brazilian sub-unit and thereby to turn into the company’s regional HQ for the 
Americas. At present, the focal subsidiary is managing the establishment of a Brazilian assembly 
site, which is aimed at better serving the local as well as other South American markets. The set-
ting up of such an assembly line and the penetration of regional markets are expected to take time 
and require significant support from the US subsidiary. Nonetheless, already today corporate 
management is considering transferring market responsibility for South America from its US to 
its Brazilian sub-unit and establishing direct reporting links with the latter. Such a decision would 
reduce the current subsidiary mandate both geographically and functionally to pure sales and ser-
vice responsibility for North and Central America. 
Compared to its Chinese counterpart in case #5, the US subsidiary is equipped with similar CSAs 
like host market size and geographical as well as cultural proximity even though it may lack at-
tractive labor costs and strong market growth. In addition, it exhibits comparable if not superior 
subsidiary-related FSAs in the form of local production facilities and proven management capa-
bilities. Finally, internationalization experience and management styles of the parent company do 
not reveal fundamental differences. This raises the question of why the regional HQ status of the 
US subsidiary in endangered while the one of the Chinese subsidiary is expected to flourish in the 
future. The main difference between the cases is that the US subsidiary is overseeing a sub-unit 
that is currently strongly augmenting its local value-add while the Chinese subsidiary looks after 
a relatively small and less influential MNC unit. The aspect of corporate marketplaces (Galunic 
& Eisenhardt, 1996) in which MNC units compete for responsibilities and resources even beyond 
national borders therefore appears to differentiate one case from another. While CSA and FSA 
superiority of the Chinese subsidiary in Asia and Oceania is unquestionable, local US manage-
ment is facing increasing pressure from the Brazilian subsidiary with regard to CSAs (location, 
culture and customers) as well as FSAs (value-add). This observation does not imply that increas-
ing value-add of the sub-unit under supervision necessarily leads to regional HQ loss but it ap-
pears to put the mandate under increased pressure and HQ surveillance. 
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The aspect of intra-MNC competition and its impact on the evolution of multinational subsidiary 
mandates is exemplified by case #7. Having already lost its regional HQ status for China and 
Northeast Asia due to CSA and FSA inferiority versus its rival MNC unit in China, the focal sub-
sidiary in Singapore now faces further mandate decline for India. Again, growing market size and 
enhanced local value-add in the focus area of India are expected to constitute the main HQ ra-
tionales. Local management in Singapore can count on neither a particularly strong host market 
nor on local production facilities, so it admits to its lack of MNC competitiveness and therefore 
limited suitability to manage relatively influential sub-units at Company E. In this sense the re-
spective subsidiary manager in case #8 agrees with the following question without any re-
strictions: 
“Do market size and local value-add in an area that a regional HQ is looking after impact a 
mandate in the sense that you would lose it if it gets too big or if the local value-add becomes too 
distinct?” 
Following the cross-case analyses the following nine key observations of the outlook for multina-
tional subsidiary mandates were made: 
1) Evolutionary paths for cross-border subsidiary mandates seem to differ from one case to 
another 
2) Evolutionary paths for cross-border subsidiary mandates are equally characterized by el-
ements of gradualism and discontinuity 
3) Some subsidiaries appear to face development boundaries or truncated evolutionary paths, 
which do not allow them to achieve certain functional responsibility scopes 
4) Evolution boundaries tend to originate from a combination of HQ-related, subsidiary-
related as well as externally-related factors 
5) Evolution of subsidiary responsibilities beyond host markets can largely be predefined by 
corporate management 
6) Life spans of multinational subsidiary mandates may be limited from their very start 
7) Local subsidiary management’s influence on evolutionary paths appears fairly limited 
8) Enhanced local value-add appears to facilitate the receiving and maintaining of regional 
HQ status 
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9) Host-market-related CSA and subsidiary-related FSA superiority versus sister subsidiaries 
and the parent company appears to strengthen overall mandate sustainability 
5.2.4. Mandate lifecycle 
The previous examination of process mechanisms for initial mandate gains, subsequent mandate 
alterations as well as expected future mandate developments allowed the sketching of a simple 
lifecycle framework for subsidiary responsibilities beyond host market borders. Despite analyz-
ing highly heterogeneous cases of subsidiary internationalization with regard to geographies, 
functional scopes, evolutionary paths and future prospects, relatively robust patterns of mandate 
evolution emerged from the case sample at hand. The aim of the following section is therefore to 
put the puzzle pieces of cross-case patterns observed along the different phases of subsidiary in-
ternationalization together in order to come up with a solid framework capable of embracing all 
eleven evolutionary paths.   
In the course of the case study analysis five characteristics of subsidiary mandates that reach be-
yond the original host market appear to be of particular relevance when applying a lifecycle per-
spective. First, not all subsidiaries are eligible for cross-border responsibilities. Second, those that 
obtain international market exposure are often functionally limited. Third, subsidiaries that obtain 
regional HQ status exhibit distinct value-propositions for foreign market development. Fourth, all 
subsidiaries are pressured by rival MNC units, which puts their mandate sustainability at constant 
risk. Finally, evolutionary paths are characterized by critical points where mandates are extended, 
reduced or eventually dissolved.  
The case study observations illustrated above suggested the use of a very simple design when 
elaborating a lifecycle framework for subsidiary responsibilities beyond host market borders as 
depicted in Figure 5-2 below. Development paths of foreign market mandates of foreign subsidi-
aries are differentiated here into three evolutionary stages: (1) host market responsibility, (2) for-
eign market responsibility and (3) foreign subsidiary responsibility. The length of time that a for-
eign subsidiary spends in one of these phases is expected to differ from one case to another as no 
other indication could be obtained from the case sample. In addition, two critical points or quality 
gates characterize the framework. The first refers to the crossing from stage one to stage two, i.e. 
when a foreign subsidiary officially receives responsibilities of any kind for a market or region 
outside its host market. The second critical point relates to the changeover from stage two to 
stage three, in which a foreign subsidiary is officially granted regional HQ status and is thus re-
sponsible for looking after one or several other MNC units outside its home territory. The evolu-
tionary framework is further characterized by an unofficial zone, which is highlighted in Figure 
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5-2 by the patterned area just above the parting lines between the first and the second stage. At 
this point local subsidiary management fulfills cross-border responsibilities for which it does not 
possess official HQ approval yet. Varying weights of the development paths were taken in order 
to highlight that the majority of foreign subsidiaries actually never benefit from official cross-
border responsibility and very few of them from regional HQ mandates. 
Figure 5-2: Evolution stages of cross-border subsidiary mandates 
 
When foreign subsidiaries are established, their geographical responsibility scope is generally 
limited to the host market, so that they find themselves at the initial stage of cross-border respon-
sibilities. Nonetheless, the sample exhibited three cases (#3, #6 and #7) in which a foreign sub-
sidiary was equipped with cross-border reach from its very start, so evolutionary paths for inter-
national subsidiary responsibility do not necessarily commence at the first level. Similar to mod-
ern internationalization processes of the first degree, it is therefore acknowledged that the indi-
vidual path of a mandate may commence at a phase other than the initial one and may actually 
leapfrog certain quality gates.  
Following its inauguration, local subsidiary management appears to gradually develop market 
knowledge and business networks that eventually cross host-market borders. This is predominate-
ly driven by host-market-related CSAs like geographical proximity, cultural similarities or com-
parable customer preferences. While local management appears to be capable of influencing and 













































if local management focuses on host market business operations. As a result of knowledge and 
network development, foreign subsidiaries are gradually approaching the first quality gate of 
cross-border mandate development. Some of them, as observed in cases #2 and #8, actually cross 
this line by actively pursuing foreign market opportunities without seeking prior HQ approval. 
This can happen in the form of sporadic and unofficial exports, which enables local management 
to test its suitability for extended geographical reach. Independent of whether local management 
enters such an unofficial zone, increasing foreign market involvement can make personnel at cor-
porate or subsidiary level aware of decentralized market development options. This moment 
marks the first critical point in the evolution of cross-border subsidiary mandates.  
Only if the subsidiary’s value-proposition for the development of a particular foreign market or 
region expressed by the sum of host-market-related CSAs and subsidiary-related FSAs is rela-
tively superior to market development approaches through the parent company or any other MNC 
unit may local management be allowed to reach the next evolutionary stage. The parent compa-
ny’s evaluation therefore appears to be strongly impacted by its individual risk proclivity that is 
in turn influenced by company characteristics like internationalization experience, organizational 
maturity or management styles. As a result of significant difficulties in identifying cross-border 
subsidiary mandates at around fifty MNCs at the offset of the study, it is believed that subsidiary 
internationalization actually constitutes a rare MNC phenomenon. This may not only be due to a 
lack of CSA and FSA superiority of foreign sub-units but may also be the result of missing initia-
tive-taking for decentralized market development opportunities at either end of the MNC. If local 
subsidiary management, however, seeks and fails to obtain extended geographical responsibility, 
its overall cross-border involvement is expected to decline as corporate management has official-
ly rejected the extension beyond host market borders. This is highlighted by the falling evolu-
tionary path in the bottom-left corner of Figure 5-2 above.   
If a foreign subsidiary officially obtains its initial mandate for foreign market development, the 
second phase of the evolutionary path begins. Throughout this stage local management may gain 
enhanced geographical responsibility through the integration of additional markets under the ex-
isting mandate, as the Spanish subsidiary in case #3 experienced with added responsibility for 
Chile in South America. It may also experience mandate extensions with regards to functional 
responsibilities along the value chain. In case #7, for example, the Singaporean subsidiary was 
suddenly also in charge of managing cross-border sales and service activities while its initial 
mandate was strictly limited to multinational logistics tasks. At the same time foreign subsidiaries 
may lose responsibility scope throughout this phase. Significant HQ interference in case #1, 
which can be interpreted as an unofficial mandate loss, exemplifies potential negative mandate 
developments.  
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The second evolution phase of subsidiary internationalization is at its top limited by management 
responsibilities for a particular foreign market or region. It therefore does not include responsibil-
ities for other sub-units in that area. This limitation appears to be of importance as it, in addition 
to those MNC units that never obtain foreign market reach, clearly separates another two types of 
foreign subsidiaries. Based on current HQ prospects for existing mandates in cases #1, #2, #3, #4, 
#6 and #9, the foreign subsidiaries in focus are not expected to cross the second quality gate nec-
essary for obtaining regional HQ status at any time in the future. The limitation can thereby be 
due to subsidiary characteristics like insufficient local value-add or HQ particularities like risk 
averseness and individual management styles among corporate decision-makers. In addition, the 
limitation can simply be the fact that the company never considers the opening of another subsid-
iary in the covered area so that the construct of a regional HQ is not even discussed. 
If a company decides to open another sub-unit in the region, however, upper boundaries of the 
second stage of cross-border subsidiary responsibility are likely to have a negative impact on 
existing mandates. As shown by all six cases, the opening of new MNC units would inevitably 
result in a mandate decline with different magnitudes. While foreign subsidiaries in cases #3, #4, 
#6 and #9 could get off relatively smoothly with the loss of geographical responsibility for the 
market in which the new subsidiary is established, their counterparts in cases #1 and #2 are actu-
ally facing the worst case scenario of full mandate loss. In both latter cases, CSAs of a new sub-
unit in any former CIS and any South American market are expected to clearly outweigh the fo-
cal subsidiaries’ current value-propositions so that extended regional responsibility would be 
transferred to the new entity. For the Austrian subsidiary in case #4 the situation is similar as any 
new subsidiary is also likely to exhibit superior CSAs for Eastern Europe. In this particular case, 
however, local subsidiary management would at least be left with global KAM for Austrian cli-
ents.  
Cases #5, #7 and #8 show that some foreign sub-units are able to reach the third stage of cross-
border responsibility by obtaining regional HQ status for their covered area. The question thus 
arises what differentiates these subsidiaries from previous cases or what conditions need to pre-
vail in order to allow such a construct. Regarding the second part of the question, the region cov-
ered by the subsidiary mandate needs to exhibit sufficient attractiveness regarding size and 
growth or other aspects like labor costs that makes a parent company consider the opening of 
another entity in the region. Second, corporate management must view regional HQ constructs 
despite additional uncertainty elements as a valid form of market development and subsidiary 
supervision.  
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Finally, focal subsidiaries need to be capable of efficiently managing other sub-units. For the 
three observed cases such qualification criterion refers to enhanced local value-add in the form of 
HQ-like capabilities and functions. As illustrated by case #7, value-add does not necessarily re-
late to production facilities but can also encompass capabilities like stock management or typical 
HQ-like functions such as controlling or accounting. Local value-add as a means for foreign sub-
sidiaries to qualify for a regional HQ is exemplified by cases #4 and #5, which relate to the same 
parent company. While the Chinese subsidiary in case #5 has become regional HQ for Asia and 
Oceania, its Austrian counterpart in case #4 is not expected to benefit from this status despite 
significant Eastern European market attractiveness and sufficient organizational maturity with 
regard to subsidiary empowerment. 
Once a foreign subsidiary reaches the third stage of mandate evolution and holds regional HQ 
responsibility, it is automatically faced with increased intra-MNC competition in the covered area. 
The sum of host-market-related CSAs and subsidiary-related FSAs appears to be decisive for the 
sustainability of this advanced mandate type. If a foreign subsidiary maintains CSA and FSA 
superiority versus its parent company and the sub-unit under supervision it is likely to maintain 
its regional HQ mandate. This situation is exemplified by case #5 in which the focal subsidiary 
can rely on strong CSAs like market size, growth or labor costs and robust FSAs in the form of 
local production facilities. The mandate is therefore likely to increase rather than to decline in the 
future. Case #7 exhibits exactly the opposite scenario. The focal subsidiary has already lost part 
of its regional HQ mandate to the rival subsidiary in China and is expected to further cede re-
sponsibility for India. While the Chinese subsidiary has surpassed the focal subsidiary in terms of 
CSAs and FSAs the Indian subsidiary is expected to do so in the near future as local production 
facilities are currently in development. The US subsidiary in case #8 is currently situated some-
where in between the two other cases though it is likely to take the negative scenario of case #7 
rather than preserving the status quo or benefiting from further mandate extensions.    
Mandate evolution across all eleven cases is highlighted by Figure 5-3 below. For each case the 
figure outlines the mandate scope at the following five stages: (1) at the establishment of the sub-
sidiary; (2) at the subsidiary request for cross-border responsibility
27
; (3) after the initial mandate 
gain; (4) after any mandate alteration; (5) as expected at some stage in the future. It should be 
noted that the figure is illustrative and thus does not provide meaningful information about time 
gaps between the various points in mandate evolution or about relative depths of responsibility 
scopes. It should be exclusively used as an instrument to better understand different paths of 
mandate evolution. In addition, it aims to provide a broad overview of how mandate evolution 
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 Only relevant for cases with subsidiary-driven initiatives for initial cross-border reaching. 
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differs across subsidiary types: first, subsidiaries that are not allowed to reach beyond host mar-
ket borders at all. Second, foreign sub-units that benefit from cross-border mandates but that are 
limited in their functional scope. Finally, subsidiaries that turn into regional headquarters but that 
are faced with enhanced intra-MNC competition at this level.  
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The paper at hand has investigated the internationalization process of ten foreign subsidiaries at 
seven MNCs covering the initial mandate gain, subsequent mandate alterations as well as likely 
future mandate developments. In the course of the analysis a total of 36 initiatives for subsidiary 
internationalization with varying outcomes and impacts on subsidiary mandates revealed mean-
ingful insights into process drivers and restrictions as well as the evolutionary paths of subsidiary 
mandates for foreign market development. In line with the previous analysis part, the following 
discussion is split into the initial mandate gain encompassing opportunity-identification and re-
sponsibility-allocation processes and the subsequent mandate evolution composed of responsibil-
ity modifications and future outlooks. Regarding comparative case study analysis approaches as 
chosen for the study at hand, Eisenhardt (1989b: 544) stressed that “an essential feature of theory 
building is comparison of the emergent concepts, theory, or hypothesis with literature”. In the 
following, findings will therefore be thoroughly contrasted with confirming as well as conflicting 
literature in order to better understand how and where in the modern MNC opportunities for sub-
sidiary internationalization are identified and pursued and in what form resulting mandates de-
velop over time. 
5.3.1. Overview 
While the following exercise was impacted by literature with a static and dynamic view on 
MNCs in general and foreign subsidiaries in particular as outlined in chapter 2 of this study, cer-
tain prior research proved to be of pronounced relevance to the topic of subsidiary internationali-
zation and cross-border subsidiary mandates. First of all, the original and revised IP model of 
Johanson and Vahlne (1977; 2009) helped the investigator to contrast observations for interna-
tionalization processes of the second degree with mechanisms of traditional market development 
approaches from the parent company. The network approach towards firm internationalization of 
Johanson and Mattsson (1988) and Forsgren et al. (2005) further allowed the author to put case-
study findings from outside the MNC into the overall context of subsidiary internationalization. 
When further seeking to understand witnessed corporate reluctance to the delegation of cross-
border responsibilities, the risk visualization of the IP model by Figueira-de-Lemos et al. (2011) 
and the principal-agent display of Jensen and Meckling (1976) helped to combine the separate 
aspects of foreign market development and HQ–subsidiary relationships including associated 
uncertainty dimensions (e.g. moral hazard).   
The work of Rugman and Verbeke (1992, 2001) on the existence of host-market-related CSAs 
and its ability to contribute to FSA development outside national borders allowed the investigator 
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to obtain a clearer picture of why a foreign subsidiary may possess a competitive advantage 
across the MNC for the development of a particular foreign market and why decentralized market 
development approaches may therefore be capable of lowering the total risk level of the under-
taking. In addition, later studies of Rugman and Verbeke (2004, 2005 and 2007) around ‘region-
bound’ FSAs helped to better differentiate between ‘location-bound’ and ‘non-location-bound’ 
FSAs and the role of CSAs in their development. In the following, the work of Birkinshaw 
(1996) on the development of subsidiary mandates allowed the investigator to better understand 
the sudden impact of subsidiary capabilities in the course of mandate development. In addition, 
the sketching of a corporate immune system that may cause resistance to subsidiary initiatives by 
Birkinshaw and Ridderstråle (1999) facilitated the understanding of widely monitored functional 
mandate limitations as well as predefined and truncated evolutionary paths related to subsidiary 
internationalization.  
In order to understand limited subsidiary influence on mandate evolution that contradicts several 
findings by leading IB scholars (Birkinshaw, 1996, 1997; Birkinshaw et al., 1998) at first sight, 
the suggestion of Araujo and Rezende (2003) to combine literature of overall MNC strategy with 
internationalization processes proved to be of great help. Finally, the work of Galunic and Eisen-
hardt (1996) on charter evolution across business units and intra-MNC competitions allowed the 
author to better understand shifting cross-border responsibilities from one subsidiary to another. 
In this context, the work of Mudambi and Navarra (2004), Andersson et al. (2007) and Bouquet 
and Birkinshaw (2008) on subsidiary importance in the federative MNC set the breeding ground 
for elucidating why some subsidiaries are likely to face stagnating, declining or dissolving cross-
border mandates whilst others are expected to maintain or even further develop their responsibil-
ity scopes beyond host market borders.  
When finally faced with clarifying evolutionary paths of subsidiary mandates for foreign markets 
which did not only reveal gradual elements as suggested by the original IP model (Johanson & 
Vahlne, 1977) but were also often characterized by discontinuities, truncations or reversals, again 
the work of Araujo and Rezende (2003) caught the attention of the investigator. Combining MNC 
strategies regarding externalization and localization degrees in foreign markets and underlying 
levels of integration across MNC units with network approaches to firm internationalization, 
Araujo and Rezende (2003: 731) suggested that that “internationalisation processes are affected 
by different types of relationships, internal and external to the MNC network, articulated in dif-
ferent temporal and spatial contexts. The paths in space and time framework advises against 
equating path dependence with incrementalist trajectories confined to specific territories, even if 
self-reinforcing processes continue to play an important role in explaining internationalisation 
processes.” When contrasting case findings for cross-border mandate evolution to the reasoning 
230 
of Araujo and Rezende (2003), process similarities soon became apparent and eye-catching and 
will be detailed in the following pages. 
Overall, IB literature that explicitly looked into cross-border subsidiary roles and/or mandate evo-
lution proved to be particularly relevant when challenging case study findings. Nonetheless earli-
er groundbreaking IB research like the monopolistic advantage theory (Hymer, 1960, 1976), 
transaction-cost-based and internalization theories (e.g. Williamson, 1975; Buckley & Casson, 
1976), the eclectic paradigm (Dunning, 1977) or the product lifecycle theory (Vernon, 1966) that 
was not leveraged for analytical generalization (Pauwels & Matthyssens, 2004) find their expres-
sion in later studies that were extensively used for the purpose of this study. All work of Rugman 
and Verbeke (1992, 2001, 2004, 2005 and 2007), for example, which strongly added to the ro-
bustness of case study findings, finds its origin in earlier theories of the MNC (e.g. Hymer, 1960, 
1976; Williamson, 1975; Buckley & Casson, 1976). Similarly, earlier work around HQ–
subsidiary relationships (e.g. Ghoshal & Nohria, 1989; Nohria & Goshal, 1994) or general sub-
sidiary roles (e.g. Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1986; Gupta & Govindarajan, 1991) was not directly used 
for analytical generalization but strongly influenced relevant work for this study concerning sub-
sidiary evolution (e.g. Birkinshaw, 1996) or subsidiary power (e.g. Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008).   
5.3.2. Initial mandate gain 
Despite its existence for more than 30 years and its limitation to internationalization processes of 
the first degree, the original IP model of Johanson and Vahlne (1977) serves as a meaningful in-
strument for explaining subsidiary internationalization. Moreover, the recently revised IP model 
(Johanson & Vahlne, 2009) that explicitly acknowledges the relevance of cross-border networks 
for internationalization processes while simultaneously leaving the core pillars of the Uppsala 
model unaltered can be leveraged as a theoretical framework for foreign market development 
through foreign subsidiaries. Even though certain process drivers for subsidiary internationaliza-
tion show remarkable overlaps with findings for initial foreign market developments from a par-
ent company, it became soon apparent that the study topic exhibits numerous particularities that 
need to be illuminated from different perspectives by applying different streams of literature.   
5.3.2.1. Subdivision of the revised IP model 
One of the distinguishing features of subsidiary internationalization that accompanied the study 
throughout all within- and cross-cases analyses is a minimum involvement of two MNC levels, 
i.e. the focal subsidiary and its parent company. Acknowledging the subsidiary’s resource de-
pendency from its parent company appears to be crucial when aiming to understand peripheral 
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internationalization processes. In addition to its relevant corporate headquarters, the focal subsid-
iary’s decisions and actions are further influenced by other MNC units like sister subsidiaries and 
by stakeholders outside the MNC. It therefore came as no surprise that valuable theoretical 
frameworks of internationalization of the first degree needed to be adjusted in order to suit the 
topic of subsidiary internationalization. In fact, significant extensions to the revised IP model 
were inevitable in order to account for today’s multiple embeddedness of foreign subsidiaries 
(Meyer, Mudambi & Narula, 2011). As a consequence of multiple embeddedness, foreign subsid-
iaries are faced with “internal competition for charter” (Birkinshaw & Hood, 1998: 782) and de-
pendent on headquarter resources, further adding complexity to explaining peripheral internation-
alization processes. 
Adapting the revised IP model for subsidiary internationalization, state and change variables need 
to be viewed from different MNC perspectives while simultaneously putting their extent in rela-
tion to each other. The MNC is thereby treated as a ‘corporate marketplace’ (Galunic & Eisen-
hardt, 1996: 262) in which the attention of corporate executives is unequally spread across for-
eign sub-units (Prahalad & Doz, 1987). The multiple embeddedness of modern MNCs therefore 
marks the first substantial particularity of subsidiary internationalization when comparing it with 
internationalization processes of the first degree. State and change variables can no longer be 
viewed as total MNC parameters but need to be broken down to individual MNC units.  
Looking at the state variables of the revised IP model for subsidiary internationalization, the sum 
of knowledge, in particular about foreign market opportunities found across all MNC units, con-
stitutes the total firm value for a particular foreign market or region. Due to a set of restraints for 
intra-MNC knowledge transfer (Forsgren et al., 2005), foreign market knowledge is likely to be 
unequally distributed across the organization. Similarly, the network position of the MNC in a 
particular foreign market, representing the second state variable, is the sum of expressions at eve-
ry single sub-unit including the parent company. This variable may also differ from one firm enti-
ty to another as varying networking capabilities of MNCs (Cantwill & Santangelo, 1999) are also 
expected to apply for different MNC units. Total knowledge and cumulated network positions of 
the MNC may differ from one market to another and are dependent on the firm’s overall cross-
border exposure. Foreign market knowledge and cross-border networks can thus be manifested in 
the company’s resources in the form of HQ or subsidiary employees as well as contractual rela-
tionships with local market participants. 
Adhering to the revised IP model and accounting for the multiple embeddedness of MNC units, 
both state variables are influenced by the learning, creating and trust-building that can take place 
anywhere in the organization (Tallman & Chacar, 2011) and that represent one of the model’s 
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change variables. As a result, not only the total knowledge and network position regarding a for-
eign market change but also their internal distribution is likely to alter over time. In addition to 
such gradual development, both state variables may also be driven by altering resource combina-
tions in the firm (Galunic & Rodan, 1998) of varying magnitudes. While resource recombination 
may be the result of internal MNC transfers of tacit knowledge (Kogut & Zander, 1993), compa-
nies also appear to impact overall knowledge levels and network positions including their internal 
distribution ratios by external transfers. This process is exemplified by case #3, in which the in-
stallation of a new subsidiary CEO in Singapore immediately reduced the firm’s liability of out-
sidership (Johanson & Vahlne, 2009) in Southeast Asia. In addition, external resource inflow 
allowed the focal subsidiary to obtain a distinct positioning for the entire region in the MNC. 
Adhering to the existence of subsidiary initiatives for foreign market development that failed to 
obtain HQ buy-in (cases #10a.0 and #10b.0), the second extension to the revised IP model un-
folds. While the relative magnitude for all previously described variables can more or less freely 
diffuse across the MNC, the change variable relationship commitment decisions regarding a new 
foreign market is initially fixed by the subsidiary assignment, mandate or charter. While foreign 
subsidiaries may very well be able to erode HQ control by several means (Mudambi & Navarra, 
2004), their mandate beyond the host market represents a ‘head-office assignment’ that may or 
may not be accompanied by other elements like ‘subsidiary choice’ or ‘environmental determin-
ism’ (Birkinshaw et al., 1998: 235). Initial foreign market responsibility for foreign subsidiaries 
is thus dependent on corporate headquarters as they “control corporate resources and fulfill an 
important role as orchestrator of assets, knowledge, and attention” (Ambos & Birkinshaw, 2010: 
451). If a foreign subsidiary therefore seeks to increase its commitment to a particular foreign 
market, it is required to obtain official HQ approval for doing so. An overview of the revised IP 
model for subsidiary internationalization is provided by Figure 5-4 below.  
 233 
Figure 5-4: State and change variables for foreign market development across the MNC (prior to initiative-taking at 
either MNC level)  
 
Source: Own illustration, adapted from the revised IP model from Johanson & Vahlne (2009) 
The above illustration may represent the MNC distribution of values for a particular foreign mar-
ket or region at the time of the subsidiary inauguration or at any later stage of its evolution. 
Moreover, the total MNC value of state and change variables may only be marginal if the compa-
ny as a whole lacks any form of business involvement in the market in focus. In addition, learn-
ing, creating and trust-building and resulting network positions and knowledge levels may be 
limited to a single MNC, which would then account for the total MNC value. Finally, foreign 
subsidiaries may officially disclose the highest degree of relationship commitment decision to a 
foreign market from their inauguration as observed in cases #3, #6 and #7, where all three Singa-
porean subsidiaries benefited from cross-border reach from the very start of their existence. Simi-
lar to firms that are international from their very establishment, so-called ‘born globals’ (e.g. 
Madsen & Servais, 1997), foreign subsidiaries may also be ‘born regionals’. 
When a foreign subsidiary is established, state variable knowledge about and network position in 
a foreign market are generally more distinct at the parent company than at its local counterpart. 
The focal subsidiary’s mandate is initially orientated towards its host market with little responsi-
bility for additional markets (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989). In the course of time and independent of 
















































tionships beyond its original host market (Forsgren et al., 2005). This process is facilitated by 
host-market-related CSAs (Rugman & Verbeke, 1992) like geographical proximity, cultural un-
derstanding or regional product and customer requirements that a foreign subsidiary possesses for 
a specific foreign market. Host-market-related CSAs are generally applicable to countries or are-
as with low geographic and/or cultural distance and may therefore allow local subsidiary man-
agement to benefit from a higher degree of cross-border learning, creating and trust-building (Jo-
hanson & Vahlne, 2009) than any rival MNC unit including the parent company. This process 
can be speeded up by local subsidiary management if it unofficially decides to augment the cross-
border commitment.  
The development process of knowledge and business networks that constitute FSAs for a particu-
lar foreign market and that can be equally attributed to any MNC unit is highlighted in Figure 5-5 
below. For simplicity purposes the illustration is reduced to the corporate HQ and the focal sub-
sidiary but may also apply for sister subsidiaries, especially if they are located in geographical 
proximity to the target market. The process originates with the parent company’s relationship 
commitment decision for the target market. The overall commitment is further divided among 
MNC units based the individual subsidiary mandates. In the following, learning, creating and 
trust-building at either MNC level is impacted by the presence of CSAs, so that the FSA output in 
the form of knowledge about and networks in the target market is likely to vary across MNC 
units. Case observations further show that the FSA development process at foreign subsidiaries is 
likely to outperform its counterpart at the HQ both in terms of speed and magnitude. The superi-
ority of host-market-related CSAs versus home market-related CSAs therefore appears to be suf-
ficient to more than offset any subsidiary disadvantage caused by limited responsibility scopes. 























While as a consequence all variables change, relationship commitment decisions remain fixed by 
the subsidiary mandate. The result is an imbalance between corporate headquarters, focal subsid-
iary and other MNC units for the responsibility scope in a particular market. Based on its 
knowledge, in particular about market opportunities, and its network position, the focal subsidi-
ary would most likely decide to extend its relationship commitment beyond the original host 
market but the decision is held back by the subsidiary mandate. Such imbalance is highlighted by 
case #4, in which process inefficiencies eventually culminated in the proposal of alternative mar-
ket development or customer management approaches. The subsidiary mandate thereby manifests 
the subsidiary’s dependency on HQ approval as the latter possesses authority for local budget 
allocation beyond host market borders. As noted earlier, the interplay between different MNC 
levels marks a particularity of subsidiary internationalization and strongly impacts overall pro-
cesses mechanisms. 
Observed cases reveal that the aforementioned imbalance across the MNC does not automatically 
initiate subsidiary internationalization processes. It augments or enhances, however, the proclivi-
ty of stakeholders at both ends of the MNC for change, in this particular case for alternative mar-
ket development approaches. Case study analyses further illustrate that quantum leap changes are 
then initiated by critical incidents (Macharzina & Engelhard, 1991) within and outside the MNC. 
With regard to subsidiary internationalization, the imbalance of state and change variables across 
MNC units therefore refers to the firm’s inability to adjust the mandate of a subsidiary to its level 
of market knowledge and network position outside the host market. In turn, quantum leap chang-
es mark the initial gain of subsidiary responsibility for foreign markets. All observed cases of 
subsidiary internationalization reveal critical incidents that eventually caused subsidiary-driven 
mandate requests or HQ-driven responsibility delegations. Subsidiary internationalization there-
fore seems to equally involve evolutionary (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977) and revolutionary ele-
ments (Macharzina & Engelhard, 1991). 
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Figure 5-6: State and change variables for foreign market development across the MNC (at the time of initiative-
taking at either MNC level)  
 
Source: Own illustration, adapted from the revised IP model from Johanson & Vahlne (2009) 
The frequency of altering organizational structures or human resource configurations that made 
HQ or subsidiary management act on the imbalance of relationship commitment decisions is eye-
catching. While Johanson and Vahlne (1977) attributed the ‘psychic distance’ between two coun-
tries a crucial role in the order of foreign market development from the home market, the aspect 
may also be relevant to the initiation of subsidiary internationalization. Sousa and Bradley (2008: 
470) specified the term by stating that “the distance exists in the mind of the individual and de-
pends on how he or she perceives the world. Hence, it is the individual’s perception of the differ-
ences between the home country and the foreign country that shapes the psychic distance con-
cept.” The exit of a foreign market sales manager at the parent company (cases #3 and #9) or the 
installation of a new CEO at the focal subsidiary (case #10b) are therefore likely to result in vary-
ing psychic distances for a particular market or region between the two MNC units. As organiza-
tional change generally involves altering responsibility distributions it should have a similar im-
pact across the MNC. The relevance of varying psychic distances for making MNC stakeholders 
aware of decentralized market development approaches and for initiating subsidiary internation-
















































The study also highlights different loci of opportunity-identification and initiative-taking for sub-
sidiary internationalization across the MNC. While in the majority of cases both process elements 
originated at the focal subsidiary, the case sample also features HQ initiatives for extended geo-
graphical responsibilities of foreign subsidiaries. Case findings therefore challenge the original 
assumption of the Uppsala model that the “locus of learning is at the business frontline” (Blank-
enburg Holm et al., 2009: 15). The study rather supports modern views on dispersed knowledge 
accumulation and dissemination (Tallman & Chacar, 2011). Overall, however, case study obser-
vations support the findings of Birkinshaw (1996) that initial mandate gains are largely subsidi-
ary-driven.  
Finally, case study observations have demonstrated that subsidiary internationalization, unlike 
internationalization of the first degree, does not necessarily relate to the development of new for-
eign markets when taking an MNC perspective. In fact, all eleven initiatives for cross-border sub-
sidiary responsibility were related to markets or regions in which the MNC was already present. 
Even though company presence was often limited at the time of initiative-taking at either MNC 
level, corporate management had already gotten a foot in the door of the respective area. Any 
definition of internationalization as “the process of increasing involvement in international opera-
tions” (Welch & Luostarinen, 1988: 36) therefore does not seem to apply for cross-border subsid-
iary mandates. At first, local subsidiary management seeks or corporate management wishes to 
delegate existing foreign-market responsibility, which may result in altering responsibility distri-
butions across the MNC but not necessarily in increased foreign market exposure of the firm.  
Nonetheless, Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul (1975: 304) already noted that “the term interna-
tional usually refers to either an attitude of the firm towards foreign activities or to the actual car-
rying out of activities abroad”, so that the objective of increasing foreign market penetration 
through shifting MNC responsibilities should already satisfy the definition of internationalization 
processes as set by Welch and Luostarinen (1988). In addition, internationalization is often seen 
as gradually increasing foreign market commitments (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977) so that the in-
volvement of entirely new markets is not a prerequisite for internationalization processes. Finally, 
from a pure subsidiary perspective the opportunity-identification and initiative-taking relates to 
initial cross-border operations, so that even the definition of Welch and Luostarinen (1988) out-
lined above would be fulfilled. Having stated this, the particularity of shifting MNC responsibili-
ties rather than increasing MNC cross-border exposure that characterized the process offset of 
subsidiary internationalization is remarkable as it clearly separates internationalization processes 
of the first degree from their equivalents of the second degree.  
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5.3.2.2. Host-market-related CSAs and the liability of inter-regional foreignness 
Having thoroughly contrasted emergent concepts regarding the initiation of subsidiary interna-
tionalization with literature in order to develop mid-range theory, the same exercise will be car-
ried out for the underlying reasoning of corporate management for selecting or avoiding decen-
tralized market development approaches. The HQ rationale for using local subsidiary resources in 
order to obtain further global reach may differ from one subsidiary to another, one country to 
another or from one point in time to another. In addition, some subsidiary requests for extended 
geographical responsibility may fail to obtain HQ approval as a result of lacking corporate atten-
tion or insufficient value-proposition beyond national borders. Therefore, understanding why and 
under what circumstances MNCs opt for decentralized market development approaches repre-
sents a crucial aim of this study. 
Study findings shows that a precondition for internationalization at any level of the organization 
is the presence of and knowledge about opportunities in a foreign market that are “assumed to 
initiate decisions” (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977: 27). All cases in which an MNC unit eventually 
obtained foreign market responsibilities exhibit a high level of market attractiveness in terms of 
size and growth that strongly facilitated positive decision-making at HQ level. In addition, the 
only two failed subsidiary requests (#10a.0 and #10b.0) for extended geographical reach lacked 
the presence of and knowledge about opportunities in the respective area. In the course of their 
internationalization efforts, firms employ existing or new resources in order to overcome liability 
of outsidership (Johanson & Vahlne, 2009), in particular by developing external networks and 
building its position in the target market. Adding to this, the MNC is faced with a higher level of 
coordination efforts, both internally as well as externally, in the new network. They are defined 
as ‘dynamic adjustment cost’ (Hutzschenreuter, Voll & Verbeke, 2011) and augment with in-
creasing cultural distance (Newman & Nollen, 1996). Multiple cases of subsidiary internationali-
zation have shown that corporate headquarters seem to select from all MNC units including 
themselves the one which is best suited to exploit foreign market opportunities while minimizing 
involved risk levels. 
According to Rugman and Verbeke (1992), an MNC is equipped with home-market-related 
CSAs at corporate headquarters and host-market-related CSAs at affiliated foreign subsidiaries. 
In the same article they further stated that both types of CSAs can be location-bound or non-
location-bound and that the latter form can be exploited transnationally in both markets. Rugman 
and Verbeke (1992: 763) thereby assigned host-market-related CSA applicability across the en-
tire MNC as they “may create dynamic benefits to the corporation as a whole”. However, their 
perspective appears to be restricted to MNC networks encompassing the parent company and its 
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affiliated foreign sub-units. In addition, their examples are limited to leveraging host-market-
related CSAs for selected FSAs along the value chain (e.g. low labor costs for MNC-wide pro-
duction). Study findings of subsidiary internationalization, however, disclose that host-market-
related CSAs in the form of locational advantages like geographical proximity or cultural under-
standing may also be leveraged for the development of markets without existing company pres-
ence. Their applicability therefore appears to exceed existing MNC borders and to comprise addi-
tional value chain elements like sales and service functions. 
In a later study Rugman and Verbeke (2005: 14) once again stressed the relevance of FSAs and 
CSAs combination in a particular host market for successful internationalization of the MNC and 
added that “these FSAs can easily be made ‘region-bound’ to the extent that linking investments 
with high institutional and economy-related specificity can be avoided”. Though not explicitly 
addressing the topic of subsidiary internationalization, Rugman and Verbeke (2007) further 
granted foreign subsidiaries the capability of avoiding so-called ‘liability of inter-regional for-
eignness’ that a parent company would face outside its home region. According to Rugman and 
Verbeke (2007), liability of inter-regional foreignness is caused by varying FSA requirements 
between two distant regions. Combining the work of Rugman and Verbeke (2007) and Johanson 
and Vahlne (2009), a firm that seeks to develop markets outside its home region is simultaneous-
ly confronted with liability of inter-regional foreignness towards a new region and liability of 
outsidership toward business networks of a new market.  
When linking the transformation of location-bound into region-bound FSAs and the dual liability 
associated with foreign market development outside the parent company’s home region to case-
study findings, three important implications for subsidiary internationalization unfold. First, host-
market-related CSAs like geographical proximity, cultural understanding or similar regional 
product requirements allow the transformation of subsidiary-related location-bound FSAs like 
market knowledge or business networks into subsidiary-related region-bound FSAs. Second, cor-
porate management credits resulting subsidiary-related location-bound FSAs the ability of signif-
icantly lowering or even eliminating the liability of inter-regional foreignness if the new market 
belongs to the same region as the subsidiary’s host market. Finally, the reduction or avoidance of 
this liability of inter-regional foreignness seems to constitute the primary rationale for switching 
from traditional, centralized market development approaches to decentralized internationalization 
methods. This principle is summarized by Figure 5-7 below.  
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Figure 5-7: Leverage of host-market-related CSAs for new market development 
  
Source: Own illustration, adapted from Rugman & Verbeke (1992, 2005) 
Having outlined the suitability of host-market-related CSAs for developing region-bound subsid-
iary-related FSAs and the impact of resulting FSAs on the liability of inter-regional foreignness, 
it needs to be stated that not all observed cases of subsidiary internationalization exhibited re-
gion-bound subsidiary-related FSAs at the process offset. In fact, in three cases (#3, #6 and #7) 
the corporate decision for multinational subsidiary responsibility was taken prior to the opening 
of the focal subsidiary. It therefore appears that the mere existence of host-market-related CSAs 
may qualify a foreign subsidiary for obtaining extended geographical reach. HQ management 
thereby anticipates the transformation of these CSAs into region-bound FSAs. Putting it into the 
context of the corporate marketplace within the MNC (Galunic & Eisenhardt, 1996), host-
market-related CSAs of mandate-receiving subsidiaries need to be distinct and superior to else-
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mentioned host-market-related CSAs are likely to be excluded from any foreign market devel-
opment.  
The presence of subsidiary capabilities and proven resources are largely viewed as a catalyst for 
subsidiary evolution (e.g. Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008). While they are likely to also facilitate 
the process of subsidiary internationalization, they represent by no means a necessary condition. 
This is highlighted by cases of subsidiary internationalization where corporate management was 
at the time of the decision not or only to a limited degree convinced of the overall subsidiary ca-
pability but still granted additional global reach (cases #1 and #2). Furthermore, the actual rent-
seeking process at subsidiary level and decision-making process at headquarter level required 
relatively little persuasion efforts from local subsidiary management, challenging Birkinshaw and 
Fry’s (1998: 52) note on global initiatives that subsidiary managers “need a lot of tactical savvy, 
persistence, and luck if they are to pursue initiatives effectively”. Observed particularities might 
be the result of the relatively small scope of commitment decisions at the initial stage of subsidi-
ary internationalization or might indicate the particular relevance of risk alterations in the process. 
Adhering to the observation of initial mandate gains for which local subsidiary management was 
neither requested to hold subsidiary-related FSAs for the target market, nor to possess a signifi-
cant amount of confidence among corporate management nor to strongly fight for HQ approval, 
only two preconditions for subsidiary internationalization remain that were found among all initi-
atives with positive outcomes and that were simultaneously missing in the only two failed subsid-
iary requests: (1) sufficient attractiveness of the market for which extended responsibility is re-
quested and/or granted and (2) HQ awareness of the presence and superiority of host-market-
related CSAs in relation to other affiliated MNC units as well as to home-market-related CSAs 
found at the parent company. Both elements seem to be relatively easily measurable. Market at-
tractiveness, for example, can be judged by the comparison of market sizes and growth rates. The 
CSA-based value-proposition for the development of a particular market can be assessed for each 
MNC unit by using simple data about geographical distances or cultural overlaps. Nonetheless, 
case study observations have shown that the HQ decision to grant cross-border responsibility to 
foreign subsidiaries is not as straightforward as one might expect. In fact, numerous MNC stake-
holders commented on additional risk parameters that impacted the decision-making process. So 
which other elements play a crucial role in the subsidiary’s initial mandate gain for foreign mar-
ket responsibility? 
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5.3.2.3. Principal-agent relationships and altering risk parameters 
Several IB scholars (e.g. Nohria & Ghoshal, 1994) have demonstrated that the delegation of re-
sponsibilities across the MNC may lead to increased information asymmetry and goal incongru-
ence between the parent company and the focal subsidiary. In internationalization processes such 
problems further increase as a result of cultural and geographic distance (Benito, Lunnan & To-
massen, 2010). In order to offset increased risk levels linked to activities in foreign sub-units, a 
parent company can employ headquarters supervision, e.g. through the use of expatriates, or bu-
reaucratic monitoring mechanisms such as monthly reports or other information collection tools 
(O’Donnell, 2000). The process of subsidiary internationalization is therefore characterized by a 
principal–agent relationship (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The parent company as the principal 
delegates the task of foreign market development to its subsidiary that acts as an agent in the 
overall process. Additional risk levels perceived by corporate management can have various ori-
gins in this interplay. It can arise from insufficient HQ trust in subsidiary capabilities. It may also 
relate to goal incongruence between the two process stakeholders. It can equally be caused by 
lacking knowledge about subsidiary actions or networks. Acknowledging missing completeness 
of this listing, Vahlne et al. (2012: 229) summarized the aforementioned aspects as “liability of 
outsidership of a HQ” that forces corporate stakeholders “to manage under a cloud of uncertainty 
and thus in an atmosphere of goal ambiguity”. 
Even though Vahlne et al. (2012) built their work around the revised IP model of Johanson and 
Vahlne (2009), they did not touch upon the impact of liability of outsidership of an HQ on inter-
nationalization in general and subsidiary internationalization in particular. As varying risk per-
ceptions among HQ management for centralized (internationalization of the first degree) and de-
centralized (internationalization of the second degree) foreign market development characterized 
the entire case sample, a closer look into the matter seems appropriate. The importance of risk in 
the internationalization process of a firm has already been acknowledged in the original IP model. 
According to it, a firm gradually increases its commitment to a specific market until “its tolerable 
risk frontier is met” (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977: 30). Figueira-de-Lemos et al. (2011) recently 
seized the aspect of risk in the internationalization process when analytically and graphically ex-
amining its market commitment and market uncertainty variables. Despite exclusively looking at 
internationalization processes of the first degree, they acknowledge that “the formula variables 
can contain various sub-variables” (Figueira-de-Lemos et al., 2011: 146). The development of 
sub-variables seems appropriate for subsidiary internationalization as the focal subsidiary cannot 
increase or is at least restricted in increasing its commitment to regions outside its host market 
without obtaining prior HQ approval.  
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Expanding upon the original risk formula, a set of equations for the peripheral internationaliza-
tion process is elaborated. The extended IP model includes MNC units other than corporate 
headquarters (HQ) and the focal subsidiary (SUB) as it always views the latter positioning rela-
tive to other subsidiaries. All variables of the extended risk model are expressed from a headquar-
ter perspective in order to account for its decision-making authority. It further assumes that any 
firm is profit- and/or opportunity-seeking and that it only augments its risks within acceptable 
boundaries (Shrader, Oviatt & McDougall, 2000). This assumption implies that HQ management 
not only evaluates involved risk levels of a decentralized market development, but also takes po-
tential opportunity costs linked to the decision into consideration. 
Extending the IP model as described by Figueira-de-Lemos et al. (2011), the variables market 
commitment and uncertainty are subdivided into an external (traditional approach) and an inter-
nal perspective. The variable commitment (Ct) thus still refers to existing commitment to a spe-
cific foreign market (external), while additionally accounting for the existing commitment to del-
egating responsibilities to the focal subsidiary (internal). The sum of external commitment (Ct-
EXT) and internal commitment (Ct-INT) makes up the total HQ commitment. Correspondingly, the 
variable uncertainty (Ut) is further broken down into existing uncertainty about a specific foreign 
market (external) and existing uncertainty about the focal subsidiary’s capability to adequately 
fulfill the market development task (internal). Again, the sum of external uncertainty (Ut-EXT) and 
internal uncertainty (Ut-INT) makes up the total HQ uncertainty. The selected approach is very 
much in line with the recent postulation of Vahlne et al. (2012: 230) that an HQ’s liability of out-
sidership not only relates to foreign markets (external) but also to its affiliated subsidiaries (inter-
nal) as uncertainty arises “from the fact that the HQ is not fully knowledgeable about the net-
works and actions of its important subsidiaries.” Variables of the extended IP model are listed in 
Table 5-7 below.  
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Table 5-7: Variables of the peripheral internationalization process model  
Source: Own illustration, based on Figueira-de-Lemos et al. (2011) 
In addition to subdividing the core variables market commitment and market uncertainty, the 
extended IP model is further enriched by the value-proposition for the development of a foreign 
market of the focal foreign subsidiary (Vt-SUB) and its rival MNC units (Vt-MNC). Finally, a risk 
frontier (R*) characterizes the model, indicating the maximum risk associated with foreign mar-
ket development and responsibility delegation that a parent company can bear. The extended risk 
formula of the IP model and the risk alterations associated with subsidiary internationalization are 
visualized in Figure 5-8 below.  
Variable Description 
R* Maximum tolerable market and delegation risk for a foreign market and foreign subsidiary 
Rt Existing market and delegation risk for a foreign market and foreign subsidiary 
Ct Existing commitment for a foreign market and responsibility delegation to a foreign subsidiary 
Ct-EXT Existing market commitment for a foreign market 
Ct-INT Existing delegation commitment to a foreign subsidiary  
Ut Existing uncertainty about a foreign market and a foreign subsidiary 
Ut-EXT Existing external uncertainty about a foreign market 
Ut-INT Existing internal uncertainty about a foreign subsidiary 
Vt-SUB Existing value-proposition for foreign market development of a foreign subsidiary    
Vt-MNC Existing value-proposition for foreign market development of rival MNC unit(s)  
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Figure 5-8: Risk alterations associated with subsidiary internationalization  
 
Source: Own illustration, adapted from Figueira-de-Lemos et al. (2011) 
Once a company decides to develop a foreign market, it has to opt for the adequate market devel-
opment approach. On the left-hand side of Figure 5-8, the risk level for the initial internationali-
zation step (R0) perceived by corporate management for internationalization of the first degree, 
i.e. market development through the HQ, is highlighted by the solid grey area. It is the product of 
the HQ’s external commitment to (C0-EXT) and external uncertainty about (U0-EXT) a specific for-
eign market. For subsidiary internationalization the aforementioned risk level (R0) is impacted in 
three dimensions resulting in a modified risk level (R’0), as depicted on the right-hand side of 
Figure 5-8. First, commitment relatively increases due to the delegation of market development 
responsibility from a parent company to a foreign subsidiary (+C0-INT). Second, uncertainty rela-
tively amplifies as a result of HQ uncertainty about its subsidiary (+U0-INT). Finally, external un-
certainty relatively decreases driven by host-market-related CSAs and subsidiary-related FSAs 
that lower the external market uncertainty, e.g. by reducing or eliminating liability of inter-
regional foreignness (-ΔU0-EXT). Total risk alteration (∆R0 = R0 – R’0) represents the subsidiary’s 
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Preconditions for subsidiary internationalization 
Case study findings reveal that at least three conditions need to be met in order to allow subsidi-
ary internationalization: 
1) The resulting risk level (R’0) is equal to or less than the maximum tolerable risk (R*) for a 
specific foreign market and for the delegation of market development responsibilities to a for-
eign subsidiary; 
2) the subsidiary is capable of lowering external uncertainty (∆U0-EXT) sufficiently to offset the 
uncertainty increase resulting from the delegation of market development responsibilities to a 
foreign subsidiary; only in this case, the subsidiary’s value-proposition (Vt-SUB) is positive; 
3) the subsidiary’s value-proposition (Vt-SUB) is equal to or greater than the value-proposition of 
any other MNC unit (Vt-MNC) for the development of a particular market. 
If one of these conditions is not met, corporate management is likely to prefer a traditional and 
centralized market development approach (cases #10a and #10b). It should be noted that corpo-
rate management’s risk perception is by no means fixed and may alter over time, e.g. as a result 
of subsidiary profile-building (Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008) or changing organizational risk 
approaches (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977). Local subsidiary management that initially fails to obtain 
extended geographical responsibility may therefore experience a positive initiative outcome at a 
later stage.  
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5.3.3. Mandate evolution 
When looking at decentralized exploitation of internationalization opportunities the aspect of 
internationalization trajectories is of particular interest. To what extent does subsidiary interna-
tionalization resemble internationalization of the first degree? Do cross-border subsidiary man-
dates exhibit fundamental differences to their host market equivalents? Do internationalization 
trajectories involve critical evolution steps where subsidiary mandates are further extended, re-
duced or potentially lost? What parameters are driving the evolution of subsidiary mandates be-
yond host market borders and to what extent and by what means can local management influence 
this process?  
Looking at the above questions it soon becomes apparent that analytical generalization for the 
following two sections on mandate evolution, mandate development and mandate outlook needs 
to be carried out simultaneously. Dividing the iteration between case findings and literature into 
two parts would be misleading as the overall case sample is characterized by highly varying ex-
istences of cross-border subsidiary mandates. In addition, it seemed necessary to include findings 
for initial mandate gains into the following exchange with prior IB research findings as particu-
larities of the process offset may impact subsequent mandate evolution just as fundamental dif-
ferences between both phases may allow an additional perspective on subsidiary internationaliza-
tion. When contrasting study findings about the evolution of subsidiary mandates beyond host 
market borders to literature, the IP model of Johanson and Vahlne (1977) again offered a solid 
basis. Their original establishment chain stressed “that companies start to internationalize in 
neighboring markets and subsequently move further away in terms of psychic distance, and also 
that in each market companies begin by using low-commitment modes, such as a middleman, and 
subsequently switch to modes that suggest a stronger commitment, such as wholly owned subsid-
iaries” (Johanson & Vahlne, 2009: 1420). Later research (e.g. Hedlund & Kverneland, 1985; 
Madsen & Servais, 1997; Weerawardena et al., 2007), however, indicated a declining relevance 
of the establishment chain for internationalization of the first degree.  
Eleven cases of subsidiary internationalization demonstrate that the establishment chain may 
serve as a very helpful approach for getting a first understanding of trajectories for subsidiary 
internationalization. Nonetheless, it equally proves its weaknesses that will be outlined in the 
following. Regarding the psychic distance chain, all eleven initiatives for initial foreign market 
responsibility exhibited cultural similarities between the subsidiary’s host market and the target 
market or region. For eight out of the eleven initiatives, the host markets were also bordering 
target countries or regions. From a subsidiary perspective the aspect of psychic distance therefore 
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appears to be of significance at first sight. However, three aspects significantly question the rele-
vance of the psychic distance chain for the evolution of cross-border subsidiary mandates.  
First, observed initial mandates usually encompassed numerous countries, for which no priority 
in terms of market development order was given to or suggested by the focal subsidiary. Second, 
for mandate development and outlook only cases #6 (from Southeast Asia into Vietnam) and #8 
(from Mexico into Central and South America) showed subsidiary-driven gradual extension of 
mandate scopes into markets with higher psychic distances. Finally, as the regional HQ marks the 
final evolutionary stage throughout the study, limited variances of psychic distances are inevita-
ble. A regional headquarters is defined as an MNC unit that is fully responsible for activities of 
one or several subsidiaries within a limited geographical area (Schütte, 1996). While psychic dis-
tances and inter-regional liability of foreignness may thus have an important role for initiating or 
altering cross-border subsidiary mandates, they do not seem to impact the order of decentralized 
foreign market development.  
5.3.3.1. Evolutionary elements of gradualism and discontinuity  
Regarding overall commitment scopes a certain degree of gradualism was noticeable across all 
nine subsidiary mandates. The initial responsibility scope, for example, was highly limited and 
did not surpass sales and service functions. In case #4 it was actually limited to a single customer 
and in case #7 the focal subsidiary was not allowed to cross host market borders for purposes 
other than logistics support. With increasing cross-border market exposure, foreign subsidiaries 
appear to pursue functionally and geographically extended responsibility levels. In case #4 the 
mandate was extended to global KAM for all Austrian clients and in case #7 the functional scope 
was broadened into sales and service responsibilities. Early steps of mandate evolution therefore 
appear to be the result of relatively small incremental commitment decisions. However, numer-
ous initial mandate gains and mandate alterations show that evolutionary paths of cross-border 
subsidiary mandates are not exclusively characterized by elements of gradualism but often exhib-
it discontinuous trajectories. 
Observed cases of mandate evolution feature the omission and the skipping of certain develop-
ment stages. Discontinuities in internationalization processes of the first degree in the form of 
born globals (Weerawardena et al., 2007) and leapfrogging (Hedlund & Kverneland, 1985) are 
therefore also noticeable for subsidiary internationalization. In cases #3, #6 and #7, focal subsidi-
aries were equipped with the foreign market mandate from their inauguration so that in terms of 
responsibility scopes they can be classified as ‘born regionals’. The Chinese subsidiary in case #5 
became regional HQ without demonstrating any foreign market development skills so that it 
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clearly leapfrogged certain evolutionary steps that other subsidiaries had to pass through (e.g. 
cases #7 and #8). Moreover, losing and declining subsidiary mandates in cases #1 and #7 respec-
tively in combination with predominately negative mandate outlooks convey an image of rever-
sals and truncations rather than incremental developments. While subsidiary internationalization 
may therefore embody elements of gradualism, the explanation of evolutionary paths of cross-
border subsidiary mandates needs to incorporate the aspect of discontinuity. 
When looking at observed mandate alterations and outlooks, the observer is faced with a relative-
ly heterogeneous picture. As shown in Table 5-1, mandates appear to expand, stagnate, decline or 
even dissolve. Moreover, related initiatives may be triggered from incidents within and outside 
the MNC and predominately but not exclusively originate at the parent company. Finally, the HQ 
rationale for mandate modification is by no means similar across cases and the level of subsidiary 
influence on the overall process often appears to be highly limited or even non-existent. Especial-
ly the aspects of corporate management as initiative driver and restrained process influence of 
local management are surprising as they contradict findings of Birkinshaw (1996) that mandate 
development is largely subsidiary-driven and impacted by subsidiary capabilities. Even though 
the mandate types investigated by Birkinshaw (1996) are not fully comparable as they, in addi-
tion to cross-border mandates, also relate to internal and local mandates, the lack of subsidiary 
choice in internationalization processes of the second degree is eye-catching. The question that 
immediately arises is whether the evolution of cross-border subsidiary mandates is impacted by 
MNC parameters for which local management’s access is largely restrained. 
In seeking to provide an answer to this question, Araujo and Rezende’s (2003) dual use of litera-
ture for internationalization processes and MNC strategy in order to explain internationalization 
trajectories of MNCs units proved to be highly beneficial. In fact, the outcome of their work that 
explicitly encompassed the aspect of subsidiary internationalization largely corresponds to obser-
vations made for the evolution of cross-border subsidiary mandates, so it will be described in 
more detail here. Araujo and Rezende (2003: 719) rejected the notion that subsidiary evolution 
had a purely gradual character and postulated “that the internationalisation trajectory of units 
within a multinational corporation’s network comprises a trajectory in time and space involving 
multiple, overlapping networks”. The citation already reveals their network approach for interna-
tionalization processes that was first applied by Johanson and Mattsson (1988) and only recently 
integrated in the revised IP model by Johanson and Vahlne (2009). According to Araujo and 
Rezende (2003), internationalization trajectories of subsidiaries are the result of relationships 
with external network actors, with corporate headquarters and with affiliated MNC units within 
and outside their host market. Given the relevance of all three types of relationship for mandate 
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evolution of cross-border subsidiary responsibilities across the cases sample, a closer look at the 
network aspect will be applied before integrating findings from MNC strategy literature.  
5.3.3.2. Impact of business networks and MNC localization degrees 
The business network of a foreign subsidiary with foreign market responsibility inevitably 
stretches beyond national borders. Based on the company’s global presence it has at least an in-
tra-MNC relationship with its parent company. If the firm possesses more than one sub-unit, local 
subsidiary management is likely to also be impacted by relationships with sister subsidiaries, e.g. 
through bilateral knowledge transfers (Mudambi & Navarra, 2004). For simplicity purposes, 
however, the internal business network of a foreign subsidiary with cross-border responsibility 
will be initially reduced to HQ relationships. This approach is in line with Forsgren et al. (2005: 
93), who noted with regard to intra-MNC networks that “one of the most important actors in this 
context is the MNC HQ itself, which strives to shape the subsidiary’s activities in accordance 
with the overall strategy”.  
In their book about the embedded MNC, Forsgren et al. (2005) further differentiated between 
embedded relationships and arm’s-length exchange with external network actors in order to out-
line the profoundness of bilateral commitment. Varying levels of relationships with external ac-
tors were also found across the MNC at the time of the initial mandate gain. While in the majori-
ty of cases the focal subsidiary had already developed a dominant network position in the target 
market or region, HQ involvement was still noticeable. Varying network positions of MNC units 
at the time of the initial mandate gain are highlighted in Figure 5-9 below.  
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Figure 5-9: Network position of focal subsidiary and HQ at initial mandate gain 
  
Source: Own illustration, adapted from Forsgren et al. (2005: 82, 97) 
As a result of its cross-border mandate the focal subsidiary is likely to gradually strengthen its 
network position in the covered area by turning arm’s-length exchanges into embedded relation-
ships as well as by building new relationships. The required time and involved costs for such po-
sition-building (Axelsson & Johanson, 1992) in a foreign market can vary from one market to 
another and one MNC or MNC unit to another (Eriksson, Johanson, Majkgård & Sharma, 1997). 
The important aspect of subsidiary internationalization is, however, that corporate management 
expects local management to more efficiently develop the firm’s network position. This view is 
based on the existence of host-market-related CSAs that should reduce or eliminate the firm’s 
liability of inter-regional foreignness (Rugman & Verbeke, 2007) and thereby facilitate the de-
velopment of subsidiary-related region-bound FSAs (Rugman & Verbeke, 1992) in the form of 
network insidership (Johanson & Vahlne, 2009). If foreign subsidiaries succeed in doing so as 
observed in cases #2, #4, #6, #7 and #8 they are likely to maintain their mandate or even benefit 
from further geographical and/or functional responsibility extensions. Mandate extension as a 
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sidiary developed business relationships into Vietnam and could as a consequence extend the 
geographical scope of its mandate into this market. In reverse, if subsidiaries do not fulfill HQ 
expectations as shown in case #1, local subsidiary management may face declining or even dis-
solving cross-border mandates.  
The unofficial mandate loss of the Polish subsidiary in case #1 outlines an interesting aspect of 
subsidiary internationalization. CSAs in the form of geographical and cultural proximity and 
FSAs embodied in locally existent Russian language skills constituted the main HQ rationale for 
initially granting extended responsibility for former CIS markets to local Polish management. In 
the course of mandate execution, HQ management realized however that it had overestimated the 
subsidiary’s value-proposition in the sense that cultural overlap between Poland and former CIS 
countries did not prove to be as pronounced as expected. The subsidiary thus failed in sufficiently 
reducing liability of inter-regional foreignness (Rugman & Verbeke, 2007) and thereby external 
levels of uncertainty (Figueira-de-Lemos et al., 2011). When local management further lacked 
management skills for cross-border salesman coaching, the mandate was retaken by HQ man-
agement as it was convinced it was in a better position to develop market presence in former CIS 
countries. 
The emerging relevance of subsidiary-related capabilities or FSAs, embodied amongst others in 
market development results for the covered area, strongly differentiates mandate evolution from 
initial mandate gain related to subsidiary internationalization. While with regards to proven re-
sources (e.g. Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008) or distinct subsidiary capabilities (e.g. Birkinshaw, 
1996) only little weight was noticeable at the start of subsidiary internationalization they seem to 
be crucial for local subsidiary management to maintain and grow existing foreign market respon-
sibilities. The note of Birkinshaw (1996: 467) that “the engine of subsidiary growth is its distinc-
tive capabilities, and that for a mandate to be effective it must be built on those capabilities” 
therefore also seems to apply for cross-border subsidiary mandates. Adding to this Gebbert, Wil-
liams and Matten (2003: 637) postulated that strongly locally and regionally embedded subsidiar-
ies “have more strategic choice in terms of retaining wide charter responsibilities, more control 
over their business activities and are less resource dependent”. Is it therefore reasonable to as-
sume that continuous development of a firm’s network position in a foreign market is sufficient 
for local subsidiary management to maintain its cross-border mandate? 
Based on case study observations the question clearly has to be answered with no. In cases #2, #3, 
#4, #6 and #8 foreign subsidiaries are expected to experience future mandate declines or losses 
despite showing satisfying market development results. Local subsidiary management in case #7 
has already seen several mandate reductions in the past and is facing additional cross-border re-
 253 
sponsibility cuts despite exhibiting a satisfying standing among corporate management. All these 
cases equally show that required subsidiary capabilities augment with increasing functional 
scopes of foreign market mandates and that the access to these capabilities is restrained for many 
subsidiaries. For keeping and potentially developing relatively simple cross-border sales and ser-
vice mandates, for example, local management is often only requested to adequately transform 
host-market-related CSAs into subsidiary-related region-bound FSAs in the form of foreign mar-
ket knowledge and business networks. In order to obtain regional HQ status or to claim cross-
border sovereignty versus other MNC units, however, foreign subsidiaries need to demonstrate 
additional capabilities. Key for sustaining one’s place in the corporate marketplace (Galunic & 
Eisenhardt, 1996) appears to be sufficient levels of local value-add. 
In order to explain this particularity of subsidiary internationalization, the network approach (Jo-
hanson & Mattsson, 1988) was no longer sufficient. The suggestion of Araujo and Rezende 
(2003) to integrate literature of MNC strategy, however, helped to add clarity to the topic at hand. 
In addition to the three aforementioned relationship types, Araujo and Rezende (2003) studied 
internationalization paths of foreign subsidiaries by looking at the development of their mode of 
operation and their host-market or cross-border mandate or charter in the MNC system. While the 
mode of operation is determined by MNC strategy regarding the degree of externalization of ac-
tivities and the level of localization of activities in each country, the mandate is largely impacted 
by the degree of integration of activities across different countries. Regarding the relationship 
between the dimensions, Araujo and Rezende (2003: 726) noted that they “may also interact and 
overlap-e.g. as the firm progressively increases its degree of localisation of activities, it enhances 
the prospect of developing capabilities that may be of use to other parts of the MNC network”. 
When looking at the evolution of and outlook for nine cross-border subsidiary mandates, such 
interplay is clearly noticeable and largely explains limited means of local subsidiary management 
to influence mandate development at more mature stages.  
At the time of the initial mandate gain all nine cases were characterized by limited company 
presence in the covered market or region. The foreign subsidiary generally organized sales into 
this newly won territory through third parties like national importers or dealers and subsidiary 
personnel made only sporadic country visits. The degree of externalization was therefore relative-
ly high, the degree of localization relatively low and the degree of integration of activities across 
the host and target market relatively stable. If overall attractiveness of the target market and the 
relevance of business networks alter, however, the equilibrium between the three dimensions is 
likely to falter. This phenomenon is exemplified by the outlook for cases #2, #3, #4, #6 and #9 
that anticipates a mandate decline or loss in the event that the parent company decides to estab-
lish company presence in the covered region. A reduced level of externalization and increased 
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level of localization is therefore expected to impact the degree of integration of activities across 
the host and target market.  
The interplay of these three dimensions in the evolution of cross-border subsidiary mandates is 
highlighted in Figure 5-10. It outlines that changing MNC strategies for the subsidiary’s host 
market may impact its cross-border mandate. The parent company in case #5, for example, decid-
ed to set up local production facilities at the Chinese subsidiary in order to participate in the sig-
nificant market growth by satisfying local product demand. Increased levels of localization in 
China in turn allowed local subsidiary management to develop subsidiary capabilities or FSAs in 
the form of product and production know-how that enabled it to obtain regional HQ status and to 
look after another Asian subsidiary at a later stage. The Austrian sister subsidiary in case #4 on 
the other hand is not expected to obtain management responsibility for other sub-units as it only 
represents a sales subsidiary and therefore lacks sufficient degrees of host market localization.  
Figure 5-10: Impact of international MNC strategies on cross-border subsidiary mandates 
 
Source: Own illustration, based on Araujo & Rezende (2003) 
The illustration further underlines the relevance of resource-based views of the firm in general 
and of the MNC in particular for mandate evolution of cross-border subsidiary mandates. Ac-
cording to the view, the firm’s ability to adapt, integrate and reconfigure internal resources to 
environmental change determines its competitive positioning in the market place (Teece & Pisa-
no, 1994; Teece et al., 1997). Putting it in the context of subsidiary internationalization, the par-
ent company adapts its level of externalization and localization of activities in a particular foreign 
market to altering weight of business networks. As a consequence it also reevaluates the current 
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its mandate. If it thereby turns out that the degree of subsidiary-related FSAs is no longer suffi-
cient to adequately execute the mandate, in which case the subsidiary’s value-proposition as out-
lined in the last section of the chapter is negative for this task, HQ management reconfigures in-
ternal resources in the sense that the market development is centralized or handed over to another 
subsidiary.  
The differentiation between foreign subsidiaries that have obtained significant functional man-
date extension in the form of regional HQ status (cases #5, #7 and #8) and those that are not ex-
pected to benefit from similar mandate developments (cases #1, #2, #3, #4, #6 and #9) character-
izes the case sample in general. The question that arises is whether varying degrees of localiza-
tion as discussed above are the single characteristic that separates one subsidiary type from an-
other. The answer to this question is again no. While sufficient local value-add apparently ena-
bles foreign subsidiaries to reach more mature stages of mandate evolution, they alone are not 
sufficient. This is demonstrated by cases #1 and #9, where focal subsidiaries possess their own 
production facilities but exhibit cross-border mandates that are restrained to sales and service 
functions. As a reason for such mandate limitation, corporate management equally stated that 
sub-units always report to the parent company and that is has never thought of and actually sees 
no reason for changing the approach by granting regional HQ statuses.  
5.3.3.3. Corporate immune systems and risk-reducing measures 
The aforementioned statements very much resemble observations made by Birkinshaw and Rid-
derstråle (1999) when examining varying outcomes of subsidiary initiatives. Based on case study 
analysis of 26 initiatives, Birkinshaw and Ridderstråle (1999) found that the outcome of subsidi-
ary initiatives is likely to be influenced by a ‘corporate immune system’. The system is composed 
of manifestations, which refer to “actions taken (or inaction) by corporate managers that provide 
resistance to the initiative” and interpreted predispositions, which relate to “underlying behavior-
al traits of corporate managers” (1999: 158). Even though the work of Birkinshaw and Ridder-
stråle (1999) immediately appears to explain observations in the study at hand, a set of modifica-
tions needs to be made in order to provide better insight into evolutionary paths of cross-border 
subsidiary mandates. 
For explaining evolutionary paths of cross-border subsidiary mandates it appeared necessary to 
expand the corporate immune system of Birkinshaw and Ridderstråle (1999) in order to account 
for initiatives at all MNC levels as well as missing initiative-taking anywhere in the firm. Both 
aspects can equally impact mandate evolution and were observed in the case sample of this study. 
In the modified corporate immune system, manifestation and interpreted predispositions can 
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therefore relate to any MNC stakeholder adhering to the aforementioned network approach of 
subsidiary internationalization. In addition, manifestations are split into actions (or inactions) 
related to opportunity-identification and initiative-taking as well as rent-seeking and responsibil-
ity-allocation processes. Finally, interpreted predispositions are enlarged by a lack of entrepre-
neurship and risk-taking, which are viewed as behavioral traits that countervail any form of op-
portunity pursuit (Birkinshaw, 1997) and whose magnitudes are likely to differ from one MNC 
type to another (Miller, 1983). Incorporating the aspect of entrepreneurship in internationalization 
processes was also suggested by Schweizer et al. (2010), who extended the revised IP model (Jo-
hanson & Vahlne, 2009) by the aspect of ‘entrepreneurial capabilities’ (state variables) and ‘ex-
ploiting contingencies’ (change variables). The nature of the modified corporate immune system 
for subsidiary internationalization is illustrated in Figure 5-11 below. 
Figure 5-11: Nature of the modified corporate immune system for subsidiary internationalization 
  
Source: Own illustration, adapted from Birkinshaw & Ridderstråle (1999: 158) 
Looking at the aforementioned cases in which foreign subsidiaries are not expected to obtain re-
gional HQ status at any future stage, the adapted corporate immune system and its impact on the 
evolution of cross-border subsidiary mandates becomes apparent. It is very likely that as a result 
of interpreted predisposition, in particular ethnocentrism and suspicion of the unknown, oppor-
tunity-identification and initiative-taking processes regarding potential benefits of regional HQs 
will not be stimulated in the first place. Cases #1 and #2, in which local management itself does 
not believe it is positioned to manage other foreign subsidiaries, show that organizational rigor is 
not only driven by HQ personnel but that local subsidiary management can also exhibit behavior-
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al traits that impede mandate development. In addition to lacking initiative-taking at either MNC 
level, case #8 shows that subsidiaries may fail to advance with their cross-border mandate as a 
result of countervailing MNC forces like those observed by Birkinshaw and Ridderstråle (1999). 
As today acknowledged by the corporate management of case #8, the US subsidiary’s request to 
obtain regional HQ status for Mexico was only rejected at that time as a result of ethnocentrism 
and HQ fear about power imbalances across the MNC. A decade later however local subsidiary 
management was granted regional HQ responsibility for the entire Americas region. Is it there-
fore appropriate to assume that corporate immune systems for subsidiary internationalization may 
change over time? 
Birkinshaw and Ridderstråle (1999) already mentioned the likelihood of system evolution in their 
study as several interview partners at corporate headquarters remarked on the need for cross-
border business experience in order get familiar with subsidiary initiatives. This phenomenon is 
exemplified by case #8, in which corporate management admitted to growing HQ acceptance for 
ceding power and responsibilities to MNC units located outside the home region. The case also 
shows that such evolutionary processes can be significantly accelerated through revolutionary 
incidents. Confronted with the financial crisis from 2008 onwards that led to significant HQ re-
ductions, especially in the home market, corporate management was forced to shift higher re-
sponsibilities to foreign sub-units and to reach a different level of risk-taking. The relevance of 
risk for initial gains of cross-border subsidiary mandates has been extensively discussed in the 
previous section. It is therefore not surprising that the aspect reemerges when seeking to explain 
internationalization trajectories of foreign subsidiaries. 
The establishment of a regional HQ is likely to modify risk perceptions among corporate manag-
ers as they cease direct access to their foreign sub-units. In addition, they grant proprietary HQ 
functions to local subsidiary management without being certain about its capability to fulfill such 
a task. In the majority of observed cases the transfer of HQ functions to a foreign sub-unit does 
not represent a valid option for HQ management, either because local subsidiary management 
lacks sufficient value-add (case #4) or because the corporate immune system simply impedes the 
foreign subsidiary from reaching this stage of mandate evolution (cases #1, #2, #3, #6 and #9). 
On the other hand, three subsidiaries (cases #5, #7 and #8) reached advanced stages of cross-
border mandate evolution and thereby revealed highly interesting aspects of subsidiary interna-
tionalization. The focal subsidiaries commonly exhibited pronounced local value-add that, in ad-
dition to other FSAs like cross-border network positioning and host-market CSAs, strongly con-
tributed to their overall value-proposition for regional subsidiary management. Despite a pro-
nounced positioning, all three mandate extensions appeared to be influenced by parameters that 
impacted uncertainty levels at corporate level that need to be detailed in the following. 
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In the peripheral internationalization process model that was developed in the previous section to 
explain initial gains of cross-border subsidiary mandates, the risk perception among HQ manag-
ers played a crucial role. Building on the IP model of Johanson and Vahlne (1977) and the asso-
ciated risk visualizations of Figueira-de-Lemos et al. (2011), the adapted model postulates that in 
order to allow subsidiary internationalization the perceived risk level for decentralized market 
development is likely to be equal to or lower than its equivalent for traditional internationaliza-
tion efforts from the parent company. While the validity of the peripheral internationalization 
process model for mandate evolution is by no means questioned by case study observations, it 
needs to integrate other elements that impact HQ decisions. Precisely, the model needs to reflect 
on the impact of sending expatriates to foreign subsidiaries (cases #5 and #7) as well as on ad-
justed tolerable risk levels among corporate management (case #8). Both elements are highlight-
ed on the left- and right-hand side of Figure 5-12 below. 
Figure 5-12: Risk-influencing parameters in subsidiary internationalization 
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According to the initial mandate gain and potential subsequent mandate modifications, the per-
ceived risk level (R1) among corporate management is the product of external and internal uncer-
tainty levels (U1 = U1-EXT + U1-INT) and external and internal commitment levels (C1 = C1-EXT + C1-
INT) for a particular foreign market and foreign subsidiary. If corporate management considers 
transferring management responsibility for another MNC sub-unit to a foreign subsidiary the total 
risk level is likely to amplify for two reasons. First, the parent company augments its internal 
delegation commitment (∆C1-INT) for a particular market. Second, internal uncertainty levels are 
likely to increase (∆U1-INT) as corporate management is uncertain whether the focal subsidiary is 
capable of managing other MNC units. At the same time external commitment (C1-EXT) and un-
certainty (U1-EXT) levels are not impacted by such a transfer. The degree of localization remains 
unchanged (C1-EXT) and the foreign subsidiary, other than in the course of initial mandate gains, is 
initially not capable of further lowering external uncertainty levels (U1-EXT). As a result of chang-
ing internal delegation commitments and uncertainty levels the total risk level (R2) may, ceteris 
paribus, surpass the company’s maximum tolerable risk frontier (Ri*). If, as a result of the subsid-
iary’s long-term value-proposition for regional HQ mandate, corporate management urges with 
the continuation of the responsibility transfer it is left with two choices: first, the implementation 
of risk-reducing actions as seen on the left-hand side of Figure 5-12 or second, the augmentation 
of overall risk tolerances as highlighted on the right-hand side of Figure 5-12.  
In both cases #5 and #7, HQ management decided to send expatriates to the focal subsidiary in 
order to guide newly acquainted HQ-like functions in the region. This reduced internal uncertain-
ty levels (∆U1’-INT) so that previously excessive risk exposure (R2) was brought to acceptable lev-
els (R’2). Whether the use of expatriates is sufficient to entirely offset the uncertainty increase 
from responsibility delegation is likely to vary from one case to another. In any case, expatriates 
were used as a means to influence and monitor subsidiary behavior and thus to reduce the risk of 
moral hazard in the principal–agent relationship (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Eisenhardt, 1989a). 
Other instruments like monetary incentives for subsidiary management (O’Donnell, 2000) might 
also have served the purpose of risk reduction but were not observed in the course of the study.  
The delegation of regional HQ function for the entire Americas region to the US subsidiary in 
case #8 did not involve any use of expatriates. What therefore made corporate management allow 
a construct that it rejected several years previously for the significantly smaller geographical area 
of Mexico? HQ management assumed that it was a combination of increasing organizational ma-
turity and economic pressure. The impact of both aspects on the evolution of cross-border subsid-
iary mandates is highlighted on the right-hand side of Figure 5-12. Similar to cases #5 and #7, the 
resulting risk (R2) from delegating regional HQ status to the US subsidiary might have, ceteris 
paribus, crossed the firm’s maximum frontier (Ri*). As a result of increasing familiarization with 
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foreign market operations and responsibility ceding to foreign sub-units, however, corporate 
management could accept risk levels that it was previously incapable of accepting. In addition, at 
the time of the decision the parent company had just undergone severe headcount reductions that 
forced it to accept management constructs that it was not willing to allow before. Both aspects led 
to a shift of the firm’s risk frontiers from Ri* to R’i*, which enhanced the proclivity of corporate 
management to grant the regional HQ mandate to its US subsidiary. Case study findings therefore 
appear to support suggestions of Birkinshaw and Ridderstråle (1999) that the likelihood of sub-
sidiaries benefiting from additional responsibilities or extensions of existing mandates may in-
crease with organizational maturity.  
5.3.3.4. Comptetitive pressure on advanced cross-border subsidiary mandates 
Up to this point the study has identified drivers and restrictions for initial mandate gains and sub-
sequent mandate developments up to regional HQ statuses. With the exception of explaining the 
(unofficial) mandate loss in case #1 as well as limitations or truncations in the evolutionary path 
of several subsidiaries, the possibility of reversed mandate trajectories has not yet been extensive-
ly illuminated. Historical incidents in case #7 and mandate outlooks for cases #7 and #8 however 
suggest that it is just as difficult to obtain regional HQ status as to preserve such a privileged 
MNC positioning. In addition, the subsidiary’s possibility to actively contribute to mandate 
preservation appears even more restrained. When seeking an explanation for this particularity of 
subsidiary internationalization the investigator was surprisingly brought back to earlier discus-
sions about mandate evolution, as altering MNC relationships (Forsgren et al., 2005) and external 
network positions (Johanson & Mattsson, 1988) again appear to play an important role. In addi-
tion, the suggestion of Araujo and Rezende (2003) to make dual use of literature of international-
ization processes and MNC strategy again proved to be of great help. 
The construct of a regional HQ requires a minimum of three MNC units: (1) corporate headquar-
ters; (2) regional headquarters; (3) foreign sub-unit managed by the regional HQ. Intra-MNC 
relationships are thus characterized by ownership between corporate HQ and regional HQ, by 
ownership between corporate HQ and the foreign sub-unit and by control over operations (En-
right, 2005b) or the fulfillment of HQ-like functions (Lehrer & Asakawa, 1999) between the re-
gional HQ and the foreign sub-unit. It is acknowledged that relationships between the three MNC 
units differ from one regional HQ type to another (Enright, 2005a) and may thus significantly 
vary from the form described above. As the study deals with the evolution of cross-border subsid-
iary mandates as opposed to regional HQ types, however, the topic will not be considered in fur-
ther detail. The important aspect for the study at hand is that even though the foreign sub-unit is 
subordinate to its regional HQ it is likely to continue exchange with its corporate headquarters. In 
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addition to intra-MNC relationships, each MNC unit holds external network relationships of var-
ying magnitudes. The relationships in a regional HQ construct are depicted in Figure 5-13 below. 
Figure 5-13: Network positions of corporate HQ, regional HQ and foreign sub-unit 
  
Source: Own illustration, adapted from Forsgren et al. (2005: 82, 97) 
All three MNC units are likely to be equipped with external network relationships within and 
across national borders that can relate to highly embedded interplay or to rather loose arm’s-
length exchange. In addition, for the area covered by the focal subsidiary’s regional HQ mandate 
the subordinate foreign sub-unit is likely to possess the most distinct network positioning as it 
constantly exchanges with customers on an operational basis. Nonetheless, one can assume that 
corporate like regional headquarters have arm’s-length exchange with local customers or have 
minimum levels of knowledge about the subsidiary’s business network as it constitutes one im-
portant intra-MNC power source (Andersson et al., 2007). As long as the business network and 
its underlying market attractiveness of the foreign sub-unit is of limited significance to corporate 
headquarters, the cross-border mandate of the regional HQ is presumably at relatively little risk. 
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proposition driven by CSAs and in particular by FSAs in the form of local value-add for foreign 
market and subsidiary management. 
According to Araujo and Rezende (2003), however, mandate sustainability is threatened if the 
overall MNC strategy for the area covered by the regional HQ mandate is changed. If corporate 
management as a result of the area’s increasing attractiveness and network relevance decides to 
augment the degree of localization, the regional HQ’s positioning in the corporate marketplace 
(Galunic & Eisenhardt, 1996) for that region is likely to be relatively weakened versus its subor-
dinate foreign subsidiary. In other words, the regional HQ suffers from the comparative disad-
vantages of its host country versus the subsidiary’s host market (Dörrenbächer & Gammelgaard, 
2010). This phenomenon is exemplified by case #7 in which the parent company as a result of the 
growing relevance of the Chinese market and local business networks decided to increase the 
localization degree by setting up local production facilities. As a result, the regional HQ in Sin-
gapore exhibited a lower level of localization (sales subsidiary with selected HQ capabilities) 
than its subordinate Chinese subsidiary (producing MNC entity) and was therefore confronted 
with a weakened intra-MNC positioning. In the aftermath of the decision the regional HQ in Sin-
gapore gradually ceded responsibilities to the Chinese subsidiary. At the same time direct report-
ing links between the parent company and the Chinese sub-unit were reestablished. Even though 
the geographical cut of the regional HQ mandate was not officially declared, local subsidiary 
management had completely lost its influence on operations in the Chinese market. The impact of 
modified MNC strategies with regard to the localization degree in the area covered by a regional 
HQ mandate is shown in Figure 5-14 below. 
Figure 5-14: Impact of international MNC strategies on regional HQ mandates 
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Mechanisms observed in case #7 are strongly supported by various studies of leading IB scholars. 
Bouquet and Birkinshaw (2008), for example, tested a positive correlation between headquarter 
attention and the strategic significance of the local subsidiary environment as well as the strength 
of the subsidiary within the MNC network. Andersson et al. (2007) further found that a subsidi-
ary’s intra-MNC influence is positively impacted by the headquarters’ knowledge about its busi-
ness network and its MNC importance with regard to product and production development. Final-
ly Mudambi and Navarra (2004) stated that intra-MNC knowledge flows are a key determinant of 
bargaining powers of MNC units. In case #7 the subordinate Chinese subsidiary first of all bene-
fits from a significantly stronger local business network versus its regional HQ in Singapore, of 
which the parent company is aware. In addition, the Chinese subsidiary is likely to exhibit a pro-
nounced relevance for other entities in the MNC network due to local production facilities. Di-
minishing regional influence of the Singaporean subsidiary therefore appeared to be inevitable. 
When developing on Vernon’ (1966) product lifecycle view, Birkinshaw (1996: 489) noted in 
this context that “to the extent that sources of comparative advantage shift over time, one would 
thus expect the location of economic activity to shift correspondingly”. 
As the ceding of responsibilities was limited to the Chinese market, the focal subsidiary in Singa-
pore initially maintained its regional HQ status for South and Northeast Asia as well as India. A 
few years later, however, it lost the strategic regional HQ status for the entire Asia region as well 
as all responsibilities for Northeast Asia to the Chinese subsidiary. It therefore appears that based 
on its distinct capabilities mainly in the form of production facilities and gradually increasing 
cross-border business networks local management in China itself turned into a regional HQ. In 
addition, the company is currently augmenting its degree of localization in India and expects the 
Singaporean subsidiary to lose its regional HQ mandate for that area once sufficient levels of 
value-add and business networks are established. The mechanisms of declining regional HQ sta-
tuses as observed in China are therefore likely to reoccur in India. 
The subsidiary’s fight for cross-border responsibilities versus the Chinese and Indian sister sub-
sidiaries as well as its parent company has much in common with the work of Birkinshaw and 
Lingblad (2005) on intra-firm competition and charter evolution. According to Birkinshaw and 
Lingblad (2005), three elements fundamentally form the charter of an MNC unit: (1) product 
markets served; (2) capabilities; (3) stated charter. As a result of environmental change, Birkin-
shaw and Lingblad (2005: 676) noted that “the three elements are all prone to change, so they are 
likely to fall out of alignment to some degree at certain times, and this is where the social process 
of negotiation and competition between units becomes intense”. Even though they looked into 
competition and overlapping charters between different business units their work also appears to 
be relevant to intra-firm competition for cross-border responsibilities between MNC entities of 
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the same business unit. The regional HQ mandate for China and later also for Northeast Asia, for 
example, appeared to be at one point no longer in line with the capabilities of the focal subsidiary 
in Singapore. As a consequence, local subsidiary management gradually ceded responsibilities to 
its Chinese rival, which was only later followed by an official HQ declaration of mandate transfer. 
It is therefore likely even though not investigated in the course of the study that the balancing 
process of the three elements of mandate were accompanied by intra-firm competition of some 
kind. The aspect of ‘dynamic capabilities’ (Teece & Pisano, 1994) is exemplified by gradually 
reducing responsibilities of the focal subsidiary in Singapore. 
Further supporting this view, the US subsidiary in case #8 that currently possesses regional HQ 
status for the Americas region may be reduced to an MNC unit with cross-border sales and ser-
vice responsibilities for Central and North America. As a potential reason, corporate management 
stated the current establishment of production facilities in Brazil that are aimed towards develop-
ing network positions in the entire region of South America. Even though the US subsidiary is 
also equipped with its own production facilities and should therefore exhibit similar degrees of 
MNC network relevance, CSA superiority of the subordinate Brazilian subsidiary for South 
America may cause regional shifting of cross-border responsibilities. The observed unbundling 
processes for regional HQ mandates very much correspond to findings of Kähäri et al. (2010). In 
their longitudinal study about Finnish MNCs, Kähäri et al. (2010) not only documented numer-
ous declining and dissolving regional HQ mandates but also identified host and target market 
growth as key drivers of mandate evolution. Based on their observations they found that regional 
HQ mandates have a rather temporary character, which coincides with case observations of the 
study at hand. 
While cases #7 and #8 have shown that modified MNC strategy in the form of increasing degrees 
of localization in the covered area is likely to put regional HQ mandates at risk, case #5 shows 
that increased localization in the host market may strengthen the sustainability of cross-border 
subsidiary mandates. Following the establishment of local production facilities that only allowed 
the Chinese subsidiary to obtain its regional HQ status, the parent company is now planning to 
turn it into one of the firm’s leading sourcing platforms. In addition, it expects to add additional 
subsidiaries under the umbrella of the regional HQ mandate, which would further extend the 
functional scope of the mandate. The outlook reveals two interesting aspects. First, it demon-
strates that cross-border subsidiary mandates may refer to foreign market development or out-
ward internationalization as well as foreign sourcing activities or inward internationalization 
(Welch & Luostarinen, 1993). Second, increasing degrees of host market localization are likely to 
add to the sustainability of cross-border subsidiary mandates. 
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Overall, the evolution of cross-border subsidiary mandates appears to equally exhibit elements of 
gradualism and discontinuity (Araujo & Rezende, 2003). It further seems that mandate evolution 
is largely driven by altering external and internal relationships of foreign subsidiaries (Johanson 
& Mattsson, 1988; Forsgren et al, 2005) as well as top-down MNC strategies with regard to the 
externalization, localization and integration of foreign market operations (Martinez & Jarillo, 
1991). As a result, the level of subsidiary influence on mandate development is likely to be rela-
tively limited. In fact, marginal localization degrees in the host market and pronounced localiza-
tion degrees in the covered area may impede foreign subsidiaries from reaching higher levels of 
cross-border responsibilities or cause mandate decline or loss respectively. In addition, corporate 
immune systems (Birkinshaw & Ridderstråle, 1999) can lead to truncated or reversed evolution-
ary paths from the very start. Varying risk levels at the parent company are due to present princi-
pal-agent relationships (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) likely to accompany any form of mandate 
change (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977) and seem to be crucial in the internationalization process at 
any MNC level (Figueira-de-Lemos et al., 2011).  
Nonetheless, local subsidiary managers may contribute to mandate sustainability by adequately 
transforming host-market-related CSAs into subsidiary-related FSAs (Rugman & Verbeke, 1992) 
in the form of enhanced network insidership (Johanson & Vahlne, 2009). A foreign subsidiary 
can thereby prove its ability to reduce or eliminate liability of inter-regional foreignness (Rugman 
& Verbke, 2007). Higher stages of mandate evolution further appear to entail increased levels of 
intra-firm competition (Galunic & Eisenhardt, 1996) for cross-border responsibilities. While ex-
ternal networks may strengthen the subsidiary’s position in the resulting bargaining process, its 
overall MNC relevance for product and production development appears to be decisive (Anders-
son et al., 2007). While distinct subsidiary capabilities can therefore be seen as the engine of 
mandate evolution (Birkinshaw, 1996), the impact of top-down MNC strategy in setting the 
breeding ground for capability development needs to be taken into consideration for the topic of 
subsidiary internationalization. This view is supported by a majority of mandate alterations, 
which are initiated from corporate managers rather than local subsidiary personnel. In sum, cross-
border subsidiary mandates not only seem to be highly receptive to change but in contrast to their 
host market equivalents also appear to be of temporary nature and potentially limited in their 
lifespan from the very start.  
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5.3.4. Mandate lifecycle 
When combining case study findings for initial mandate gains and subsequent developments, a 
relatively robust lifecycle framework for subsidiary internationalization emerges that will be de-
tailed in this final part of the chapter. Throughout the process of contrasting observed mandate 
lifecycle patterns with confirming and conflicting literature, the work of Johanson and Vahlne 
(1977, 2009), Rugman and Verbeke (1992, 2007), Birkinshaw (1996), Galunic and Eisenhardt 
(1996), Birkinshaw and Ridderstråle (1999), Araujo and Rezende (2003), Forsgren et al. (2005), 
Andersson et al. (2007) and Figueira-de-Lemos et al. (2011) proved to be of particular relevance 
to the study at hand. In fact, only the selective combination of findings from these academic piec-
es allowed a lifecycle approach to be applied to the topic of cross-border subsidiary mandates.  
One of the key outcomes of the last two sections is that only a few foreign subsidiaries appear to 
actually obtain cross-border responsibilities. In turn, only a limited number of these seem to be 
able to add substantial functional scopes to initially obtained foreign market mandates. Finally, 
foreign subsidiaries that eventually fulfill HQ-like functions in a region are likely to be exposed 
to severe intra-MNC competition that may erode the existing mandate over time. Any lifecycle 
framework therefore needs to be capable of accounting for the select and temporary nature of 
subsidiary mandates beyond host market borders while simultaneously providing answers to 
highly heterogeneous evolution paths. Precisely, a lifecycle framework needs to explain why the 
majority of subsidiaries are unlikely to obtain cross-border responsibilities (host market specialist 
or prisoner), why cross-border mandates generally remain functionally restrained and decline or 
dissolve over time (foreign market pioneer), why only a few MNC units hold significant regional 
influence (empowered regional headquarters) and why regional HQ statuses often fall apart in the 
course of time (falling regional star). The challenge is summarized in Figure 5-15 below.  
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Figure 5-15: Challenges for a lifecycle perspective of cross-border subsidiary mandates 
 
Figure 5-15 further reveals three critical points where (1) official cross-border responsibility is 
granted or denied, where (2) regional HQ status is obtained or rejected and where (3) regional 
HQ mandates start to decline or dissolve. The weight of evolutionary paths as outlined in the fig-
ure finally indicates that the majority of foreign subsidiaries are excluded from cross-border re-
sponsibilities and that local subsidiary management only rarely benefits from regional HQ man-
dates. It should be noted that the study at hand does not provide any information about how long 
a foreign subsidiary may rest in one of the evolutionary phases. In fact, case study observations 
indicate that time intervals differ from one case to another. In addition, it is acknowledged and 
observed in the case sample that a subsidiary may leapfrog certain evolutionary phases or start at 
stages other than the initial one. Both aspects were already observed for internationalization pro-
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As previously elaborated, evolutionary paths of cross-border subsidiary mandates contain four 
core process drivers or restrictions:  
 The level of market and business network attractiveness outside the subsidiary’s host 
market borders that influences the overall MNC commitment to a particular foreign mar-
ket or region and thus the degree of localization or chosen market entry form 
 The distinctiveness of host-market-related CSAs and subsidiary-related FSAs that fixes 
the positioning of foreign subsidiaries in the ‘perpetual bargaining process’ (Andersson et 
al., 2007) for foreign market responsibilities across the MNC 
 The recognition and active exploitation of distinctive CSAs and FSAs that is necessary 
for any form of mandate evolution (Blankenburg Holm et al., 2009) and that is largely 
shaped by the MNC’s ‘corporate immune system’ (Birkinshaw & Ridderstråle, 1999). 
Critical for passing through this system is whether the level of risk that corporate man-
agement attributes to cross-border subsidiary responsibilities is perceived to be lower than 
for traditional market development or subsidiary management approaches. The outcome is 
largely shaped by ethnocentrism, suspicion of the unknown and resistance to change 
among corporate managers, who generally “prefer to work within existing routines, throw 
their support behind low-risk projects, and resist ideas that challenge their own power 
base” (Birkinshaw & Ridderstråle, 1999: 154)  
 The existence of competitive forces across the MNC (Galunic & Eisenhardt, 1996) that 
lead to a continuous surveillance of the subsidiary’s suitability for the specific task.  
Evolutionary drivers and restrictions are summarized in Figure 5-16 below. 
Figure 5-16: Drivers and restrictions in the evolutionary path of cross-border subsidiary mandates 
 
According to the illustration, foreign subsidiaries only benefit from official cross-border respon-
sibility if the top-down MNC strategy shows minimum levels of localization in the target area, if 
the subsidiary exhibits host-market-related CSAs that are distinct and thus superior to elsewhere 
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in the organization and if the MNC’s corporate immune system allows for opportunity-
identification and pursuit as well as a decentralized opportunity exploitation. If only one of the 
requirements is not fulfilled, the subsidiary’s business operations are likely to remain host-
market-orientated. Following an initial mandate gain, local subsidiary management may benefit 
from further mandate extension if the degree of localization in the target market is maintained or 
augmented, if the subsidiary achieves a distinct value-proposition for foreign market develop-
ment by leveraging host-market-related CSAs for the development of region-bound FSAs and if 
added responsibility scopes do not interfere with the MNC’s corporate immune system. If only 
one of the requirements is not fulfilled the focal subsidiary is likely to experience stagnating, de-
clining or dissolving cross-border mandates. Finally, preconditions for obtaining regional HQ 
status are significantly increased localization degrees in the form of company presence in the 
target area, distinct subsidiary capabilities for cross-border market and subsidiary management 
and an MNC-wide tolerance for the construct. Again, if only one of the requirements is not ful-
filled the focal subsidiary is likely to experience stagnating, declining or dissolving foreign mar-
ket responsibilities. If a foreign subsidiary reaches advanced stages of mandate evolution, its in-
tra-MNC competitive positioning is decisive for responsibility extension, preservation or decline.  
Evolutionary paths of cross-border subsidiary mandates as illustrated above allow a four-fold 
typology of foreign subsidiaries, which marks the end of this chapter. The dimensions of the 2x2 
matrix encompass the relative intra-MNC value-proposition of a foreign subsidiary for the devel-
opment of a particular foreign market or region and the MNC’s overall degree of localization in 
the same area. The individual value-proposition of a foreign sub-unit may refer to its host-
market-related CSAs like geographical proximity or cultural similarities alone or to a combina-
tion with its subsidiary-related FSAs in the form of network insidership or subsidiary manage-
ment capabilities. The MNC’s overall degree of localization in the target area may in turn relate 
to any market entry form from indirect exports up to affiliated units with their own production 
facilities. It should be noted that in addition to the two dimensions, mandate evolution is further 
influenced by the corporate immune system. As observed in the case sample and highlighted by 
the difficulty of identifying subsidiary internationalization in numerous MNCs, it strongly im-
pacts whether foreign subsidiaries may obtain cross-border mandates in the first place and wheth-
er they can obtain regional HQ status. Based on the matrix the following four subsidiary types for 
foreign market development emerge that are outlined in Figure 5-17 below: (1) host market spe-
cialist / prisoner; (2) foreign market pioneer; (3) empowered regional HQ; (4) falling regional star.  
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Figure 5-17: Subsidiary typology for cross-border responsibilities 
  
Foreign subsidiaries are therefore likely to be host-market-specialized or limited if they exhibit a 
relatively low MNC positioning on the basis of host-market-related CSAs and subsidiary-related 
FSAs and if the MNC commitment is relatively low for the territory in focus, i.e. without local 
company presence. The dual use of the terms host market prisoner and host market specialist was 
deliberately chosen as a significant number of MNC units are likely not to consider or strive for 
foreign market responsibility (host market specialist) and only selected subsidiaries as observed 
in cases #10a and #10b actually seek and fail to obtain cross-border reach (host market prisoner). 
If local subsidiary management can rely on a distinct value-proposition for market development 
outside its host market borders and if the degree of MNC localization in these markets is still rel-
atively low, it may benefit from a ‘pioneering’ foreign market mandate. Even if parameters are 
set in this way, however, foreign market responsibility may still be impeded by the corporate 
immune system that can equally cause a lack of opportunity-identification and initiative-taking at 
either MNC level or resistance to change based on behavioral traits of corporate managers. 
If the overall MNC strategy results in enhanced localization degrees in the form of company 
presence in the target market, the primary precondition for the setting up of regional headquarters 
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is fulfilled. Nonetheless, in order to turn into an empowered regional HQ, local subsidiary man-
agement further needs to exhibit distinct capabilities for cross-border subsidiary management and 
the process must not be inhibited by the corporate immune system. Finally, once a regional HQ 
construct is established, a foreign subsidiary is automatically exposed to direct competition with 
the subordinate subsidiary in the target region. If, as a result of increasing localization degrees in 
the target area, the focal subsidiary loses the distinctiveness of capabilities it is prone to experi-
encing declining or dissolving regional HQ mandates. The Singaporean subsidiary in case #7 
exemplifies the fall of a regional star as it was forced to cede its China mandate to the parent 
company and responsibility for Northeast Asia to its subordinate subsidiary in China. Moreover, 
it is likely to further lose responsibility for India once local production facilities and business 
networks are well established.  
The filing of the ten subsidiaries that were analyzed in the course of the study in the above 2x2 
matrix further proves the robustness of the overall construct. The French subsidiary in cases #10a 
and #10b clearly represents a host-market prisoner as it strives for extended geographical reach 
but lacks distinct CSAs that would make corporate management consider a departure from tradi-
tional market development approaches. In addition, subsidiaries in those MNCs that were con-
tacted at the offset of the study and that did not reveal any form of decentralized market devel-
opment or failed local requests for cross-border responsibilities may represent host market spe-
cialists. Subsidiaries in cases #2, #3, #4, #6 and #9 are foreign market pioneers that are impeded 
from reaching regional HQ statuses as a result of lacking subsidiary capabilities and/or counter-
vailing forces from the corporate immune system. The Chinese and the US subsidiary in cases #5 
and #8 clearly represent empowered regional headquarters of which the former is likely to main-
tain this status on the basis of its distinct value-proposition while the latter may turn into a falling 
regional star if it loses the distinctiveness of capabilities to its subordinate subsidiary in Brazil. 
Finally, the Singaporean subsidiary in case #7 already embodies the falling regional star as it had 
lost regional mandate to its Chinese counterpart and is likely to suffer from further responsibility 
decline in India.  
It is acknowledged that the elaboration of this subsidiary typology is based on a relatively small 
number of cases. In addition, none of these findings have been verified by quantitative empirical 
analyses. Finally, the significant impact of the corporate immune system pinpoints the restrained 
suitability of the dimensions relative value-proposition and the MNC’s overall commitment to the 
target market. Nonetheless, the easiness of placing ten subsidiaries in the framework and explain-
ing their historic and current positioning indicates that the matrix may be of relevance for further 
studies of the topic.   
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6. Conclusion 
6.1. Contribution to IB theory 
This study contributes to the relatively unexplored research field (Blankenburg Holm et al., 2009) 
of internationalization processes of foreign subsidiaries in several ways. Overall, the findings 
allow a first dynamic view of drivers and restrictions in the process of subsidiary internationaliza-
tion and in evolutionary paths of cross-border subsidiary mandates. By accounting for multiple 
embeddedness of foreign subsidiaries (Forsgren et al., 2005) and the competition for corporate 
marketplace (Galunic & Eisenhardt, 1996), both horizontally versus the parent company and ver-
tically versus other MNC units, the study helps explain the effects of the increasing complexity of 
contemporary MNCs.  
On the one hand, multiple cases of subsidiary internationalization show many similarities with 
internationalization processes of the first degree, in particular the mélange of evolutionary (Jo-
hanson & Vahlne, 1977) and revolutionary (Macharzina & Engelhard, 1991) process elements as 
well as the superordinate role of network positions (Johanson & Mattson, 1988). On the other 
hand, the study reveals a set of fundamental process differences and particularities. First of all, 
subsidiary internationalization may initially refer to a transfer of existing responsibilities or char-
ters (Birkinshaw & Hood, 1998) from one MNC unit to another and does not necessarily relate to 
increasing foreign market presence of a firm (Welch & Luostarinen, 1988). In addition, cross-
border reach of foreign subsidiaries appears to be a select MNC phenomenon, as factors within 
and outside the subsidiary’s scope of operations determine its suitability for the specialized role. 
Moreover, subsidiary internationalization is likely to be accompanied by geographically and in-
stitutionally dispersed loci of knowledge gathering and exploitation (Tallman & Chacar, 2011). 
Finally, subsidiary internationalization is characterized by additional risk elements largely driven 
by the principal–agent relationship (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) between corporate and local sub-
sidiary management. 
In addition to identifying particular process elements of subsidiary internationalization, the study 
extends the home and host market applicability of CSAs (Rugman & Verbeke, 1992) into third 
markets without company presence. Developing the transnational solution (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 
1989), it thereby grants host-market-related CSAs a critical role at the offset of subsidiary inter-
nationalization, as their expression, relative to other MNC units, qualifies foreign subsidiaries for 
or excludes them from cross-border participation. They are thus capable of equipping foreign 
subsidiaries with unique MNC positioning to overcome ‘liability of outsidership and foreignness’ 
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(Johanson & Vahlne, 2009) in general and ‘liability of inter-regional foreignness’ (Rugman & 
Verbeke, 2007) in particular. 
In order to reflect on process particularities and additional risk parameters witnessed in the course 
of subsidiary internationalization, the study, taking a corporate HQ perspective, manages to sub-
divide the original risk formula for internationalization processes (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977) into 
internal and external uncertainty about the focal subsidiary’s capabilities and the market respec-
tively. It further splits the MNC’s overall market commitment in the course of subsidiary interna-
tionalization into internal commitment, i.e. the degree of responsibility delegation to local subsid-
iary management, and external commitment, i.e. the degree of localization in a foreign market. 
Case findings further reveal that corporate management can influence internal uncertainty levels 
by implementing risk-reducing measures (O’Donnell, 2000), for example through the installing 
of expatriates at foreign subsidiaries, and that maximum tolerable risk levels may rise with in-
creasing internationalization experience and subsidiary involvement across the organization 
(Birkinshaw & Ridderstråle, 1999).  
Building on the concept of corporate marketplaces (Galunic & Eisenhardt, 1996), case study find-
ings indicate that corporate management opts for a decentralized market development if a foreign 
subsidiary, based on its host-market-related CSAs and subsidiary-related FSAs, is best suited 
across the MNC to grow business networks in a third market. In order to illustrate this aspect of 
subsidiary internationalization the study extends the risk formula of the original IP model (Johan-
son & Vahlne, 1977). It is demonstrated that the total risk level associated with subsidiary inter-
nationalization as the product of internal and external market uncertainty and commitment is 
thereby equal or less to the equivalent for traditional market development from the parent com-
pany. At the offset of subsidiary internationalization, particular subsidiary characteristics in the 
form of host-market-related CSAs alone seem to allow local subsidiary management to reach 
beyond host market borders. On the basis of recent visualizations of risk parameters in the origi-
nal IP model (Figueira-de-Lemos et al., 2011), varying risk levels in the course of subsidiary in-
ternationalization are also graphically illustrated in the study at hand.  
In addition to providing a first explanation of ‘where’, ‘how’ and ‘why’ subsidiary internationali-
zation commences in modern MNCs, the study further offers a glance into internationalization 
trajectories of foreign subsidiaries. One of the key study contributions here is that evolutionary 
paths of cross-border subsidiary mandates are not limited to elements of gradualism (Johanson & 
Vahlne, 1977) but equally unfold in discontinuous ways (Araujo & Rezende, 2003). While local 
subsidiary management may contribute to mandate sustainability or even extension by develop-
ing FSAs in the form of cross-border knowledge and business networks on the basis of host-
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market-related CSAs (Rugman & Verbeke, 2005), it may be faced with declining or dissolving 
cross-border responsibility despite proving local resources to corporate management. In addition, 
while some subsidiaries are able to grow foreign market responsibilities up to a regional HQ sta-
tus, others experience truncations in their evolutionary paths as they are not able to reach similar 
responsibility scopes. In fact, some foreign market mandates appear to have a limited lifespan 
from their very start as they are expected to fulfill market pioneering groundwork that is to be 
continued by corporate headquarters or other MNC units at a later stage. 
By combining literature for internationalization processes and MNC strategy as suggested by 
Araujo and Rezende (2003), the study further leverages resource-based views of the firm (Teece 
& Pisano, 1994) in order to explain the aforementioned elements of gradualism and discontinuity 
in internationalization trajectories of foreign subsidiaries. It shows that increasing relevance of 
external business networks in the area covered by the subsidiary mandate may stimulate increas-
ing market commitment at corporate level (Johanson & Mattsson, 1998). Case findings further 
highlight that if local subsidiary management adequately uses its host-market-related CSAs in 
order to obtain cross-border network insidership (Rugman & Verbeke, 1992), it is likely to bene-
fit from gradually increasing foreign market responsibility. Distinct subsidiary capabilities as a 
catalyst for mandate preservation or extension (Birkinshaw, 1996) are therefore also noticeable 
for foreign market mandates of foreign subsidiaries.  
Case findings further show that if the MNC significantly increases the localization degree in the 
covered area, i.e. by establishing local company presence, the degree of integration of activities 
across borders is likely to be affected (Martinez & Jarillo, 1991). Distinct subsidiary capabilities 
appear to be decisive for the direction of mandate evolution but access to these capabilities is 
restrained by the localization degree in the subsidiary’s host market. Only subsidiaries that are, 
based on local value-add, able to develop HQ-like capabilities (Lehrer & Asakawa, 1999) are 
eligible for regional HQ status. Others are likely to face mandate decline or loss. If at some stage 
localization degrees in the covered area surpass their equivalent in the subsidiary’s host market, 
mandate sustainability is equally at risk. Mechanisms of the corporate marketplace (Galunic & 
Eisenhardt, 1996) are then likely to shift cross-border responsibilities from the focal subsidiary to 
its previously subordinate sister subsidiary. By highlighting the impact of MNC configuration 
strategies on the evolution of cross-border subsidiary mandates, the study explains limited influ-
ence of foreign subsidiaries on their internationalization trajectories, which largely contradicts the 
findings of other studies on mandate evolution (e.g. Birkinshaw, 1996; Birkinshaw & Hood, 
1998). 
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Finally, the study contributes to IB research by drawing a robust evolutionary path for subsidiary 
mandates in foreign markets and by highlighting critical points where mandates may be extended, 
reduced or eventually lost. It thereby further comes up with a four-fold typology of foreign sub-
sidiary roles for cross-border responsibilities based on the dimensions of relative value-
proposition and degrees of localization in the covered area. The process impact of corporate im-
mune systems (Birkinshaw & Ridderstråle, 1999) causing inaction for or rejection of cross-
border reaching by foreign subsidiaries as a result of behavioral traits of MNC stakeholders is 
equally taken into consideration here. 
Several IB scholars touched upon the aspect of altering cross-border subsidiary mandates and the 
potentially temporary nature of this construct. This study, however, stretches beyond earlier find-
ings in four dimensions. First, by looking at HQ-driven as well as subsidiary-driven mandate 
change, it accounts for the multiple embeddedness of modern MNCs (Forsgren et al., 2005) and 
so contributes to earlier studies that were limited to subsidiary initiatives and thus subsidiary-
driven mandate change (e.g. Birkinshaw, 1997). Second, by looking at positive and negative 
mandate evolution, the study adds a perspective to earlier scientific work in this field (e.g. 
Birkinshaw & Hood, 1998) that was limited to understanding how subsidiaries can advance in 
their evolutionary path. Third, the study deals with various types of cross-border subsidiary re-
sponsibilities and is therefore not limited to regional HQ functions as analyzed by Kähäri et al. 
(2010). Finally, in contrast to Birkinshaw (1996), the study at hand truly applies a lifecycle per-
spective to the topic of altering cross-border responsibilities as it looks at the initial mandate gain, 
subsequent mandate evolutions as well as current outlooks on future mandate development.  
6.2. Managerial implications 
The study of subsidiary internationalization processes and evolutionary paths of cross-border 
subsidiary mandates offers a set of interesting implications for corporate and subsidiary manage-
ment alike. Among these, the mere possibility of systematically tapping foreign subsidiaries for 
the obtaining of increased or intensified global reach clearly stands out. None of the seven inves-
tigated MNCs have revealed a truly structured approach towards setting the geographical spheres 
of influence for their foreign sub-units and towards attributing functional scopes to cross-border 
subsidiary mandates. In fact, the decision of corporate management to select decentralized market 
development approaches or to modify existing subsidiary mandates often appears to be more the 
result of incidental occurrences than of thorough consideration. In addition, local subsidiary man-
agement does not seem to be fully aware of its intra-MNC competitive advantage for obtaining 
network insidership beyond host market borders. 
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The study clearly shows that there are situations in which a decentralized market development 
approach constitutes a viable option for the MNC. This can be due to significantly varying geo-
graphic and/or psychic distances between the target market and the parent company’s home and 
the foreign subsidiary’s host market respectively. In addition to favorable host-market-related 
CSAs, a foreign subsidiary may be equipped with distinct capabilities like language skills or for-
eign market knowledge embodied in its local personnel and not found elsewhere in the organiza-
tion. Finally, temporary resource constraints in the corporate HQ and/or excessive staffing levels 
at foreign sub-units may suggest the leveraging of local resources beyond host market borders. 
Acknowledging the multitude of occasions in which corporate management may consider decen-
tralized market development approaches, a more structured approach towards this form of firm 
internationalization seems appropriate. 
In the course of mid- to long-term planning, for example, corporate management is well advised 
not only to prioritize target regions and to allocate resources accordingly but also to evaluate 
which MNC units are capable of contributing to the overall goal. Some markets may not suggest 
increasing localization degrees in the near future but still embody significant potential for the 
future. Assuming existing company presence with favorable host-market-related CSAs and/or 
subsidiary-related FSAs for any of these markets, the use of local resources for obtaining initial 
foreign market knowledge and business networks represents an attractive option without imply-
ing significant delegation risks. At the same time, corporate management could avoid local sub-
sidiary management settling for routine host market operations within existing business networks, 
thus ensuring a constant sharpening of subsidiary capabilities. In order to minimize risks resulting 
from host market negligence, parent companies could set clear targets for traditional and new 
market development and could incentivize subsidiary managers accordingly. 
While previous illustrations mainly relate to initial or small-scale forms of subsidiary internation-
alization, corporate management is also likely to benefit from an adequate anticipation of neces-
sary regional HQ structures that are related to subsidiary internationalization. Certain regions 
may, due to their mere size and growth, undoubtedly require the setting up of more than one for-
eign sub-unit in the future. If regional characteristics like comparable customer needs or cultural 
similarities strongly suggest the management of smaller sub-units from a regional HQ rather than 
from the parent company, the gradual upgrading of subsidiary capabilities for HQ-like functions 
seems appropriate. In order to fully benefit from decentralized market development approaches, 
corporate management is therefore not only required to identify subsidiaries suitable for cross-
border reach but also to steer and accompany internationalization trajectories of foreign subsidi-
aries in accordance with the firm’s overall strategic goals. 
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Finally, local subsidiary managers are likely to greatly benefit from a more proactive approach 
towards subsidiary internationalization. In addition to obtaining increased visibility among corpo-
rate management and enhanced positioning in the MNC as a whole, cross-border market partici-
pation may also enable them to develop capabilities and obtain resources for which their access is 
restrained on the basis of host market operations. This specifically refers to the offset of cross-
border responsibility, as subsequent mandate development is increasingly subject to the MNC’s 
overall configuration strategy. Local managers could therefore make their parent company aware 
of the subsidiary’s suitability for foreign market development by either highlighting the distinc-
tiveness of host-market-related CSAs and/or subsidiary-related FSAs for this particular task or by 
demonstrating initial results on the basis of unofficial trials. In any case, cross-border reaching 
amplifies the opportunities of any foreign subsidiary to contribute to the success of the MNC and 
should therefore be actively pursued by local management.   
6.3. Limitations and suggestions for further research 
As with any study, there are certain limitations. The topic of subsidiary internationalization repre-
sents a relatively unexplored research field (Blankenburg Holm et al., 2009), so the author opted 
for an exploratory research approach in the form of multiple case studies. Despite the suitability 
of the selected research design for developing explanatory middle range theory in the field of 
subsidiary internationalization and the evolution of cross-border subsidiary mandates and the 
exploitation of all methodological anchors for the selected approach (e.g. Eisenhardt, 1989b; 
Pauwels & Matthyssens, 2004), the study is subject to all legitimate criticisms associated with 
qualitative research in general and case study analysis in particular. As limited degrees of gener-
alizability (Yin, 2009) mark the most significant limitation of the study, it seems appropriate to 
elaborate on some of the aspects in more detail. 
The case sample of subsidiary internationalization processes limits the possibility to generalize 
from study findings for two particular reasons. First, only MNCs with a parent company location 
in Western Europe were analyzed in the course of the study. Even though the investigator me-
thodically approached also Asian and American MNCs at the offset of the research undertaking, 
firms were either reluctant to participate or did not reveal any forms of subsidiary internationali-
zation. Second, the case companies are exclusively from the manufacturing industries sector. This 
form of homogeneity is primarily the result of existing contacts of the investigator from his prior 
consultancy work, which significantly facilitated the process of talking to relevant MNC stake-
holders and identifying cases of subsidiary internationalization while simultaneously limiting 
risks of misinterpretations by the investigator due to a lack of industry knowledge (Yin, 2009). 
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Nonetheless, any future research in this field should also involve MNCs from outside Europe and 
outside manufacturing sectors in order to contribute to the generalizability of findings. 
Having mentioned the lack of case sample heterogeneity with regard to parent company location 
and industry belonging, the study is further limited to wholly-owned subsidiaries as well as to 
subsidiaries with a predominately market-seeking objective. While this limitation was deliberate-
ly chosen in order to reduce complexity drivers for this unexplored research topic, it would be 
interesting to know to what extent other subsidiary types (e.g. cooperative forms like joint ven-
tures) or subsidiary objectives (e.g. resource-seeking) lead to confirming or contrasting findings.  
In addition to a lack of generalizability, the study is also characterized by three methodological 
shortfalls. First, out of 36 initiatives the case sample only reveals three initiatives with a negative 
outcome, for example with corporate management’s rejection of a subsidiary request for extended 
geographical reach. Even though the investigator, in addition to cases #10a and #10b, explicitly 
sought negative examples for initial mandate gains or subsequent mandate developments 
throughout the case sampling process, MNC stakeholders were either unaware of or reluctant to 
speak about failed petitions. A failure or unwillingness to speak about rejected initiatives may 
explain the only limited success in identifying negative examples. Future studies of this phenom-
enon would be highly relevant to the topic as they could add clarity to countervailing forces or 
corporate immune systems (Birkinshaw & Ridderstråle, 1999) as well as altering risk levels asso-
ciated with subsidiary internationalization. This limitation could clearly be mitigated by the use 
of real-time observations but they are likely to fail due to time and resource constraints among 
investigators as well as among stakeholders from participating companies.  
The second methodological concern for this study relates to a lack of perspectives from MNC 
units other than the parent company and the focal subsidiary. It actually challenges the study’s 
aim to provide a truly holistic MNC view on the topic of internationalization of the second degree. 
Even though the incorporation of two perspectives already marks a clear strength of this study, 
selected exchange with other subsidiaries involved in shifting cross-border responsibilities could 
provide meaningful insights into competitive forces in the corporate marketplace (Galunic & Ei-
senhardt, 1996) for the topic at hand. It is not necessary to involve all subsidiaries of an MNC in 
a study about the intra-MNC transfer of foreign market mandates, but a selected extension of the 
viewpoints would clearly contribute to the topic. Finally, limited identification of subsidiary in-
ternationalization processes at numerous MNCs was interpreted as an indication that cross-border 
reaching of foreign subsidiaries represents a select MNC phenomenon and that only a limited 
number of foreign subsidiaries actually benefit from this type of mandate. While highlighting this 
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aspect undoubtedly contributed to the study, it is by no means empirically backed and needs to be 
examined through additional studies in the future. 
Overall, the study findings offer many interesting departure points for future research. First of all, 
interesting aspects of subsidiary internationalization like the potentially select and temporary na-
ture of cross-border subsidiary mandates should be further investigated. Special attention should 
thereby be drawn to MNCs that do not exhibit any form of subsidiary responsibilities beyond 
host market borders despite being highly internationalized. What hinders local management from 
enhanced territorial reach and to what extent do outlined corporate immune systems impede sub-
sidiary internationalization? The study has further shown that foreign market responsibilities of 
foreign subsidiaries strongly vary in their functional scope, ranging from pioneering market sur-
veillance to complex steering of other entities in the region. Future research should study in more 
detail the alignment of regional subsidiary mandates with overall MNC strategies. Recent work 
of Alfoldi, Clegg and McGaughey (2012) that differentiated between regional HQ functions and 
regional management mandates could serve as a solid starting point in this context. 
The focus of future studies in the field of subsidiary internationalization should generally be set 
on testing the outlined middle range theory by quantitative analysis. The measurement of risk 
alterations associated with subsidiary internationalization offers a good starting point. In addition, 
a better understanding of efficiency variations for centralized and decentralized market develop-
ment approaches, e.g. the benefits of host-market-related CSAs, would not only significantly con-
tribute to IB research but could also have pronounced practical relevance. Finally, the impact of 
MNC strategies with regards to localization degrees in the subsidiary’s host market and covered 
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8. Appendix 
8.1. Interview guideline 
The following guideline was sent to each interviewee prior to the exchange and was used 
throughout the conduction of the semi-structured interviews. While the guideline allowed the 
interviewee to prepare for the discussion and the interviewer to structure his questions it did not 
seek to limit interview findings by any means. At the end of each interview the interviewee was 
further asked to answer a set of questions using a Likert scale. However, as most interviewees 
were hesitant to provide answer in such form due to potential sanctions of any kind from other 
MNC stakeholders the outcome was not used for the study. It should be further noted that the 
interview focus shifted from one case to another as findings from earlier cases urged the investi-
gator to better understand certain aspects of subsidiary internationalization in the following cases. 
Interview guideline 
A. Description of the MNC and focal subsidiary 
Please provide a short overview about the MNC and subsidiary in focus (revenues, employees, 
geographical coverage, value-add, product range, organizational structure, inauguration date etc.). 
The aim of such introduction is to put the following case example into a larger context and to 
avoid potential misinterpretations. 
B. Description of the international business opportunity in focus 
Please provide a short overview about the selected case of subsidiary internationalization. The 
overview should encompass type of opportunity, relevant dates with regards to the opportunity 
(identification, enactment, and exploitation), involved stakeholders, level of investment and/or 
resource requirements as well as outcome and current status of the initiative.  
C. Identification of international business opportunity 
 
Chapter introduction 
This chapter of the interview focuses on the initial part of the initiative, the identification of the 
international business opportunity. An international business opportunity is thereby defined as a 
foreign subsidiary’s possibility to expand its operations encompassing all value chain elements 
(R&D, sourcing, production, sales, after sales etc.) beyond its original host market. For any type 
of market expansion operational responsibility needs to be taken by the focal subsidiary.  
Chapter questions 
1) Where was the international business opportunity identified (focal subsidiary, other MNC 
units, MNC headquarter, other)? 
2) How was the business opportunity for subsidiary internationalization identified? Please 
name the main drivers and potential restrictions throughout the identification process. 
3) To what extend did internal (other MNC units) and / or external stakeholders (customers, 
suppliers, regulators, competitors etc.) influence the identification process?  
D. Enactment of international business opportunity 
Chapter introduction 
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This chapter of the interview focuses on the activities that were initiated once the international 
business opportunity was identified. The question about how the opportunity was exchanged be-
tween involved MNC units is thereby of particular interest. 
Chapter questions 
4) Following the opportunity identification for subsidiary internationalization what next 
steps were initiated (business case calculation, trials etc.)? What role did the different 
stakeholders (focal subsidiary, other MNC units, MNC headquarter) take in this process?  
5) Had the focal subsidiary launched previous initiatives for market expansion? If yes, please 
comment on the nature and outcome of these initiative(s). If not, please state the reason 
for lacking prior initiatives. 
6) In general, do you believe that belonging to an MNC increases or decreases the proclivity 
of local management to act upon business opportunities outside the host market? 
E. Allocation of resources towards the identified business opportunity 
Chapter introduction 
This chapter of the interview focuses on the HQ decision to grant responsibility to the focal sub-
sidiary for exploitation of the identified business opportunity with or without additional resource 
demand. Understanding the headquarter reasoning for a decentralized market expansion strategy 
is thereby of particular interest. 
Chapter questions 
7) For what reason was the focal subsidiary mandated to exploit the opportunity as opposed 
to exploiting it centrally from the MNC headquarters? 
8) To what extend was the decision a result of a new headquarter strategy to maximize local 
resource exploitation as opposed to following a rather opportunistic approach?  
9) To what extend did the prevalence of country-specific advantages (culture, customer de-
mand, regulation, financial / tax-related matters etc.) of the focal subsidiary influence the 
decision-making process at headquarter level? 
10) Did the focal subsidiary depend on additional resources in order to exploit the identified 
international business opportunity? If yes, please state amount and type of resources that 
were requested and allocated. 
11) When reflecting on the process of responsibility allocation, what are key facilitators for 
subsidiaries to obtain foreign market responsibility? 
F. Exploitation of international business opportunities and outlook 
Chapter introduction 
This chapter of the interview focuses on the actual implementation and the outcome of the market 
expansion, including the level of headquarter involvement as well as the steps that were taken or 
are planned following the implementation 
Chapter questions 
12) How was the market expansion step prepared? To what extend was personnel from other 
MNC units (other MNC subsidiaries, MNC headquarters) involved in this process? To 
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what extend was experience from prior market expansions (1
st




13) How was the market expansion implemented? To what extend was personnel from other 
MNC units, including headquarters, involved? To what extend was experience from prior 
market expansions (1
st
 and / or 2
nd
 degree) leveraged? 
14) Do you view the implementation as a success or a failure? Please state the reasons for the 
outcome and steps that you would take differently given your current knowledge. 
15) Following the implementation what next steps were initiated by the focal subsidiary and / 
or responsible headquarter? What are current medium to long-term plans?  
